Department of Health vs. National Labor Relations Commission

The Civil Service Commission, not the National Labor Relations Commission, has jurisdiction over employment disputes involving employees of government agencies performing governmental functions. Government employees, including those of government hospitals such as the DJRMH, are governed by the Civil Service Law, rules, and regulations, and not by the Labor Code. Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and where none exists, no agreement of the parties can provide one; a decision rendered by a tribunal without jurisdiction is null and void.

The Dr. Jose N. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital (DJRMH), originally known as the Tala Leprosarium, was one of three leper colonies established under Commonwealth Act No. 161. It is maintained as a public medical center and health facility attached to the Department of Health, exercising strictly governmental functions relating to the management and control of Hansen's disease (leprosy). As a government agency, the DJRMH falls within the scope and coverage of the Civil Service Law pursuant to paragraph 1, Section 2, Article IX B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), and Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree of the Philippines). The Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency of the Government and the single arbiter of all contests relating to the civil service.

Private respondent Ceferino R. Laur was a patient of the then Tala Leprosarium (now Jose N. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital), having been admitted in 1951 for treatment of Hansen's disease, commonly termed leprosy. He was discharged in 1956 after being deemed cured of his affliction. In 1975, he was employed at the DJRMH as a patient-assistant by then Hospital Director Dr. Artemio F. Runez, upon the recommendation of the Barangay Captain of Tala. Specifically assigned as a member of the Patient-Assistant Police Force, he was accorded a compensation/salary initially in the amount of P110.00, which was gradually increased through the years depending upon the availability of funds. His salary was chargeable to the maintenance and operating expenses of the hospital.

On September 15, 1989, complaints for Alarm and Scandal, Oral Defamation, Grave Threats, Concealment of Deadly Weapon, Violation of the Code of Ethics of Policemen, and Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer were filed against private respondent, pursuant to a report made by his Chief of Police. Upon a finding of guilt of the aforesaid offenses, private respondent was meted the penalty of suspension for sixty (60) days, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same would result in his outright dismissal by petitioner Dr. Cesar J. Viardo in his capacity as Chief of Hospital.

On July 15, 1990, private respondent Laur got involved in the mauling of one Jake Bondoc, along with two policemen, Corporal Ferrer and Patrolman Berdon. Private respondent's account of the incident was that, while he and his companions were manning their posts at the hospital's Administration Building, a group of twelve young boys engaged another group of four male youngsters in a stone-throwing encounter, resulting in damage to the windows of the nearby Holy Rosary College. The caretaker of the college, Agustin Chan, while assessing the damage caused, was chased by the smaller group and threw stones at him. Chan ran and took refuge at the administration building where private respondent and the two policemen were on guard duty, at which point one of the policemen hit one of the stone throwers with a night stick.

A complaint filed by Jake Bondoc, one of the young boys, against private respondent and his companions provoked an investigation conducted on July 27, 1990, during which complainant Bondoc pointed to private respondent as the party responsible for his injuries even as Patrolman Berdon admitted to having hit Bondoc. On August 21, 1990, private respondent was dismissed by the Chief of Hospital, Dr. Cesar J. Viardo, per Office Order No. 101, s-90, on the basis of the Public Assistance Complaints Unit's (PACU) report/investigation finding private respondent and his companions to have indeed mauled Jake Bondoc. The two policemen were merely suspended.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in private respondent's favor, determining that private respondent was in truth an employee in contemplation of the Labor Code, the existence of an employer-employee relationship being evident from the fact that his work was necessary and desirable for the operation of the hospital, and that his dismissal was illegal because it was not for a just cause and was wanting in due process. The NLRC dismissed petitioners' appeal for failure to perfect the same on time. Petitioners then instituted the petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

• Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission: Petitioners contended that since the DJRMH is a government hospital, its employees are covered by Civil Service rules and regulations and not by the Labor Code; therefore, any controversy concerning the relationship between the employees and the hospital's administration comes under the jurisdiction of the Merit Systems Board and the Civil Service Commission.
• Lack of Jurisdiction of the NLRC: Petitioners argued that the NLRC and Labor Arbiter Cornelio L. Linsangan committed serious error and acted without jurisdiction when they took cognizance of the complaint filed by private respondent before the NLRC instead of the Civil Service Commission.

• Employer-Employee Relationship: The Labor Arbiter determined that private respondent was an employee in contemplation of the Labor Code, the existence of an employer-employee relationship being evident from the fact that private respondent's work is necessary and desirable for the operation of the hospital, and that his functions were beyond rehabilitative therapy.
• Illegality of Dismissal: The Labor Arbiter ruled that private respondent's dismissal was illegal because it was not for a just cause, the mauling incident not being sufficiently established, and the dismissal was wanting in due process for non-observance of the procedure prescribed under Sections 2, 5 and 6 of Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing B.P. Blg. 130.
• Estoppel: Private respondent argued that petitioners are estopped from assailing the respondent labor authorities' jurisdiction over the case because petitioners had earlier submitted themselves to said jurisdiction by virtue of their participation in all stages of the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, and that they failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction in the said proceedings.

• Jurisdiction over Government Employees: Whether the NLRC and Labor Arbiter Cornelio L. Linsangan committed serious error and acted without jurisdiction when they took cognizance of the complaint filed by private respondent before the NLRC instead of the Civil Service Commission.

• Jurisdiction over Government Employees: Yes. The NLRC and the Labor Arbiter acted without jurisdiction. The DJRMH, being a government hospital performing strictly governmental functions, falls within the scope and coverage of the Civil Service Law, and the Civil Service Commission is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the civil service. The Labor Code itself provides that the terms and conditions of employment of government employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules, and regulations.

• Jurisdiction over Government Employees: The Court found the petition to be impressed with merit. The DJRMH, originally known as the Tala Leprosarium, was one of three leper colonies established under Commonwealth Act No. 161, maintained to this day as a public medical center and health facility attached to the Department of Health, exercising strictly governmental functions relating to the management and control of the dreaded communicable Hansen's disease. As it is clearly an agency of the Government, the DJRMH falls well within the scope and/or coverage of the Civil Service Law in accordance with paragraph 1, Section 2, Article IX B of the 1987 Constitution and the provisions of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) and Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree of the Philippines). As the central personnel agency of the Government, the Civil Service Commission administers the Civil Service Law and is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the civil service. The discharge of this function was formerly lodged in the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), but with the issuance of Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 93-2387 on June 29, 1993, such appeals shall now be filed directly with the Civil Service Commission. The Labor Code itself provides that "the terms and conditions of employment of government employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations." Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and where there is none, no agreement of the parties can provide one. Consequently, it was incorrect for the respondent labor arbiter to have proceeded to hear the case simply because private respondent happened to lodge his complaint before his office, or to hold that petitioners are estopped from assailing the respondent labor authorities' jurisdiction simply because they participated in all stages of the proceedings. Considering that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void, the labor arbiter's finding of an employer-employee relationship and his order of payment of monetary claims are likewise null and should not be given effect.

• Jurisdiction over Government Employees — The Civil Service Commission, not the NLRC, has jurisdiction over contests relating to the civil service, including employment disputes involving employees of government agencies performing governmental functions. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the DJRMH, a government hospital performing strictly governmental functions, falls within the coverage of the Civil Service Law, and that the Labor Arbiter and NLRC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of private respondent's complaint.
• Jurisdiction is Conferred by Law — Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and where there is none, no agreement of the parties can provide one. The Court applied this principle in ruling that the labor arbiter incorrectly proceeded to hear the case simply because private respondent happened to lodge his complaint before his office, and that petitioners cannot be estopped from assailing the labor authorities' jurisdiction despite their participation in the proceedings.
• Decisions of Tribunals Without Jurisdiction are Null and Void — The decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void. The Court applied this doctrine in declaring that the labor arbiter's finding of an employer-employee relationship and his order of payment of private respondent's monetary claims are null and should not be given effect.

• "As the central personnel agency of the Government, the Civil Service Commission administers the Civil Service Law. It is, therefore, the single arbiter of all contests relating to the civil service." — This passage establishes the controlling principle that the Civil Service Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over civil service contests, which is the ratio decidendi of the case.
• "Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Where there is none, no agreement of the parties can provide one." — This passage articulates the fundamental principle that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the parties' agreement or conduct, and is frequently cited in jurisdictional challenges.
• "Considering that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void, the respondent labor arbiter's finding of an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner government agency and the private respondent should serve no purpose whatsoever." — This passage states the consequence of a tribunal acting without jurisdiction, rendering all its findings and orders null and void.

• Lopez, Jr. vs. Civil Service Commission, 195 SCRA 777 — Cited as authority for the proposition that the Civil Service Commission is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the civil service.
• Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 — Cited as authority for the proposition that the Civil Service Commission administers the Civil Service Law as the central personnel agency of the Government.
• Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, Aquaculture Department vs. NLRC, 206 SCRA 283 — Cited as authority for the principle that jurisdiction is conferred by law and where there is none, no agreement of the parties can provide one.
• Javier vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 572 — Cited as authority for the principle that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void.

• Paragraph 1, Section 2, Article IX B, 1987 Constitution — The constitutional provision that defines the scope and coverage of the Civil Service, which the Court applied in holding that the DJRMH falls within the coverage of the Civil Service Law.
• Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) — The statute that governs the organization and functions of the Civil Service Commission, applied in determining that the DJRMH is within the scope of the Civil Service Law.
• Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree of the Philippines) — The statute that governs the civil service, applied in determining that the DJRMH falls within its coverage.
• Article 276, Presidential Decree No. 442 (Labor Code), as amended — The Labor Code provision providing that the terms and conditions of employment of government employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules, and regulations, applied in ruling that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case.
• Commonwealth Act No. 161 — The statute under which the Tala Leprosarium (now DJRMH) was established as one of three leper colonies, used to establish the governmental character of the hospital.
• Section 16(2)(a), Chapter 3, Book V, Executive Order No. 292 — The provision vesting the Merit Systems Protection Board with the power to hear and decide on appeal administrative cases involving officials and employees of the civil service, cited to show the former procedure for civil service appeals.
• Section 17, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987 — The provision authorizing the Civil Service Commission to effect changes in its organization, cited in connection with Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 93-2387 which transferred appeals directly to the Commission.
• Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 93-2387 (June 29, 1993) — The resolution providing that decisions in administrative cases involving civil service officials and employees shall now be appealed directly to the Commission and not the MSPB.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ., concurred.