Del Prado vs. Manila Electric Co.

A common carrier is liable in culpa contractual for injuries to a person boarding its street car when its motorman prematurely accelerates and thereby increases the boarding passenger's peril; the carrier cannot escape liability by proving due diligence in training or instructing the motorman, and the passenger's contributory negligence merely mitigates damages under Article 1103 of the Civil Code.

Manila Electric Company operated street cars in the City of Manila for the conveyance of passengers. Ignacio del Prado was an intending passenger who sought to board one of its cars. The case required application of the Civil Code's distinction between culpa contractual, arising from breach of a positive obligation under Articles 1101, 1103, and 1104, and culpa aquiliana under Articles 1902 and 1903, a distinction material to whether the carrier could exculpate itself by proving diligence in the selection and instruction of its employees.

Manila Electric Company operated street cars in the City of Manila for the conveyance of passengers. On the morning of November 18, 1925, its motorman, Teodorico Florenciano, was in charge of car No. 74 running east to west on R. Hidalgo Street near its intersection with Mendoza Street. After the car had stopped at its appointed place for taking on and letting off passengers, just east of the intersection, it resumed its course at a moderate speed. Ignacio del Prado then ran across the street to catch the car, approaching from the left. The car had entrance and exit at either end, and Del Prado reached the front entrance at the moment the car was passing.

According to Del Prado and his witness Ciriaco Guevara, Del Prado raised his hand to signal the motorman of his desire to board. The motorman eased up a little without stopping. Del Prado then seized the front perpendicular handpost with his hand and placed his left foot on the platform. Before his position became secure and before his raised right foot reached the platform, the motorman applied the power. The car gave a slight lurch forward, causing Del Prado's foot to slip; his hand was jerked loose from the handpost, and he fell to the ground. His right foot was caught and crushed by the moving car, and the member had to be amputated the next day.

Guevara also stated that Del Prado grasped the handpost on either side with both hands. The Supreme Court considered this possibly incorrect as to the use of the right hand, but it held that the trial court's finding—that the motorman slowed up slightly as Del Prado was boarding and that Del Prado's fall was due in part at least to a sudden forward movement when he put his foot on the platform—was supported by the evidence and should not be disturbed.

The motorman testified that he did not see Del Prado attempting to board; that he did not accelerate the car; and that he knew nothing of the incident until after Del Prado had been hurt and someone called to him to stop. The Supreme Court was not convinced of the complete candor of this statement, as it could not see how a motorman operating the car could have failed to see a person boarding under the circumstances, especially because the front handpost grasped by Del Prado was immediately on the left side of the motorman.

Del Prado thereafter sued Manila Electric Company for damages. The trial court found that the motorman slowed up slightly as Del Prado was boarding and that Del Prado's fall was due in part at least to a sudden forward movement at the moment he put his foot on the platform; that finding was supported by the evidence and was not disturbed on appeal.

• Due Diligence of Employer: The appellant, Manila Electric Company, pleaded as a special defense that it had used all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage and introduced testimony showing that due care had been used in training and instructing the motorman in charge of the car.
• Denial of Negligence: The motorman testified that he did not see Del Prado attempting to board the car, did not accelerate its speed, and knew nothing of the incident until after Del Prado had been hurt and someone called to him to stop.

• Carrier's Liability for Boarding Passenger: Whether Manila Electric Company is liable for the injuries sustained by Ignacio del Prado when he fell while boarding its moving street car after the motorman prematurely accelerated.
• Culpa Contractual and Due Diligence Defense: Whether the carrier's liability arises from culpa contractual under Articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the Civil Code, such that its proof of diligence in training and instructing the motorman is not a defense.
• Contributory Negligence: Whether Del Prado's attempt to board a moving street car constitutes contributory negligence that bars recovery or merely mitigates the damages under Article 1103 of the Civil Code.
• Proximate Cause and Last Clear Chance: Whether the motorman's premature acceleration was the proximate cause of the injury and whether the last clear chance doctrine prevents Del Prado's contributory negligence from defeating his action.
• Damages: Whether the award of P10,000 should be reduced to P2,500 in light of the loss of Del Prado's foot, his use of an artificial member, his reduced earning capacity, and the relevant precedents.

• Carrier's Liability for Boarding Passenger: Yes. Although the carrier was not bound to stop at an unauthorized point, the motorman had the duty not to increase Del Prado's peril while boarding, and the premature acceleration breached that duty.
• Culpa Contractual and Due Diligence Defense: Yes, liability is contractual. The carrier's proof of due diligence in training and instructing the motorman is irrelevant because liability arose from breach of a positive obligation under Article 1101 and related provisions, not from culpa aquiliana under Articles 1902 and 1903.
• Contributory Negligence: It does not bar recovery; it mitigates damages under Article 1103. Del Prado's attempt to board the moving car was contributory negligence, but it was not the proximate cause of the injury.
• Proximate Cause and Last Clear Chance: The motorman's premature acceleration was the direct and proximate cause. The company had the last clear chance to avoid the injury, so Del Prado's contributory negligence did not defeat the action.
• Damages: The award was reduced to P2,500. Considering the loss of the foot, the use of an artificial member without great inconvenience, a probable reduction in earning capacity of not more than 30%, and the cited precedents, P2,500 adequately compensated Del Prado.

• Carrier's Liability for Boarding Passenger: A street railway company is under no obligation to stop its cars to let on intending passengers at points other than those appointed for stoppage; requiring it to do so would make operation impossible. Even so, although the motorman was not bound to stop for Del Prado, he had the duty not to do any act that would increase Del Prado's peril while he was attempting to board. The evidence supported the trial court's finding that the motorman slowed up slightly as Del Prado boarded and that Del Prado's fall was due in part at least to the sudden forward movement when he placed his foot on the platform. The premature acceleration was therefore a breach of the motorman's duty. The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is contractual; failure to use due care in carrying passengers safely is a breach of duty (culpa contractual) under Articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the Civil Code. This duty extends to persons boarding the cars as well as to those alighting, as illustrated by Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. (38 Phil., 768), where a passenger alighting from a train was injured due to the company's negligence.
• Culpa Contractual and Due Diligence Defense: The distinction between negligence arising from breach of contractual duty (culpa contractual) and that arising under Articles 1902 and 1903 (culpa aquiliana) is important. In culpa aquiliana, not involving a breach of positive obligation, an employer or master may exculpate himself under the last paragraph of Article 1903 by proving that he exercised due diligence to prevent the damage. That defense is not available if the master's liability arises from a breach of contractual duty. Here, the company pleaded as a special defense that it had used all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage and introduced testimony that due care had been used in training and instructing the motorman. This proof was irrelevant because the liability involved was derived from a breach of obligation under Article 1101 of the Civil Code and related provisions, as supported by Manila Railroad Co. vs. Compana Transatlantica and Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co. (38 Phil., 875, 887) and De Guia vs. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co. (40 Phil., 706, 710). Another practical difference is that in contractual negligence the court has discretion to mitigate liability according to the circumstances under Article 1103, whereas no such general discretion is given under Article 1902.
• Contributory Negligence: Del Prado's negligence in attempting to board the moving car was contributory and should be treated, as in Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359), as a mitigating circumstance under Article 1103 of the Civil Code. His negligence was not the proximate cause of the injury. The direct and proximate cause was the act of the motorman in putting on the power prematurely. A person boarding a moving car must be taken to assume the risk of injury from boarding under the conditions open to his view, but he cannot fairly be held to assume the risk that the motorman, having the situation in view, will increase his peril by accelerating the speed before he is safely on the platform. The negligent act of the company's servant succeeded the negligent act of Del Prado, and the company's negligence must be considered the proximate cause of the injury.
• Proximate Cause and Last Clear Chance: The rule applicable is analogous to, if not identical with, the doctrine of the last clear chance. Under that doctrine, the contributory negligence of the injured party will not defeat the action if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the injured party's negligence (20 R.C.L., p. 139; Carr vs. Interurban Ry. Co., 185 Iowa, 872; 171 N.W., 167). The motorman had the situation in view and could have avoided the injury by not accelerating the car before Del Prado was safely on the platform. Del Prado's negligence remained contributory and was considered only as a mitigating circumstance.
• Damages: With respect to the effect of the injury on Del Prado's earning power, although he lost his foot, he was able to use an artificial member without great inconvenience, and his earning capacity had probably not been reduced by more than 30 percent. In view of the precedents in Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359), Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. (38 Phil., 768), and Borromeo vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. (44 Phil., 165), and all the circumstances, P2,500 would adequately compensate him. The appealed judgment was accordingly modified by reducing the recovery to P2,500 and affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

• Culpa Contractual vs. Culpa Aquiliana — In a contract of carriage, the carrier's failure to use due care in carrying passengers safely is a breach of a positive obligation under Articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the Civil Code, known as culpa contractual. This differs from culpa aquiliana under Articles 1902 and 1903, where an employer may exculpate itself by proving due diligence. In this case, the Manila Electric Company's liability arose from culpa contractual, so its proof of diligence in training and instructing the motorman was irrelevant.
• Carrier's Duty to Persons Boarding — Although a street railway company is not obliged to stop its cars at points other than appointed stopping places, it owes a duty not to increase the peril of a person attempting to board. The duty extends to persons boarding as well as alighting. The motorman's premature acceleration while Del Prado was boarding breached this duty.
• Contributory Negligence as Mitigating Circumstance in Culpa Contractual — Under Article 1103 of the Civil Code, the court may mitigate liability according to the circumstances when the negligence arises from breach of a contractual obligation. A passenger's contributory negligence in boarding a moving car does not bar recovery but mitigates damages. Del Prado's attempt to board the moving car was treated as such a mitigating circumstance.
• Last Clear Chance — Contributory negligence of the injured party will not defeat the action if the defendant, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, could have avoided the consequences of the injured party's negligence. The doctrine applied because the motorman had the situation in view and could have avoided the injury by not accelerating prematurely.
• Proximate Cause — The direct and proximate cause of an injury is the act that, in natural and continuous sequence, produces the injury. Del Prado's attempt to board the moving car was not the proximate cause; the motorman's premature acceleration was, because it succeeded Del Prado's negligent act and increased his peril.
• Damages for Loss of Limb — In awarding damages for loss of a limb, courts consider the injured party's earning capacity, ability to use an artificial member, and prior precedents. Del Prado's earning capacity was probably reduced by not more than 30 percent, and he could use an artificial member without great inconvenience; P2,500 was adequate.

• "Nevertheless, although the motorman of this car was not bound to stop to let the plaintiff on, it was his duty to do act that would have the effect of increasing the plaintiff's peril while he was attempting to board the car. The premature acceleration of the car was, in our opinion, a breach of this duty." — This states the carrier's duty to a boarding passenger and the breach that founded liability.
• "The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is of a contractual nature; and in failure on the part of the carrier to use due care in carrying its passengers safely is a breach of duty (culpa contructual) under articles 1101, 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code." — This is the ratio for treating the carrier's liability as culpa contractual under the Civil Code.
• "In the case bfore us the company pleaded as a special defense that it had used all the deligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage suffered by the plaintiff; and to establish this contention the company introduced testimony showing that due care had been used in training and instructing the motorman in charge of this car in his art. But this proof is irrelevant in view of the fact that the liability involved was derived from a breach of obligation under article 1101 of the Civil Code and related provisions." — This explains why the due diligence defense available in culpa aquiliana is unavailable in culpa contractual.
• "In accordance with this doctrine, the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party (20 R. C. L., p. 139; Carr vs. Interurban Ry. Co., 185 Iowa, 872; 171 N. W., 167)." — This states the last clear chance doctrine as applied to preserve Del Prado's action despite his contributory negligence.

• Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil., 768 — Cited as an instance of a carrier's violation of its duty to a passenger who was alighting from a train; also used to distinguish culpa contractual from culpa aquiliana.
• Manila Railroad Co. vs. Compana Transatlantica and Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 38 Phil., 875, 887 — Cited in support of the ruling that the carrier's liability arose from a breach of obligation under Article 1101 and related provisions, making the due diligence defense irrelevant.
• De Guia vs. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., 40 Phil., 706, 710 — Cited together with Manila Railroad Co. vs. Compana Transatlantica for the same proposition on contractual liability under Article 1101.
• Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil., 359 — Cited for treating contributory negligence as a mitigating circumstance under Article 1103; also cited as a damages precedent.
• Carr vs. Interurban Ry. Co., 185 Iowa, 872; 171 N.W., 167 — Cited as authority for the last clear chance doctrine, under which contributory negligence does not defeat recovery if the defendant could have avoided the consequences of the injured party's negligence.
• Borromeo vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., 44 Phil., 165 — Cited as a precedent on damages for the loss of a limb, supporting the reduced award of P2,500.

• Article 1101, Civil Code — Provides the basis for liability arising from breach of a positive obligation. The Court held that the carrier's liability was derived from a breach of obligation under this article and related provisions, so the company's proof of due diligence in training the motorman was irrelevant.
• Article 1103, Civil Code — Allows the court to mitigate liability according to the circumstances in cases of contractual negligence. The Court applied it to treat Del Prado's contributory negligence as a mitigating circumstance, reducing the damages.
• Article 1104, Civil Code — Cited with Articles 1101 and 1103 as part of the provisions governing culpa contractual in the carrier-passenger relation. The Court used these provisions to characterize the failure to use due care in carrying passengers safely as a breach of contractual duty.
• Article 1902, Civil Code — Governs culpa aquiliana, or negligence not involving a breach of positive obligation. The Court distinguished it from the contractual liability in this case and held that it was not the basis of the carrier's liability.
• Article 1903, Civil Code — In culpa aquiliana, an employer or master may exculpate himself under the last paragraph by proving due diligence to prevent the damage. The Court held this defense unavailable because the carrier's liability arose from culpa contractual, not culpa aquiliana.

Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

• Johnson, J. — Dissented on the ground that (a) the motorman managed the car carefully and with ordinary prudence at the moment of the accident; (b) Del Prado acted with imprudence and lack of due care in attempting to board a moving street car; and (c) Del Prado contributed to his own injury without any negligence, malice, or imprudence on the part of the defendant. The dissent concluded that there was no justification for contribution of damages between the parties, that Del Prado should suffer the damages he himself occasioned, and that the judgment should be revoked and the appellant absolved from all liability. The text records that Johns, J., concurred.