Del Rosario vs. Del Rosario

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code requires a grave, juridically antecedent, and incurable mental incapacity that deprives a spouse of awareness of the essential marital obligations; ordinary immaturity, irresponsibility, infidelity, or refusal or neglect of marital duties do not suffice. On the evidence presented, Jose's conduct did not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify nullifying the marriage.

Rachel A. Del Rosario and Jose O. Del Rosario met as teenagers in December 1983, became romantically involved, and later married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1989 in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija. They had a son, Wesley, on December 1, 1993, and renewed their vows in a church ceremony on February 19, 1995 at the Philippine Independent Church in Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya. The dispute concerns Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, which voids a marriage where a party was psychologically incapacitated at the time of celebration to comply with the essential marital obligations. The 1987 Constitution protects the family as a basic social institution and marriage as inviolable.

Rachel, then fifteen years old, met Jose, then seventeen years old, sometime in December 1983 at a party in Bintawan, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya. They soon became romantically involved. Sometime in 1988, Rachel went to Hongkong to work as a domestic helper; during this period, she allegedly provided for Jose's tuition fees for his college education. Rachel and Jose eventually decided to get married on December 28, 1989 in a civil rites ceremony held in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, and were blessed with a son, Wesley, on December 1, 1993. On February 19, 1995, they renewed their vows in a church ceremony held at the Philippine Independent Church in Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya. In 1998, Rachel returned to Hongkong to work as a domestic helper/caregiver and had been working there ever since, returning to the Philippines every year for vacation; through her efforts, she acquired a house and lot in Rufino Homes Subdivision, San Jose, Nueva Ecija.

In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 11-891, alleging that Jose was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations. According to Rachel, Jose conspicuously tried to avoid discharging his duties as husband and father; he was hot-tempered and violent; he punched her in the shoulder a few days before their church wedding, causing it to swell, when she refused to pay for the transportation expenses of his parents; he hit his own father with a pipe, causing the latter to fall unconscious, which forced them to leave Jose's parents' house where they were then staying; and he locked her out of their house in the middle of the night sometime in December 2007 when she fetched her relatives from the bus terminal, which he refused to do. Rachel added that Jose would represent himself as single, would flirt openly, and had an extra-marital affair which she discovered when Jose mistakenly sent a text message to her sister, Beverly A. Juan, stating: "love, kung ayaw mo na akong magpunta diyan, pumunta ka na lang dito." Another text message read: "Dumating lang ang asawa mo, ayaw mo na akong magtext at tumawag sa 'yo." On one occasion, she, together with Wesley and Beverly, caught Jose and the other woman with their child inside their conjugal dwelling. She also claimed that Jose would refuse any chance of sexual intimacy between them as they slowly drifted apart. Rachel, however, admitted that their married life ran smoothly during its early years, and it was only later in their marriage that Jose started frequenting bars and engaging in drinking sessions.

Rachel presented the testimonies of Wesley and her sisters, Beverly and Jocelyn Cabusora, which corroborated her allegations, as well as the testimony of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, who prepared the Psychological Report on Rachel. The remarks section of Dr. Tayag's Report, which was primarily based on her interview with Rachel and Wesley, stated that Jose suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder characterized by (a) his lack of empathy and concern for Rachel; (b) his irresponsibility and his pleasure-seeking attitude that catered only to his own fancies and comfort; (c) his selfishness marked by his lack of depth when it comes to his marital commitments; and (d) his lack of remorse for his shortcomings.

For his part, Jose denied all the allegations in the petition. Jose maintained that he had dutifully performed all of his marital and parental duties and obligations to his family; that he had provided for his family's financial and emotional needs; and that he contributed to the building and maintenance of their conjugal home. He claimed that although they occasionally had misunderstandings, they nevertheless had a blissful relationship, pointing out that their first major argument was when Rachel decided to go to Hongkong to work; that they continued to communicate through mail during her stay overseas; and that he remained supportive of Rachel and would advise her to give her family the financial aid that they need so long as she would not sacrifice her well-being. He denied the alleged extra-marital affair and having laid hand on Rachel and their son. Jose presented the testimony of Faustino Rigos to support his allegations.

The RTC found that Jose's Antisocial Personality Disorder interfered with his capacity to perform his marital and paternal duties, as he even refused to take responsibility for his actions notwithstanding the evidence against him. The CA, on the other hand, found that the totality of the evidence was not enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity; that Jose's alleged infidelity, refusal to seek employment, squandering of money on vices, and temper and propensity for violence were not so grave and permanent as to deprive him of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond; and that Dr. Tayag's Report failed to show the relation between Jose's "deprived childhood" and "poor home condition," on one hand, and a grave and permanent psychological malady, on the other.

• Psychological Incapacity under Article 36: Rachel alleged that Jose was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations, citing his avoidance of duties as husband and father, his hot temper and violence, his infidelity, and his refusal of sexual intimacy.
• Antisocial Personality Disorder: Rachel relied on Dr. Tayag's Psychological Report and testimony, which diagnosed Jose with Antisocial Personality Disorder characterized by lack of empathy, irresponsibility, pleasure-seeking, selfishness, and lack of remorse, and concluded that this condition interfered with his capacity to perform his marital and paternal duties.
• Corroborating Evidence: Rachel maintained that the testimonies of Wesley, Beverly, and Jocelyn corroborated her allegations and, together with Dr. Tayag's findings, established the existence of psychological incapacity.

• Denial of Allegations: Jose denied all the allegations in the petition and maintained that he had dutifully performed his marital and parental duties, provided for his family's financial and emotional needs, contributed to the conjugal home, and had a blissful relationship with Rachel despite occasional misunderstandings.
• No Grave and Permanent Psychological Condition: Jose argued on appeal that his alleged refusal to seek employment, squandering of money on vices, violent nature, and infidelity were not the serious, grave, and permanent psychological condition required by Article 36 of the Family Code.
• At Most Legal Separation Grounds: Jose contended that his alleged traits were at most personality defects such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness, which may be considered grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, not psychological incapacity.

• Psychological Incapacity: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC's finding that Jose was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.

• Psychological Incapacity: No. The CA correctly reversed the RTC; the totality of the evidence failed to establish that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, or infidelity amounted to grave, juridically antecedent, and incurable psychological incapacity under Article 36. The petition was denied and the nullity petition dismissed.

• Psychological Incapacity: The constitutional policy protects and strengthens the family as the basic social institution and marriage as its foundation, making marriage legally inviolable and protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, psychological incapacity must refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to marriage; it must be a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants under Article 68, including mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support. The malady must be so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. In Santos vs. CA, the requisites were gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In Republic vs. Molina, more definitive guidelines were laid down; these continue to apply but call for a more flexible approach, and expert opinion is not absolutely necessary and may be dispensed with if the totality of the evidence establishes psychological incapacity and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. The evidence need not come only from the allegedly incapacitated spouse but may come from relatives and close friends. Applying these standards, insufficient factual or legal basis existed to conclude that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, or infidelity amounted to psychological incapacity. Rachel's evidence showed only that Jose indulged in drinking sprees, tended to become violent when drunk, avoided duties as father and husband including sexual intimacy, flirted openly and represented himself as single, and engaged in an extra-marital affair with a bar girl whom he brought to the conjugal dwelling on several occasions. Significantly, Rachel admitted that their married life ran smoothly in its early years. Dr. Tayag's findings merely summarized Rachel and Wesley's narrations, diagnosed Jose with Antisocial Personality Disorder, and concluded that his personality flaw was severe, grave, deeply embedded since early childhood, permanent, incurable, and beyond repair. However, the Report did not explain in detail how Jose's Antisocial Personality Disorder could be characterized as grave, deeply rooted in childhood, and incurable within the jurisprudential parameters; it did not discuss the classification, cause, symptoms, and cure of the disorder, or show how and to what extent Jose exhibited it and how his actions correlated with it; it did not specify why and to what extent the disorder was serious and grave or how it incapacitated him from understanding and complying with marital obligations; and it hastily concluded that Jose had a "deprived childhood" and "poor home condition" that automatically resulted in the disorder without identifying the history of his condition antedating the marriage. Dr. Tayag also did not personally assess or interview Jose to determine his background, and her Report was based solely on Rachel's side, whose bias cannot be doubted, so it deserved more rigid and stringent standards. Psychological incapacity must be more than difficulty, refusal, or neglect in performing marital obligations; there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage, linked with the manifestations of the incapacity. Article 36 is not a divorce law, and absent sufficient evidence of psychological incapacity, the indissolubility of the marital tie must be upheld.

• Psychological Incapacity under Article 36 — A marriage is void under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, if a party was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration to comply with the essential marital obligations, even if the incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization. The provision was applied but the evidence failed to establish the required incapacity.
• Santos Requisites: Gravity, Juridical Antecedence, and Incurability — Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, meaning it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; (b) juridical antecedence, meaning it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) incurability, meaning it must be incurable, or the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. These requisites were not sufficiently established.
• Molina Guidelines — In Republic vs. Molina, the Court laid down guidelines: (1) the burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff, with doubts resolved in favor of marriage; (2) the root cause must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity must be proven existing at the time of celebration; (4) the incapacity must be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; (5) the illness must be grave enough to bring about disability to assume essential marital obligations, not mere refusal, neglect, or difficulty; (6) the essential marital obligations are those under Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220, 221, and 225 of the Family Code; (7) interpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines should be given great respect; and (8) the trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State, with the Solicitor General's certification. These guidelines continue to apply but call for a more flexible approach.
• Expert Opinion Not Indispensable — An expert opinion is not absolutely necessary and may be dispensed with in a petition under Article 36 if the totality of the evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. In this case, however, the expert report presented was insufficient.
• Totality of Evidence — The totality of the evidence must still establish the characteristics laid down in Santos vs. CA. The testimonies and Dr. Tayag's Report, taken together, did not show that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity rose to the level of psychological incapacity.
• Distinction from Legal Separation Grounds — Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and similar matters do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity; they may only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal, or neglect to undertake marital obligations, which is not the psychological illness addressed by Article 36. Jose's alleged traits could at most be grounds for legal separation under Article 55.
• Indissolubility of Marriage — Article 36 is not a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves; a marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage. Absent sufficient evidence of psychological incapacity, the indissolubility of the marital tie must be upheld.

• "psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage." — This passage states the controlling definition of psychological incapacity, emphasizing that only the most serious personality disorders qualify.
• "it must be a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." — This passage explains the required gravity and permanence of the incapacity, which was found lacking in Jose's case.
• "an expert opinion is not absolutely necessary and may be dispensed with in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of the evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established." — This passage clarifies the role of expert evidence and the sufficiency of the totality of evidence, while also framing why Dr. Tayag's Report was assessed strictly.
• "Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is not a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves; a marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage." — This passage articulates the final note on the indissolubility of marriage and the limited scope of Article 36.

• Santos vs. CA, 310 Phil. 21 (1995) — Relied on for the requisites of psychological incapacity: gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.
• Republic vs. Molina, 335 Phil. 664 (1997) — Cited for the definitive guidelines in interpreting and applying Article 36, while noting that a more flexible approach is now called for.
• Dedel vs. CA, 466 Phil. 226 (2004) — Cited to support the ruling that emotional immaturity and irresponsibility are not equivalent to psychological incapacity unless shown to be manifestations of a disordered personality making the party completely unable to discharge essential marital obligations.
• Taring vs. Taring, 640 Phil. 434 (2010) — Cited for the principle that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity.
• Republic vs. Galang, 665 Phil. 658 (2011) — Cited for the clarified guidelines and the requirement of a natal or supervening disabling factor linked to the manifestations of psychological incapacity.
• Navales vs. Navales, 578 Phil. 826 (2008) — Cited for the rule that an expert witness need not personally examine the allegedly incapacitated party if corroborating evidence sufficiently establishes the required legal parameters.
• Republic vs. Romero, G.R. Nos. 209180 and 209253, February 24, 2016 — Cited for the standard of psychological incapacity and the principle that Article 36 is not a divorce law.
• Marcos vs. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000) — Cited for the rule that expert opinion is not absolutely necessary in a petition under Article 36 if the totality of evidence establishes psychological incapacity.

• Article 36, Family Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 227 — Provides that a marriage contracted by a party who was psychologically incapacitated at the time of celebration to comply with the essential marital obligations is void, even if the incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization. The provision was applied but the evidence was found insufficient to declare the marriage void.
• Article 68, Family Code — Provides that husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. Cited to define the essential marital obligations that psychological incapacity must relate to.
• Article 55, Family Code — Lists grounds for legal separation, including repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct, drug addiction or habitual alcoholism, and sexual infidelity or perversion. Cited to distinguish legal separation grounds from the stricter requirement of psychological incapacity under Article 36.
• Article II, Section 12, 1987 Constitution — Recognizes the family as a basic social institution and provides that the State shall protect and strengthen it. Cited in emphasizing the constitutional policy favoring marriage and family.
• Article XV, Section 2, 1987 Constitution — Provides that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. Cited to support the indissolubility of marriage and the strict interpretation of Article 36.
• A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC — The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which provides that the complete facts should allege the physical manifestations of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration but expert opinion need not be alleged. Mentioned in connection with the non-indispensability of expert opinion.
• Articles 220, 221, and 225, Family Code — Provisions on parental obligations, included among the essential marital obligations that may be relevant under the Molina guidelines.

Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice and Chairperson), Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Mariano C. Del Castillo, and Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa concurred. The decision was penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe.