Delos Santos vs. Elizalde

The reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration is reckoned from the date of receipt of the decision by the counsel of record, not from the date the party-litigant personally learns of the decision, and a party's own failure to diligently monitor the status of the case constitutes inexcusable negligence that bars equitable relief.

Petitioners are the heirs of the late Mariano delos Santos, claiming inheritance rights over four adjoining lots in Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, designated as Lots 393-A, 393-B, 394-D, and 394-E, with a total area of 14,771 square meters. Respondents spouses Fred and Joan Elizalde claimed ownership by purchase from the heirs of Leonardo delos Santos; respondents delos Santos-Flores and Jesus delos Santos, two of Leonardo's three legitimate children, claimed two-thirds of the disputed lots as their rightful inheritance; and the Casimeros claimed Lots 393-B and 394-E as heirs of Tomasa Prado. The dispute required adjudication of competing claims of ownership over the same parcels of land, with petitioners asserting inheritance from Mariano delos Santos while respondents traced their titles through Leonardo delos Santos and Tomasa Prado.

On December 15, 1986, petitioners filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Damages, and Attorney's Fees before the Kalibo, Aklan RTC, involving four adjoining lots in Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, designated as Lots 393-A, 393-B, 394-D, and 394-E, with areas of 1,515 sqm, 1,010 sqm, 5,764 sqm, and 6,482 sqm, respectively, totaling 14,771 sqm. Petitioners claimed the lots as their inheritance from the late Mariano delos Santos, their common ascendant, whom they alleged was the original owner. An amended complaint was filed on May 8, 1991. Three sets of intervenors appeared before the trial court: spouses Fred and Joan Elizalde, who claimed they purchased the lots on June 18, 1974 from the heirs of Leonardo delos Santos; the Casimeros, who claimed Lots 393-B and 394-E as heirs of Tomasa Prado; and Rosita delos Santos-Flores and Jesus delos Santos, two of Leonardo's three legitimate children, who claimed two-thirds of the disputed lots as their rightful inheritance and denied having sold or assigned their share to anyone, including Fred Elizalde.

After due hearing, the trial court rendered its April 29, 1996 Decision dismissing petitioners' complaint and that of the Casimeros, declaring the deeds of sale null and void insofar as they affected the two-thirds share of Jesus and Rosita delos Santos, declaring Jesus and Rosita as lawful owners of two-thirds of the land (9,915 sqm on the northwest portion), declaring Fred Elizalde as rightful owner of one-third (4,957 sqm on the southeast portion), and ordering the cancellation or revision of tax declarations accordingly. Both petitioners and Fred Elizalde filed separate notices of appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 54136 for petitioners and CA-G.R. SP No. 48475 for Elizalde.

On June 2, 1998, the CA issued a Notice to File Brief requiring the parties to file their briefs within forty-five days from receipt. Petitioners received the notice on June 15, 1998, giving them until July 30, 1998. Beginning July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a series of motions for extension of time to file their appellants' brief — on July 27, September 10, October 27, November 27, and December 28, 1998 — each seeking thirty to forty-five additional days, ultimately extending the period by a total of 180 days to January 27, 1999. Despite these extensions, no appellants' brief was ever filed. Meanwhile, on October 6, 1998, respondents Fred Elizalde, Jesus delos Santos, and Rosita delos Santos-Flores filed a Joint Manifestation and Motion in which Elizalde abandoned his appeal pursuant to a May 27, 1997 Agreement with respondents delos Santos, whereby they agreed to swap and re-adjust the areas adjudged in their favor.

On April 8, 1999, petitioners' former counsel, Atty. Napoleon M. Victoriano, filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Appeal, alleging that petitioners and respondents delos Santos had entered into an amicable settlement denominated as an Undertaking executed on September 19, 1998, whereby petitioners would be paid Four Million Pesos in consideration of their leaving the disputed lots peacefully. The Undertaking was signed by 39 of the 46 petitioners and notarized by Atty. Edgar S. Calizo. It was further alleged that counsel for respondents delos Santos, Atty. Romeo R. Robiso, executed a promissory note on October 15, 1998 for the Four Million Pesos. On May 11, 1999, the CA dismissed the appeals and considered them withdrawn, citing the failure to file appellants' briefs, the Joint Manifestation and Motion, and the Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Appeal.

On June 17, 1999, new counsel Atty. Cesar T. Verano filed an Entry of Appearance with the sole conformity of petitioner Vicente delos Santos, and on the same day petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Reinstatement of Appeal, verified solely by Vicente delos Santos. Petitioners alleged they had no knowledge of the CA Decision until June 2, 1999, never entered into any amicable settlement, had forged signatures in the May 27, 1997 Agreement, and never authorized Atty. Victoriano to withdraw their appeal. The CA, in its January 31, 2000 Resolution, denied admission of the motion for being nine days late, finding that Atty. Victoriano, who had not filed any notice of withdrawal as counsel, received the CA Decision on May 24, 1999, giving petitioners until June 8, 1999 to file their motion for reconsideration.

• Timeliness of Motion for Reconsideration: Petitioners argued that their Motion for Reconsideration was filed on time because the reglementary period should be counted from June 2, 1999, when they personally learned of the CA Decision, and not from May 24, 1999, when their former counsel Atty. Victoriano received a copy thereof.
• Negligence of Former Counsel: Petitioners maintained that their former counsel was clearly at fault and grossly negligent in failing to file a Motion for Reconsideration within the reglementary period from his receipt of the CA Decision, and that the negligence of counsel should not bind the clients.
• Equity and Substantial Justice: Petitioners contended that the non-admission of their Motion for Reconsideration for a nine-day delay was manifestly unjust and inequitable, giving premium to technicalities rather than substantial justice, and cited cases where the Court allowed late filings of four to six days.
• Invalidity of the Agreement: Petitioners argued that the alleged Agreement between them and respondents delos Santos was null and void because their signatures were forged and they never received a single centavo of the alleged consideration, rendering the withdrawal of the appeal baseless.
• Merits of the Appeal: Petitioners asserted that their appeal from the trial court's decision was meritorious, their claim of ownership over the disputed properties being supported by substantial and competent evidence.

• Procedural Defect: Respondents delos Santos argued that petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration should be considered a mere scrap of paper for not containing any notice of hearing.
• Valid Dismissal: Respondents countered that the appeal was validly dismissed for petitioners' failure to file their appellants' brief despite repeated extensions totaling 180 days.
• Validity of the Agreement: Respondents maintained that the Agreement was valid.

• Timeliness of Motion for Reconsideration: Whether the reglementary period for filing a Motion for Reconsideration should be counted from the date the counsel of record received the CA Decision or from the date the petitioners personally learned of it.
• Liberal Construction of Procedural Rules: Whether the CA erred in refusing to admit petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration despite a nine-day delay, and whether equity and substantial justice warrant a liberal application of the rules.
• Binding Effect of Counsel's Negligence: Whether the negligence of petitioners' former counsel in failing to file the appellants' brief and the Motion for Reconsideration should bind the petitioners, or whether petitioners' own negligence precludes relief.
• Validity of the Compromise Agreement: Whether the Supreme Court may resolve the factual issue of forgery and non-payment raised regarding the Undertaking or Agreement.
• Dismissal for Failure to File Appellants' Brief: Whether the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the appeal given petitioners' failure to file the appellants' brief.

• Timeliness of Motion for Reconsideration: No. The fifteen-day reglementary period is reckoned from the date of receipt by the counsel of record, not from the date the party-litigant personally learns of the decision. Service upon counsel of record is tantamount to service upon the party.
• Liberal Construction of Procedural Rules: No. There exists no exceptional circumstance justifying the disregard of the reglementary period; the cases cited by petitioners involved grave injustice that is absent here.
• Binding Effect of Counsel's Negligence: No. Petitioners were themselves guilty of inexcusable negligence in failing to monitor the developments in their case for nearly a year, and equitable relief cannot be granted to parties who benefit from their own negligence.
• Validity of the Compromise Agreement: N/A as a ruling on the merits. The issue of authenticity of the Undertaking or Agreement is a question of fact that the Supreme Court cannot entertain in a Rule 45 petition, and none of the recognized exceptions to the rule against factual review applies.
• Dismissal for Failure to File Appellants' Brief: No. The CA did not commit reversible error, as the dismissal was based not solely on the motion to withdraw but also on petitioners' failure to file the required appellants' brief despite 180 days of extensions.

• Timeliness of Motion for Reconsideration: Section 1 of Rule 37, in conjunction with Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, provides that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is fifteen days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. This period begins to run upon receipt of notice by the counsel of record, which is considered notice to the parties. Service of judgment directly on the party is prohibited and is not considered the official receipt of the judgment. The rationale is that parties generally lack formal education in procedural rules and may be unaware of their rights and duties as litigants; moreover, orderly procedure is best served when courts deal with only one person — either the retained lawyer or the party acting in propria persona. Even assuming petitioners had replaced Atty. Victoriano before his receipt of the Decision, the period would still be reckoned from his receipt because Section 26 of Rule 138 requires that written notice of the change of counsel be given to the adverse party and entered on the docket; absent proper substitution, the counsel of record remains the party's counsel for purposes of notice. Since Atty. Verano filed his appearance only on June 17, 1999 — after Atty. Victoriano's receipt on May 24, 1999 — the CA correctly counted the period from May 24, 1999, ending on June 8, 1999. The Motion for Reconsideration filed on June 17, 1999 was therefore nine days late.

• Liberal Construction of Procedural Rules: While the Court has in rare instances condoned late filings to better serve the ends of justice, such liberal application is confined to situations where there exists a clear need to prevent the commission of grave injustice. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, the government stood to lose close to 300 hectares of prime sugar land already titled in its name; in Ramos vs. Bagasao, the record on appeal was already with the respondent judge. In the instant case, no exceptional circumstance justifies disregarding the reglementary period. Furthermore, equitable relief cannot be invoked by a party guilty of negligence, as the Court ruled in Mesina vs. Meer that it will not allow petitioners, in the guise of equity, to benefit from their own negligence.

• Binding Effect of Counsel's Negligence: Petitioners sought to invoke Ginete vs. Court of Appeals, where counsel's negligence without any participatory negligence on the part of the clients was deemed a sufficient reason to set aside the CA's resolutions. However, Ginete is not applicable because petitioners here were themselves negligent. The Court in Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals emphasized that litigants represented by counsel should not simply sit back and await the outcome of their case; they should give necessary assistance to their counsel. Petitioners did not know that Atty. Victoriano failed to file an appellants' brief during the more than 180 days of extensions he sought, nor did they learn of the CA Decision until June 2, 1999 — nearly a year after the notice to file brief was received on June 15, 1998. Ordinary prudence would dictate that petitioners give utmost importance to a case involving their residences, especially after having already lost at the trial court. Their failure to apprise themselves of the case status is unjustified, and they cannot be shielded from the repercussions of both their counsel's and their own negligence.

• Validity of the Compromise Agreement: The question of whether the signatures in the Undertaking or Agreement were forged, and whether the consideration was paid, are questions of fact — involving the truth or falsity of alleged facts — which the Supreme Court cannot entertain in a Rule 45 petition. The Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake a re-examination of the evidence. While exceptions exist, such as when findings are grounded on speculation or when there is grave abuse of discretion, a perusal of the enumerated exceptions reveals that the instant case falls under none of them.

• Dismissal for Failure to File Appellants' Brief: Even assuming the withdrawal of the appeal was groundless, the CA did not commit reversible error in dismissing the appeal for failure to file the appellants' brief. The CA Decision expressly stated that the dismissal was based on both the failure to file the briefs and the prayers in the Joint Manifestation and Motion and the Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Section 7 of Rule 44 provides forty-five days from receipt of notice to file the appellant's brief, and Section 12 declares that extensions shall not be allowed except for good and sufficient cause. No such justification is present. Petitioners' failure to monitor their case is inexcusable, and their former counsel's failure to file the brief binds them.

• Service on Counsel of Record as Service on the Party — Notice sent to the counsel of record is considered notice to the party represented; conversely, service upon the party is not considered service upon counsel. The rationale is that parties generally lack formal knowledge of procedural rules, and orderly procedure is best served when courts deal with only one person — either retained counsel or the party acting without a lawyer. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the fifteen-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration was correctly counted from Atty. Victoriano's receipt of the CA Decision on May 24, 1999, not from petitioners' personal knowledge on June 2, 1999.

• Binding Effect of Counsel's Negligence; Participatory Negligence of the Client — The negligence of counsel generally binds the client. An exception exists where the negligence is purely the lawyer's and the client had no participatory negligence, as in Ginete vs. Court of Appeals, which requires: (1) special or compelling circumstances, (2) merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the party's fault or negligence, (4) lack of frivolous or dilatory intent, and (5) no unjust prejudice to the other party. However, where the client is also negligent — as by failing to monitor the case for months — the exception does not apply, and the client cannot invoke equity to escape the consequences.

• Duty of Party-Litigant to Monitor Case — A party-litigant must not rely totally on counsel to litigate the case. It is the duty of a party to be in contact with counsel from time to time to be informed of the progress of the case. Absence from one or two hearings may be negligible, but want of inquiry or update on the status of the case for several months is inexcusable. The Court applied this principle to find petitioners negligent for failing to inquire about their case from June 15, 1998, when the notice to file brief was received, until June 2, 1999, when they allegedly learned of the CA Decision — a period of nearly a year, involving their residences and after an adverse trial court ruling.

• Supreme Court Not a Trier of Facts — In the exercise of its power of review under Rule 45, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake re-examination of the evidence, the factual findings of the CA being conclusive and binding. Recognized exceptions include: (1) findings grounded on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) inference manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) grave abuse of discretion; (4) judgment based on misapprehension of facts; (5) conflicting findings; (6) findings beyond the issues or contrary to admissions; (7) findings contrary to the trial court; (8) conclusions without citation of specific evidence; (9) facts in the petition not disputed by respondent; (10) findings premised on supposed absence of evidence but contradicted by the record; and (11) manifest overlooking of relevant facts. The Court found none of these exceptions applicable to the factual issues of forgery and non-payment raised by petitioners.

• Substitution of Counsel — Under Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in case of substitution, the name of the newly employed attorney must be entered on the docket in place of the former one, and written notice of the change must be given to the adverse party. Unless the change is carried out properly, the counsel of record remains the party's counsel, and notice sent to such counsel is considered notice to the party. The Court applied this rule to hold that because Atty. Verano's entry of appearance was filed only on June 17, 1999 — after Atty. Victoriano's receipt of the Decision on May 24, 1999 — the latter remained counsel of record for purposes of notice.

• "Service of judgment on the party is prohibited and is not considered the official receipt of the judgment." — This passage establishes the controlling rule that the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration runs from counsel of record's receipt, not the party's, and is frequently cited in procedural law jurisprudence.

• "To reiterate, service upon the parties' counsels of record is tantamount to service upon the parties themselves, but service upon the parties themselves is not considered service upon their lawyers." — This formulation articulates the asymmetrical rule of service in Philippine procedure, explaining why the fifteen-day period was correctly counted from Atty. Victoriano's receipt.

• "No prudent party will leave the fate of his case entirely to his lawyer. Absence in one or two hearings may be negligible but want of inquiry or update on the status of his case for several months (four, in this case) is inexcusable." — This passage, quoted from Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, defines the standard of diligence required of party-litigants and was applied to find petitioners inexcusably negligent for failing to monitor their case for nearly a year.

• "[S]eldom have we condoned late filing of notices of appeal, and only in very exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice" — Quoted from Neypes vs. Court of Appeals, this passage defines the restrictive standard for liberal application of procedural rules and explains why the nine-day delay here could not be excused.

• GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. vs. Principe, G.R. No. 141484, November 11, 2005 — Followed for the rule that unless the change of attorneys is properly effected, the counsel of record remains the party's counsel and notice to such counsel is notice to the party.
• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-31303-04, May 31, 1978 — Distinguished. Petitioners cited it for the proposition that a late motion for reconsideration may be admitted to prevent gross miscarriage of justice; the Court distinguished it because the government stood to lose 300 hectares of titled land, a circumstance absent here.
• Ramos vs. Bagasao, G.R. No. L-51552, February 28, 1980 — Distinguished. Petitioners cited it for excusing a four-day delay in filing a notice of appeal; the Court distinguished it because the record on appeal was already with the respondent judge and the delay was excused on the basis of equity.
• Neypes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005 — Followed for the principle that liberal application of procedural rules is confined to rare cases where there is a clear need to prevent grave injustice.
• Mesina vs. Meer, G.R. No. 146845, July 2, 2002 — Followed for the rule that a party cannot, in the guise of equity, benefit from their own negligence.
• Ginete vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127596, September 24, 1998 — Distinguished. Petitioners cited it for the rule that counsel's negligence does not bind the client; the Court distinguished it because the clients in Ginete had no participatory negligence, whereas petitioners here were themselves negligent.
• Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106153, July 14, 1997 — Followed for the principle that party-litigants must actively monitor their cases and assist their counsel, and that failure to do so constitutes inexcusable negligence.
• Sampayan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156360, January 14, 2005 — Followed for the doctrine that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and the enumeration of exceptions to this rule.

• Section 1, Rule 37, Rules of Court — Provides the grounds and the period for filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration, which must be filed within the period for taking an appeal. Applied to determine the fifteen-day reglementary period for the motion for reconsideration.
• Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court — Provides that an ordinary appeal shall be taken within fifteen days from notice of the judgment or final order, and that the period of appeal is interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. Applied in conjunction with Rule 37 to fix the period for filing the motion for reconsideration.
• Section 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court — Requires that in case of substitution of counsel, the name of the newly employed attorney be entered on the docket and written notice of the change be given to the adverse party. Applied to hold that absent proper substitution, the former counsel remained counsel of record for purposes of notice.
• Section 7, Rule 44, Rules of Court — Provides forty-five days from receipt of notice within which to file an appellant's brief. Applied to the CA's dismissal of the appeal for failure to file the brief.
• Section 12, Rule 44, Rules of Court — Declares that an extension of time for filing briefs shall not be allowed except for good and sufficient cause. Applied to find that no sufficient justification existed for petitioners' repeated extensions without filing the brief.

Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Chairperson), Antonio T. Carpio, Conchita Carpio Morales, and Dante O. Tinga concurred. No separate concurring opinions were written.