Dela Rosa vs. Carlos

In a forcible entry case, the sole determinative issue is prior physical possession (possession de facto), and claims of ownership or co-ownership cannot be collaterally raised to defeat the action—they must be ventilated in a separate proceeding. Further, a verified position paper constitutes the affidavit of witnesses required by Rule 70, and possession does not demand continuous physical presence; acts of dominion and periodic visits suffice to maintain juridical and physical possession.

On 1 September 1966, Leonardo Carlos executed an Absolute Deed of Sale conveying a house and lot in Paombong, Bulacan, to his daughter Lucila Dela Rosa and her husband Jesus Dela Rosa. The deed was registered under Act No. 3344 on 6 October 1966. The spouses renovated the house, furnished it, built a perimeter fence, and paid the real property taxes from 1966 onward. They resided in Manila because of work and their children’s schooling but occupied the property on weekends and holidays, padlocked the house when away, and left it under the watch of nearby relatives. Santiago Carlos and Teofila Pacheco, son and another daughter of Leonardo, claimed the property as heirs of their parents and as co-owners, asserting that the sale was void for lack of their mother Benita’s consent and for fraud. In October 1997, Santiago built a house of strong materials on a vacant portion of the lot, and Teofila moved in furniture and began sleeping there. The spouses caused a demand to vacate to be served; the demand was ignored, and the complaint for forcible entry followed.

• Nature of the Action: Spouses Jesus and Lucila Dela Rosa commenced a forcible entry complaint against Santiago Carlos and Teofila Pacheco on 25 February 1998 before the Municipal Trial Court of Paombong, Bulacan. They alleged ownership of a 352-square-meter residential lot and house at No. 25 San Roque, Paombong, by virtue of an Absolute Deed of Sale executed on 1 September 1966 by Leonardo Carlos in their favor. The deed was registered under Act No. 3344 with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on 6 October 1966.

• Acts of Possession by Petitioners: After the sale, petitioner spouses renovated the house, furnished it, and occupied it from 1966 onward. They resided in Manila for work and their children’s schooling but stayed at the property every weekend and during holidays. When absent, they padlocked the house and instructed relatives living nearby to watch over the property. They also built a perimeter fence to separate the lot from the municipal road and paid the real property taxes on the land from 1966 to 1997 and on the house from 1966 to 1993.

• Respondents’ Encroachment: In October 1997, petitioners discovered that Santiago Carlos, without their knowledge or consent and without a building permit, had constructed a house of strong materials on a vacant portion of the lot. Teofila Pacheco had been moving furniture into the house and sleeping there. On 20 November 1997, petitioners’ lawyer demanded that respondents demolish the structure, remove their belongings, and vacate within ten days. The demand was unheeded.

• Respondents’ Defense: Respondents answered as surviving heirs of Leonardo and Benita Carlos. They claimed co-ownership of the property, alleging the 1966 deed of sale was obtained through fraud and undue influence and that their mother Benita did not consent to the sale, rendering it void as a disposition of conjugal property. They maintained petitioners were never in possession and only visited as children of Leonardo, not as owners. Santiago asserted he had occupied the property since birth and built his house in the concept of a co-owner. They admitted, however, that petitioners did visit the property.

• Undisputed Incidents: Petitioners contended that Santiago and Teofila had moved out when they married in 1961 and 1959, respectively—Santiago residing in Manila and Teofila on an adjacent lot. Respondents did not dispute these allegations.

• Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that their complaint lacked verification and a certification against forum shopping. They pointed out that the missing page was an omission by respondents, who failed to attach the complete complaint to their own petition for review.

• Collateral Attack on the Deed of Sale: Petitioners maintained that respondents could not assail the validity of the Absolute Deed of Sale in an ejectment proceeding. The validity of the sale goes to ownership, which is not triable in a summary action for forcible entry.

• Prior Physical Possession: Petitioners contended that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding they failed to prove prior physical possession. They cited the notarized deed of sale, which effected constructive delivery under Article 1498 of the Civil Code, and the overwhelming evidence of material possession: renovation of the house, furnishings, construction of a perimeter fence, payment of taxes, and regular weekend occupation.

• Co-ownership: Petitioners argued that the appellate court misapplied the rules on co-ownership. The remedy of respondents, if they genuinely believed themselves to be co-owners, was to file a separate action for partition or annulment of sale, not to oust petitioners extrajudicially and raise co-ownership as a defense in the ejectment suit.

• Lack of Prior Possession: Respondents countered that petitioners were never in physical possession of the property. They insisted that petitioners only visited as family members, not as owners, and that such visits could not constitute the prior possession required for a forcible entry action. They relied on the petitioners’ admission that they reside in Manila and come to the property only on weekends and vacations, arguing this confirmed respondents’ continuous physical possession since birth.

• Validity of the Sale and Co-ownership: Respondents claimed the Absolute Deed of Sale was void because it was executed without the marital consent of Benita Carlos and was procured through fraud and undue influence. They asserted that, as heirs of both parents, they are co-owners of the property. On this premise, they maintained that the construction of a house by a co-owner on commonly owned land could not be deemed forcible entry.

• Procedural Deficiencies: In the proceedings below, respondents argued that petitioners failed to attach the affidavits of witnesses required by Section 10 of Rule 70, thereby failing to establish prior possession. They also initially raised the absence of a verification and certification against forum shopping, although this argument later proved to be based on respondents’ own incomplete submission.

• Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that it lacked a verification and certification against forum shopping, when the omission was attributable to respondents’ failure to attach the complete pleading to their petition.

• Affidavits of Witnesses under Rule 70: Whether the petitioners’ verified position paper satisfied the requirement of affidavits of witnesses under Sections 10 and 14 of Rule 70, and whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding otherwise.

• Prior Physical Possession: Whether the petitioners sufficiently proved prior physical possession of the property despite not residing there continuously, in light of their renovation, furnishing, fencing, tax payments, and regular weekend occupation.

• Collateral Attack on the Deed of Sale: Whether respondents could properly challenge the validity of the Absolute Deed of Sale in a forcible entry proceeding, and whether the alleged nullity of the sale defeated petitioners’ right to possession.

• Co-ownership as a Defense: Whether the claim of co-ownership barred the ejectment action and whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied the rules on co-ownership to dismiss the complaint.

• Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping: The omission of the verification and certification page was attributable to respondents, not petitioners. The Court of Appeals itself acknowledged in its resolution on reconsideration that the missing page was a mere oversight by respondents, who failed to append the last page of the complaint to their petition for review. No defect inhered in the complaint as filed with the MTC. The appellate court should have faulted respondents, not dismissed the complaint against petitioners.

• Affidavits of Witnesses under Rule 70: The verified position paper constituted the required affidavit of witnesses. The verification, wherein petitioners stated under oath that the allegations were true and correct of their own personal knowledge, is itself an affidavit. Since petitioners are the complainants and have personal knowledge of the facts, their verified pleading fully complied with Sections 10 and 14 of Rule 70. Respondents never raised this issue in the MTC, RTC, or even in their petition for review before the Court of Appeals. The MTC and RTC correctly treated the verified complaint as the requisite affidavit. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling otherwise.

• Prior Physical Possession: Prior physical possession was sufficiently established. The notarized deed of sale effected constructive delivery under Article 1498 of the Civil Code, and the evidence demonstrated actual possession: renovation of the house, furnishing, construction of a perimeter fence, continuous tax payments, padlocking, and regular weekend occupation. Possession does not require that a person stand on every square meter of the property; it is enough that the property is subjected to the possessor’s will. The doctrine in Somodio v. Court of Appeals—that occasional visits and leaving property under another’s care suffice for possession—was applied. Respondents admitted petitioners visited the property and did not rebut the assertion that respondents had moved out upon marriage. The acts of dominion exercised over the property were incompatible with a mere visitor’s presence and established petitioners as the prior possessors.

• Collateral Attack on the Deed of Sale: The validity of the deed of sale could not be challenged in an ejectment suit. Forcible entry cases deal solely with possession de facto and proceed independently of any claim of ownership. Whether the sale was void for lack of marital consent or was vitiated by fraud are questions touching on ownership and must be litigated in a separate plenary action for annulment. Until such a suit is filed and decided, the deed stands, and the possession it underpins cannot be defeated by a collateral attack in a summary proceeding.

• Co-ownership as a Defense: Co-ownership does not bar a forcible entry action where the defendants’ entry was effected through stealth and without the consent of the prior possessor. Resolution of respondents’ claim of co-ownership depends on the success of an action to annul the deed of sale, which had not been instituted. Even if co-ownership were ultimately established, a co-owner may not oust another co-owner and then raise co-ownership to resist ejectment; the proper remedy is a separate action for partition or recovery of possession. The Court of Appeals thus misapplied the rules on co-ownership.

• Verified Pleading as Affidavit — A pleading verified by a party who states under oath that the allegations are true and correct of personal knowledge constitutes an affidavit for purposes of procedural rules requiring the submission of affidavits of witnesses. In ejectment cases under Rule 70, the verified position paper itself satisfies Sections 10 and 14, dispensing with separate witness affidavits so long as the verifying parties are competent to testify on the matters stated.

• Prior Physical Possession in Forcible Entry — Forcible entry concerns possession de facto alone. Prior physical possession need not be continuous actual residence; it is enough that the claimant has subjected the property to his will through acts of dominion, such as construction, renovation, payment of taxes, fencing, and periodic occupation. The doctrine in Somodio v. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 307) holds that possession does not require the possessor’s feet on every square meter; care entrusted to another while the possessor is away does not interrupt possession.

• Impossibility of Collateral Attack on Title in Ejectment — In an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, ownership or claims of title cannot be collaterally interposed to defeat the plaintiff’s right to possession. Any challenge to the validity of a deed of sale on which possession is based must be brought in a separate plenary action for annulment. An ejectment court is not the proper forum to adjudicate ownership.

• Co-ownership as a Defense in Ejectment — A defendant in a forcible entry case cannot defeat the action by simply asserting co-ownership, especially where the entry was clandestine and without the plaintiff’s consent. Co-ownership is merely a consequence of successional rights that must first be established; until ownership is determined in a proper action, the prior possessor is entitled to be restored to possession.

• “In a forcible entry case, the principal issue for resolution is mere physical or material possession (possession de facto) and not juridical possession (possession de jure) nor ownership of the property involved.”

• “Santiago and Teofila cannot properly challenge the validity of the Deed of Sale in the ejectment case because ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership.”

• “The law does not require one in possession of a house to reside in the house to maintain his possession. … possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before he is deemed in possession.”

• “The verification itself is an affidavit. Section 4 of Rule 7 states that a ‘pleading is verified by an affidavit.’ Thus, the verified position paper constitutes the affidavit of witnesses required under Rule 70. Certainly, the Spouses Dela Rosa qualify as witnesses to their own complaint.”

• Somodio v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 307 (1994) — Followed. Applied the principle that possession does not require actual presence on every portion of the land; periodic visits and leaving property under another’s care suffice to maintain possession. Used to hold that petitioners’ weekend occupation and the care entrusted to relatives preserved their possession.

• Spouses Diu v. Ibajan, 379 Phil. 482 (2000) — Cited as authority that ejectment proceedings are independent of claims of ownership. Supported the ruling that respondents could not collaterally attack the deed of sale.

• Nasser v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 783 (1990); Mago v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 225 (1999) — Cited in relation to the sufficiency of a verified complaint as an affidavit for purposes of obtaining a writ of preliminary attachment; used by analogy to support the sufficiency of a verified position paper as an affidavit under Rule 70.

• Section 4, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — A pleading is verified by an affidavit. Applied to equate the verification of the position paper with the required affidavit of witnesses.

• Sections 10 and 14, Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Require the submission of affidavits of witnesses and position papers in ejectment cases. Interpreted to allow a verified position paper of the plaintiffs themselves to satisfy the requirement, as they have direct personal knowledge of the facts.

• Article 1498, Civil Code — Provides that a sale made through a public instrument effects delivery equivalent to transfer of possession, unless the contrary appears. Referred to by the MTC and implicitly accepted as establishing constructive delivery of possession to petitioners upon execution of the notarized deed.

• Act No. 3344 — Registration law under which the deed of sale was recorded with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, supporting petitioners’ claim of open and public acquisition.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Vitug, and Azcuna, JJ., concurred. Ynares-Santiago, J., was on official leave.