Del Banco vs. IAC

An action to demand partition of co-owned property is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches while the co-ownership remains unrepudiated. To extinguish a co-ownership, the co-owners must not merely agree upon ideal shares or occupy portions of the property; they must execute a subdivision plan, take actual and exclusive possession of determinate portions pursuant to that plan, and obtain corresponding titles, following the procedure under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. Mere actual possession of parts of the undivided property by some co-owners does not terminate the co-ownership, and no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner against fellow co-owners absent a clear and communicated repudiation of the common title.

Three Pansacola brothers—Benedicto, Jose, and Manuel (known as Fr. Manuel Pena)—purchased Cagbalite Island, located in Mauban, Tayabas (now Quezon), from the Spanish Government in 1859 as their common property. The original purchase agreement also recognized minor children of Manuel Pansacola as co-owners. On April 11, 1868, the co-owners modified the sharing arrangement and allocated ideal one-fourth shares to: (a) Benedicto Pansacola; (b) Jose Pansacola; (c) the children of their deceased brother Eustaquio Pansacola; and (d) the minor children of Manuel Pansacola. No physical division of the island was made. For over a century, various heirs occupied portions of the island and some obtained cadastral titles in their names. On November 18, 1968, heirs from some of the branches filed a special action for partition under Rule 69 against the other heirs and successors-in-interest. Petitioners, as defendants, resisted the action by invoking prescription, res judicata based on a 1958 Supreme Court decision, exclusive ownership, estoppel, and laches.

• The Original Co-ownership: In a document executed on February 11, 1859, in San Rafael, Bulacan, Benedicto Pansacola, Jose Pansacola, and Manuel Pansacola agreed to purchase Cagbalite Island from the Spanish Government as their common property. The minors Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo, represented by Manuel Pansacola, were also recognized as participants. The benefits from the island were to be shared equally, with Benedicto and Jose each receiving one-fourth and the minors receiving two-fourths under the care of Manuel.

• The 1868 Modification: On April 11, 1868, the parties modified the sharing arrangement to include the children of their deceased brother Eustaquio Pansacola and others. The new agreement distributed the island in ideal one-fourth shares to four branches: (a) Benedicto Pansacola; (b) Jose Pansacola; (c) the children of Eustaquio Pansacola (Mariano, Maria, and Hipolito); and (d) the minor children of Manuel Pansacola (Domingo Arce, Baldomera Angulo, Marcelina Flores, Francisca Flores, Candelaria dela Cruz, and Gervasio Pansacola). No physical division accompanied this distribution.

• The 1907 and 1908 Partition Agreements: On January 20, 1907, representatives of the heirs of all the original owners signed an agreement in Mauban, Tayabas, setting out how the island was to be partitioned. The agreement provided that a survey was to be made according to a sketch prepared by a surveyor, Jose Garcia, and that plantings on crossed boundaries would be compensated. On April 18, 1908, they executed a supplemental agreement ratifying the 1907 accord, stipulating that the land and the “pacatan” would be divided equally, and designating Amadeo Pansacola to conduct the survey and prepare the plan and description at the rate of one peso per hectare. The 1908 agreement also indicated that a final plan was pending, and expenses for boundary markers were to be shared. The son of Amadeo, Virgilio Pansacola, testified that the contracts were never implemented because no one defrayed the survey expenses.

• The 1968 Partition Suit and Defenses: Private respondents, as heirs of some of the four branches, filed a special action for partition in 1968. Petitioners, as defendants, raised prescription, res judicata by virtue of the Supreme Court’s 1958 decision in G.R. Nos. 21033-35 (Domingo Arce v. Maria Villabona, et al.), exclusive ownership, estoppel, and laches. The trial court found that the island had already been partitioned and dismissed the complaint.

• Possession and Titles: Several petitioners and private respondents were in actual possession of different portions of the island at the time of suit, and some had obtained cadastral titles in their names over those portions.

• Prescription and Laches: Petitioners maintained that the action for partition was barred by prescription and laches because private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest had not sought physical partition for more than a century, and some petitioners and their predecessors had possessed defined portions under claim of exclusive ownership.

• Res Judicata: Petitioners invoked the Supreme Court’s 1958 decision in Domingo Arce v. Maria Villabona, et al. (G.R. Nos. 21033-35), where the Court stated that the original parcel had been “partitioned” and that plaintiff Arce had disposed of all his rights. They argued that this finding conclusively established that a partition had already been effected.

• Exclusive Ownership: Some petitioners asserted exclusive ownership over specific portions they occupied, contending that their long possession and issuance of cadastral titles to those portions constituted a de facto partition or termination of co-ownership.

• No Actual Physical Partition: Private respondents countered that the 1859 and 1868 agreements provided only for ideal shares in the co-owned property, and no physical division had ever been carried out. They argued that the 1907 and 1908 agreements were never implemented because the survey was not conducted, and thus the island remained undivided common property.

• The 1958 Decision Applied “Partition” in a Metaphysical Sense: Private respondents contended that the word “partition” in the Arce decision referred to an ideal, abstract distribution, not a technical physical partition. They argued that the earlier case involved recovery of possession of distinct parcels, not an action for partition of the whole island, and therefore could not bar the present action.

• Imprescriptible Nature of Partition: Private respondents maintained that an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches while the co-ownership subsists and has not been repudiated, and that mere possession by some co-owners of portions of the property did not constitute repudiation.

• Partition: Whether Cagbalite Island had been physically partitioned, thereby extinguishing the co-ownership, or remained undivided property owned in common by the heirs and successors of the original co-owners.

• Res Judicata: Whether the Supreme Court’s 1958 decision in Domingo Arce v. Maria Villabona, et al. barred the action for partition on the ground that the island had already been partitioned.

• Prescription and Laches: Whether the action for partition was barred by prescription or laches given the long lapse of time and the possession of specific portions by some parties.

• Partition: The property remained undivided and co-ownership persisted. The 1859 and 1868 agreements established only an ideal, pro-indiviso distribution of shares; each co-owner held an abstract, undivided aliquot portion of the whole. The 1907 and 1908 agreements evinced an intent to effect a physical partition but were never carried out because the required survey was not executed. A valid partition that terminates a co-ownership requires not merely an agreement to subdivide but an actual subdivision plan, exclusive possession of determinate portions pursuant to that plan, and the issuance of corresponding titles in accordance with the procedure under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. Neither actual possession of portions by some co-owners nor the issuance of cadastral titles over those portions, absent the conformity of all co-owners or a judicial decree of partition, suffices to adjudicate a definite portion to any co-owner in fee simple to the exclusion of the others.

• Res Judicata: The 1958 decision did not bar the action for partition. The earlier actions (G.R. Nos. 21033-35) were suits for recovery of possession of three distinct parcels of land, not an action for partition of the entire island. The reference to “partition” in that decision was used in a metaphysical or ideal sense—referring to the distribution of ideal shares—rather than in its technical, legal meaning of a physical division adjudicating specific portions. Because the earlier judgment did not adjudicate specific determined portions, it could not constitute res judicata on the issue of whether a real partition had been achieved.

• Prescription and Laches: The action for partition was not barred. Under Article 400 (now Article 494) of the Civil Code, a co-owner may demand partition at any time, and under Article 403 (now Article 497), assignees may participate; this renders the action imprescriptible and not subject to laches so long as the co-ownership is not properly repudiated. A co-owner’s possession of a share is co-possession linked to the possession of the other co-owners, and no prescription runs in favor of one co-owner against another absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership openly communicated to the other co-owners. Petitioners failed to prove such repudiation.

• Nature of a co-owner’s share before physical partition — Each co-owner holds a full right of dominion over the entire property and, simultaneously, an abstract, undetermined aliquot share of the whole. Until physical division is effected, that share is an ideal portion not concretely determined. (Citing 3 Manresa, Codigo Civil, and cases such as Lopez v. Cuaycong, 74 Phil. 601; De la Cruz v. Cruz, 32 SCRA 307; Felices v. Colegado, 35 SCRA 173.)

• Requisites for a partition that extinguishes co-ownership — To terminate a co-ownership, a co-owner must strictly comply with the procedure under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. It is insufficient that the co-owners merely agree to subdivide; they must have a subdivision plan drawn, take actual and exclusive possession of their respective determinate portions based on that plan, and obtain corresponding titles. (Citing Caro v. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 10 and Maganon v. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282.)

• Sale of an undivided share — A co-owner may validly sell his entire pro-indiviso share, but may not convey a physical portion with definite boundaries of the land owned in common. (Citing Pamplona v. Moreto, 96 SCRA 775 and Mercado v. Liwanag, 5 SCRA 472.)

• Imprescriptibility of action for partition — The action to demand partition of common property is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches. Article 400 (now Article 494) of the Civil Code gives each co-owner the right to demand partition at any time, and Article 403 (now Article 497) extends that right to assignees. The action lies as long as the co-ownership is not clearly and effectively repudiated. (Citing Budlong v. Pondoc, 79 SCRA 24; Jardin v. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532.)

• Prescription among co-owners — No prescription runs in favor of a co-owner against fellow co-owners or co-heirs while the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized. To set prescription in motion, there must be a clear, unequivocal, and communicated repudiation of the co-ownership. (Citing Valdez v. Olonga, 51 SCRA 71; Tero v. Tero, 131 SCRA 100; Mariano v. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342; Gatchalian v. Arlegui, 75 SCRA 234.)

• ”There is nothing in all four agreements that suggests that actual or physical partition of the Island had really been made by either the original owners or their heirs or successors-in-interest.” — This passage underscores the Court’s finding that the documentary evidence merely reflected ideal distributions, not an executed physical division.

• ”It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They must have a subdivision plan drawn in accordance with which they take actual and exclusive possession of their respective portions in the plan and titles issued to each of them accordingly.” — This articulation of the formal requisites for a valid extrajudicial partition is frequently cited in jurisprudence.

• ”An action for partition does not prescribe. … a provision which implies that the action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches.” — This restates the settled rule on the imprescriptibility of the action for partition during the subsistence of co-ownership.

• ”While there is co-ownership, a co-owner’s possession of his share is co-possession which is linked to the possession of the other co-owners.” — This explains why mere possession of a part does not ripen into exclusive ownership against other co-owners.

• Caro v. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 10 (1982) — Followed; established that an agreement to subdivide is insufficient to terminate co-ownership without a subdivision plan, exclusive possession under it, and issuance of titles.

• Maganon v. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282 (1986) — Followed; reiterated that the mechanics of actual partition should follow the procedure under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

• Budlong v. Pondoc, 79 SCRA 24 (1977) — Followed; declared the action for partition imprescriptible and not subject to the defense of laches.

• Gatchalian v. Arlegui, 75 SCRA 234 (1977) — Followed; held that a co-owner’s possession is co-possession linked to the possession of others and does not by itself constitute repudiation.

• Mariano v. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 (1987) — Followed; ruled that co-owners cannot acquire by prescription the share of other co-owners without a clear, communicated repudiation of the co-ownership.

• Domingo Arce v. Maria Villabona, et al. (G.R. Nos. 21033-35, February 20, 1958) — Distinguished; the word “partition” was used in an ideal, abstract sense in the context of a suit for recovery of possession, not a technical physical partition; thus it did not operate as res judicata.

• Article 400, Spanish Civil Code (now Article 494, Civil Code of the Philippines) — Provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property; applied to underpin the imprescriptible nature of the action.

• Article 403, Spanish Civil Code (now Article 497, Civil Code of the Philippines) — Provides that the assignees of co-owners may take part in the partition of the common property; reinforced the right of heirs to institute the action.

• Rule 69, Rules of Court (formerly Rule 71) — Governs the procedure for judicial partition of co-owned property; the Court ordered that the partition be conducted in conformity with Sections 2, 3, et seq. of this Rule.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz, and Gancayco, JJ., concurred.

N/A — The decision was unanimous.