Deloso vs. Sandiganbayan

A preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 cannot be indefinite; it must be limited to 90 days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, after which the officer reassumes office, without prejudice to the continuation of the criminal trial. Section 13, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 192, applies to any office the officer charged may be holding, not only the office under which he was charged.

Petitioner Amor D. Deloso was the municipal mayor of Botolan, Zambales at the time of the acts charged. The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 3019, authorizes preventive suspension of incumbent public officers facing criminal prosecution under valid informations, and Section 13 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 192 is the provision challenged in this petition. The constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection frame the dispute over the duration of that suspension.

Amor D. Deloso was the duly elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales in the November 1971 local elections. While he occupied the position of mayor, Juan Villanueva filed a letter complaint with the Tanodbayan accusing him of having committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act No. 3019) in relation to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals in the municipal waters of Botolan, Zambales during the period 1976 to 1978 and the issuance of five tractors of the municipality to certain individuals allegedly without any agreement as to the payment of rentals.

The complaint with respect to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals was dismissed. As regards the other complaint, the Tanodbayan filed five separate informations, all dated May 30, 1984, accusing Deloso of violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law with the Sandiganbayan; the cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9200 to 9204. Except for the names of the individuals allegedly favored and the dates when the favors were made, the informations uniformly alleged that on or about February 3, 1978, in the Municipality of Botolan, Zambales, Deloso, a public officer then the Municipal Mayor of Botolan, taking advantage of his public and official position, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously give unwarranted benefits to Daniel Ferrer through manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the discharge of his official functions by issuing to him a tractor purchased by the Municipality of Botolan through a loan financed by the Land Bank of the Philippines for lease to local farmers at reasonable cost, without any agreement as to the payment of rentals for the use of the tractor by Daniel Ferrer, thereby causing undue injury to the Municipality of Botolan.

Deloso filed a motion to quash the informations; the Sandiganbayan denied it, and also denied his motion for reconsideration. Deloso then filed a petition with the SC, docketed as G.R. Nos. 69963-67, to annul the Sandiganbayan’s resolutions denying the motion to quash and the motion for reconsideration. Deloso was elected governor of the Province of Zambales in the January 18, 1988 local elections; the regular term of a governor is three years, although he shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992 by special provision of the Constitution. In a resolution dated July 28, 1988, the SC dismissed the petition for lack of merit; the resolution became final and executory on October 17, 1988.

Deloso was arraigned on January 6, 1989 before the Sandiganbayan and pleaded not guilty to the charges. The Office of the Special Prosecutor then filed a motion to suspend him pendente lite pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019. On February 10, 1989, the Sandiganbayan issued the questioned resolution suspending Deloso pendente lite from his position as Provincial Governor of Zambales and from any other office he may then be holding, and directed that a copy be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Local Government for implementation and for him to inform the Sandiganbayan of the action taken within five days from receipt.

The day following his receipt of the resolution, or on February 16, 1989, Deloso filed the instant petition. On February 17, 1989, he filed an urgent motion with the Sandiganbayan requesting that the execution and implementation of the February 10, 1989 suspension order be held in abeyance pending determination of the merits of the petition; the motion was denied. Deloso then asked the SC for an earlier setting of the trial of the cases, but the Sandiganbayan denied the plea in an order dated February 22, 1989. The Sandiganbayan noted that the cases had already been set for May 15, 16 and 17 as well as June 5, 6 and 7, 1989, and that an earlier setting would be a sham because other cases set earlier had a right to expect priority. In view of this development, Deloso filed an urgent supplemental application for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the Sandiganbayan, the Secretary of Local Government and Community Development, and all those acting in their behalf from executing and implementing the February 10, 1989 resolution.

• Constitutionality of Section 13: Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the suspension provision of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act No. 3019).
• Applicability to Current Office: Petitioner argued that Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 192, did not apply to him because the amendment qualifies the public officer as incumbent and he was then occupying the position of governor, not mayor, the position under which he was charged under the Anti-Graft Law.

• Constitutionality of Section 13: Whether the suspension provision of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 is unconstitutional.
• Indefinite Preventive Suspension: Whether a preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, without a definite period, becomes unreasonable and violates due process and equal protection.
• Applicability to Current Office: Whether Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 192, applies to petitioner who was charged as mayor but was then holding the position of governor.

• Constitutionality of Section 13: No categorical ruling. The SC did not declare Section 13 invalid; it applied Layno and resolved the case on due process and equal protection by determining whether an indefinite suspension becomes unreasonable.
• Indefinite Preventive Suspension: Yes. An indefinite preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 becomes unreasonable and violates due process and equal protection; it must be limited to 90 days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807.
• Applicability to Current Office: No. Section 13, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 192, applies to any office the officer charged may be holding, not only the office under which he was charged; petitioner’s argument is untenable.

• Constitutionality of Section 13: The SC noted that the same issue was raised in Layno vs. Sandiganbayan, where it ruled that the petition need not be resolved through a ruling on the validity of the mandatory suspension provision and instead decided the case under due process and equal protection. Faced with similar facts, the SC applied Layno anew and decided the instant petition under due process and equal protection without categorically declaring whether the suspension provision of Republic Act No. 3019 should be struck down. It limited itself to ascertaining whether, under the circumstances, an indefinite suspension becomes unreasonable.

• Indefinite Preventive Suspension: The SC observed that Deloso was elected governor of Zambales in the January 18, 1988 local elections; the regular term of a governor is three years, although he shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992 by special provision of the Constitution. He was ordered suspended from performing his duties as governor under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 by virtue of the criminal charges, and the order had no definite period, so he could be suspended for the rest of his term unless the case was terminated sooner. An extended suspension was a distinct possibility because the Sandiganbayan denied his plea for earlier trial dates on the ground that other cases set earlier had a right to expect priority. Under these circumstances, the preventive suspension, initially justified, became unreasonable and raised a due process question. The SC quoted Layno: a preventive suspension may be justified, but its continuance for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question; even if the official were later acquitted, his right to hold office would have been nullified, and the people would have been deprived of the services of the official they elected. The SC also applied Garcia vs. The Executive Secretary, where it ruled that to allow an officer appointed by the President facing administrative charges to be preventively suspended indefinitely would countenance a situation where preventive suspension could in effect be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to the Constitution and the Civil Service Law, and could shorten his term or remove him without a finding of cause after due hearing. The SC held that the principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to national government officials and that an Anti-Graft charge does not justify a different rule; to hold otherwise would negate the equal protection guarantee. The application of Garcia applies with greater force to elective officials, especially Deloso whose term was relatively short; the interests of the sovereign electorate and the province of Zambales cannot be subordinated to the heavy caseload of the Sandiganbayan and the SC. The SC ruled that the February 10, 1989 order suspending Deloso without a definite period could not be sanctioned and that henceforth a preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 should be limited to 90 days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, which period also appeared reasonable and appropriate. It added that should the purposes behind preventive suspensions, such as preventing abuse of the prerogatives of the office and intimidation of witnesses, become manifest, the Sandiganbayan was not bereft of remedies or sanctions; Deloso could still be suspended but for specifically expressed reasons and not from an automatic application of Section 13.

• Applicability to Current Office: The SC held that Deloso’s argument was untenable. It cited Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, where it was settled that the amendatory provision states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under Republic Act No. 3019 or for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property, whether as a simple or complex offense and in whatever stage or execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. By the use of the word office, the provision applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he was charged.

• Preventive Suspension of Elective Officials under Section 13, Republic Act No. 3019 — A preventive suspension may be justified, but its continuance for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. The SC limited preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 to 90 days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, after which the officer reassumes office, without prejudice to the continuation of the criminal trial.
• Equal Protection and Indefinite Preventive Suspension — The principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to national government officials and elective local officials; an Anti-Graft charge does not justify a different rule. The SC applied Garcia and Layno to avoid denying equal protection.
• Applicability of Section 13 as Amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 192 to Any Office Held — Section 13 applies to any office the officer charged may be holding, not only the particular office under which he was charged; thus a mayor charged under Republic Act No. 3019 who later becomes governor is still covered.
• Due Process as Limit on Preventive Suspension — An indefinite preventive suspension can become the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to due process; it can nullify the right to hold office and deprive the electorate of the services of the official they elected.

• "The order dated February 10, 1989 suspending the petitioner without a definite period can not be sanctioned. We rule that henceforth a preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 should be limited to the ninety (90) days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree, which period also appears reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances of this case." — The SC fixes the duration of preventive suspension for elective public officers under Section 13.
• "A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question." — The SC states the due process limit on preventive suspension.
• "The application of the Garcia injunction against preventive suspensions for an unreasonable period of time applies with greater force to elective officials and especially to the petitioner whose term is a relatively short one." — The SC extends the Garcia principle to elective officials.
• "Thus, by the use of the word office the same applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he was charged." — The SC rejects petitioner’s argument that Section 13 does not apply because he is now governor.

• Layno vs. Sandiganbayan, 136 SCRA 536 [1985] — Controlling precedent; the SC applied anew its due process and equal protection approach and quoted its ruling that unreasonable continuance of preventive suspension raises a due process question.
• Garcia vs. The Executive Secretary, 6 SCRA 1 [1962] — Followed; the SC used its ruling that indefinite preventive suspension would be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to the Constitution and Civil Service Law.
• Garcia vs. Hon. Secretary, 116 Phil. 348 [1962] — Cited in Layno as the leading case for the principle against indefinite suspension of national government officials; the SC applied the same principle to elective officials.
• Oliveros vs. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163, 197-198 [1974] — Cited for then Justice Fred Ruiz Castro’s separate opinion warning against the mischief of indefinite suspension of elective local officials charged under the Anti-Graft Law.
• Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 383 [1984] — Followed; the SC relied on it to hold that Section 13 applies to any office the officer charged may be holding, not only the office under which he was charged.

• Section 13, Republic Act No. 3019 (as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 192) — Authorizes preventive suspension of any incumbent public officer against whom a criminal prosecution under a valid information under Republic Act No. 3019 or for an offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property is pending in court. The SC held that the suspension cannot be indefinite and limited it to 90 days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807; it also held the provision applies to any office the officer may be holding.
• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 — The provision under which petitioner was charged for giving unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality and evident bad faith; the informations alleged issuance of a tractor without agreement on rentals causing undue injury to the Municipality of Botolan.
• Section 42, Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree) — The SC used its 90-day period as the limit for preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, finding the period reasonable and appropriate.
• Due Process and Equal Protection Guarantees, 1987 Constitution — The SC resolved the challenge to the indefinite suspension under these guarantees, holding that an unreasonable continuance of preventive suspension raises a due process question and that the principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to elective officials to satisfy equal protection.
• Section 8, Article X and Section 2, Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution — Cited to note that the regular term of a governor is three years although the petitioner shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992; this short term made an indefinite suspension especially burdensome.
• Section 35, Republic Act No. 2260 (Civil Service Act of 1959) — Cited through Garcia for the 60-day preventive suspension limit; the SC used the principle against indefinite suspension, not the specific 60-day period, in this case.
• Section 63(2), Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (Local Government Code) — Cited through Layno for the 60-day limit on preventive suspension in administrative cases; the SC used it to show the policy against indefinite suspension and the equal protection problem.