Delos Santos vs. People

Mere presence at the crime scene, knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of an illegal act, without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is insufficient to establish conspiracy; there must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

PO1 Carlo B. Delos Santos was a police officer identified as the security escort of Mayor Helen Bunan. The victim, Pio V. Ontog, Jr. alias "Mata," was a leader and supporter of Marvie Bravo, a political rival of Mayor Bunan. The Arevalos—Barangay Captain Erlinda Arevalo and her husband Danilo—were leaders and supporters of Mayor Bunan. The shooting incident arose in the context of this political rivalry, specifically involving a dispute over the use of a public road in front of the Arevalos' house.

On March 7, 2007, at around 7:35 p.m., PO1 Ronald Medalla, Pio V. Ontog, Jr. alias "Mata," and Joseph Oliva, a barangay tanod, went to the house of Barangay Captain Erlinda Arevalo at Sitio Bacolod, Baybay Dagat, San Fernando, Masbate to discuss Kagawad Rustom Barroga. Upon approaching the house, they saw Salvador Galos and Ronaldo "Bahotog" Almoete having a drinking spree with Brgy. Capt. Arevalo and her husband Danilo Arevalo. PO1 Medalla and Danilo were conversing when Galos suddenly shouted, "bakit sino ka ba?" and struck PO1 Medalla on the upper left lip with the butt of his .45 caliber gun. Pio attempted to pacify the situation, saying, "tama na yan, maliit na bagay lang yan." PO1 Medalla tried to grab Galos's gun, but Almoete pulled him back. Galos then aimed at Pio and fired, hitting him above the abdomen. More gunshots followed. Oliva saw Galos continuously firing at Pio, who tried to hide behind a motorcycle. They heard Brgy. Capt. Arevalo shout, "sige, barilin nyo na si 'Mata' (Pio) dahil matapang yan."

Oliva ran toward the police station to report the incident, but PO1 Delos Santos and Rodolfo Pelones, both in civilian clothing, prevented him. According to the prosecution, PO1 Delos Santos poked his M-14 rifle at Oliva and brought him inside a warehouse (camalig) owned by Noli Arevalo, brother of Danilo, while Pelones, armed with an M-16 rifle, stood guard nearby. PO1 Delos Santos released Oliva when two uniformed policemen passed by on their way to the crime scene. Oliva then reported the incident to Marvie Bravo's camp, as Pio, Kgd. Barroga, and Oliva were leaders and supporters of Bravo, while the Arevalos supported Mayor Bunan. Pio was brought to the hospital where Dr. Roger Lim declared him dead on arrival. PO1 Medalla went to the police station to seek assistance and had the incident entered in the police blotter.

The defense presented a different version. Galos testified that he was at Danilo's house to collect payment for fish he had sold. PO1 Medalla, accompanied by Pio, confronted Danilo about prohibiting Bravo's supporters from using the public road in front of the Arevalos' house. PO1 Medalla poked a gun at Danilo and then at Galos. In the ensuing struggle for the gun, it accidentally fired and hit Pio. Galos claimed the shooting was unintentional, occurring during a wrestle for possession of the firearm.

For his part, PO1 Delos Santos admitted being at the crime scene with his firearm slung on his back, but denied preventing Oliva from reporting the incident. He testified that he was at the police station with five other officers on duty when they heard Gloria Cantojos shout for help. A team of six officers was dispatched to respond. On the way, PO3 Alindogan and PO3 Recto stopped to meet someone later identified as PO1 Medalla. Upon arrival at the crime scene, they cordoned the area and recovered the injured Pio. PO1 Delos Santos was instructed to secure a vehicle to transport Pio to the hospital and then to stay at the crime scene to await the police investigator.

The RTC found PO1 Delos Santos and Galos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, sentencing each to reclusion perpetua and ordering payment of damages. The case against Galos was later dismissed on appeal due to his death. The CA affirmed the conviction with modification, increasing the awards of damages and imposing legal interest.

• Qualifying Circumstances: Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to prove the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, as the testimonies of Oliva and PO1 Medalla showed that a confrontation preceded the shooting incident.
• Conspiracy: Petitioner asserted that conspiracy was not established, questioning the lower courts' appreciation of conspiracy based on the testimony of a single prosecution witness that he prevented the reporting of a crime. He contended that a crime had already been committed when Oliva implicated him, making the finding that he did nothing to prevent the commission of the crime baseless.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Petitioner contended that abuse of superior strength, aid of armed men, and abuse of public position were not proved since it was only Galos who attacked Pio with a gun.

• Mode of Appeal: The Office of the Solicitor General observed that petitioner availed himself of the wrong mode of appeal, noting that Section 3(e) of Rule 122, in relation to Section 13(c) of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, provides that appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the CA imposes reclusion perpetua shall be by notice of appeal filed with the CA.

• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy was established to justify the conviction of PO1 Delos Santos for Murder.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the prosecution proved PO1 Delos Santos's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Conspiracy: No. Conspiracy was not established because petitioner's mere presence at the crime scene and alleged act of preventing a witness from reporting the incident, without active participation in the shooting, were insufficient to prove a common design or intentional participation in the crime.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: No. The prosecution failed to prove petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, warranting his acquittal.

• Conspiracy: Conspiracy requires unity in purpose and intention in the commission of a crime and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the crime. However, mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of an illegal act, without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy; there must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. The shooting transpired during a heated argument in a drinking spree and was consummated without petitioner's cooperation or assistance. Even assuming petitioner was present near the scene where Pio was shot by Galos, mere presence at the crime scene does not by itself establish conspiracy absent evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval. The purported act of preventing Oliva from reporting the shooting occurred after the crime was already consummated and did not demonstrate participation in the common design to kill Pio.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Because conspiracy was not established and no direct participation in the killing was attributed to petitioner, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court reversed the CA's decision and acquitted petitioner, declining to put premium on technicalities regarding the mode of appeal when the liberty of a person is at stake.

• Conspiracy — Elements and Proof — Conspiracy is present when there is unity in purpose and intention in the commission of a crime. It does not require a previous plan or agreement to commit assault; it is sufficient that at the time of aggression, all accused manifested by their acts a common intent or desire to attack. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence and may be inferred from conduct before, during, and after the commission of the crime indicative of joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments. However, even though direct proof is not essential, there must be positive and conclusive evidence satisfying the same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime to support a finding of criminal conspiracy.

• Mere Presence Does Not Establish Conspiracy — Mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission is not by itself sufficient to establish conspiracy in the absence of evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act. The Court applied this principle to hold that petitioner's presence near the scene where Pio was shot by Galos did not constitute a sufficient basis for concluding that he was in conspiracy with the actual perpetrator.

• Mere Knowledge or Acquiescence Insufficient — Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of an act, without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. The Court found that the shooting was consummated without petitioner's cooperation, negating the element of intentional participation.

• "Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of the act, without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy." — This passage articulates the controlling principle distinguishing passive awareness from active participation in conspiracy, forming the ratio decidendi of the acquittal.

• "mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission is not, by itself, sufficient to establish conspiracy in the absence of evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required." — This formulation defines the insufficiency of mere presence as a basis for conspiracy, directly applied to exonerate the petitioner.

• "There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose." — This passage states the affirmative requirement for conspiracy liability, emphasizing that passive conduct does not satisfy the standard.

• People vs. Vargas, G.R. No. 230356, September 18, 2019 — Followed for the definition of conspiracy as requiring unity in purpose and intention, and that it need not be proven by direct evidence but may be inferred from conduct before, during, and after the crime.

• Orodio vs. Court of Appeals, 247-A Phil. 409 (1988) — Followed for the principle that mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval without cooperation is insufficient for conspiracy, and that intentional participation is required.

• Rimando vs. People, 821 Phil. 1086 (2017) — Followed for the principle that mere presence at the crime scene does not establish conspiracy absent evidence of actual cooperation.

• People vs. Vda. de Quijano, 292-A Phil. 157 (1993) — Followed for the standard that although direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, there must be positive and conclusive evidence satisfying the same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime.

• Hilario vs. People, 574 Phil. 348 (2008) — Cited for the proposition that rules of procedure are mere tools and strict application resulting in technicalities that frustrate substantial justice must be avoided, justifying the Court's decision to overlook the wrong mode of appeal.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code (as amended) — Defines and penalizes the crime of Murder. The RTC and CA convicted petitioner under this article; the Supreme Court reversed the conviction for failure to prove conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt.

• Section 3(e), Rule 122, Rules of Court, in relation to Section 13(c), Rule 124 — Provides that appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the CA imposes reclusion perpetua shall be by notice of appeal filed with the CA. The OSG observed that petitioner used the wrong mode of appeal (Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45), but the Court declined to dismiss on this technicality.

Perlas-Bernarte, S.A.J. (Chairperson), Hernando, and Delos Santos, JJ., concurred. Baltazar-Padilla, J., was on official leave.