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Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Monsanto Company

The petition was denied and the Court of Appeals’ decision affirmed. Monsanto Company, as assignee of a Delaware corporation that supplied acrylic fibers to a Philippine buyer through a local indentor, was held not to be “doing business” in the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 1789 and its implementing rules. Consequently, the foreign corporation and its assignee retained capacity to sue under Section 133 of the Corporation Code. Alternatively, the defense of lack of capacity was barred by estoppel because the buyer had contracted with and received benefits from the foreign supplier.

Primary Holding

A foreign corporation that transacts business through a local indentor acting in its own name and for its own account is not deemed “doing business” in the Philippines under the applicable investment laws, and therefore retains the capacity to sue before Philippine courts. Even if such a corporation were considered to be doing business without a license, a Philippine entity that contracted with and benefited from it is estopped from challenging its capacity to sue.

Background

Monsanto International Sales Company (MISCO), a Delaware corporation, sold acrylic fibers to Philippine firm Continental Manufacturing Corporation (CMC) from 1978 to 1983. The sales were effected through a local indentor, Robert Lipton and Co., Inc. (Lipton). Payment was arranged by means of drafts drawn against acceptance. When CMC failed to pay the outstanding balance, MISCO filed a collection suit, naming as defendants CMC and Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), which was alleged to have co-accepted the drafts. The defendants raised MISCO’s lack of capacity to sue, asserting that the foreign corporation had been doing business in the Philippines without the required license.

History

  1. MISCO filed a complaint for sum of money against CMC and DBP on 31 July 1986 in the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City (Civil Case No. 53682). The complaint was later amended to substitute Monsanto Company as party-plaintiff.

  2. The RTC dismissed the complaint on 15 August 2006, finding that MISCO had been doing business in the Philippines without a license and therefore lacked capacity to sue under the Corporation Code. Counterclaims were likewise dismissed.

  3. Monsanto appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 88100). The CA reversed the RTC, holding that MISCO was not doing business and that in any case estoppel barred the defense. The case was remanded for decision on the merits.

  4. DBP’s motion for reconsideration was denied. DBP then filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Facts

  • Nature of the Transaction: MISCO sold acrylic fibers to CMC through Robert Lipton and Co., Inc., a Philippine-registered domestic corporation acting as an indentor. The arrangement worked as follows: Lipton would inquire if CMC wished to buy acrylic fiber; CMC would provide specifications, which Lipton relayed to MISCO; MISCO would quote a price inclusive of delivery and terms of payment; the transaction was documented by indent orders prepared in five copies and distributed to CMC, Lipton, and MISCO. Payment was by draft against acceptance.
  • The Unpaid Drafts: CMC failed to settle its obligations for five drafts aggregating US$1,417,980.89, leaving an unpaid balance of US$938,267.58. MISCO alleged that the drafts were co-accepted by DBP.
  • Defenses Raised: CMC admitted the obligation but contended MISCO was a foreign corporation doing business without a license and thus lacked capacity to sue; alternatively, CMC argued the manner of payment had been novated. DBP denied being a co-acceptor and likewise raised MISCO’s lack of capacity.
  • Substitution of Party-Plaintiff: MISCO was substituted by respondent Monsanto Company, its mother company and sole stockholder of record, as assignee of all receivables including the subject drafts. DBP did not oppose the substitution.
  • Lipton’s Independence: Lipton’s articles of incorporation listed its purpose as engaging in a general brokerage business, acting as an agent or broker in effecting sales of merchandise. Lipton represented multiple manufacturers worldwide. Its vice-president testified that Lipton earns commissions by bringing together buyers and foreign manufacturers and that it operates in its own name.
  • RTC Finding: The trial court found that MISCO, by selling through Lipton from 1978 to 1983, was transacting business in the Philippines without a license and thus lacked capacity to sue.
  • CA Finding: The appellate court held that Lipton was a bona fide independent indentor that transacted business in its own name and for its own account; therefore MISCO was not doing business in the Philippines. The CA also ruled that CMC was estopped from challenging MISCO’s capacity because it had admitted the obligation.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Applicable Law: DBP posited that the governing statute was Presidential Decree No. 1789 (the Omnibus Investments Act of 1981), not Republic Act No. 7042 which was enacted nearly a decade after the transactions. Under PD 1789, MISCO was doing business because it appointed a representative in the Philippines.
  • Lipton’s Lack of Independence: DBP argued that Lipton was not transacting in its own name and account; it functioned merely as a go-between with no authority to agree to supply terms for MISCO. The foreign supplier acted and transacted in its own behalf, which constituted doing business under the law.
  • Estoppel Inapplicable: DBP maintained that the doctrine of estoppel could not cure the jurisdictional lack of capacity. Moreover, DBP denied any participation in the transaction, contending it was not a party to the contract upon which estoppel could rest.

Arguments of the Respondents

  • Indentor Exclusion under PD 1789: Monsanto countered that under the implementing rules of PD 1789, a foreign corporation transacting through middlemen acting in their own names—specifically including indentors—is not deemed doing business in the Philippines. Lipton qualified as an independent indentor.
  • Estoppel Bars the Defense: Monsanto argued that CMC and DBP were estopped from questioning MISCO’s capacity because CMC had contracted with and received the benefits of the sales. Lipton’s independent status removed any bar to suit.

Issues

  • Definition of “Doing Business”: Whether MISCO, and its assignee Monsanto, were “doing business” in the Philippines without a license, thereby lacking capacity to sue under Section 133 of the Corporation Code, when the sales were made through the local indentor Lipton.
  • Estoppel: Whether the defendants were estopped from raising the lack of capacity to sue given that CMC admitted the obligation and benefited from the transactions.

Ruling

  • Definition of “Doing Business”: The capacity to sue was affirmed. Under Presidential Decree No. 1789, Article 65, and specifically Section 1(g) of its Implementing Rules and Regulations, a foreign firm that does business through middlemen acting in their own names—such as indentors, commercial brokers, or commission merchants—is not deemed “doing business” in the Philippines. The same exclusion is consistently carried through subsequent investment statutes, including Executive Order No. 226 and Republic Act No. 7042. An indentor, as defined in jurisprudence, is a middleman who brings about a sale between a foreign supplier and a local purchaser, acting as an agent of both parties. Precisely because the indentor transacts for its own account in the ordinary course of its brokerage business, the foreign supplier stands outside the statutory definition of doing business. Lipton was a registered domestic corporation engaged in general brokerage, representing various manufacturers, and earning commissions by connecting buyers and suppliers. The evidence showed that Lipton operated independently in its own name; DBP’s characterization of Lipton as a mere go-between did not negate that independence but rather confirmed the classic role of an indentor. The express exclusion of indentor transactions from the ambit of “doing business” under PD 1789’s IRR was controlling.
  • Estoppel: The alternative ground of estoppel was likewise sustained. A party who has contracted with and received benefits from a foreign corporation is estopped from subsequently challenging its capacity to sue, notwithstanding the license requirement in Section 133 of the Corporation Code. The doctrine applies equally to foreign corporations. CMC undisputedly contracted with and benefited from MISCO’s supply of acrylic fibers. DBP’s denial of participation was factual in nature and could not be resolved in the present petition; moreover, it was rendered immaterial by the principal ruling that MISCO and Monsanto were not doing business without a license. The question of Monsanto’s status as a real party-in-interest was likewise without merit: Monsanto was the sole stockholder and assignee of MISCO’s receivables, and in any event a defect in joinder of parties does not warrant outright dismissal of the complaint.

Doctrines

  • Definition of “Doing Business” — Indentor Rule — Under the IRR of PD 1789, a foreign corporation is not deemed doing business in the Philippines when it transacts through a middleman acting in its own name, such as an indentor, commercial broker, or commission merchant. An indentor is a middleman who, for compensation, brings about a purchase and sale of goods between a foreign supplier and a local purchaser and, as agent of both parties, transacts for its own account. The statutory exclusion has been consistently replicated in later investment codes, including RA 7042.
  • Estoppel to Deny Corporate Capacity of Foreign Corporation — A Philippine entity that contracts with and derives benefit from a foreign corporation is estopped from later asserting the foreign corporation’s lack of capacity to sue by reason of non-compliance with the license requirement. The principle applies both to domestic and foreign corporations and prevents a contracting party from taking advantage of noncompliance with regulatory statutes after receiving the benefits of the contract.

Key Excerpts

  • “An indentor is a middleman in the same class as commercial brokers and commission merchants. … an indentor may therefore be best described as one who, for compensation, acts as a middleman in bringing about a purchase and sale of goods between a foreign supplier and a local purchaser. From the language of Section 1(g) of the IRR of PD 1789 and the nature of the business of an indentor as described in Schmid, it can be concluded that when an indentor brings about a purchase and sale of goods between a foreign supplier and a local purchaser, as an agent of both parties, it is in contemplation of law transacting for its own account. Precisely because such is the business of an indentor as a middleman.”
  • “The rule is that a party is estopped to challenge the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. And the ‘doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to foreign as well as to domestic corporations;’ ‘one who has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin as a corporate entity is estopped to deny its corporate existence and capacity.’”

Precedents Cited

  • Schmid & Oberly, Inc. v. RJL Martinez Fishing Corp., 248 Phil. 727 (1988) — Followed; defined the nature and function of an indentor under Philippine law, holding that an indentor acting in its own name removes the foreign supplier from the coverage of “doing business” provisions.
  • Merrill Lynch Futures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97816, 24 July 1992 — Followed; articulated the doctrine that a party who deals with a foreign corporation is estopped to deny its corporate existence and capacity to sue.
  • Asia Banking Corporation v. Standard Products Co., 14 Phil. 222 (1924) — Cited as the early adoption of the estoppel doctrine applicable to foreign corporations.

Provisions

  • Section 133, Batasang Pambansa Blg. 68 (Corporation Code) — Prohibits unlicensed foreign corporations transacting business in the Philippines from maintaining suit in Philippine courts. Applied as the basic rule but subject to the definitional exclusions under investment laws and the doctrine of estoppel.
  • Article 65, Presidential Decree No. 1789 (Omnibus Investments Act of 1981) — Defines “doing business” to include appointing representatives domiciled in the Philippines and other acts implying commercial continuity. Applied; the definition was read together with its IRR.
  • Section 1(g), IRR of PD 1789 — Explicitly excludes from “doing business” transactions made through middlemen acting in their own names, such as indentors, commercial brokers, or commission merchants. Controlling in this case.
  • Section 3(d), Republic Act No. 7042 (Foreign Investments Act of 1991) — Reproduces the same exclusion for representatives transacting business in their own name and account. Cited as consistent with earlier law.
  • Section 9, Rule 3, Rules of Court — Non-joinder or misjoinder of parties does not warrant dismissal. Applied in rejecting the argument that Monsanto was not the real party-in-interest.

Notable Concurring Opinions

Chief Justice Gesmundo (Chairperson), Justice Hernando, and Justice Marquez concurred. Justice Rosario was on official leave.

Notable Dissenting Opinions

N/A — The decision was unanimous; no dissenting opinions were registered.