Dela Llana vs. Commission on Elections

The governing principle is that a consultative referendum asking the electorate to express confidence in the incumbent President’s continuance in office and his assumption of the Prime Ministership does not constitute a constitutional amendment, presents a political question beyond judicial competence, and is expressly authorized by Amendment No. 7 of the 1973 Constitution. Because an affirmative vote merely reaffirms existing law and a negative vote results only in the incumbent’s exercise of the inherent prerogative to resign, the calling of the referendum suffers from no constitutional infirmity.

President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1229 to convene a national referendum scheduled for December 17, 1977, to be supervised by the Commission on Elections. The ballot contained a single question asking voters to affirm or reject whether the incumbent President should continue in office and assume the position of Prime Minister following the organization of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as contemplated in Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 Constitutional Amendments. Petitioner challenged the decree, contending that the exercise was unnecessary, improperly framed, and constitutionally infirm. The respondents defended the executive’s authority to call the referendum, emphasizing its consultative character and the President’s categorical pledge to resign should the electorate vote in the negative.

• Presidential Decree No. 1229 mandated a national referendum on December 17, 1977, to be administered under the supervision of the Commission on Elections. The referendum presented the electorate with a single question: whether they vote for the incumbent President to continue in office and become Prime Minister after the Interim Batasang Pambansa convenes, as provided under Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 Constitutional Amendments. Petitioner challenged the decree, arguing that the referendum was unnecessary, improperly framed, and constitutionally infirm. The Solicitor General defended the executive’s authority to call the referendum, emphasizing its consultative nature and the President’s categorical pledge to resign should the electorate vote in the negative. The Court treated the petition as a direct challenge to the validity of P.D. 1229 and the constitutionality of the referendum mechanism itself, ultimately resolving to dismiss it without further proceedings.

• Petitioner maintained that the December 17, 1977 referendum lacked constitutional basis because it sought to reaffirm or effectively amend Amendment No. 3 through a consultative vote rather than through the formal constitutional amendment process. Petitioner argued that the question was improper for a referendum, as the Constitution envisions contested elections on fixed dates rather than plebiscites affirming a single incumbent. Petitioner further contended that holding the referendum under martial law conditions compromised free expression, rendering the exercise a waste of public funds that should instead address economic distress.

• Respondents, through the Solicitor General, argued that the referendum was explicitly authorized by Amendment No. 7 of the 1973 Constitution, which permits the government to ascertain the people’s will on important matters of national or local interest. Respondents maintained that the referendum question did not seek to amend the Constitution but merely to gauge public confidence in the incumbent President’s continuance in office and assumption of the Prime Ministership. Respondents emphasized that a negative result would not alter the Constitution but would simply exercise the President’s inherent prerogative to resign, thereby rendering the exercise constitutionally sound and politically legitimate.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the petition for prohibition and declaratory relief warrants due course and judicial intervention to enjoin the holding of the December 17, 1977 referendum.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the referendum question constitutes a de facto constitutional amendment.
  • Whether the necessity and wisdom of calling a referendum present a justiciable controversy or a political question.
  • Whether Amendment No. 7 of the 1973 Constitution validly authorizes the President to call a referendum on the incumbent’s continuance in office and assumption of the Prime Ministership.

• Procedural:
  • The Court dismissed the petition without giving it due course, holding that the matter does not pose a question of sufficient importance or significance to warrant judicial intervention. The dismissal was declared immediately executory.
• Substantive:
  • The Court held that the referendum question neither alters nor indirectly amends Amendment No. 3 of the Constitution, as an affirmative vote merely reaffirms existing provisions and a negative vote results only in the incumbent’s voluntary resignation, which is a prerogative inherent to public office.
  • The Court classified the necessity of the referendum as a political and non-justiciable question, falling exclusively within the discretion of the political branches to evaluate multifaceted political, social, and economic considerations outside judicial competence.
  • The Court ruled that the call for the referendum is expressly authorized by Amendment No. 7, which grants the government broad discretion to ascertain the people’s will on important matters, and aligns with the constitutional principle that public office is a public trust requiring accountability to the electorate.

• Political Question Doctrine — The doctrine holds that certain questions are constitutionally committed to the political branches of government and are not subject to judicial review because they lack judicially discoverable and manageable standards. The Court applied this doctrine to the necessity and wisdom of calling the referendum, ruling that the decision to consult the people involves multifaceted political, social, and economic considerations outside judicial competence.
• Public Office as a Public Trust — Derived from Section 1, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, this principle mandates that public officers remain accountable to the people. The Court relied on this doctrine to validate the President’s decision to submit himself to a vote of confidence, characterizing the referendum as an act of democratic accountability rather than a constitutional alteration.

• "If the people vote 'yes,' Amendment No. 3 will merely be reaffirmed and reinforced. If the people vote 'no,' the incumbent President, heeding 'the will' of the people, will - as he has categorically announced - resign; in such situation, he will be merely exercising the prerogative, inherent in all public officials, to resign. In either case the Constitution, as it now reads, will remain unaltered." — This passage articulates the Court’s rationale for rejecting the claim that the referendum effects a constitutional amendment, emphasizing that the exercise merely reaffirms existing law or triggers a voluntary resignation.
• "The power to determine when a referendum should be called and what matter is important for referral to the people, resides in the political branch of the Government, the exercise of which involves consideration of a multitude of factors political, social, economic, etc. - normally outside the periphery of competence of the courts." — The Court invoked this formulation to classify the referendum’s necessity as a political question, thereby foreclosing judicial review.

• Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. Nos. L-44640, L-44684, L-44714, October 12, 1976) — Cited in the dissenting opinions to challenge the constitutional validity of referendums under martial law and the 1976 Amendments; the majority implicitly affirmed the validity of Amendment No. 7 as previously interpreted.
• Gonzales vs. Comelec (L-40117, February 22, 1975) — Cited by Justice Teehankee in dissent to argue that referendums under the 1973 Constitution are purely consultative, lack constitutional authorization for matters of personnel, and cannot substitute for the formal amendment process or electoral mandates.
• Javellana vs. Executive Secretary (L-36142, March 31, 1973) — Referenced in the dissents to support the view that expressions of the people’s will under martial law lack judicial certainty due to restricted media and coercive conditions.

• Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 Constitutional Amendments — Provides that the incumbent President shall serve as Prime Minister and continue exercising all presidential and prime ministerial powers after the Interim Batasang Pambansa is organized. The Court interpreted the referendum as a reaffirmation, not an alteration, of this provision.
• Amendment No. 7 of the 1973 Constitution — Authorizes referenda through barangays under COMELEC supervision to ascertain the people’s will on important national or local matters. The Court relied on this provision as the direct constitutional basis for calling the December 17, 1977 referendum.
• Section 1, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution — Establishes that public office is a public trust and requires public officers to remain accountable to the people. The Court invoked this principle to validate the President’s voluntary submission to a public vote of confidence.

• Justice Barredo — Concurred with the dismissal but clarified that the referendum does not technically amend the Constitution even if the result is negative. Justice Barredo reasoned that the incumbent retains the individual prerogative to decline the Prime Ministership, and a negative vote merely constitutes a popular mandate permitting that declination. He further noted that, substantively, the referendum functions as a ratification mechanism to isolate the specific question from broader issues, thereby satisfying democratic intent without violating formal amendment procedures.
• Justice Santos — Concurred on the grounds that the referendum advances democratic mechanisms and implements the sovereignty of the people under Amendment No. 7. Justice Santos emphasized the President’s categorical commitment to resign if defeated, arguing that this assurance guarantees a genuine expression of the electorate’s will and dispels claims of coercion under martial law.

• Justice Teehankee — Dissented on the ground that the Constitution does not authorize referendums on the affirmation or repudiation of a single incumbent, as the constitutional framework mandates contested elections on fixed dates under COMELEC supervision. He argued that the proposed question falls outside the scope of “important matters” under Amendment No. 7 and that free expression under martial law cannot be judicially verified, rendering the referendum constitutionally improper and susceptible to coercion.
• Justice Muñoz Palma — Dissented by reiterating her position in prior referendum cases that the 1973 Constitution does not authorize the amending process through presidential decrees calling referendums. She classified the necessity of the referendum as a justiciable question because it involves the appropriation and expenditure of public funds, which remains subject to constitutional limitations and judicial review. She further stressed that martial law inherently involves coercion and repression, thereby invalidating any expression of popular will and rendering the ten-million-peso expenditure futile.