Deliva vs. Surtida

A reconstituted judicial record need not be a physical or verbatim reproduction of the destroyed record; where the trial court and the Court of Appeals have found that notice of the judgment was served upon the defeated party’s attorney, and that finding is attached to the reconstituted record, the judgment becomes final and executory and may be executed, and the lack of a property description is not a legal ground to refuse execution.

Juan Deliva and Leodegario Ronquillo were parties to a partition proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur involving three parcels of land described under Group A. The record of that case was destroyed during the battle for liberation, and Act No. 3110 governed the reconstitution of destroyed judicial records. The present petition arose from the subsequent reconstitution and execution of the judgment in that case.

Juan Deliva and Leodegario Ronquillo were parties to Civil Case No. 99-R in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, a partition proceeding involving three parcels of land described under Group A. On July 19, 1944, the court rendered judgment ordering Ronquillo to deliver to Deliva one-half of the three parcels and to pay him P1,425 in damages. The record of the case was later destroyed during the battle for liberation.

Deliva began reconstitution proceedings, and on February 13, 1947, the respondent court declared the record reconstituted. Ronquillo moved for reconsideration of that order. The parties presented evidence on whether the judgment had been rendered and whether a copy had been served upon Ronquillo. The respondent court denied the motion for reconsideration. Ronquillo appealed to the Court of Appeals from the orders declaring the record reconstituted and denying reconsideration. One of the issues joined and submitted on appeal was whether, in 1944 after judgment, Ronquillo or his attorney had been served with a copy of the judgment. On April 8, 1949, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment declaring that Ronquillo’s attorney had been served with a copy.

On February 2 and December 1, 1950, motions for execution of the judgment and for appointment of commissioners to partition the three parcels were presented. The respondent court, upon Ronquillo’s objection, denied the motions in its orders of February 20 and December 20, 1950, respectively, and refused to issue a writ of execution on the ground that the judgment was not yet final. In those orders, the respondent court stated that Ronquillo had not been notified of the judgment. In their answer, Ronquillo and the respondent court alleged that the question whether a copy of the judgment had been received by Ronquillo or his attorney was raised incidentally in the motion for reconsideration to support the main claim that Ronquillo or his counsel had not been notified of the date of trial in Civil Case No. 7110 and that the parcels of land litigated therein could not be located and identified for lack of description.

In their memorandum, the respondents invoked the rule in San Jose vs. de Venecia and Velasquez vs. Ysip that where only the rendition of the judgment is reconstituted and notice is not reconstituted, notice should be served anew and the appeal period computed from the new service. The respondent court and the Court of Appeals had found, however, that notice of the judgment had been served upon Ronquillo’s attorney, and both judgments containing that finding were part of the reconstituted record. The claim that the parcels could not be identified for lack of description was also raised. These facts were uncontroverted.

• Unlawful Neglect of Duty: Petitioner claimed that the respondent court’s refusal to issue a writ of execution constituted an unlawful neglect to perform an act specifically enjoined by law.
• Absence of Other Plain, Speedy and Adequate Remedy: Petitioner claimed that there was no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to have the orders denying execution annulled and set aside.

• Incidental Finding on Notice: Respondents alleged that the question whether Ronquillo or his attorney received a copy of the judgment was raised incidentally in the motion for reconsideration to support the main claim that Ronquillo or his counsel had not been notified of the date of trial in Civil Case No. 7110 and that the parcels of land could not be located and identified for lack of description.
• Reconstitution of Notice Required: Respondents invoked the rule in San Jose vs. de Venecia and Velasquez vs. Ysip that where only the rendition of the judgment is reconstituted and notice is not reconstituted, notice should be served anew and the period of appeal computed from the new service.
• No Notice of Judgment: The respondent court stated in its orders denying execution that Ronquillo had not been notified of the judgment.
• Lack of Property Description: Respondents claimed that the parcels of land could not be identified for lack of description.

• Finality of Reconstituted Judgment: Whether the judgment had become final and executory where the record was reconstituted and the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that notice of the judgment had been served upon the attorney for the defeated party.
• Execution Despite Lack of Property Description: Whether the alleged inability to identify the parcels of land for lack of description is a legal reason for refusing to issue a writ of execution upon the judgment.
• Mandamus to Compel Execution: Whether mandamus lies to compel the respondent court to direct execution of the judgment after it denied the motions for execution on the ground that the judgment was not yet final.

• Finality of Reconstituted Judgment: Yes. The judgment had become final and executory; the finding of both the respondent court and the Court of Appeals that notice of the judgment had been served upon Ronquillo’s attorney, attached to the reconstituted record, sufficiently established service and finality.
• Execution Despite Lack of Property Description: No. Lack of description of the parcels of land is not a legal reason for refusing to issue a writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment; the sheriff may make a return, and the damages award may be executed independently.
• Mandamus to Compel Execution: Yes. Mandamus lies to compel execution because the refusal constituted unlawful neglect to perform an act specifically enjoined by law, and no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy existed.

• Finality of Reconstituted Judgment: The rule invoked by respondents in San Jose vs. de Venecia and Velasquez vs. Ysip was correct and sound: where only the rendition of the judgment is reconstituted and notice is not, notice should be served anew and the appeal period computed from the new service. Those cases, however, involved records in which no notice prior to destruction appeared to have been reconstituted. Here, not only was the judgment reconstituted but the fact that notice had been served upon Ronquillo’s attorney was found by the respondent court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The issue of service was raised, joined, evidence was presented, and both courts passed upon it. Even if the finding was incidental to the main claim that no notice of trial had been served, it did not lose its value and effectiveness; lack of notice of judgment could influence the trial court’s conclusion on lack of notice of hearing. Both judgments containing the finding were part of the reconstituted record. To require copying the dispositive part and serving it anew, making the date of receipt the start of the appeal period, would reverse the final finding of two courts that notice had already been served. Section 4, Act No. 3110 also showed that reconstitution need not be a physical or verbatim reproduction; an agreement on facts could replace unavailable documents. Thus, the judgment was final and executory.
• Execution Despite Lack of Property Description: The claim that the parcels could not be identified for lack of description, even if true, was no legal reason for refusing to issue a writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment. The sheriff should make a return thereon. If the sheriff could not carry out the part of the judgment involving the land for that reason, further proceedings could be had toward execution. The judgment also awarded P1,425 in damages, and execution of that part did not need the description of the three parcels.
• Mandamus to Compel Execution: Because the judgment was final and executory and the respondent court refused to issue execution, the refusal constituted unlawful neglect to perform an act specifically enjoined by law. No other plain, speedy and adequate remedy existed in the ordinary course of law to annul or set aside the orders denying execution. The petition for mandamus was therefore granted, with costs against Ronquillo.

• Reconstitution of Judicial Records under Act No. 3110 — Reconstitution does not require a physical or verbatim reproduction of the destroyed pleadings, evidence, judgment, orders, or motions. Under Section 4, Act No. 3110, if it is impossible to find a copy of a motion, decree, order, document, or other proceeding of vital importance, it may be replaced by an agreement on the facts entered into between the counsels or interested parties, reduced to writing, and attached to the proper record. The Court applied this principle to hold that a finding of service of judgment, affirmed on appeal and attached to the reconstituted record, sufficiently established finality.
• Finality of Judgment Based on Reconstituted Notice — Where the trial court and the Court of Appeals have found that notice of the judgment was served upon the attorney for the defeated party, and that finding is part of the reconstituted record, the judgment becomes final and executory. Requiring new service would reverse the final finding of two courts.
• Execution of Final and Executory Judgment Despite Lack of Property Description — A final and executory judgment may be executed even if the property subject thereof cannot be identified for lack of description; the sheriff may make a return, and further proceedings may follow. The damages portion of the judgment may be executed independently of the property description.
• Mandamus to Compel Execution — Mandamus lies where a court refuses to issue a writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment, because such refusal is an unlawful neglect to perform an act specifically enjoined by law and no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy exists.

• "Does a reconstitution mean a physical or verbatim reproduction of the pleadings, evidence, decision or judgment rendered and subsequent judicial acts or orders and motions of the parties prompting them?" — The Court framed the central reconstitution question and answered it through Section 4, Act No. 3110, which permits reconstitution by agreement on facts rather than verbatim reproduction.
• "Be it the main or just an incidental issue, the fact remains that the question of service of judgment was raised, the issue joined, evidence in support of both claims presented, and the respondent court and the court of Appeals passed upon it finding that a notice of judgment had been served upon the attorney for the respondent." — This passage establishes that an incidental finding on service of judgment retains probative value and supports finality.
• "The claim that the parcels of land cannot be identified for lack of description, granting it to be true, is no legal reason for refusing to issue the writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment." — This is the ratio on execution despite lack of property description.
• "To copy or type the dispositive part of the decision in order to have copies thereof served upon the parties or their attorneys and to make the date of receipt of such notice of judgment the beginning of the period within which appeal may be taken would have the effect of reversing the final finding already made by two courts that a notice of the judgment rendered in the case had already been served upon the attorney for the respondent." — This explains why new service was not required and why the judgment was final.

• San Jose vs. de Venecia, 79 Phil. 636 — Cited by respondents for the rule that where only the rendition of the judgment is reconstituted and notice is not, notice must be served anew and the appeal period computed from the new service. The Court found the rule sound but distinguished it because here service of judgment was established and attached to the reconstituted record.
• Velasquez vs. Ysip, 79 Phil. 645 — Cited for the same rule. The Court distinguished it because no notice prior to destruction appeared to have been reconstituted in that case, whereas here both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that notice had been served.

• Section 4, Act No. 3110 — Provides that if it is impossible to find a copy of a motion, decree, order, document, or other proceeding of vital importance for the reconstitution of the record, it may be replaced by an agreement on the facts entered into between the counsels or interested parties, reduced to writing and attached to the proper record. The Court used this provision to hold that reconstitution need not be a physical or verbatim reproduction and that the reconstituted record’s finding of service was sufficient.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.