Del Monte Philippines, Inc. vs. Velasco

An employee's absences due to pregnancy and pregnancy-related illnesses are justified absences that cannot constitute a valid ground for dismissal, and terminating the employee on such basis constitutes a prohibited act under Article 137(2) of the Labor Code. Pregnancy, unlike intermittent conditions such as asthmatic bronchitis, is a continuing condition accompanied by various symptoms and related illnesses, so absences approximating the dates covered by medical certification may be safely assumed to arise from that condition.

Lolita M. Velasco was employed by Del Monte Philippines, Inc. beginning October 21, 1976 as a seasonal employee, and was regularized on May 1, 1977; her latest assignment was as Field Laborer. The company maintained rules penalizing with discharge any employee who incurred six (6) or more absences without permission or subsequent justification within one employment year. The dispute arose from Velasco's termination on January 10, 1995, effective January 16, 1994, for excessive absences without official leave (AWOP) during August and September 1994, a period during which she was pregnant and suffering from related ailments.

Lolita M. Velasco began working for Del Monte Philippines, Inc. on October 21, 1976 as a seasonal employee and was regularized on May 1, 1977. Her latest assignment was as Field Laborer. Her employment history was marked by recurring absenteeism: she received written warnings for absences on June 16, 1987, May 4, 1991 (with forfeiture of vacation leave entitlement for 1990–1991), and September 14, 1992 (with forfeiture of vacation entitlement for 1991–1992).

On September 17, 1994, Del Monte sent Velasco a notice of hearing charging her with violating the Absence Without Official Leave rule for excessive absences without permission on August 15–18, 29–31, and September 1–10, 1994. The hearing was set for September 23, 1994. Velasco failed to appear, and the hearing was reset to September 30, 1994, and again to October 5, 1994. After the hearings, Del Monte terminated her services on January 10, 1995, effective January 16, 1994, due to excessive absences without permission.

Velasco filed a case for illegal dismissal, asserting that at the time of her absences she was pregnant and suffering from urinary tract infection, a pregnancy-borne illness. She explained that for her absence from August 15 to 18, 1994, she had sent an application for leave to her supervisor, Prima Ybañez. Thereafter, she went to the company hospital for check-up and was advised to rest in quarters for four days, from August 27 to 30, 1994. Still not feeling well, she failed to work on September 1, 1994, and was again advised two days of rest in quarters on September 2–3, 1994. Unable to recover, she consulted an outside physician, Dr. Marilyn Casino, who ordered her to rest for five consecutive days, from September 5 to 9, 1994. Velasco declared that she did not file the adequate leave of absence because a medical certificate was already sufficient per company policy. On September 10, 1994, she again failed to report to work and sent an application for leave of absence to her supervisor, which was no longer accepted.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint, finding Velasco an incorrigible absentee who failed to justify her absences. The NLRC reversed, holding that under company rules an employee may subsequently justify her absenteeism, which Velasco was able to do; that her pregnancy was admitted by Del Monte; that the company itself had issued rest-in-quarters advice for certain dates yet included those same dates among the purported unexplained absences; and that the discharge was unlawful under Article 137(2) of the Labor Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC in toto.

• Limited Scope of Medical Evidence: Petitioner argued that the Discharge Summary and Medical Certificate established respondent's sickness only from August 23–30, 1994 and September 4–8, 1994, leaving ten other days of absence — August 15, 16, 17, 18, 31 and September 1, 2, 3, 9, and 10, 1994 — unsupported by any proof of illness and therefore unjustified.
• Applicability of Filflex Doctrine: Petitioner maintained that under Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Co. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, if a medical certificate fails to refer to the specific period of the employee's absence, such absences are not supported by competent proof and are unjustified; by parity of reasoning, in the absence of evidence indicating pregnancy-borne illness outside the period stated in the medical certificate, such illness should not excuse the excessive absences.
• Gross and Habitual Neglect: Petitioner argued that respondent's latest string of absences, taken together with her long history of absenteeism without permission, established gross and habitual neglect of duties, a just and valid ground for dismissal.
• Pregnancy Not the Cause of Dismissal: Petitioner contended that respondent was dismissed not by reason of her pregnancy but on account of her gross and habitual neglect of duties, and that her pregnancy had no bearing on the decision to terminate her employment.
• Prior Notice Requirement: Petitioner stressed that many women go through pregnancy and yet manage to submit prior notices to their employer, and that there was no evidence on record indicating a condition of such gravity as to preclude efforts at notifying the employer of her absence.

• Justification of Absences: Whether respondent's excessive absences without permission were justified on account of her pregnancy and pregnancy-related illnesses.
• Gross and Habitual Neglect: Whether respondent's latest string of absences, taken together with her prior history of absenteeism, established gross and habitual neglect of duties justifying dismissal.
• Violation of Article 137(2): Whether respondent's dismissal was in violation of Article 137 of the Labor Code, which prohibits discharging a woman on account of her pregnancy.
• Award of Backwages: Whether full backwages were properly awarded notwithstanding petitioner's evident good faith.

• Justification of Absences: Yes. The absences were justified by pregnancy and related illnesses, which constitute a continuing condition that cannot be strictly confined to the dates stated in medical certificates.
• Gross and Habitual Neglect: No. The last string of absences was justifiable and subsequently explained, so petitioner had no legal basis to combine them with prior infractions to establish gross and habitual neglect.
• Violation of Article 137(2): Yes. The dismissal was on account of pregnancy, a prohibited act under Article 137(2) of the Labor Code, rendering the dismissal illegal.
• Award of Backwages: N/A. The Court did not separately address the backwages issue, as it affirmed the CA and NLRC rulings in toto, which had ordered reinstatement with full backwages under Article 279.

• Justification of Absences: The Court distinguished pregnancy from intermittent conditions such as chronic asthmatic bronchitis, the illness involved in Filflex. Asthmatic bronchitis is intermittent, so if a medical certificate fails to correspond with the dates of absence, the absences may reasonably be deemed unjustified. Pregnancy, by contrast, is a continuing condition accompanied by various symptoms and related illnesses — morning sickness, frequent urination, vomiting, and fatigue — particularly during the first trimester. It would be unreasonable to isolate the condition strictly to the dates stated in the medical certificate or discharge summary. Absences not covered by, but approximating, those dates may be safely assumed to arise from the continuing condition of pregnancy and related illnesses, and are therefore justified. The Court upheld the findings of the NLRC and CA, supported by substantial evidence, that respondent was pregnant and suffered related ailments, that the company doctor himself advised rest-in-quarters for a pregnancy-related sickness, and that respondent attempted to file leaves of absence but the supervisor refused to receive them. Under company rules, absences may be subsequently justified, which respondent was able to do.

• Gross and Habitual Neglect: Petitioner's reliance on the jurisprudential rule that the totality of an employee's infractions may justify dismissal was found tenuous. Petitioner emphasized respondent's "long history" of unauthorized absences committed years beforehand, but could not use those prior infractions to establish a pattern justifying dismissal because the prior absences had already been penalized. The decisive fact was that during the complained absences in 1994, respondent was pregnant and suffered related illnesses. Since the last string of absences was justifiable and subsequently explained, petitioner had no legal basis to consider them together with prior infractions as gross and habitual neglect.

• Violation of Article 137(2): The Court agreed with the CA that respondent's sickness was pregnancy-related, and therefore petitioner could not terminate her services without violating Article 137(2) of the Labor Code, which prohibits an employer from discharging a woman on account of her pregnancy. The Court was convinced that petitioner terminated respondent's services on account of her pregnancy, which justified her absences, and thus committed a prohibited act rendering the dismissal illegal.

• Award of Backwages: The Court found no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the CA and NLRC, which had ordered reinstatement with full backwages under Article 279 of the Labor Code. The petitioner's claim of good faith was not separately addressed, as the illegality of the dismissal under Article 137(2) necessarily entitled respondent to the statutory remedies.

• Pregnancy as a Continuing Condition — Unlike intermittent illnesses such as asthmatic bronchitis, pregnancy is a continuing condition accompanied by various symptoms and related illnesses (morning sickness, frequent urination, vomiting, fatigue). Absences not covered by, but approximating, the dates stated in a medical certificate or discharge summary may be safely assumed to arise from the continuing condition of pregnancy and are therefore justified. The Court applied this by holding that respondent's absences on dates outside the periods explicitly covered by her medical documents were nonetheless justified because they were attributable to her ongoing pregnancy and related ailments.

• Subsequent Justification of Absences Under Company Rules — Where company rules permit an employee to subsequently justify her absenteeism, the employer cannot dismiss the employee for failure to file prior notice if the absences are later adequately explained through substantial evidence. The Court found that respondent was able to subsequently justify her absences in accordance with company rules and policy, rendering the dismissal improper.

• Prohibition Against Discharge on Account of Pregnancy (Article 137(2), Labor Code) — It is unlawful for any employer to discharge a woman employee on account of her pregnancy, while on leave or in confinement due to her pregnancy. The Court held that petitioner committed this prohibited act by terminating respondent's services based on absences caused by her pregnancy and related illnesses.

• Prior Penalized Infractions Cannot Be Recycled — An employer cannot use previous infractions that have already been penalized to lay down a pattern of absenteeism or habitual disregard of company rules to justify a subsequent dismissal. The Court found petitioner's reliance on respondent's prior absenteeism misplaced because those absences had already been penalized.

• "The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the condition of asthmatic bronchitis may be intermittent, in contrast to pregnancy which is a continuing condition accompanied by various symptoms and related illnesses." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi distinguishing pregnancy from intermittent illnesses for purposes of justifying absences, establishing the doctrine that pregnancy-related absences need not be strictly confined to dates in medical certificates.

• "It can be safely assumed that the absences that are not covered by, but which nonetheless approximate, the dates stated in the Discharge Summary and Medical Certificate, are due to the continuing condition of pregnancy and related illnesses, and, hence, are justified absences." — This defines the controlling rule for evaluating pregnancy-related absences and is the practical application of the continuing-condition doctrine.

• "Since her last string of absences is justifiable and had been subsequently explained, the petitioner had no legal basis in considering these absences together with her prior infractions as gross and habitual neglect." — This states the principle that prior penalized infractions cannot be combined with subsequently justified absences to establish gross and habitual neglect.

• Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Co. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 349 Phil. 913 (1998) — Distinguished. The Court held that Filflex, which concerned chronic asthmatic bronchitis (an intermittent condition), was not applicable to pregnancy cases because pregnancy is a continuing condition accompanied by various symptoms and related illnesses. In Filflex, absences not corresponding to the dates in the medical certificate were deemed unjustified; the Court refused to apply that rule in a "straight-hand fashion" to pregnancy.

• Article 137, Labor Code — Prohibits an employer from discharging a woman employee on account of her pregnancy, while on leave or in confinement due to her pregnancy. The Court held that petitioner violated paragraph (2) of this Article by terminating respondent's services based on absences caused by her pregnancy and related illnesses.
• Article 279, Labor Code — Provides for reinstatement with full backwages from the date of termination to actual reinstatement in cases of illegal dismissal. The NLRC ordered this relief, which the CA and the Supreme Court affirmed.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson, on leave), Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., Minita V. Chico-Nazario, and Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura concurred.