Degamo vs. Office of the Ombudsman

A petition for certiorari against the Office of the Ombudsman's finding of no probable cause will not prosper absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, which exists only where a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Court will not interfere with the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause, as it is an executive function and the Ombudsman is in a better position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of the evidence.

Petitioner Roel R. Degamo was the Governor of Negros Oriental, and private respondent Mario L. Relampagos was the Undersecretary for Operations of the Department of Budget and Management. The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council requested the release of P961,550,000.00 to the Negros Oriental provincial government to finance the rehabilitation of infrastructures damaged by Typhoon Sendong and a 6.9-magnitude earthquake. The Office of the President approved the request, charging the amount against the Calamity Fund for Fiscal Year 2012. The release of funds was governed by Republic Act No. 10121, the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010, and the special provisions of Republic Act No. 10155, the General Appropriations Act of 2012, as provided in the Department's Budget Circular No. 2012-2.

Petitioner Roel R. Degamo was the Governor of Negros Oriental, and private respondent Mario L. Relampagos was the Undersecretary for Operations of the Department of Budget and Management. The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council requested the release of P961,550,000.00 to the Negros Oriental provincial government to finance the rehabilitation of various infrastructures damaged by Typhoon Sendong and a 6.9-magnitude earthquake. The Office of the President, through Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr., approved the request, charging the amount against the Calamity Fund for Fiscal Year 2012, subject to availability. The Department, through its Regional Office No. VII, issued on June 5, 2012 Special Allotment Release Order No. ROVII-12-0009202, which covered the approved amount, and also issued a Notice of Cash Allocation worth P480,775,000.00, or 50% of the approved sum.

In a June 18, 2012 letter to Budget and Management Secretary Florencio Abad, Public Works and Highways Secretary Rogelio L. Singson requested the Department not to indicate the recipient local government unit in the Special Allotment Release Order yet, since the Department of Public Works and Highways needed to evaluate the local government units' capability to implement projects prior to the release of a fund. Thus, Abad ordered Relampagos to withdraw the previously issued Special Allotment Release Order and Notice of Cash Allocation. In a June 19, 2012 letter-advice, Relampagos informed Degamo that the Department was withdrawing the Special Allotment Release Order because its release did not comply with the guidelines on large-scale fund releases for infrastructure projects, effective until the Department of Public Works and Highways could determine that the local government units were able to implement the projects. On June 29, 2012, the Department's Regional Office VII Director advised Degamo that the Special Allotment Release Order had been withdrawn and ordered the provincial government to return and deposit P480,775,000.00 to the National Treasury. On July 16, 2012, Degamo informed Relampagos that the provincial government would not be returning the funds, claiming that he was illegally withdrawing funds unbeknownst to higher authorities.

On December 26, 2012, Degamo filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a Complaint for Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions against Relampagos, alleging that when Relampagos wrote the June 19, 2012 letter-advice, he falsely posed himself to have been authorized by President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, and that he usurped the official functions of the Executive Secretary, who had the sole authority to write and speak for and on behalf of the President. In his Counter-Affidavit, Relampagos maintained that he wrote the letter as the Department's Undersecretary for Operations, acting upon Abad's instructions, and that the Office of the President was informed of the withdrawal. The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the Complaint, finding no probable cause to charge Relampagos with Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions since he signed the letter in his own name and under the words, "By Authority of the Secretary," with no positive, express, and explicit representation made, and neither did he act under pretense of official position nor without legal authority. The Ombudsman denied Degamo's Motion for Reconsideration, prompting Degamo to file the Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner argued that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion when it held that there was no probable cause to indict private respondent of the crime charged.
• Violation of the Law: Petitioner argued that the funding assistance was a calamity fund governed by Republic Act No. 10121 and the special provisions of Republic Act No. 10155, as provided in the Department's Budget Circular No. 2012-2, and that per these laws, releasing funds to the implementing agency requires the approval of the President with favorable recommendation of the Council, so there was no need for the Department of Public Works and Highways' prior determination before the Special Allotment Release Order could be released.
• Lack of Authority to Withdraw: Petitioner maintained that private respondent's cancellation of the Special Allotment Release Order and Notice of Cash Allocation was contrary to law, and that the Department "relinquishes its jurisdiction, disposition[,] and control of public funds once a [Notice of Cash Allocation] is issued," so private respondent no longer had authority to cancel both documents pertaining to the calamity fund already deposited to the provincial government's account.
• Usurpation of Presidential Prerogative: Petitioner alleged that private respondent usurped the "sole prerogative of the President to suspend or stop further expenditures under Section 38 of the Administrative Code of 1987."

• Authority as Undersecretary: Private respondent countered that he withdrew the Special Allotment Release Order as the Undersecretary for Operations, under the August 18, 2011 Department Order No. 2011-11, and that nowhere in his letter did he assume acting on behalf of the President or the Executive Secretary, as he signed it under his name, using the words, "By Authority of the Secretary."
• Acting Upon Instructions: Private respondent contended that he acted upon Abad's orders, whom the President instructed to comply with the 2012 GAA provision "allowing delegation of nationally[-]funded infrastructure projects [only] to [local government units] with the capability to implement the projects by themselves," and that the President was duly informed of the reasons for the withdrawal and has neither rejected nor reversed it.
• No Grave Abuse of Discretion: Public respondent argued that it did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint against private respondent, invoking the same department order which authorized private respondent to sign for and on behalf of Abad, and that it "has the ultimate and unfettered discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be filed against an erring public official, except only upon a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion which petitioner utterly failed to establish."

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Complaint for usurpation of authority or official functions, which petitioner filed against private respondent, for lack of probable cause.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The Petition was dismissed for lack of merit. The Court affirmed the April 19, 2013 Resolution and January 8, 2014 Order of the Office of the Ombudsman, as the petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman's finding of no probable cause to indict private respondent for usurpation of authority or official functions.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Court adopted a policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause, citing Dichaves vs. Office of the Ombudsman, which held that both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 give the Ombudsman wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials, and that the Ombudsman has the sole power to determine whether there is probable cause to warrant the filing of a criminal case, a function that is executive in nature. The Court noted that in a special civil action for certiorari, it cannot correct errors of fact or law not amounting to grave abuse of discretion, and that an allegation of grave abuse of discretion must be substantiated, as held in Joson vs. Office of the Ombudsman, citing Tetangco vs. Ombudsman, which defined grave abuse of discretion as a power exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.

Regarding the crime of usurpation of authority, the Court explained that Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes the act of knowingly and falsely representing oneself to be an officer, agent, or representative of any department or agency of the government, which is a malicious misrepresentation. The Court found that private respondent did not maliciously misrepresent himself as an agent, officer, or representative of the government, as he is a public official himself, the Department's Undersecretary for Operations, and he signed the letter in his own name and under the words, "By Authority of the Secretary." Thus, the facts presented by petitioner did not constitute the crime of usurpation of authority.

Regarding the crime of usurpation of official functions, the Court identified the elements as: (1) performing any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof; (2) acting under pretense of official position; and (3) acting without being lawfully entitled to do so. The Court found that the first element was present, as the withdrawal of the Special Allotment Release Order was an act pertaining to a person in authority or public officer. However, the Court found that private respondent did not claim to write for and on behalf of the President in the letter, and that he acted under Abad's authority under the August 18, 2011 Department Order No. 2011-11, which designated him to sign documents on Abad's behalf, explicitly including the Special Allotment Release Order, the Notice of Cash Allocation, and the letter-advice to agencies. The Court also noted that petitioner failed to refute private respondent's allegations that the act was upon the instructions of the President, and that under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department secretaries may act for and on behalf of the President on matters where the President is required to exercise authority in their respective departments. Thus, the Court ruled that private respondent, under Abad's authority, may exercise the power to withdraw the Special Allotment Release Order through the letter-advice sent to petitioner.

Finally, the Court found that private respondent acted in good faith, citing Ruzol vs. Sandiganbayan, which defined good faith as "honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even though technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts[,] which render transaction unconscientious." The records failed to show that private respondent acted in bad faith, and on the contrary, it appeared that petitioner acted in bad faith, as he was the only one among the local chief executives who disregarded the order from the Executive Department. Thus, without proof that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion, the Petition was dismissed.

• Non-Interference with the Ombudsman's Determination of Probable Cause — The Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's exercise of its constitutional mandate to determine probable cause, as both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 give the Ombudsman wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials. The Ombudsman has the sole power to determine whether there is probable cause to warrant the filing of a criminal case, a function that is executive in nature, and the Court defers to the Ombudsman's sound judgment as it is not a trier of facts. The Court may review the Ombudsman's exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers only upon a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law. An allegation of grave abuse of discretion must be substantiated before the Court can exercise its power of judicial review.
• Usurpation of Authority — Under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of usurpation of authority punishes the act of knowingly and falsely representing oneself to be an officer, agent, or representative of any department or agency of the government. The punishable act is the malicious misrepresentation as an agent, officer, or representative of the government. A public official who signs a document in his own name and under the words "By Authority of the Secretary" does not maliciously misrepresent himself as an agent of the government.
• Usurpation of Official Functions — Under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of usurpation of official functions are: (1) performing any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof; (2) acting under pretense of official position; and (3) acting without being lawfully entitled to do so. Good faith is a defense against a charge under this provision.
• Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency — Department secretaries may act for and on behalf of the President on matters where the President is required to exercise authority in their respective departments. Under this doctrine, an undersecretary designated to sign documents on behalf of the department secretary, upon the instructions of the President, may exercise the power to withdraw a Special Allotment Release Order.
• Good Faith — Good faith is a defense in criminal prosecutions for usurpation of official functions. It denotes "honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even though technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts[,] which render transaction unconscientious." Good faith is a question of intention that can be ascertained by evidence of conduct and outward acts, not by self-serving protestations.

• "As a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's exercise of its constitutional mandate. Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) give the Ombudsman wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials and government employees. The rule on non-interference is based on the respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman." — This passage from Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman states the foundational rule of non-interference with the Ombudsman's probable cause determination, which is the central principle applied in this case.
• "The punishable act in usurpation of authority is false and knowing representation, i.e. the malicious misrepresentation as an agent, officer, or representative of the government." — This passage defines the core element of the crime of usurpation of authority under Article 177, which the Court applied to find that the private respondent did not commit the crime.
• "It appears that private respondent was acting on behalf of Abad, upon the instructions of the President. Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department secretaries may act for and on behalf of the President on matters where the President is required to exercise authority in their respective departments." — This passage articulates the application of the doctrine of qualified political agency, which justified the private respondent's authority to withdraw the Special Allotment Release Order.
• "The term 'good faith' is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting 'honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even though technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts[,] which render transaction unconscientious.'" — This passage from Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan defines good faith as a defense in prosecutions for usurpation of official functions, which the Court applied to find that the private respondent acted in good faith.

• Dichaves vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 802 Phil. 564 (2016) — Controlling precedent on the rule of non-interference with the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause, cited to support the Court's dismissal of the petition.
• Joson vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 197433 and 197435, August 9, 2017 — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion and the requirement that an allegation of grave abuse of discretion must be substantiated.
• Tetangco vs. Ombudsman, 515 Phil. 230 (2006) — Cited in Joson for the canonical definition of grave abuse of discretion as a power exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner.
• People vs. Hilvano, 99 Phil. 655 (1956) — Followed for the ruling that Article 177 applies to "any person," including public officials, and that good faith is a defense against a charge under it.
• Gigantoni y Javier vs. People, 245 Phil. 133 (1988) — Followed for the principle that a person cannot be said to have knowingly and falsely represented himself as an officer without competent and credible proof that he knew of his lack of authority.
• Ruzol vs. Sandiganbayan, 709 Phil. 708 (2013) — Followed for the elements of usurpation of official functions, the inquiry into whether the accused may exercise the power in question, and the definition of good faith as a defense.
• Joson vs. Torres, 352 Phil. 888 (1998) — Cited for the doctrine of qualified political agency, under which department secretaries may act for and on behalf of the President.

• Article 177, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 379 (1949) — The provision defining and penalizing the crimes of usurpation of authority and usurpation of official functions. The Court applied this provision to determine whether the private respondent's acts constituted either crime.
• Section 38, Administrative Code of 1987 — Cited by the petitioner as the provision granting the President the sole prerogative to suspend or stop further expenditures, which the petitioner alleged the private respondent usurped.
• Republic Act No. 10121, Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 — Cited by the petitioner as the law governing the calamity fund, which requires the approval of the President with favorable recommendation of the Council for releasing funds to the implementing agency.
• Republic Act No. 10155, General Appropriations Act of 2012 — Cited by the petitioner as the law containing special provisions on the delegation of nationally-funded infrastructure projects to local government units with the capability to implement the projects by themselves.
• Republic Act No. 6770, The Ombudsman Act of 1989 — Cited in Dichaves for the proposition that the Ombudsman has wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials and government employees.
• Republic Act No. 6713 (1989), Section 3 — Cited to define "Public Officials," which includes elective and appointive officials and employees, to support the finding that the private respondent is a public official himself.

Peralta (Chairperson), Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., and Hernando, JJ., concurred.