Dela Cruz vs. The Office of the Ombudsman

The doctrine of finality of judgment does not apply to the results of a preliminary investigation, and the Ombudsman may motu proprio reinvestigate or reconsider its earlier rulings even without new matters or evidence, its findings on probable cause being entitled to great respect absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioner Cesar J. Dela Cruz was an Assistant City Prosecutor assigned to conduct the inquest investigation of a homicide case arising from the death of fourteen-year-old Manny Abequiebel, son of Lilia M. Abequibel, against five children in conflict with the law designated as AAA, BBB, CCC, DDD, and EEE. The case implicated the guardians of the accused minors, who entered into an amicable settlement with Abequiebel. The dispute turns on the constitutional and statutory framework governing the Office of the Ombudsman, which under Article XI, Section 13(1) of the Constitution and Section 15(1) of RA 6770 is vested with wide latitude to investigate and prosecute, motu proprio or on complaint, any act or omission of any public officer appearing illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Republic Act No. 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, prohibits public officials and employees from having any financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office.

On May 19, 2014, Cesar J. Dela Cruz, an Assistant City Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the inquest investigation of a homicide case filed against five children in conflict with the law — AAA, BBB, CCC, DDD, and EEE — arising from the death of fourteen-year-old Manny Abequiebel, son of Lilia M. Abequibel. The case was docketed as NPS No. XV-16-INQ-14E-00309. On May 27, 2014, the parties entered into an amicable settlement providing that, upon payment of the respective settlement debts stated in the Agreement, Abequiebel would no longer pursue the criminal case against the accused.

In a Resolution dated May 30, 2014, Dela Cruz recommended the dismissal of the case against AAA and CCC because their guardians had paid Abequiebel their respective monetary obligations and Abequiebel had executed an Affidavit of Desistance in their favor on the same date. Thereafter, the guardians of DDD and EEE paid their respective monetary liabilities, and Abequiebel executed an Affidavit of Desistance in favor of DDD and EEE on July 10, 2014. Dela Cruz thus issued a Resolution dated October 17, 2014 dismissing the case against DDD and EEE. In that Resolution, Dela Cruz noted that BBB did not participate in any amicable settlement with Abequiebel despite the signature of his guardian appearing in the Agreement; because BBB was found by Social Welfare Officer IV Jurita P. Olvido of the Taguig City Social Welfare and Development Office to have "Acted Without Discernment," the case against BBB was likewise dismissed.

In a Complaint notarized on October 30, 2014, Abequiebel alleged that Dela Cruz received the amounts of PHP 35,000.00 and PHP 25,000.00 paid by the guardians of AAA and CCC, respectively, and took PHP 10,000.00 from each amount, leaving her with only PHP 25,000.00 and PHP 15,000.00. Abequiebel also stated that she went to Dela Cruz's office to inform him of her receipt of PHP 25,000.00 each from the guardians of EEE and DDD pursuant to their Agreement, and that Dela Cruz asked for his share of such payments; when she told him she only had PHP 2,000.00 left, Dela Cruz nonetheless asked to be paid PHP 1,500.00. The amounts paid by the guardians and the amounts allegedly taken by Dela Cruz totaled PHP 21,500.00.

The National Bureau of Investigation, acting on a Memorandum issued by then Department of Justice Undersecretary Jose F. Justiniano, conducted an investigation and issued a Memorandum dated June 5, 2015 finding that Dela Cruz intervened in the amicable settlement between Abequiebel and the parents of the accused CCC, AAA, DDD, and EEE. In an Indorsement letter dated September 3, 2015, former DOJ Secretary Leila M. De Lima referred the NBI findings to former Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales for appropriate action. On October 19, 2015, the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman, as nominal complainant, filed a criminal complaint for violation of Sec. 3(e) and (h) of RA 3019 and Sec. 7(d) of RA 6713, as well as an administrative complaint for Grave Misconduct, recommending that Dela Cruz be held liable because his intervention and collection of a portion of the amicable settlement for himself were indicative of corruption and violative of both statutes.

In his Counter-Affidavit, Dela Cruz denied the accusations and claimed that all payments made by the guardians to Abequiebel were made in the presence of Abequiebel and other parties such as the parents of the minors, barangay authorities, and Olvido of the Social Welfare and Development Office of Taguig City. He asserted that, in the interest of protecting the parties, he issued receipts stating the full amounts received by Abequiebel, signed by the respective parties, and furnished copies to the parties. As to the alleged demand for PHP 1,500.00 from the payments of the guardians of DDD and EEE, Dela Cruz denied the allegation and claimed that Abequiebel was not clear as to when and where such amount was allegedly given to him. He averred that Abequiebel had ill motive in filing the complaint because he had dismissed the case against BBB despite the latter's non-payment of the amount agreed upon in the Agreement.

The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Dela Cruz for three counts of violation of Sec. 7(d), in relation to Sec. 11(a) last paragraph, of RA 6713, based on the following: (a) as investigating prosecutor of the inquest case, Dela Cruz conducted hearings in his official capacity; (b) as narrated by Abequiebel in her Sinumpaang Salaysay, Dela Cruz allegedly solicited PHP 21,500.00 in three separate instances; (c) the guardians of AAA and CCC paid Abequiebel in the office and in the presence of Dela Cruz, who issued his own handwritten receipts; (d) AAA's guardian, in his handwritten statement, unequivocally stated that Dela Cruz told him to leave the room upon giving the money; and (e) Dela Cruz dismissed the case against the accused after payment of the settlement debt even though AAA acted with discernment. The Ombudsman emphasized that the prohibition in Sec. 7(d) of RA 6713 is malum prohibitum and that Dela Cruz's defenses, being evidentiary in nature, would be best presented during trial proper. The charges under Sec. 3(e) and (h) of RA 3019 were dismissed for lack of probable cause.

• Finality of Judgment: Dela Cruz claimed that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in motu proprio reversing itself more than two months after it had issued its previous Order dismissing the criminal complaint, invoking the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment and asserting that the November 27, 2019 Order must take precedence over the February 13, 2020 Order as the former had already reached finality by operation of law.
• Applicability of the Ombudsman Rules on Administrative Cases: Dela Cruz maintained that the provisions on finality and execution of decision under Rule III, Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 07, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, should also apply to criminal cases, such that the dismissal of the criminal complaint necessarily became final after the lapse of the reglementary period provided under Sections 7 and 8, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules.
• Absence of Solicitation: Dela Cruz argued that he was assigned to the inquest case as part of his duty as Assistant City Prosecutor, which was neither by his design nor desire; that Abequiebel voluntarily and unconditionally signed receipts covering the amounts she received in the presence of parents of the accused minors, barangay authorities, and Olvido; that as handling prosecutor he merely witnessed and formalized the amicable settlement independently reached by the parties; that even assuming he asked AAA's guardian to leave the room, the other guardians of the co-accused were still present; and that the dismissal of AAA was a logical consequence of the Agreement and the Affidavit of Desistance.
• Presence of Witnesses: In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, Dela Cruz emphasized that Olvido, a Social Worker of the Taguig City Social Welfare and Development Office, was personally present during the preliminary investigation on May 28, 2014, and had narrated in her Salaysay that the parents of the other accused minors witnessed Abequiebel's receipt of PHP 25,000.00 from CCC.

• Inapplicability of Res Judicata and Double Jeopardy: The Ombudsman claimed that res judicata and double jeopardy do not apply in preliminary investigation.
• Power to Order Another Review: The Ombudsman emphasized that it is not precluded from ordering another review of the case and that the courts must uphold the policy of non-interference considering the Ombudsman's constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutorial powers.
• Defenses Best Ventilated at Trial: The Ombudsman maintained that Dela Cruz's claims are matters of defense and are, thus, best ventilated during a full-blown trial.

• Reversal of the November 27, 2019 Order: Whether the Ombudsman erred in issuing the assailed February 13, 2020 Order reversing its November 27, 2019 Order granting the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Dela Cruz.

• Reversal of the November 27, 2019 Order: No. The petition is bereft of merit. The doctrine of finality of judgment does not apply to the results of a preliminary investigation, and the Ombudsman may motu proprio reinvestigate or reconsider its earlier rulings absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.

• Reversal of the November 27, 2019 Order: The Constitution and RA 6770 vest the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude to investigate and prosecute, motu proprio or on complaint of any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office, or agency when such act or omission appears illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The Court has consistently adopted a policy of non-interference in the Ombudsman's exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers, and may review its acts only if a party substantiates, not merely alleges, grave abuse of discretion. As stated in Casing vs. Hon. Ombudsman, grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, done in an arbitrary or despotic manner so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. The Court has recognized specific instances warranting interference: to afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; when there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; and where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance. The conflicting Orders resolved the Motion for Reconsideration assailing the July 26, 2018 Resolution finding probable cause, and the determination of whether probable cause exists is a function that belongs to the Ombudsman. Under Dichaves vs. Office of the Ombudsman, the executive determination of probable cause is a highly factual matter, and the Court, not being a trier of facts, defers to the sound judgment of the Ombudsman absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion. The records show that the matter was subjected to separate investigations by the NBI and the Ombudsman, both finding that Dela Cruz intervened in the amicable settlement and recommending the filing of appropriate criminal charges; the assailed February 13, 2020 Order affirms the July 26, 2018 Resolution, which is in line with the findings of the NBI and the FIO. Absent any grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not disturb the findings of the Ombudsman. The petition does not directly call for review of the probable cause finding but claims that the Ombudsman committed reversible error in issuing the assailed Order more than two months after the Motion for Reconsideration had already been granted. Dela Cruz invokes the doctrine of finality of judgment and claims that, applying the provisions on finality and execution of decisions in administrative cases under Sec. 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules to criminal cases, the November 27, 2019 Order had attained finality. However, Sec. 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules particularly refers to procedures in administrative cases and provides when an administrative case shall be considered final and executory or unappealable, as well as when the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals via Rule 43. The Ombudsman Rules does not provide for a similar provision in criminal cases. In criminal cases before the Ombudsman, upon evaluation of the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend any of the following: (a) dismiss the case outright for want of palpable merit; (b) refer the complaint to respondent for comment; (c) indorse the complaint to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case; (d) forward the complaint to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation; (e) refer the case for administrative adjudication; or (f) subject the case to a preliminary investigation. It is settled that the remedy of an aggrieved party from a resolution of the Ombudsman finding the presence or absence of probable cause is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court. In Yatco vs. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, the Court discussed the clear distinction between assailing the rulings of the Ombudsman in administrative and criminal cases: for administrative charges, Ombudsman rulings exonerating the respondent are considered final and unappealable but still subject to judicial review on the ground of grave abuse of discretion via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals, while in cases where the respondent is not exonerated and the penalty is not merely public censure or reprimand or suspension of not more than one month's salary, the decision is appealable under Rule 43; with respect to criminal charges, the remedy of an aggrieved party from a resolution of the Ombudsman finding the presence or absence of probable cause is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not before the Court of Appeals but before the Supreme Court. It is thus apparent from the Ombudsman Act and the Ombudsman Rules, as amended, as well as jurisprudence, that the provision pertaining to the finality and execution of a decision of the Ombudsman and the appropriate remedies available to aggrieved parties in administrative charges do not apply to criminal cases. To apply the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment invoked by Dela Cruz, it is first necessary to determine if there is indeed a final judgment. Under FGU Insurance Corp. vs. Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 66, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, whether by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land; the rule admits exceptions: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. In Imingan vs. The Office of the Honorable Ombudsman, the Court emphasized that the results of preliminary investigations cannot be considered a valid and final judgment: preliminary investigation does not form part of trial, and investigation for the purpose of determining whether an actual charge shall subsequently be filed is a purely administrative, rather than a judicial or quasi-judicial, function; it is not an exercise in adjudication, as no ruling is made on the rights and obligations of the parties, but merely evidentiary appraisal to determine if it is worth going into actual adjudication; the dismissal of a complaint on preliminary investigation by a prosecutor cannot be considered a valid and final judgment, and as there is no former final judgment or order on the merits rendered by the court having jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties, there could not have been res judicata. Considering that both the November 27, 2019 and the February 13, 2020 Orders were issued to resolve a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the July 26, 2018 Resolution finding probable cause, the Orders pertain to the results of preliminary investigations and cannot be considered as valid and final judgments; hence, the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment cannot be applied. The two conflicting Orders were notably prepared and signed by the same officer, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III Lauren Gail D. Divino-Sudweste, and from a perusal of the assailed Order, it appears as if the Motion for Reconsideration was being resolved for the first time, with no reference to the earlier Order already dismissing the criminal case. Nonetheless, the Court respects the power of the Ombudsman to reinvestigate and reconsider its earlier rulings. In Binay vs. Office of the Ombudsman, citing Alvarez vs. People, Roxas vs. Hon. Vasquez, and Abdula vs. Guiani, the Court recognized the Ombudsman's power to revoke or alter the ruling of its predecessor as well as order another review of a complaint: a sitting Ombudsman has the power to revoke or alter the rulings of a predecessor within the bounds of law; the Ombudsman is not precluded from ordering another review of a complaint, for he or she may revoke, repeal or abrogate the acts or previous rulings of a predecessor in office; and new matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for the prosecutor, or in this case the Office of the Ombudsman, to review and re-evaluate its findings and the evidence already submitted. In Roxas vs. Hon. Vasquez, the Court held that in criminal prosecutions, a reinvestigation, like an appeal, renders the entire case open for review; it matters not that the complainants did not seek a reinvestigation or reconsideration of the dismissal of the charges; consistent with its independence as protector of the people and as prosecutor to ensure accountability of public officers, the Ombudsman is not and should not be limited in its review by the action or inaction of complainants; and it is clear from Section 15 of RA 6770 that the Ombudsman may motu proprio conduct a reinvestigation to assure that the guilty do not go unpunished. In Abdula vs. Guiani, the Court held that the respondent did not abuse his discretion in ordering a reinvestigation of a criminal charge previously dismissed, and that it is not material that no new matter or evidence was presented, because reinvestigation is merely a repeat investigation of the case and new matters or evidence are not prerequisites. Sec. 7, Rule II of the Ombudsman Rules provides that an aggrieved party may file one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of the adverse order or resolution; however, the Ombudsman may motu proprio conduct a reinvestigation, consistent with its independence as protector of the people and as prosecutor to ensure accountability of public officers, and is not and should not be limited in its review by the action or inaction of complainants. Even if the criminal charge against Dela Cruz was previously dismissed, the Ombudsman did not abuse its discretion in reconsidering its earlier findings, and is not required to base its findings on new matters or evidence. Redulla vs. Sandiganbayan also involved the reversal of the previous findings of the Ombudsman and serves as an example of a case when the Ombudsman's act of reinvestigating cases and reconsidering its earlier rulings is within its power; that case involved an Information already filed before the Sandiganbayan, while the present case involves a Motion for Reconsideration of a Resolution finding probable cause. If the Ombudsman can freely exercise its power to reinvestigate cases and even file another Information after the same was already withdrawn, it can also reinvestigate a case during the preliminary investigation stage and reconsider or revisit its earlier ruling. Considering that the present case does not fall under any of the exceptions recognized under jurisprudence when courts may interfere with the investigatory powers of the Ombudsman, the Court upholds the policy of non-interference in the Ombudsman's exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers, including its power to motu proprio initiate a reinvestigation or reconsideration of a case within its jurisdiction. The Court recognizes the right of the Ombudsman to reinvestigate cases or reconsider its earlier rulings, but such power must be wielded cautiously so as not to frustrate the ends of justice. Absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion in the determination of the existence of probable cause and the issuance of a subsequent Order affirming its earlier findings, the Petition for Certiorari must be dismissed.

• Doctrine of Finality of Judgment (Immutability of Judgment) — A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, whether by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. The rule admits exceptions: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. In this case, the Court held that the doctrine cannot be invoked because the assailed Orders pertained to the results of a preliminary investigation, which cannot be considered a valid and final judgment.
• Preliminary Investigation Is Not a Final Judgment — Preliminary investigation does not form part of trial; it is a purely administrative, rather than a judicial or quasi-judicial, function, involving no ruling on the rights and obligations of the parties but merely evidentiary appraisal to determine if it is worth going into actual adjudication. The dismissal of a complaint on preliminary investigation by a prosecutor cannot be considered a valid and final judgment, and absent a former final judgment or order on the merits rendered by a court having jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties, res judicata cannot attach. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the November 27, 2019 and February 13, 2020 Orders, both resolving a Motion for Reconsideration of a probable-cause Resolution, were not final judgments.
• Ombudsman's Power to Reinvestigate and Reconsider, Including Motu Proprio — The Ombudsman is not precluded from ordering another review of a complaint, for it may revoke, repeal or abrogate the acts or previous rulings of a predecessor in office, and new matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for the prosecutor, or in this case the Office of the Ombudsman, to review and re-evaluate its findings and the evidence already submitted. In criminal prosecutions, a reinvestigation, like an appeal, renders the entire case open for review, and the Ombudsman is not and should not be limited in its review by the action or inaction of complainants; Section 15 of RA 6770 authorizes the Ombudsman to motu proprio conduct a reinvestigation to assure that the guilty do not go unpunished. The Court applied this doctrine in upholding the assailed Order reinstating the finding of probable cause.
• Policy of Non-Interference with the Ombudsman's Investigatory and Prosecutorial Powers — The Office of the Ombudsman has wide latitude to investigate and prosecute, motu proprio or on complaint of any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office, or agency when such act or omission appears illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Courts shall not interfere in the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in determining probable cause, and the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, or lack of it, is entitled to great respect if there is no showing of grave abuse of discretion. The Court may interfere only in the recognized instances: (a) to afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (b) when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (c) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; (d) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (e) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (f) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g) where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (h) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; and (i) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance. The Court found that the present case did not fall under any of these exceptions.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction; the Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law, in order to exceptionally warrant judicial intervention. A party invoking Rule 65 must substantiate, not merely allege, that there was grave abuse of discretion. The Court found no such showing.
• Distinction Between Remedies in Administrative and Criminal Cases Before the Ombudsman — With respect to administrative charges, Ombudsman rulings exonerating the respondent, or imposing public censure or reprimand or suspension of not more than one month's salary, are final and unappealable but still subject to judicial review on the ground of grave abuse of discretion via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals; in all other administrative cases, the decision is appealable under Rule 43 before the Court of Appeals. With respect to criminal charges, the remedy of an aggrieved party from a resolution of the Ombudsman finding the presence or absence of probable cause is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court. The provision on finality and execution of a decision in administrative cases under Sec. 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules does not apply to criminal cases.
• Probable Cause as a Highly Factual Matter — The executive determination of probable cause is a highly factual matter, requiring probing into the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he or she was prosecuted. The Office of the Ombudsman, armed with the power to investigate, is in a better position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of the evidence on hand needed to make a finding of probable cause, and the Court, not being a trier of facts, defers to the sound judgment of the Ombudsman.

• "Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner — which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to ac at all in contemplation of law — in order to exceptionally warrant judicial intervention." — This passage, quoted from Casing vs. Hon. Ombudsman, states the controlling standard for judicial review of the Ombudsman's acts and supplies the threshold that Dela Cruz failed to meet.
• "An independent constitutional body, the Office of the Ombudsman is 'beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people[,] and [is] the preserver of the integrity of the public service.' Thus, it has the sole power to determine whether there is probable cause to warrant the filing of a criminal case against an accused. This function is executive in nature. The executive determination of probable cause is a highly factual matter." — Quoted from Dichaves vs. Office of the Ombudsman, this passage anchors the Court's deference to the Ombudsman's probable-cause determination and explains why the Court declined to substitute its own assessment of the evidence.
• "Jurisprudence has long settled that preliminary investigation does not form part of trial. Investigation for the purpose of determining whether an actual charge shall subsequently be filed against the person subject of the investigation is a purely administrative, rather than a judicial or quasi-judicial, function. It is not an exercise in adjudication: no ruling is made on the rights and obligations of the parties, but merely evidentiary appraisal to determine if it is worth going into actual adjudication." — Quoted from Imingan vs. The Office of the Honorable Ombudsman, this passage is the ratio for rejecting the invocation of the doctrine of finality of judgment, characterizing preliminary investigation as non-adjudicatory.
• "In criminal prosecutions, a reinvestigation, like an appeal, renders the entire case open for review. It matters not that the complainants did not seek a reinvestigation or reconsideration of the dismissal of the charges against petitioners. Consistent with its independence as protector of the people and as prosecutor to ensure accountability of public officers, the Ombudsman is not and should not be limited in its review by the action or inaction of complainants." — Quoted from Roxas vs. Hon. Vasquez, this passage defines the breadth of the Ombudsman's power to reinvestigate and supports the holding that the Ombudsman may motu proprio reconsider its earlier rulings even without new evidence.

• Casing vs. Hon. Ombudsman, 687 Phil. 468 (2012) — Controlling precedent supplying the definition of grave abuse of discretion applied to test the assailed Order; also cited for the rule that the determination of probable cause belongs to the Ombudsman.
• Dichaves vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 802 Phil. 564 (2016) — Followed for the rule that the executive determination of probable cause is a highly factual matter and that the Court defers to the sound judgment of the Ombudsman absent grave abuse of discretion.
• Yatco vs. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, G.R. No. 244775, July 6, 2020 — Followed for the settled distinction between the remedies for assailing Ombudsman rulings in administrative and criminal charges, and for the rule that the remedy in criminal cases is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court.
• FGU Insurance Corp. vs. Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 66, 659 Phil. 117 (2011) — Cited for the doctrine of finality or immutability of judgment and its recognized exceptions.
• Imingan vs. The Office of the Honorable Ombudsman, G.R. No. 226420, March 4, 2020 — Followed for the rule that the results of preliminary investigations cannot be considered a valid and final judgment, and that res judicata cannot attach absent a former final judgment on the merits.
• Binay vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 213957-58, August 7, 2019 — Followed for the rule that a sitting Ombudsman has the power to revoke or alter the rulings of a predecessor within the bounds of law, and that the Ombudsman may order another review of a complaint.
• Alvarez vs. People, 668 Phil. 216 (2011) — Cited in Binay for the rule that the Ombudsman is not precluded from ordering another review of a complaint and may revoke, repeal or abrogate the acts or previous rulings of a predecessor in office.
• Roxas vs. Hon. Vasquez, 411 Phil. 276 (2001) — Followed for the rule that a reinvestigation renders the entire case open for review, that new matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a reinvestigation, and that the Ombudsman may motu proprio conduct a reinvestigation under Section 15 of RA 6770.
• Abdula vs. Guiani, 382 Phil. 757 (2000) — Followed for the rule that a reinvestigation is merely a repeat investigation and that new matters or evidence are not prerequisites for it.
• Redulla vs. Sandiganbayan, 545 Phil. 711 (2007) — Cited as an example of a case where the Ombudsman's act of reinvestigating and reconsidering its earlier rulings was upheld, and as the source of the enumeration of instances when courts may interfere with the Ombudsman's investigatory powers.
• Vergara vs. Ombudsman, 600 Phil. 26 (2009) — Cited for the policy of non-interference and the rule that the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, or lack of it, is entitled to great respect absent grave abuse of discretion.
• De Jesus vs. Guerrero III, 614 Phil. 520 (2009) — Cited in the November 27, 2019 Order for the principle that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof.

• Section 7(d), Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) — Declares it unlawful for public officials and employees to have, directly or indirectly, any financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office. This is the offense for which the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Dela Cruz for three counts.
• Section 11(a), last paragraph, Republic Act No. 6713 — Cited in relation to Section 7(d) as the penal provision under which Dela Cruz was to be indicted.
• Section 3(e) and Section 3(h), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Section 3(e) penalizes causing undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; Section 3(h) penalizes having direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity. The Ombudsman dismissed these charges for lack of probable cause, finding the elements of Section 3(e) unsupported and holding that an inquest proceeding is not a business, contract, or transaction in which Dela Cruz could have a financial or pecuniary interest.
• Article XI, Section 13(1), Constitution — Vests the Office of the Ombudsman with the power to investigate on its own or on complaint by any person any act or omission of any public official or employee, office, or agency when such act or omission appears illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Cited as the constitutional source of the Ombudsman's wide latitude to investigate and prosecute.
• Section 15(1), Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) — Provides the statutory basis for the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial powers, including the authority to act motu proprio. Cited alongside the Constitution as the source of the Ombudsman's power to reinvestigate.
• Section 15, Republic Act No. 6770 — Cited in Roxas vs. Hon. Vasquez for the rule that the Ombudsman may motu proprio conduct a reinvestigation to assure that the guilty do not go unpunished.
• Section 7, Rule III, Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended) — Governs finality and execution of decisions in administrative cases, providing that where the respondent is absolved, or where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable, and that in all other cases the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals via Rule 43. The Court held that this provision applies only to administrative cases and does not apply to criminal cases.
• Section 2, Rule II, Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended) — Enumerates the actions the investigating officer may recommend upon evaluation of a complaint in criminal cases: (a) dismiss the case outright for want of palpable merit; (b) refer the complaint to respondent for comment; (c) indorse the complaint to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case; (d) forward the complaint to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation; (e) refer the case for administrative adjudication; or (f) subject the case to a preliminary investigation. Cited to show that the Ombudsman Rules do not provide a finality provision for criminal cases parallel to that for administrative cases.
• Section 7, Rule II, Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended) — Provides that an aggrieved party may file one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of the adverse order or resolution; the Court noted that this does not preclude the Ombudsman from motu proprio conducting a reinvestigation.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs the petition for certiorari filed by Dela Cruz; the Court reiterated that a party invoking Rule 65 must substantiate, not merely allege, grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of the Ombudsman's powers.
• Rule 43, Rules of Court — Provides the mode of appeal from Ombudsman decisions in administrative cases where the penalty imposed is not public censure or reprimand or suspension of not more than one month's salary; cited to distinguish the remedy in administrative cases from that in criminal cases.

Gesmundo, C.J. (Chairperson), Zalameda, and Marquez, JJ., concur. Rosario, J., on official leave.