Dedel vs. Court of Appeals

Sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. To warrant a declaration of nullity of marriage, it must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality that makes the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and that such incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Petitioner David B. Dedel and respondent Sharon L. Corpuz-Dedel were married in a civil ceremony on September 28, 1966, which was later ratified in a church wedding on May 20, 1967. The union produced four children. The parties' conjugal partnership acquired neither property nor debt. The legal backdrop for the dispute is Article 36 of the Family Code, which allows declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, a concept that jurisprudence has confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz-Dedel while he was working in the advertising business of his father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations, culminating in the exchange of marital vows before the City Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966. The civil marriage was ratified in a church wedding on May 20, 1967. The union produced four children: Beverly Jane, born on September 18, 1968; Stephanie Janice, born on September 9, 1969; Kenneth David, born on April 24, 1971; and Ingrid, born on October 20, 1976. The conjugal partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt.

Petitioner averred that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command; and later a Jordanian national. Sharon was once confined in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions.

Finally giving up all hope of reconciliation, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in the country, considering that Sharon did not reside and could not be found in the Philippines. Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does. On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.

The trial court granted the petition, declaring both the civil and church marriages null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals, however, recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition. The appellate court found that respondent was not suffering from psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations, that the alleged psychological incapacity was not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence, and permanence or incurability, and that the totality of evidence submitted by petitioner fell short of proving psychological incapacity.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner contended that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion and manifestly erred in concluding that respondent was not suffering from psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations.
• Requisites of Psychological Incapacity: Petitioner argued that the appellate court erred in finding that the psychological incapacity of respondent was not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence, and permanence or incurability.
• Totality of Evidence: Petitioner maintained that the totality of evidence submitted by him was sufficient to prove the psychological incapacity suffered by respondent.

• Absence of Valid Ground: The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed alleging that the lower court erred in granting the petition despite the absence of a valid ground for declaration of nullity of marriage.
• Church Marriage: The Republic argued that the lower court erred in declaring that the church marriage between petitioner and respondent was null and void.
• Molina Certification: The Republic contended that the lower court erred in rendering a decision without a certification having been issued by the Solicitor General as required in the Molina case.

• Psychological Incapacity: Whether the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent is psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code.
• Aberrant Sexual Behavior: Whether the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner falls within the term "psychological incapacity."
• Jurisdiction over Church Marriage: Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and respondent.

• Psychological Incapacity: No. The totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Respondent's sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.
• Aberrant Sexual Behavior: No. Respondent's sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
• Jurisdiction over Church Marriage: No. The trial court had no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and respondent, as the authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church.

• Psychological Incapacity: The Court applied the doctrine in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, which defined "psychological incapacity" as a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, including their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The Court noted that respondent's promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage; what the records disclosed was a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children.
• Aberrant Sexual Behavior: The Court reasoned that a personality disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. Respondent's sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. The Court cited Republic vs. Dagdag and Pesca vs. Pesca in holding that sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity, and that emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity, or sexual promiscuity.
• Jurisdiction over Church Marriage: The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the trial court had no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and respondent, as the authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church. The Court noted that at best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, citing Marcos vs. Marcos for the proposition that Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like.

• Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code — Refers to a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, which include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that respondent's sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility did not amount to psychological incapacity, as these were not shown to be manifestations of a disordered personality existing at the inception of the marriage.
• Distinction between Article 36 and legal separation — Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be equated with legal separation under Article 55, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like. The Court applied this distinction in holding that the evidence presented by petitioner referred only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

• "x x x 'psychological incapacity' should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support." — This passage from Santos vs. Court of Appeals, quoted by the Court, defines the canonical formulation of psychological incapacity under Article 36 and is the controlling doctrine applied in this case.
• "Respondent's sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity." — This passage states the Court's core ruling that the specific acts alleged by petitioner do not amount to psychological incapacity, distinguishing such conduct from a disordered personality.
• "It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity." — This passage articulates the required standard for establishing psychological incapacity, emphasizing that the acts must be manifestations of a disordered personality rendering the spouse completely unable to discharge marital obligations.

• Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21 (1995) — Controlling precedent that defined the meaning and scope of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code, which the Court applied in finding that respondent's conduct did not constitute psychological incapacity.
• Republic vs. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA 425 — Cited for the proposition that sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the spouse could not have known the obligations she was assuming.
• Pesca vs. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001, 356 SCRA 588 — Cited for the holding that sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity, and that emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.
• Marcos vs. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755 — Cited for the principle that Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity.
• Hernandez vs. Court of Appeals — Cited in support of the proposition that the acts relied upon must be manifestations of a disordered personality, not merely due to youth, immaturity, or sexual promiscuity.

• Article 36, Family Code — The provision allowing declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Court applied this provision in determining whether respondent's conduct constituted psychological incapacity, holding that it did not.
• Article 55, Family Code — The provision enumerating the grounds for legal separation, including sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment. The Court held that the circumstances relied upon by petitioner were, at best, grounds for legal separation under this provision, not for declaring a marriage void.
• Article 68, Family Code — The provision expressing the mutual obligations of spouses to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support, which was quoted in the definition of psychological incapacity.
• Article 54, Family Code — The provision considering children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate," which the Court cited in Santos to support the conclusion that the law does not envision an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other as psychological incapacity.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, J., and Carpio, J., concurred. Azcuna, J., was on official leave.