Del Mar vs. The Philippine Veterans Administration

Section 6 of PVA Regulation No. 2 is invalid because it suspends the operation of Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65, as amended, contrary to Section 20, which authorizes only the President to suspend the statute, and because the phrase “other Government funds” in Section 9 refers to funds of the same Government, not those of a foreign government. A suit against the PVA for pension funds already appropriated by statute falls within the exception to state immunity.

Quirico del Mar was a World War II veteran who served as chief judge advocate of the Cebu Area Command with the rank of major and was honorably discharged on October 20, 1946 on a certificate of permanent total physical disability. The Philippine Veterans Administration is the government agency administering veterans’ benefits under Republic Act No. 65, as amended, and related laws. Section 9 of that statute granted a life pension to permanently incapacitated veterans unless they were actually receiving a similar pension from other Government funds, while Section 20 authorized only the President to suspend the operation of any provision if the United States Congress approved a pending GI Bill of Rights applicable to the Philippines. Pursuant to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 2665, the PVA promulgated rules and regulations on veterans’ benefits, including Section 6 of Regulation No. 2, which cancelled a disability pension upon receipt of similar compensation from the United States Veterans Administration.

Quirico del Mar served during World War II as chief judge advocate of the Cebu Area Command, a duly recognized guerrilla organization, with the rank of major. He subsequently obtained an honorable discharge from the service on October 20, 1946 on a certificate of permanent total physical disability. Upon proper claim presented, and after hearing and adjudication, the Philippine Veterans Board, the predecessor of the Philippine Veterans Administration, granted him a monthly life pension of P50 effective January 28, 1947.

In March 1950, the Board discontinued payment of his monthly life pension. The ground was that his receipt of a similar pension from the United States Government, through the United States Veterans Administration, by reason of military service rendered in the United States Army in the Far East during World War II, precluded him from receiving any further monthly life pension from the Philippine Government. The PVA later reiterated this position, relying on Section 6 of Regulation No. 2 of the “Rules and Regulations on Veterans’ Benefits.”

Del Mar wrote the Board twice demanding that it continue paying his monthly life pension, impugning the cancellation as illegal. His demands went unheeded. On June 20, 1964, he filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for mandamus, civil case R-8465, against the PVA to compel it to continue paying him a monthly life pension of P50 from the date of its cancellation in March 1950 to June 20, 1957, and thereafter, or from June 22, 1957, his monthly life pension as increased by Republic Act No. 1920 to P100, and to pay him the monthly living allowance of P10 for each of his unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age, pursuant to Republic Act No. 1920, which took effect on June 22, 1957. He also asked for compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages.

The PVA asserted that del Mar’s receipt of a similar pension from the United States Government effectively barred him from claiming and receiving from the Philippine Government the monthly life pension granted him as well as the monthly allowances he claimed for his five living unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age. It also asserted that it was discretionary on its part to grant or discontinue the pension, that the action was premature for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and that the court a quo was without jurisdiction because the claim was a money claim against the PVA, a mere agency of the Philippine Government, and in effect a suit against the Government without its consent. It prayed for the dismissal of the petition. The trial court found del Mar’s claims meritorious; the PVA appealed.

• Invalidity of Section 6 of Regulation No. 2: Del Mar averred that Section 6 illegally effects the suspension of the operation of Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65, as amended.
• Exclusive Presidential Power to Suspend: He argued that under Section 20 of Republic Act No. 65, as amended, the power to suspend payment of the monthly life pension awarded to a disabled veteran belongs exclusively to the President of the Philippines, not to the PVA.
• Misinterpretation of “Other Government Funds”: He stated that the PVA deliberately misinterprets the phrase “from other Government funds” by extending its scope to include United States Government funds.
• Entitlement and Damages: He sought continuation of his monthly life pension from March 1950 to June 20, 1957 at P50, and from June 22, 1957 at P100 under Republic Act No. 1920, plus P10 monthly living allowance for each unmarried minor child below eighteen, and compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages.

• Lack of Jurisdiction and State Immunity: The PVA argued that the court a quo was without jurisdiction because the claim was a money claim against the PVA, a mere agency of the Government performing governmental functions with no juridical personality, and in effect an action against the Philippine Government which is immune from suit without consent, citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Ramolete and Del Mar.
• Non-Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: The PVA alleged the action was premature because del Mar failed to exhaust administrative remedies before invoking judicial intervention.
• Validity of Section 6 of Regulation No. 2: The PVA maintained that Section 6 was adopted to implement Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65, as amended, particularly its excepting clause, and that “other Government funds” includes funds of the United States Government.
• Discretion to Grant or Discontinue Pension: The PVA asserted that it was discretionary on its part to grant or discontinue the pension sought by del Mar.
• Propriety of Lower Court Orders: The PVA assigned as errors the lower court’s orders to pay the amounts stated, to give due course to and approve the application for living allowances, and its declaration that Section 6 was null and void.

• Jurisdiction and State Immunity: Whether the Court of First Instance of Cebu had jurisdiction over the petition for mandamus against the Philippine Veterans Administration, or whether the action was a suit against the Government without its consent.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Whether del Mar’s petition was premature for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies.
• Validity of PVA Regulation No. 2, Section 6: Whether Section 6 of PVA Regulation No. 2, which cancelled a disability pension upon receipt of similar compensation from the United States Veterans Administration, is valid under Republic Act No. 65, as amended.
• Discretion of the PVA: Whether it was discretionary on the part of the PVA to grant or discontinue del Mar’s monthly life pension.
• Entitlement to Pension and Living Allowances: Whether del Mar is entitled to his monthly life pension and to monthly living allowances for his unmarried minor children, and in what amounts.
• Modification Under Republic Act No. 5753: Whether the judgment should be modified to conform to Republic Act No. 5753, which further amended Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65.

• Jurisdiction and State Immunity: Yes. The action falls within the exception to state immunity because it seeks release of funds already appropriated by statute for the claimant’s benefit; the PVA’s reliance on Ramolete is misplaced.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: No. Exhaustion is not required where the case involves solely a question of law.
• Validity of PVA Regulation No. 2, Section 6: No. Section 6 is invalid because it suspends the operation of Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65, as amended, contrary to Section 20, and expands the phrase “other Government funds” beyond its statutory meaning.
• Discretion of the PVA: No. The PVA has no discretion to discontinue a pension contrary to statute; judicial power asserts itself where the administrative body fails to interpret and apply the law.
• Entitlement to Pension and Living Allowances: Yes. Del Mar is entitled to P50 monthly from April 1950 to May 1957, P100 monthly from June 22, 1957 to May 1969, and P200 monthly from June 21, 1969; the children’s living allowance requires a proper application under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 65, as amended.
• Modification Under Republic Act No. 5753: Yes. The judgment is modified to conform to Republic Act No. 5753.

• Jurisdiction and State Immunity: The PVA invoked the general rule that actions resulting in adverse consequences on the public treasury are suits against the Government and must be dismissed. The Court ruled that the rule admits an exception: it does not apply where a claimant sues a functionary who fails to comply with a statutory duty to release an amount claimed from public funds already appropriated by statute for the claimant’s benefit. The case fell under that exception. The Court also clarified that Republic of the Philippines vs. Ramolete and Del Mar decided only whether the PVA was exempt from filing an appeal bond under Section 16 of Rule 141; it did not adjudicate the suability of the PVA or the nature of del Mar’s claim. Thus, the trial court had jurisdiction.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: The Court ruled that where the controversy involves solely a legal question, there is no need for the litigant to resort to all administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. The issue was the validity and interpretation of Section 6 of Regulation No. 2 vis-à-vis Republic Act No. 65, as amended, a pure question of law. The petition was not premature.
• Validity of PVA Regulation No. 2, Section 6: The PVA adopted Section 6 pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 2665, claiming it implemented Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65, as amended. The Court recognized that administrative authorities may promulgate rules to implement a statute, but such rules must conform to the terms and standards prescribed by the statute. Section 9 granted a life pension unless the veteran was actually receiving a similar pension from other Government funds. The PVA interpreted “other Government funds” to include funds of the United States Government. The Court rejected this: the excepting clause intended to prevent receipt by the same beneficiary of concurrent or multiple similar pensions paid out of funds of the same Government, even if coursed through different departments or agencies. It did not cover pensions paid by a foreign government. Moreover, Section 20 of Republic Act No. 65, as amended, authorized only the President to suspend the operation of any provision if the United States Congress approved a pending GI Bill of Rights applicable to the Philippines with identical or similar provisions. Section 6 of Regulation No. 2 effectively suspended Section 9 without presidential action and contravened Section 20. The record showed no presidential suspension. The regulation was therefore invalid, and the cancellation of del Mar’s pension was illegal.
• Discretion of the PVA: Administrative bodies such as the PVA have adjudicatory authority to decide claims and applications, and their findings merit weight, respect, and finality because of their expertise. That deference has limits. Where an administrative body fails to interpret and apply the statutory provisions in question, judicial power should assert itself. Under the separation of powers, the judiciary has the final say on questions of law in appropriate cases. The PVA therefore could not rely on discretion to justify a discontinuance contrary to the statute.
• Entitlement to Pension and Living Allowances: Because Section 6 was invalid and no presidential suspension existed, del Mar was entitled to his monthly life pension. The Court applied the statutory rates: P50 monthly from April 1950 to May 1957 under Republic Act No. 65; P100 monthly from June 22, 1957 to May 1969 under Republic Act No. 65 as amended by Republic Act No. 1920; and P200 monthly from June 21, 1969 under Republic Act No. 65 as further amended by Republic Act No. 5753. The PVA was directed to compute and pay the past and accumulated monthly life pension at those rates. As to the monthly living allowance for his five living unmarried minor children below eighteen, del Mar had not filed a proper application with the PVA; he had merely included them in his claim for restoration of his pension. He could comply with Section 15 of Republic Act No. 65, as amended, which requires any person desiring to take advantage of the rights and privileges under the Act to file an application with the PVA. The PVA was ordered to consider and pass upon the merits of such application, if filed, particularly the entitlement qualifications of the intended beneficiaries. No costs were imposed.
• Modification Under Republic Act No. 5753: The Court noted that Congress further amended Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65, as amended, through Republic Act No. 5753, effective June 21, 1969. That law granted every totally disabled veteran of World War II a life pension of P200 a month and P30 a month for his wife and each unmarried minor child below eighteen. To conform the judgment to the statute as it now stood, the Court modified the award of del Mar’s life pension to P200 monthly effective June 21, 1969. The decision’s dispositive portion specifically addressed the children’s living allowance by requiring a proper application.

• Administrative rule-making must conform to the statute — An administrative agency may promulgate rules to implement a statute, but the rules must conform to the terms and standards prescribed by the legislature and must not depart from, suspend, or expand the statute. The PVA’s Section 6 of Regulation No. 2 was invalid because it suspended Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65, as amended, and expanded the statutory exception beyond its terms.
• Exclusive presidential power to suspend Republic Act No. 65 — Section 20 of Republic Act No. 65, as amended, authorized only the President of the Philippines to suspend the operation of any provision if the United States Congress approved a pending GI Bill of Rights applicable to the Philippines with identical or similar provisions. The PVA could not exercise that power through its regulation.
• Construction of “other Government funds” — The phrase “other Government funds” in Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65, as amended, refers to funds of the same Government, not funds of a foreign government. The excepting clause prevents concurrent or multiple similar pensions paid out of the same Government’s funds through different departments or agencies. Pension laws for war veterans are construed in favor of those seeking benefits.
• Exception to state immunity for release of appropriated funds — The general rule that suits resulting in adverse consequences on the public treasury are suits against the Government without consent does not apply where a claimant sues a functionary who fails to comply with a statutory duty to release an amount claimed from public funds already appropriated by statute for the claimant’s benefit.
• Exhaustion of administrative remedies not required for pure questions of law — Where the controversy involves solely a legal question, there is no need to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief.
• Judicial review of administrative interpretations — Administrative findings and interpretations are entitled to weight, respect, and finality because of expertise, but where the administrative body fails to interpret and apply the statutory provisions, judicial power asserts itself, and the judiciary has the final say on questions of law.
• Pension laws liberally construed in favor of veterans — The Court applied the established axiom that pension laws of war veterans are construed in favor of those seeking their benefits.

• “Nonetheless, the rule admits of an exception. It finds no application where a claimant institutes an action against a functionary who fails to comply with his statutory duty to release the amount claimed from the public funds already appropriated by statute for the benefit of the said claimant.” — This states the exception to state immunity applied to allow the mandamus action against the PVA for pension funds already appropriated by statute.
• “Clearly then, section 6 of Regulation No. 2 not only negates the very spirit behind section 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended, but also contravenes the express mandate of section 20 thereof.” — This is the ratio for invalidating the PVA regulation.
• “Section 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended, in providing for the excepting clause, obviously intends to prevent the receipt the same beneficiary of concurrent or multiple pensions benefits similar to each other in nature and basis, although coursed through different departments or agencies, but paid out of the funds of the same Government.” — This defines the scope of “other Government funds” and excludes foreign-government pensions.
• “where a case as in the present controversy — involves a question solely of a legal nature, there arises no need for the litigant to resort to all administrative remedies available to him before seeking judicial relief.” — This states the exception to exhaustion of administrative remedies.

• Republic of the Philippines vs. Ramolete and Del Mar, G.R. No. L-94673, August 12, 1966, 16 SCRA 923 — Cited by the PVA for state immunity; the Court distinguished it, holding that it decided only the PVA’s exemption from filing an appeal bond under Section 16 of Rule 141, not the suability of the PVA or the nature of del Mar’s claim.
• Begosa vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, 32 SCRA 466 — Cited for the exception to state immunity and for the rule that administrative findings are respected but judicial power asserts itself upon failure to interpret and apply the statute.
• Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration, 13 SCRA 585 — Cited for the principle that administrative rules must strictly conform to the legislative enactment and for the exception to state immunity and exhaustion; the Court quoted its statement that no lesser administrative office or agency can assert a more extensive prerogative than the Constitution allows.
• People vs. Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125 — Cited in support of the doctrine that administrative authorities may promulgate rules and regulations to implement a statute, provided they conform to its terms and standards.
• Geukekoo vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706 — Cited with People vs. Exconde and Teoxon for the same rule-making principle.

• Section 9, Republic Act No. 65, as amended — Granted a life pension of P100 a month and P10 a month for each unmarried minor child below eighteen, unless the veteran was actually receiving a similar pension from other Government funds. The Court held the excepting clause did not cover a US Veterans Administration pension and that del Mar was entitled to the pension.
• Section 20, Republic Act No. 65, as amended — Authorized the President of the Philippines to suspend the operation of any provision if the United States Congress approved a pending GI Bill of Rights applicable to the Philippines with identical or similar provisions. The Court held the PVA could not suspend Section 9 through its own regulation.
• Section 11, Republic Act No. 2665 — Empowered the PVA to promulgate and issue rules and regulations, subject to existing laws, to govern its operations and carry out the aims and purposes of the Act and other laws administered by it. The Court held this power did not authorize Section 6 of Regulation No. 2.
• Section 15, Republic Act No. 65, as amended — Required any person desiring to take advantage of the rights and privileges under the Act to file an application with the PVA. The Court ordered del Mar to comply with this requirement for the children’s living allowance and directed the PVA to consider any such application.
• Republic Act No. 1920 — Increased the monthly life pension from P50 to P100 effective June 22, 1957. The Court applied this rate from June 22, 1957 to May 1969.
• Republic Act No. 5753 — Further amended Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65, as amended, effective June 21, 1969, granting a life pension of P200 a month and P30 a month for the wife and each unmarried minor child below eighteen. The Court modified the judgment to P200 monthly from June 21, 1969.
• Section 6, PVA Regulation No. 2 — Cancelled a disability pension upon receipt of similar compensation from the United States Veterans Administration. The Court declared it invalid for contravening Republic Act No. 65, as amended.

Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, and Esguerra, JJ., concur. Antonio and Makasiar, JJ., took no part.