Del Rosario vs. COMELEC

A highly urbanized city that was formerly a component city of a province is not a "political unit directly affected" by the division of that province, such that its voters are not entitled to participate in the plebiscite required under Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, where the city's conversion into an HUC has severed its political, administrative, and fiscal ties with the province.

Puerto Princesa was originally a component city of the province of Palawan. Section 89 of its city charter (RA No. 5906) allowed its residents to vote for provincial officials of Palawan. Upon the city's declaration as a highly urbanized city by Presidential Proclamation No. 1264 on March 26, 2007 — approved by the electorate in a plebiscite held on July 9, 2007 — Article X, Section 12 of the Constitution and Section 452(c) of the Local Government Code became applicable, superseding the city charter provision and severing Puerto Princesa's political ties with the province. Meanwhile, the representatives of Palawan's three legislative districts initiated House Bill Nos. 7413 and 8055 in the 17th Congress to divide the province into three new provinces: Palawan del Norte, Palawan Oriental, and Palawan del Sur. The bill was signed into law as RA No. 11259 on April 5, 2019, and published in the Official Gazette on May 20, 2019.

Petitioners Cynthia S. Del Rosario, Federico N. Virgo, Jr., Renato V. Baladad, Beatriz A. Dioso, and Corazon Manalon Davila are residents of various barangays in Puerto Princesa City, while petitioners Loreta N. Alsa, Hiya I. Hassan, and John Vincent C. Colili are residents of municipalities in Palawan — Sagpangan, Aborlan; Panitian, Sofronio Espanola; and Amas, Brooke's Point, respectively. Claiming standing as taxpayers and registered voters of Puerto Princesa City and of Palawan, they filed the present petition for prohibition before the Supreme Court.

The petition assails RA No. 11259, entitled "Charter of the Provinces of Palawan del Norte, Palawan Oriental, and Palawan del Sur," which originated from House Bill Nos. 7413 and 8055, initiated in the 17th Congress by the representatives of the three legislative districts of Palawan. The law was signed on April 5, 2019 and published in the Official Gazette on May 20, 2019. Section 51 provides that the three new provinces shall be created upon approval by the majority of votes cast by the voters of the affected areas in a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC on the second Monday of May 2020. Section 54 expressly provides that the residents of Puerto Princesa, as a highly urbanized city, shall not be qualified to vote in the plebiscite.

Petitioners alleged three constitutional infirmities. First, the law's passage violated the public's right to participate in public affairs through public hearings and consultations, as the House and Senate bills were never submitted to the constituents of Palawan for public consultation. Second, the disqualification of Puerto Princesa voters from the plebiscite contravened Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, which requires approval by the majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Third, the law altered the sharing of proceeds from national wealth development and utilization between the three new provinces and existing municipalities and barangays, in violation of Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution.

Respondents Provincial Treasurer and Provincial Government of Palawan countered that the statute was developed in coordination with various provincial government offices, municipal mayors, and Sangguniang Panlalawigan members, and that petitioner Cynthia del Rosario was even present during one of the House deliberations. Respondents COMELEC and the Department of Budget and Management argued that the creation of the proposed provinces still required electorate approval via plebiscite, satisfying the right to public participation. The Solicitor General raised objections regarding prematurity and petitioners' lack of standing.

• Lack of Public Consultation: Petitioners argued that the legislature failed to invite written submissions and conduct public hearings on the proposed division of Palawan, such that the House and Senate bills were never submitted to the constituents of Palawan for public consultations, violating the political right of the people to participate in matters affecting their interest.
• Exclusion from Plebiscite: Petitioners maintained that disqualifying the voters of Puerto Princesa City from voting in the scheduled plebiscite was contrary to Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, which requires approval by the majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
• Alteration of Wealth Sharing: Petitioners asserted that RA No. 11259 provided for a substantial change in the sharing of proceeds from the development and utilization of national wealth between the three new provinces and their existing municipalities and barangays, in violation of Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution.
• Economic Impact on Puerto Princesa: Petitioners argued that the division would deprive Puerto Princesa of benefits it enjoys as the provincial capital, including the relocation of 1,400 permanent and 7,000 job order employees affecting consumer spending, a decline in tourism, and changes in commodity prices resulting from different tax rates across the three new provinces.

• Adequate Consultation: Respondents Provincial Treasurer and Provincial Government of Palawan countered that the statute was developed in coordination with various provincial government offices, municipal mayors, and Sangguniang Panlalawigan members, and that petitioner Cynthia del Rosario was present during one of the House deliberations.
• Plebiscite as Supreme Consultation: Respondents COMELEC and DBM argued that the passage of the statute did not disregard the right to participate in public consultations, because the creation of the proposed provinces still required the approval of the electorate of Palawan through a plebiscite.
• No Territorial Alteration of Puerto Princesa: Respondents averred that the law would neither alter the boundaries of Puerto Princesa nor reduce its land area, as the terrestrial jurisdictions of the newly created provinces would be within the present metes and bounds of the municipalities comprising them, without reference to Puerto Princesa.
• Prematurity and Standing: The Solicitor General objected to the prematurity of the petition and petitioners' lack of standing, arguing that most provisions of RA No. 11259 would take effect only after plebiscite approval.

• Public Consultation: Whether RA No. 11259 was enacted in violation of the public's right to participate in public affairs through public hearings and consultations.
• Plebiscite Participation: Whether the voters of Puerto Princesa City, as a highly urbanized city, are entitled to participate in the plebiscite for the division of the province of Palawan under Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution.
• Wealth Sharing: Whether RA No. 11259 violates Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution by altering the sharing of national wealth proceeds between the proposed provinces and existing municipalities and barangays.

• Public Consultation: No. The Constitution does not establish prior public consultation as a prerequisite for the validity of a statute, and the records show consultation was conducted through elected representatives at the municipal, provincial, and national levels.
• Plebiscite Participation: No. Puerto Princesa, having been converted into a highly urbanized city in 2007, became a distinct political entity independent and autonomous from Palawan, and is therefore not a "political unit directly affected" by the province's division within the meaning of Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution.
• Wealth Sharing: Not ruled upon. The issue was premature, as most provisions of RA No. 11259 remain inoperative pending the conduct of the plebiscite.

• Public Consultation: The Court found that the records revealed the proposed division was made in consultation with the people of Palawan through their elected representatives — municipal mayors, municipal councilors, and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan — as reflected in transcripts of consultative meetings, Sangguniang Panlalawigan meetings, and resolutions from municipal councils. Article XIII, Section 16 of the Constitution, as cited by petitioners, does not establish prior public consultation as a prerequisite for the validity of a statute; it serves as an exhortation for the state to facilitate participation by people's organizations, and Kilosbayan vs. Morato rejected the notion that these provisions confer standing to challenge governmental policies. In a republican state, the people are heard primarily through their elected representatives, and the duly elected representatives of Palawan at every level registered their support and consent. Moreover, the effectivity of the law remains subject to the supreme mode of public consultation: the ballot.

• Plebiscite Participation: The Court applied a three-factor test — territorial alteration, political effects, and economic effects — distilled from Tan vs. COMELEC, Padilla vs. COMELEC, Tobias vs. Abalos, Miranda vs. Aguirre, and Umali vs. COMELEC. On territorial alteration, the Court found nothing in RA No. 11259 that changes the metes and bounds of Puerto Princesa's territory; Section 4 confines the terrestrial jurisdictions of the new provinces to the present metes and bounds of the comprising municipalities, without reference to Puerto Princesa. The realignment of legislative district boundaries does not amount to territorial alteration requiring plebiscite approval, following Tobias and Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC. On political effects, Section 452(c) of the LGC expressly provides that qualified voters of highly urbanized cities shall remain excluded from voting for elective provincial officials. Article X, Section 12 of the Constitution mandates that HUCs shall be independent of the province. Upon Puerto Princesa's conversion into an HUC in 2007, its political ties with Palawan were effectively severed, superseding Section 89 of the city charter. On economic effects, the Court confined its analysis to fiscal or budgetary relations among political units — sharing of internal revenue allotments, budgetary allocations, and taxing powers — as governed by the LGC. As an HUC, Puerto Princesa imposes its own taxes, receives its own IRA, and holds its own share in natural resources within its territory, rendering it fiscally autonomous from Palawan. The broader economic effects petitioners raised — consumer spending, tourism, commodity prices — pertain to policy and wisdom, not legality, and require evidentiary presentation outside the Court's purview. All three factors thus established that Puerto Princesa was not directly affected by the division.

• Wealth Sharing: The Court declined to rule on this issue because most provisions of RA No. 11259 will take effect only after plebiscite approval. Sections 51 and 52 make the creation and corporate existence of the three provinces contingent upon plebiscite approval. Until the plebiscite is conducted and majority approval is ascertained, provisions relating to the organization and governance of the three provinces remain inoperative. Only Sections 51, 54, 58, 59, and 60 — pertaining to matters preparatory to the plebiscite — are in full force and effect. It was therefore premature to declare the law unconstitutional in toto.

• Three-Factor Test for "Political Units Directly Affected" — In determining which political units are directly affected — and thus eligible to participate in a plebiscite — by the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of an LGU, the Court considers three key factors: (1) territorial alteration, (2) political effects, and (3) economic effects. Territorial alteration examines whether the LGU's metes and bounds are changed; realignment of legislative district boundaries alone does not constitute territorial alteration. Political effects examine whether the LGU's political and administrative ties with the affected unit subsist; an HUC's constitutional independence from the province severs such ties. Economic effects are confined to fiscal or budgetary relations — sharing of internal revenue allotments, budgetary allocations, and taxing powers — and do not extend to broader economic impacts such as consumer spending or tourism, which pertain to policy and wisdom rather than legality.

• Independence of Highly Urbanized Cities — Under Article X, Section 12 of the Constitution and Section 452(c) of the Local Government Code, HUCs are independent of the province in which they are geographically located. This independence manifests in three forms: (1) exclusion of HUC voters from participation in provincial elections; (2) direct Presidential supervision over HUCs and their local chief executives; and (3) other special distinctions in the LGC. Upon conversion into an HUC, a city's political, administrative, and fiscal ties with the province are severed, superseding any contrary provision in the city's charter.

• Public Consultation Not a Prerequisite for Statutory Validity — The Constitution does not establish prior public consultation as a prerequisite for the validity of a statute. Article XIII, Section 16 serves as an exhortation for the state to facilitate participation by people's organizations and does not confer standing to challenge governmental policies. In a republican state, the people are heard primarily through their elected representatives, and the plebiscite itself constitutes the supreme mode of public consultation.

• Standing to Sue in Constitutional Challenges — A party has standing upon proof of: (1) personal suffering of some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy sought. Voters of an HUC lack standing to challenge the division of the province from which the city has been separated, as they have no personal stake in the outcome.

• "HUCs, as conceptualized in our local government laws, are essentially cities that have attained a level of population growth and economic development which the legislature has deemed sufficient for devolution of governmental powers as self-contained political units. As such, these cities are intended to function as first-level political and administrative subdivisions in their own right, on par with provinces." — This passage defines the constitutional and statutory concept of highly urbanized cities and explains the rationale for their independence from provinces, underpinning the Court's conclusion that Puerto Princesa was not directly affected by Palawan's division.

• "A careful survey of these cases reveals that the Court has considered three key factors in determining whether an LGU is a 'political unit directly affected' by an LGU change or conversion: territorial alteration, political effects, and economic effects." — This is the canonical formulation of the three-factor test synthesizing the Court's jurisprudence on plebiscite participation, and is the analytic framework applied to determine Puerto Princesa's eligibility.

• "As made abundantly clear in Umali, the economic factors contemplated in the determination of 'political units directly affected' by an LGU change or conversion pertain strictly to fiscal or budgetary relations among the political units concerned, specifically, the sharing of internal revenue allotments, budgetary allocations, and taxing powers, all of which are governed by the pertinent provisions of the LGC and other laws." — This passage delineates the boundary of the economic-effects inquiry, excluding broader policy considerations from judicial review and confining the analysis to fiscal relations governed by law.

• Tan vs. COMELEC, 226 Phil. 624 (1986) — Foundational case establishing that the whole mother province must vote in a plebiscite for the division thereof into two provinces, where substantial alteration of boundaries results. Followed as the origin of the territorial-alteration factor in the three-factor test.

• Gov. Padilla, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 289 Phil. 356 (1992) — Confirmed the applicability of the Tan ruling under the present Constitution, holding that the whole municipality must vote in a plebiscite for the creation of a new barangay. Followed.

• Tobias vs. City Mayor Abalos, 309 Phil. 100 (1994) — Rejected the assertion that a municipality within the same legislative district but not within the same province as a proposed HUC is a "political unit directly affected" by the conversion. Followed and applied to the legislative-district realignment argument.

• Miranda vs. Hon. Aguirre, 373 Phil. 386 (1999) — Introduced the comprehensive approach focusing on material change in political and economic rights as the common denominator in LGU creation, division, merger, abolition, or boundary alteration. Followed as the basis for the political-and-economic-effects factors.

• Umali vs. Commission on Elections, 733 Phil. 775 (2014) — Held that the whole province of Nueva Ecija was directly affected by the conversion of Cabanatuan into an HUC, elaborating on the political, administrative, and economic consequences of severance. Extensively relied upon as the primary authority for the three-factor test and for the economic-effects analysis confined to fiscal relations.

• Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC, 593 Phil. 678 (2008) — Cited for the proposition that realignment of legislative district boundaries does not amount to territorial alteration requiring plebiscite approval. Followed.

• Kilosbayan vs. Morato — Cited for the rejection of the notion that Article XIII, Section 16 confers standing on organizations to challenge governmental policies. Followed.

• Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines vs. Secretary of Education, G.R. Nos. 216930 et al., October 9, 2018 — Cited for the requirement of an actual case or controversy and the principle that a statute must have been implemented and the party affected before a constitutional challenge may be entertained. Followed on the prematurity issue.

• Article X, Section 10, 1987 Constitution — Requires that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units be approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Applied to determine whether Puerto Princesa qualified as a political unit directly affected by the division of Palawan.

• Article X, Section 12, 1987 Constitution — Provides that highly urbanized cities, as determined by law, shall be independent of the province. Applied to establish that Puerto Princesa's conversion into an HUC severed its political ties with Palawan.

• Article X, Section 7, 1987 Constitution — Governs the sharing of proceeds from the development and utilization of national wealth between local government units. Petitioners invoked this provision, but the Court declined to rule on the issue as premature.

• Article XIII, Section 16, 1987 Constitution — Provides for the right of people's organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making. Petitioners invoked this provision to argue lack of public consultation; the Court held it does not establish prior public consultation as a prerequisite for statutory validity.

• Article II, Section 1, 1987 Constitution — Declares that the Philippines is a republican state where sovereignty resides in the people and is primarily manifested through elected representatives. Applied to support the finding that consultation through elected representatives satisfies the right to public participation.

• Section 452(c), Local Government Code (RA No. 7160) — Provides that qualified voters of highly urbanized cities shall remain excluded from voting for elective provincial officials. Applied to establish that Puerto Princesa voters were properly excluded from provincial electoral processes, including the plebiscite.

• Section 453, Local Government Code — Governs the declaration of a city as a highly urbanized city upon presidential proclamation and plebiscite approval. Applied to Puerto Princesa's conversion in 2007.

• Section 29, Local Government Code — Explicitly declares the independence of HUCs from the province. Cited as the statutory manifestation of the constitutional mandate of HUC independence.

• Section 285, Local Government Code — Governs the allocation of internal revenue allotments among local government units. Cited in the economic-effects analysis as a fiscal factor confined to the three-factor test.

• Section 151, Local Government Code — Governs the taxing power of provinces. Cited for the principle that an HUC's taxes accrue to itself, rendering it fiscally autonomous from the province.

• Section 292, Local Government Code — Governs the share of local government units in the proceeds of national wealth utilization. Cited to establish Puerto Princesa's fiscal autonomy.

• Section 3, Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 — Provides that voters registered in a highly urbanized city shall not participate in the election of provincial officials. Cited as the antecedent statutory basis for the exclusion carried over into the LGC.

• Section 89, RA No. 5906 (Puerto Princesa City Charter) — Allowed residents of Puerto Princesa to vote for provincial officials of Palawan. Held to have been superseded by the Constitution and the LGC upon the city's conversion into an HUC.

• Sections 51 and 54, RA No. 11259 — Section 51 schedules the plebiscite for the creation of the three new provinces; Section 54 excludes Puerto Princesa residents from voting therein. Upheld as constitutional.

Peralta, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Lopez, Delos Santos, and Gaerlan, JJ., concurred. No separate concurring opinions were noted.