Del Castillo vs. People

Evidence seized from a place not specifically described in a search warrant is inadmissible as fruit of an invalid warrantless search, and a conviction for illegal possession of drugs cannot stand absent proof of the accused's dominion and control over the place where the drugs were found.

Acting on a tip that petitioner was selling shabu, police conducted a test-buy operation and secured Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-24 for petitioner's residence. When police arrived to serve the warrant, petitioner fled to a nipa hut situated 5 to 20 meters away from his house. The search of the residence yielded nothing. Police and barangay tanods subsequently searched the nipa hut, where a tanod found four plastic packs of shabu. Petitioner maintained he was at work during the raid and that the nipa hut belonged to his brother and was used by his father for storage.

• The Search Warrant Application: Pursuant to confidential information and a subsequent test-buy operation, police officers applied for and secured Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-24 from the RTC, targeting the residence of petitioner.
• Implementation of the Warrant: On September 13, 1997, at around 3:00 p.m., police proceeded to petitioner's two-storey residence. Upon arrival, someone shouted "raid," prompting petitioner to run toward a nipa hut in front of his house. Police cordoned the area and requested the assistance of barangay tanods.
• The Search and Seizure: Police searched petitioner's residence in the presence of his wife and the tanods, but found nothing. The search team then proceeded to the nipa hut. A barangay tanod found a folded paper containing four plastic packs of white crystalline substance, later confirmed to be 0.31 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
• Petitioner's Defense Version: Petitioner claimed he was installing electrical wiring and air-conditioning units at a canteen from 3:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. on the day of the raid, only learning of the search upon returning home between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m. He testified that the nipa hut was owned by his older brother and used as a storage place by his father.

• Validity of the Search Warrant: Petitioner argued there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant, as the applying officer lacked personal knowledge of the alleged illegal sale of drugs during the prior test-buy operation.
• Admissibility of Seized Items: Petitioner asserted that the nipa hut was outside the permissible area of the search warrant due to its distance from the residence, and the warrant did not include the hut. The seized items are thus fruits of the poisonous tree.
• Constructive Possession: Petitioner maintained that possession of the regulated drugs cannot be presumed merely from their discovery inside the nipa hut, as he did not own or control the structure.

• Validity of the Search Warrant: Respondent countered that the search warrant was valid, petitioner having failed to file a motion to quash or introduce clear and convincing evidence of falsity in the applicant's assertions.
• Admissibility of Seized Items: Respondent argued that the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures applies only against government authorities, not private individuals such as the barangay tanod who found the items.
• Constructive Possession: Respondent contended that a presumption of possession arises when prohibited drugs are found in a house or building belonging to and occupied by a particular person, sufficient to sustain a conviction.

• Probable Cause: Whether the search warrant was validly issued despite the applicant's alleged lack of personal knowledge.
• Admissibility of Evidence: Whether the items seized in the nipa hut are admissible, considering it was not described in the warrant and the seizure was effected by a barangay tanod.
• Constructive Possession: Whether the prosecution established constructive possession of the drugs found in the nipa hut.

• Probable Cause: The issuance of the search warrant was upheld. A magistrate's determination of probable cause is accorded great deference by a reviewing court provided there is a substantial basis for that determination, which was present here.
• Admissibility of Evidence: The seized items were ruled inadmissible. The search exceeded the scope of the warrant, which specifically described only the residence, not the nipa hut. Furthermore, barangay tanods act as agents of persons in authority under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 388 of the Local Government Code; thus, the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to their conduct, rendering the items fruits of an invalid warrantless search.
• Constructive Possession: Constructive possession was not proven. The prosecution failed to establish that petitioner owned or exercised dominion and control over the nipa hut. Prosecution witnesses contradicted themselves regarding the hut's ownership, and mere presence of electrical items did not adequately prove petitioner's control over the structure. Without proof of dominion, a reasonable doubt persists regarding petitioner's guilt.

• Probable Cause for Search Warrants — Defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The judge's determination is given great deference if supported by substantial basis.
• Particularity of Description — A search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others. Seizure from a place not described in the warrant constitutes an invalid warrantless search, rendering the items inadmissible.
• Constructive Possession in Drug Cases — Exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when the accused has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive control is not necessary, but dominion and control over the place must be proven, not merely presumed.
• Agents of Persons in Authority — Barangay tanods are deemed agents of persons in authority under the Revised Penal Code and the Local Government Code, making them subject to constitutional restrictions against unreasonable searches and seizures.

• "The confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of petitioner's constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure."
• "Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another."

• People v. Tira, G.R. No. 139615, May 28, 2004 — Followed. Defined the concept of constructive possession in drug cases, requiring intent to possess (animus possidendi) and dominion/control over the place where the drugs are found.
• People v. Tee, 443 Phil. 521 (2003) — Followed. Established that a magistrate's determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference if supported by substantial basis.
• People v. Del Castillo, G.R. No. 153254, September 30, 2004 — Followed. Held that while property ownership is not necessary for a valid search, there must be a sufficient showing that the property is under the appellant's control or possession to establish constructive possession.

• Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425 — Prohibits the possession or control of regulated drugs without license or prescription. Applied as the substantive offense charged.
• Article 152, Revised Penal Code — Defines persons in authority and agents of persons in authority, including barangay leaders and those who come to their aid. Applied to classify the barangay tanod as an agent of a person in authority, subjecting the search to constitutional constraints.
• Section 388, Local Government Code — Deems barangay officials and members charged with maintaining public order as agents of persons in authority. Applied to solidify the tanod's status for purposes of the exclusionary rule.
• Article III, Section 14(2), 1987 Constitution — Presumes the accused innocent until the contrary is proved. Applied to emphasize that proof beyond reasonable doubt is indispensable to overcome the presumption of innocence.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Jose Catral Mendoza, Bienvenido L. Reyes, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe