Dela Cruz vs. Hermano

In a forcible entry case, the plaintiff must prove prior physical possession—possession de facto, not possession flowing from ownership—and title or tax declarations do not substitute for that proof. A complaint may be sufficient in form if it alleges deprivation by stealth, but the action still fails where the plaintiff does not establish prior actual possession by preponderance of evidence.

The Hermano spouses are the registered owners of a house and lot in P.B. Constantino Subdivision, Tagaytay City, covered by TCT No. T-24503, while Dela Cruz asserts a claim to the same property derived from Don Mario Enciso Benitez. The case requires distinguishing the summary remedy of forcible entry under Rule 70 from an accion reivindicatoria, because the parties’ claims involve both ownership and actual possession.

Antonio and Remedios Hermano are the registered owners of a house and lot situated at Lot 2, Block 2, P.B. Constantino Subdivision, Tagaytay City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-24503. On 13 June 2002, Antonio sued Marcela Dela Cruz before the MTCC of Tagaytay City, Branch 1, for ejectment and damages. The Complaint alleged that Dela Cruz occupied and possessed the property sometime on 1 September 2001 pursuant to an alleged Memorandum of Agreement between her and a certain Don Mario Enciso Benitez, without Antonio’s authority and consent; that the property was used by Antonio and his family as their rest house or vacation place after a hard day’s work in Metro Manila; and that on 27 September 2001, Antonio, through counsel, sent a formal demand letter for Dela Cruz to vacate and turn over possession and to pay rental of ₱20,000.00 a month starting 1 September 2001.

In her Answer with Counterclaim, Dela Cruz admitted the existence of TCT No. T-24503 but contended that the true and actual owner of the property was Benitez. She alleged that Antonio and Remedios had already sold the property to Benitez, who in turn sold it to her by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on 1 March 2001. She claimed that Antonio knew about the sale and her immediate occupation of the premises; that the place was actually uninhabited when she occupied it and that Benitez provided the keys; and that Antonio knew her caretakers had been managing the property since March 2001 and never questioned their presence. On that basis, she contended that estoppel had set in because Antonio had made her believe that she had the right to occupy and possess the property.

After the parties submitted their Position Papers, the MTCC found that Antonio had indeed executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property in favor of Benitez. The transfer of title, however, was subject to a condition: Benitez was supposed to broker Antonio’s purchase of a property situated in Caloocan City. That condition had not yet been satisfied when Benitez executed the Deed of Sale in favor of Dela Cruz in March 2001. In other words, Antonio still owned the property when Benitez delivered it to Dela Cruz. Dela Cruz, for her part, claimed that she started occupying the property in March 2001, not in September 2001 as Antonio alleged in his Complaint; her claim was corroborated by the Affidavit of her caretaker, which respondents did not controvert.

The CA found that Antonio had sufficiently alleged and proved prior physical possession and that Dela Cruz’s entry and subsequent possession were illegal at the inception, effected without Antonio’s knowledge and therefore categorized as possession by stealth. It also found that Antonio came to know of Dela Cruz’s possession only on 1 September 2001 and that the Complaint was filed within the one-year period for an ejectment suit.

• Sufficiency of the Complaint: Petitioner argued that the Complaint failed to allege prior physical possession and that the CA skirted the issue of the sufficiency of the allegations, allegedly addressing only the principal issue of who had the better right to possess the subject property.

• Forcible Entry — Sufficiency of Allegations and Proof: Whether Antonio adequately pleaded and proved a case of forcible entry.

• Forcible Entry — Sufficiency of Allegations and Proof: No, as to proof. The Complaint sufficiently alleged forcible entry and was timely filed, but respondents failed to prove prior physical possession, which is essential to the summary remedy.

• Forcible Entry — Sufficiency of Allegations and Proof: Section 1, Rule 70 requires that a forcible entry complaint allege that the complainant was deprived of possession of land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and that the action was filed within one year from the unlawful deprivation. The complainant must allege and prove prior physical possession until deprivation. The one-year period is generally counted from actual entry, except when entry was by stealth, in which case it is counted from the time the plaintiff learned of it. The complaint need not use the statutory language; a statement of facts showing dispossession under those conditions is sufficient, provided the complaint shows enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. The SC found that the CA squarely addressed the sufficiency of the Complaint and correctly held that paragraphs 5 and 6 adequately averred prior physical possession by respondents and dispossession by stealth, because petitioner’s intrusion was without their knowledge and consent. The SC also agreed that the Complaint was timely: where forcible entry is clandestine, the one-year period runs from the time the person deprived of possession demanded that the deforciant desist after learning of the dispossession; owners cannot be expected to sue before learning of a clandestine intrusion, and a contrary rule would reward stealthy usurpations. On proof, however, the burden of alleging prior physical possession carries the burden of establishing the case by preponderance of evidence, and respondents had to rely on the strength of their own evidence. Respondents submitted their title and latest tax declaration, which petitioner did not controvert with competent evidence, but these proved ownership and possession de jure, not the de facto or actual/material possession required in forcible entry. Tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive proof of possession; they are merely indicia of possession in the concept of owner. Respondents’ claim that they used the property as a vacation house was not substantiated by corroborative evidence, while petitioner’s claim that she began occupying the property in March 2001, not September 2001, was corroborated by her caretaker’s affidavit, which respondents did not controvert. Respondents therefore failed to discharge their burden of proving prior physical possession; their uncorroborated claim, even if under oath, was self-serving and did not amount to preponderant evidence. The SC reviewed the facts because the MTCC and RTC findings conflicted with those of the CA, and it stressed that its pronouncements were without prejudice to the parties’ right to pursue the appropriate remedy.

• Forcible entry requisites — In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege and prove (a) prior physical possession, (b) deprivation by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and (c) filing of the action within one year from the unlawful deprivation. The SC applied this framework and found the Complaint sufficient in form but the proof of prior physical possession lacking.
• Prior physical possession means de facto possession — In forcible entry, possession refers only to possession de facto, or actual or material possession, not possession flowing from ownership. The SC held that the Hermano spouses’ TCT and tax declaration proved ownership or possession de jure, not the actual prior possession required.
• Sufficiency of allegations in forcible entry — The complaint need not use the statutory language of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; facts showing dispossession under those conditions suffice, as long as the complaint shows enough on its face to confer jurisdiction without parol evidence. The SC found paragraphs 5 and 6 sufficient because they alleged prior possession and intrusion without knowledge and consent.
• Stealth and the one-year period — Where entry is by stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned of the intrusion, and a demand to desist after discovery is the operative point. The SC applied this to hold the Complaint timely.
• Tax declarations not conclusive proof of possession — Tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive proof of possession; they are merely good indicia of possession in the concept of owner. The SC held they could not substitute for proof of actual prior possession.
• Preponderance in ejectment — The burden of alleging prior physical possession carries the burden of proving it by preponderance of evidence, relying on the plaintiff’s own evidence and not the weakness of the defendant’s. The SC found respondents’ uncorroborated claim self-serving and insufficient.
• Review of facts under Rule 45 — A Rule 45 petition ordinarily resolves only questions of law and CA factual findings are conclusive, but the SC may review facts when the findings of the MTCC and RTC conflict with those of the CA. The SC applied this exception.

• "The burden of sufficiently alleging prior physical possession carries with it the concomitant burden of establishing one’s case by a preponderance of evidence." — The SC used this to separate the sufficiency of the complaint from the proof required at trial.
• "Possession in a forcible entry suit refers only to possession de facto, or actual or material possession, and not one flowing out of ownership." — The SC distinguished the possession protected in ejectment from ownership-based possession.
• "Similarly, tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive proofs of possession. They are merely good indicia of possession in the concept of owner based on the presumption that no one in one’s right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in one’s actual or constructive possession." — The SC held that these documents did not prove the de facto possession required in forcible entry.
• "It is settled that where forcible entry occurred clandestinely, the one-year prescriptive period should be counted from the time the person who was deprived of possession demanded that the deforciant desist from dispossession when the former learned about it." — The SC used this rule to uphold the timeliness of the Complaint despite the stealthy entry.

• Nenita Quality Foods Corp. vs. Galabo, G.R. No. 174191, 30 January 2013, 689 SCRA 569 — Relied on for the exception allowing factual review under Rule 45 when lower court findings conflict, and for the rule on prior possession.
• Ong vs. Court of Appeals, 407 Phil 1045 (2001) — Relied on for the one-year period in forcible entry.
• Abad vs. Farrales, G.R. No. 178635, 11 April 2011, 647 SCRA 473 — Relied on for the sufficiency of allegations and the burden of proving prior physical possession.
• Domalsin vs. Sps. Valenciano, 515 Phil 745, 766 (2006) — Relied on for counting the one-year period from demand after discovery in stealth cases.
• Prieto vs. Reyes, 121 Phil 1218, 1220 (1965) — Relied on for the rationale that lawful possessors cannot be expected to sue before learning of a clandestine intrusion.
• Pajuyo vs. Guevarra, G.R. No. 146364, 3 June 2004, 430 SCRA 492 — Relied on for the security accorded to prior possession.
• De Grano vs. Lacaba, 607 Phil 122 (2009) — Relied on for the rule that tax declarations are not conclusive proof of possession.
• Lee vs. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 183606, 27 October 2009, 604 SCRA 522 — Relied on for the preponderance-of-evidence standard.

• Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court — Requires a forcible entry complaint to allege deprivation of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth and filing within one year from the unlawful deprivation; applied to hold the Complaint sufficient and timely but the proof of prior physical possession lacking.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — A Petition for Review on Certiorari ordinarily resolves only questions of law and CA factual findings are conclusive; applied the exception because the MTCC and RTC findings conflicted with those of the CA.