Dela Paz vs. Republic of the Philippines

Judicial reconstitution of a lost or destroyed Torrens certificate of title under R.A. No. 26 requires clear and convincing evidence and strict compliance with the ordered sources in Section 3; a petition must fail where none of the submitted documents is a competent source and the petitioner does not prove the existence, original form, and contents of the title.

Marcelino Dela Paz and his mother, Jenny Rose Dela Paz, acquired a parcel of land in Bagbag, Quezon City from the heirs of Luz Dela Paz. The land was covered by TCT No. 206714, and the controversy concerns its judicial reconstitution under R.A. No. 26, the special procedure for restoring Torrens titles lost or destroyed. Section 110 of P.D. No. 1529, as amended by R.A. No. 6732, allows such reconstitution judicially under R.A. No. 26 or administratively under R.A. No. 6732. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, was the respondent.

On 5 June 2007, Marcelino Dela Paz filed a verified petition for reconstitution of TCT No. 206714 covering a parcel of land described as Lot 457-A-12-B-2-B-2-A of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-2114428, situated in Barrio Bagbag, Quezon City, containing an area of 500 square meters more or less. The land had been the subject of an extrajudicial settlement dated 23 October 2000 among the heirs of Luz Dela Paz, namely Franklin S. Bortado, Sr., Franklin P. Bortado, Jr., and Marylou Bortado. Marcelino and his mother, Jenny Rose Dela Paz, thereafter bought the subject land on 23 November 2005.

According to the petition, the original copy of TCT No. 206714 was destroyed by the fire that razed the Quezon City Hall building on 11 June 1988, while the owner’s duplicate copy was lost, as evidenced by an affidavit of loss duly registered and recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Marcelino submitted a photocopy of TCT No. 206714, real property tax declarations, receipts of payment of real property tax, and the land’s sketch plan and subdivision plan. He also submitted an LRA report stating that the plan and technical description of the property may be used as basis for the inscription of the technical description on the reconstituted title, and a certified microfilm copy of the plan and technical description on file with the LRA, which he claimed to be a valid basis and reference for reconstitution.

After considering the evidence, the RTC granted the petition and ordered the reconstitution of TCT No. 206714 based on the approved subdivision plan and technical description. The RTC found that this was a proper case for judicial reconstitution of the original and owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 206714 and ordered the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to reconstitute the original copy in the name of Luz Dela Paz and to issue a second owner’s duplicate copy to Marcelino, based on the approved subdivision plan and technical description, subject to subsisting encumbrances and provided that no certificate of title exists in the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision and dismissed the petition for reconstitution. The CA was not convinced that the evidence was sufficient. It noted that the heirs of Luz Dela Paz who executed the extrajudicial settlement and deed of absolute sale were not presented to acknowledge the same, and the contract of sale was not registered with the Register of Deeds as required under Section 3 of R.A. No. 26. It characterized the certification from the Quezon City Registry of Deeds regarding the loss of the original TCT as a form document in which the name of Luz Dela Paz and the TCT number were merely entered on blanks, and found that it could not be deduced that TCT No. 206714 was actually issued and registered under Luz Dela Paz or that it was part of the Registry’s records. The CA also observed that from 1988 to 2001 the heirs did not file a petition for reconstitution or execute an affidavit concerning the loss of their copy; that the affidavit was made only after the land was transferred to Marcelino and his mother in 2005 and failed to explain the circumstances of the loss; and that the petition was filed only in 2007, nineteen years after the destruction. It held that the tax declaration and tax receipt were not valid bases for reconstitution, that the photocopy of TCT No. 206714 was secondary evidence and inadmissible absent satisfactory proof under Section 5, Rule 130, and that the registered owner’s name in the photocopy was concealed. It further held that the sketch plan and subdivision plan were mere additional requirements under R.A. No. 26 and not sufficient bases for reconstitution, and that the LRA report did not establish that the lot was covered by TCT No. 206714 and registered under Luz Dela Paz. Marcelino’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

• Compliance with R.A. No. 26: Marcelino argued that he had fully complied with the jurisdictional requirements set forth in R.A. No. 26, and that the RTC even found it proper to reconstitute the title based on the approved subdivision plan and technical description of the property.
• Sufficiency of Documentary Evidence: Marcelino submitted that the documents he presented were sufficient to establish the existence of TCT No. 206714 to warrant its reconstitution.
• Public Documents and LRA Report: Marcelino maintained that although the certification that the original copy of TCT No. 206714 was not included among those saved during the fire is pro forma, it is still a public document whose contents are presumed true and accurate; that the LRA report favors reconstitution because the approved plan and technical description were verified by the LRA and may be used as basis for the property’s description in the reconstituted title; and that the other documents are genuine public documents. Considered together, the documentary evidence was sufficient for reconstituting TCT No. 206714.

• Competent Proof for Reconstitution: Whether Marcelino presented competent proof that TCT No. 206714 may be reconstituted based on the documentary evidence he submitted.

• Competent Proof for Reconstitution: No. The petition is devoid of merit; not one of the submitted documents is a competent source under Section 3 of R.A. No. 26, and the requirements for reconstitution must be strictly complied with.

• Competent Proof for Reconstitution: Although a Rule 45 petition generally raises only questions of law and factual findings are conclusive, the Court examined the probative weight of the evidence because the CA’s findings were contrary to those of the RTC. In land registration actions, a party must prove its allegations not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence, which produces a firm belief or conviction as to the allegation sought to be established; this is the standard required in reconstitution proceedings. Reconstitution restores an instrument or title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original form and condition, and its only purpose is to have the title reproduced in the same form it had when the loss or destruction occurred. It is an in rem proceeding; once final, the findings cannot be opened for review. It produces two effects: cancellation of the alleged lost or destroyed title and reissuance of a new duplicate title in its original form and condition. To forestall anomalous or irregular reconstitution, the petitioner must clearly show with convincing evidence: (1) that a certificate of title was lost or destroyed; (2) that the certificate of title sought to be reconstituted is in its original form before it was lost; and (3) that the petition has legal interest over the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. The Court then examined Section 3 of R.A. No. 26, which enumerates the sources for reconstitution in order: (a) the owner’s duplicate; (b) the co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate; (c) a certified copy previously issued by the register of deeds or legal custodian; (d) the deed of transfer or other document on file in the registry of deeds containing the description of the property, or an authenticated copy showing that its original had been registered and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed TCT was issued; (e) a document on file in the registry of deeds by which the property is mortgaged, leased, or encumbered, or an authenticated copy showing that its original had been registered; and (f) any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title. Not one of Marcelino’s documentary evidence fell under this enumeration. The extrajudicial settlement and the deed of absolute sale could not fall under paragraph (d) because they were not filed with the Registry of Deeds and were not the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 206714; they did not reflect that the title should be registered under Luz Dela Paz, the name under which Marcelino sought reconstitution. The photocopy of TCT No. 206714 was not a certified copy previously issued by the Registry of Deeds or legal custodian; a copy without such certification lacks credibility and weight, and the registered owner’s name was concealed, raising doubt as to its authenticity and genuineness. None of the documents fell under paragraph (f) because, under the principle of ejusdem generis, “any other document” must refer to similar documents previously enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (e), i.e., documents issued or on file with the Registry of Deeds, and must be resorted to only in the absence of the preceding sources; failure to show that prior documents were sought and unavailable proscribes the presentation of substitutionary evidence. The survey plan and technical description are not recognized sources of reconstitution; under Section 12 of R.A. No. 26 and LRA Circular No. 35 dated 13 June 1983, they are mere additional documents accompanying competent sources. The tax declaration is only prima facie evidence of a claim of ownership, which is not the issue in a reconstitution proceeding; reconstitution does not pass upon ownership but merely determines whether reissuance of the title is proper. Thus, no competent source existed. The requirements under R.A. No. 26 are indispensable and must be strictly complied with; the petitioner is burdened to adduce in evidence the documents in the order stated in Section 3 and to prove the execution or existence of the original copy on file with the Registry of Deeds and its contents. Marcelino failed to do both, so the CA did not commit a reversible error in reversing the RTC’s order and dismissing the petition for reconstitution.

• Clear and convincing evidence in reconstitution proceedings — In land registration actions, allegations must be proved not merely by preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence, which produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. It is more than preponderance but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. This standard applies to reconstitution of a lost or destroyed Torrens title. The Court applied it to require proof of the jurisdictional requirements before a court may order reconstitution.
• Reconstitution of a Torrens certificate of title — Reconstitution is the restoration of an instrument or title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original form and condition; its only purpose is to have the title reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law, in the same form it had when the loss or destruction occurred. It is an in rem proceeding, and once the order becomes final, the findings therein can no longer be opened for review. It produces cancellation of the alleged lost or destroyed title and reissuance of a new duplicate title. The Court used this doctrine to stress careful scrutiny and strict compliance.
• Requisites for judicial reconstitution — The petitioner must clearly show with convincing evidence: (1) that a certificate of title was lost or destroyed; (2) that the certificate of title sought to be reconstituted is in its original form before it was lost; and (3) that the petition has legal interest over the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. The Court found Marcelino failed to establish the required evidentiary basis.
• Ordered sources under Section 3, R.A. No. 26 — Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from the sources enumerated in Section 3 as may be available, in the following order: (a) the owner’s duplicate; (b) the co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate; (c) a certified copy previously issued by the register of deeds or legal custodian; (d) the deed of transfer or other document on file in the registry of deeds containing the property description, or an authenticated copy showing that its original had been registered and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed TCT was issued; (e) a document on file in the registry of deeds by which the property is mortgaged, leased, or encumbered, or an authenticated copy showing that its original had been registered; and (f) any other document which, in the court’s judgment, is sufficient and proper basis. The Court held none of Marcelino’s documents fell under this enumeration.
• Ejusdem generis in Section 3(f), R.A. No. 26 — Where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific meaning, the general words are not to be construed in their widest extent but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. Thus, “any other document” in paragraph (f) refers to similar documents previously enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (e), i.e., documents issued or on file with the Registry of Deeds; it must be resorted to only in the absence of the preceding sources. The Court applied this to reject the extrajudicial settlement, deed of sale, tax declaration, and other documents as paragraph (f) sources.
• Survey plan and technical description as mere additional documents — Under Section 12 of R.A. No. 26 and LRA Circular No. 35 dated 13 June 1983, a survey plan and technical description are mere additional documents that accompany competent sources for reconstitution; they are not themselves recognized sources. The Court held that reconstitution based on a survey plan and technical description is void for want of factual support.
• Tax declaration not a basis for reconstitution — A tax declaration is only prima facie evidence of a claim of ownership, which is not the issue in a reconstitution proceeding; reconstitution does not pass upon ownership but merely determines whether reissuance of the title is proper. The Court held the tax declaration at most showed that the land had been declared for taxation purposes by Marcelino.
• Certified copy requirement for title reconstitution — A photocopy of a certificate of title that is not a certified copy previously issued by the Registry of Deeds or legal custodian lacks credibility and weight; it would be impossible to reconstitute a title not based on an exact and accurate copy of its original. The Court noted that the registered owner’s name was concealed in the photocopy, raising doubt as to its authenticity.

• "The established legal principle in actions involving land registration is that a party must prove its allegations not merely by a preponderance of evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence." — This states the standard of proof required in reconstitution proceedings and anchors the Court’s demand for strict evidentiary support.
• "Therefore, in order to forestall, if not eliminate entirely, anomalous or irregular reconstitution of a lost or destroyed title, the petitioner must clearly show with convincing evidence: (1) that a certificate of title was lost or destroyed; (2) that the certificate of title sought to be reconstituted is in its original form before it was lost; and (3) that the petition has legal interest over the land covered by the lost or destroyed title." — This is the Court’s canonical formulation of the three requisites for judicial reconstitution.
• "Not one of the documentary evidence Marcelino had presented falls under this enumeration." — This is the core application of Section 3 of R.A. No. 26 to the evidence submitted.
• "The requirements under R.A. No. 26 are indispensable and must be strictly complied with." — This states the Court’s controlling rule on compliance with the statutory sources and procedure for reconstitution.

• Republic of the Philippines vs. Santua, 586 Phil. 291, 298 (2008) — Cited to hold that paragraph (f) of Section 3, R.A. No. 26, referring to “any other document,” must refer to similar documents previously enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (e); also cited for the rule that a tax declaration is not a basis for reconstitution.
• Republic of the Philippines vs. Holazo, 480 Phil. 828, 840 (2004) — Cited for the ejusdem generis construction of Section 3(f) and for the rule that documents under paragraph (f) must be resorted to only in the absence of preceding sources; failure to show that prior documents were sought and unavailable proscribes substitutionary evidence.
• Lee vs. Republic of the Philippines, 418 Phil. 793, 800, 802-803 (2001) — Cited for the purpose of reconstitution and for the rule that reconstitution based on a survey plan and technical description is void for want of factual support; such plan and technical description are not recognized sources under Section 3, R.A. No. 26.
• Heirs of Pastora Lozano vs. Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan, 530 Phil. 255, 267 (2006) — Cited for the rule that the petitioner in a reconstitution proceeding is burdened to adduce the documents in the order stated in Section 3, R.A. No. 26, and to prove the execution or existence of the original copy on file with the Registry of Deeds and its contents.
• Republic of the Philippines vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 241 Phil. 75, 83 (1988) — Cited for the warning against hasty and reckless grant of petitions for reconstitution and the need to scrutinize supporting documents due to tampering and fake titles threatening the Torrens system.
• Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Sison, 209 Phil. 325, 335, 337 (1983) — Cited for the in rem character of reconstitution proceedings and for the clear and convincing evidence standard in land registration.
• Republic of the Philippines vs. Catarroja, 626 Phil. 389, 396 (2010); Republic of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Spouses Sanchez, 749 Phil. 999, 1004 (2014) — Cited as authority that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies in reconstitution proceedings.

• Section 3, Republic Act No. 26 — Enumerates the sources for reconstitution of transfer certificates of title in order (a) to (f). The Court held that none of Marcelino’s documentary evidence fell under any paragraph and that the requirements are indispensable and must be strictly complied with.
• Section 12, Republic Act No. 26 — Provides that petitions for reconstitution from sources in Sections 2(c) to 2(f) and 3(c) to 3(f) are filed with the RTC and lists required contents and attachments; if reconstitution is exclusively from Section 2(f) or 3(f), the petition must be accompanied by a plan and technical description approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office or a certified copy of the description from a prior certificate of title. The Court cited this to show that a survey plan and technical description are mere additional documents, not independent sources.
• Section 110, Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), as amended by Republic Act No. 6732 — Allows reconstitution of lost or destroyed original Torrens titles judicially under R.A. No. 26 or administratively under R.A. No. 6732. The Court noted that Marcelino sought judicial reconstitution by filing with the RTC.
• Paragraph 5, LRA Circular No. 35 dated 13 June 1983 — In reconstitution exclusively from Sections 2(f) and 3(f) of R.A. No. 26, the signed duplicate petition forwarded to the Commission must be accompanied by a duly prepared plan and technical description. The Court cited this to reinforce that plans and technical descriptions accompany, but do not substitute for, competent sources.
• Section 5, Rule 130, Rules of Court — The CA cited this in holding that the photocopy of TCT No. 206714 was secondary evidence and inadmissible absent satisfactory proof of admissibility. The Supreme Court likewise found the photocopy not a certified copy and noted that the registered owner’s name was concealed.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Lucas P. Bersamin, Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, and Alexander G. Gesmundo.