Del Rosario vs. Manila Electric Company

A company engaged in the transmission of electricity is liable for damages for the death of a person caused by a fallen wire where the presumption of negligence from the breakage is not overcome and where the company fails to take prompt measures to guard the point of danger after receiving notice thereof.

Manila Electric Company was engaged in transmitting electricity for lighting the City of Manila and its suburbs, including the municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal, through wires strung along public streets such as Dimas-Alang Street. The company maintained a Malabon station to receive reports of electrical trouble and conducted periodic special inspections of its wires at least once every six months, with daily rounds by inspectors required to keep a lookout for trouble. Julian del Rosario was the father of Alberto del Rosario, a nine-year-old boy attending a neighborhood public school on Dimas-Alang Street.

Manila Electric Company maintained an electric wire on Dimas-Alang Street in Caloocan, Rizal, for the purpose of conducting electricity used in lighting Manila and its suburbs. The wire was an ordinary number 6 triple braid weatherproof wire of the type commonly used by the company, cased in the usual covering. The company conducted special inspections of such wires at least once every six months and required its inspectors to keep a lookout for trouble during their daily rounds.

Shortly after 2 o'clock on the afternoon of August 4, 1930, trouble developed in the wire. Jose Noguera, who had charge of a nearby tienda, first noticed that the wire was burning and its connections smoking. In a short while the wire parted, and one end fell to the ground among shrubbery close to the way. Noguera immediately went to a nearby garage and asked Jose Soco, the timekeeper, to telephone the Malabon station of the Manila Electric Company to report that an electrical wire was burning at that place. Soco transmitted the message at 2:25 p.m. and received an answer that an inspector would be sent. At the time the message was sent, the wire had not yet parted, but from the testimony of defense witness Demetrio Bingao, the end of the wire was on the ground shortly after 3 p.m. No representative of the company appeared at the scene until after the accident, more than an hour and a half after the report was received.

At 4 p.m. the neighborhood school was dismissed and the children went home. Among them was Alberto del Rosario, nine years of age, who was a few paces ahead of two other boys — Jose Salvador, eight years old, and Saturnino Endrina, ten years old — all members of the second grade. As the three neared the place where the wire was down, Saturnino made a motion as if to touch it. Jose Salvador, whose father was an electrician and had cautioned him never to touch a broken electrical wire, stopped Saturnino, warning that the wire might be charged. Saturnino desisted, but Alberto, who was somewhat ahead, said that he had for some time been in the habit of touching wires. Jose cautioned him not to touch wires as they carry a current, but Alberto, apparently feeling challenged, put out his index finger and touched the wire. He immediately fell face downward, exclaiming "Ay! madre." The end of the wire remained in contact with his body near the post. A crowd collected, someone cut the wire and disengaged the body, and the child was taken to St. Luke's Hospital, where he was pronounced dead.

Julian del Rosario, the boy's father, instituted an action for damages in the amount of P30,000. The trial court absolved the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.

• Negligence of the Company: Whether the defendant Manila Electric Company is liable for the death of Alberto del Rosario arising from the fallen electric wire.
• Contributory Negligence of the Deceased: Whether contributory negligence can be imputed to the nine-year-old deceased child.
• Effect of Contributory Negligence: Whether contributory negligence, if imputable, would bar recovery.
• Amount of Damages: What amount of damages is recoverable for the wrongful death.

• Negligence of the Company: Yes. The presumption of negligence from the breakage of the wire was not overcome, and the company failed to take measures to guard the danger point despite receiving notice over an hour and a half before the accident.
• Contributory Negligence of the Deceased: No. Contributory negligence could not properly be imputed to the deceased owing to his immature years and the natural curiosity a child would feel to do something out of the ordinary.
• Effect of Contributory Negligence: No. Even if contributory negligence could in some measure be imputed, it would not be wholly fatal to the right of action, not having been the determining cause of the accident.
• Amount of Damages: P1,250 — P250 for expenses incurred in connection with the death and burial, and P1,000 as general damages for loss of service, in accordance with prevailing precedents.

• Negligence of the Company: The breakage of the wire itself gave rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of the company, and nothing in the record indicated any particular cause for the parting that would rebut that presumption. Beyond the initial breakage, the company received actual notice of the trouble at 2:25 p.m. when Jose Soco telephoned the Malabon station. Despite this, more than an hour and a half elapsed before any representative of the company appeared at the scene, during which time the fallen wire remained unguarded on a public street near a school. The company should have dispatched someone immediately or taken other measures to guard the point of danger. The combination of the unrebutted presumption of negligence and the failure to act promptly upon notice established the company's responsibility for the accident.

• Contributory Negligence of the Deceased: The deceased was a nine-year-old boy of the second grade. At that age, the natural curiosity a child would feel to do something out of the ordinary precluded a proper attribution of contributory negligence. The mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of an eight-year-old companion did not alter the case, as a child of that tender age could not be held to the standard of care expected of an adult.

• Effect of Contributory Negligence: Even assuming arguendo that contributory negligence could in some measure be imputed to the deceased — a proposition upon which the members of the court did not all agree — such negligence would not be wholly fatal to the right of action because it was not the determining cause of the accident. The controlling precedent was Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, which established that contributory negligence does not bar recovery where it is not the proximate or determining cause.

• Amount of Damages: The majority of the court held that P250 was recoverable for expenses incurred in connection with the death and burial of the boy. For the remainder, following the precedents cited in Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Company, 55 Phil. 427, the majority awarded P1,000 as general damages for loss of service, yielding a total of P1,250.

• Presumption of Negligence from the Breakage of a Dangerous Instrumentality — Where a wire used for the transmission of electricity parts and causes injury, a presumption of negligence arises against the company maintaining the wire. The burden is on the company to overcome this presumption, and where the record reveals no particular cause for the parting that would rebut the presumption, liability attaches. The Court applied this presumption to hold Manila Electric Company liable, as nothing in the record indicated any cause for the wire's parting that would absolve the company.

• Contributory Negligence of Minors — Contributory negligence cannot properly be imputed to a child of tender years, owing to the child's immature judgment and natural curiosity. A nine-year-old boy who touches a fallen wire despite a companion's warning does not thereby bar his heirs' right of recovery, as the child lacks the capacity to appreciate the danger in the manner expected of an adult.

• Contributory Negligence Not Fatal When Not the Determining Cause — Even if contributory negligence could in some measure be imputed to the deceased, it does not wholly bar the right of action where it was not the determining cause of the accident. This principle, drawn from Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, ensures that the primary negligence of the party maintaining a dangerous instrumentality remains the basis of liability.

• Damages for Wrongful Death — Loss of Service and Burial Expenses — In an action for damages for wrongful death, the heirs may recover reasonable burial expenses and general damages for loss of service. Following the precedents cited in Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Company, 55 Phil. 427, the Court awarded P1,000 as general damages for loss of service, in addition to P250 for burial-related expenses.

• "We are of the opinion that the presumption of negligence on the part of the company from the breakage of this wire has not been overcome, and the defendant is in our opinion responsible for the accident." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on liability: the unrebutted presumption of negligence from the breakage of an electric wire, combined with the company's failure to act upon notice, establishes responsibility.

• "It is doubtful whether contributory negligence can properly be imputed to the deceased, owing to his immature years and the natural curiosity which a child would feel to do something out of the ordinary, and the mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of a companion of the age of 8 years does not, in our opinion, alter the case." — This passage articulates the doctrine that contributory negligence cannot be imputed to a child of tender years, a principle frequently invoked in subsequent jurisprudence on infant plaintiffs.

• "[E]ven supposing that contributory negligence could in some measure be properly imputed to the deceased, — a proposition upon which the members of the court do not all agree, — yet such negligence would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case, not having been the determining cause of the accident." — This passage establishes that contributory negligence does not bar recovery where it is not the determining cause, citing Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co.

• Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359 — Followed. Established the principle that contributory negligence is not wholly fatal to a right of action where it was not the determining cause of the accident. The Court relied on this case to hold that even if the child's conduct could be considered negligent, it would not bar recovery.

• Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Company, 55 Phil. 427 — Followed. Cited for the precedents therein fixing the amount of P1,000 as general damages for loss of service in wrongful death actions. The majority relied on this case to determine the quantum of damages.

• Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil. 821 — Cited in the separate opinion of Abad Santos, J. Recognized the settled rule that an action lies to recover damages for death caused by a wrongful act.

Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Vickers, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concurred.

• Abad Santos, J. — Concurring in part and dissenting in part. He concurred with the holding that Manila Electric Company was liable for the death of the plaintiff's son but dissented from the award of only P1,250 in damages, opining that P2,250 should instead be awarded. He argued that the rule allowing P1,000 as indemnity in criminal cases — where such indemnity is merely incidental to the punishment of the guilty party — should not mechanically govern a civil action against a corporation not subject to criminal prosecution. In reason and justice, he maintained, a distinction should be drawn between the civil liability of an ordinary person who causes death by wrongful act and that of a corporation organized for profit which causes death through failure to exercise due care. The liability of such a corporation for damages should be regarded as part of the risks it assumes in promoting its business, and just as it is entitled to earn adequate profits, so it should be made to compensate adequately those who suffer damage by its negligence.