Decin v. Tayco

When the Ombudsman takes cognizance of a case and resolves it in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction over an offense committed by a public officer in relation to office, the DOJ is barred from intervening or reasserting jurisdiction; the Ombudsman’s resolution, if not elevated for judicial review, becomes final and executory and cannot be modified by the DOJ.

Sevilla Decin is the wife of Ernie Decin. The respondents are members of the Philippine National Police, Cadiz City, and SPO2 Jude dela Rama was also implicated in the complaint. The preliminary investigation of offenses committed by public officers is governed by the concurrent jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ under RA No. 6770 and OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001, which places offenses committed in relation to office under the control and supervision of the Ombudsman and offenses not in relation to office under the provincial or city prosecutor, whose ruling is final.

Ernie Decin was killed, and his wife Sevilla Decin, through the National Bureau of Investigation, filed a complaint for murder against SPO1 Melzasar Tayco, SPO1 Jeffrey Contrivida, SPO1 Sunny Becaro, SPO1 Gloria Gonzales, PO3 Arlo Deonesa, and SPO2 Jude dela Rama, all members of the Philippine National Police, Cadiz City, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, docketed as I.S. No. 7697.

On September 16, 1997, the City Prosecutor issued a 15-page resolution finding no basis to indict respondents but finding probable cause against SPO2 Jude dela Rama for Murder. The complaint against respondents was ordered dismissed. The resolution exonerated the rest of the respondents, holding that “conspiracy is absent.” Because respondents were police officers, the City Prosecutor directed in the same resolution that it “be forwarded to the Ombudsman for Military” for approval, and the Ombudsman approved the City Prosecutor’s Resolution in his “review and recommendation” dated October 31, 1997 under OMB-MIL-Crim-97-0766.

Meanwhile, Sevilla Decin, as the principal complainant and aggrieved party, appealed the September 16, 1997 Resolution to the Department of Justice. In a letter dated November 24, 1997, the DOJ, through Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab, Jr., directed Decin to submit all material and pertinent affidavits and evidence submitted by both parties in the preliminary investigation, warning that compliance within five days from receipt was required, otherwise her appeal would be dismissed. On May 19, 1998, the DOJ, in its 1st Indorsement, referred Decin’s appeal to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Military pursuant to RA No. 6770 and OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 dated October 5, 1995. On June 15, 1998, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military denied Decin’s appeal and affirmed the September 16, 1997 Resolution; no motion for reconsideration was filed by Decin.

On March 9, 1999, dela Rama was arraigned before Branch 60, RTC, Cadiz City, in Criminal Case No. 2006-C for Murder, and entered a plea of not guilty. On July 20, 1999, the DOJ issued a resolution in the appeal before it, modifying the appealed resolution and directing the City Prosecutor Office of Cadiz City to file the Information for murder against respondents and to report the action taken within ten days from receipt. Respondents received the resolution on August 12, 1999. They filed a motion for reconsideration through registered mail on August 23, 1999, although the DOJ says August 24, 1999. On September 20, 1999, the DOJ denied the motion, ruling that respondents received the resolution on August 12, 1999 and filed the motion on August 24, 1999, which was beyond the non-extendible ten-day period under Section 10 of Department Order No. 223 dated June 30, 1993, as amended.

Respondents then filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the CA, questioning the DOJ’s reversal of the June 15, 1998 Order of the Ombudsman on the ground that the Order had already become final and eventually executed and that the DOJ was devoid of jurisdiction over the appeal, including the preliminary investigation, from the Resolution of the Cadiz Prosecution Office in I.S. No. 7697. Petitioner thereafter filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

• Factual Findings of the CA: Petitioner argued that the CA committed serious and patent errors in findings of fact unsupported by evidence on record with the DOJ and based its conclusion on Tayco, et al.’s misrepresentation of facts.
• Motion for Reconsideration: Petitioner argued that the CA grievously erred in denying her Motion for Reconsideration despite submission of documents showing patent error in its factual findings.
• Questions of Substance: Petitioner argued that the CA committed serious error in deciding questions of substance not in accord with law or applicable SC decisions.
• Ombudsman’s Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction because the City Prosecutor found that the offense had no relation to the office or performance of official duties by respondents; thus the Ombudsman’s Resolution was a patent nullity and could never attain finality.
• DOJ’s Power to Reassert Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that the DOJ could reassert its jurisdiction despite its prior endorsement of her appeal to the Ombudsman, and that the Ombudsman had no inherent power to review the prosecutor’s resolution.

• Finality and Execution of Ombudsman Order: Respondents argued that the Ombudsman’s June 15, 1998 Order had already become final and eventually executed, and observed that the controversy arose only after that Resolution affirmed the City Prosecutor’s Resolution, by which time the Ombudsman’s findings had long become final and implemented when dela Rama was arraigned.
• DOJ Jurisdiction: Respondents argued that the DOJ was devoid of jurisdiction over the appeal, including the preliminary investigation, from the Resolution of the Cadiz Prosecution Office in I.S. No. 7697.

• Finality of Ombudsman Resolution: Whether the June 15, 1998 Order of the Ombudsman for the Military, approving the City Prosecutor’s September 16, 1997 Resolution dismissing the murder complaint against respondents, may subsequently be modified or reversed by the DOJ despite having become final and executory.
• Referral to Ombudsman: Whether the CA correctly held that it was within the prerogative, if not duty, of the Cadiz City Prosecutor to endorse her resolution to the Ombudsman for the Military despite the absence of basis or proof that the offense was committed in relation to office.
• DOJ’s Reassertion of Jurisdiction: Whether the CA correctly held that the Secretary of Justice is barred from re-asserting jurisdiction after the Ombudsman for the Military assumed jurisdiction over petitioner’s appeal.

• Finality of Ombudsman Resolution: No. The Ombudsman’s June 15, 1998 Order became final and executory, and the DOJ’s later resolutions modifying it were ultra vires and without basis in law and fact.
• Referral to Ombudsman: Yes. The City Prosecutor could endorse the result to the Ombudsman, whose approval was an exercise of primary jurisdiction under OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001; murder can be committed in relation to public office.
• DOJ’s Reassertion of Jurisdiction: Yes. Once the Ombudsman took cognizance of the case, the DOJ was barred from intervening or reasserting jurisdiction in the preliminary investigation.

• Finality of Ombudsman Resolution: The Ombudsman’s June 15, 1998 Order denied petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the September 16, 1997 Resolution. Petitioner filed no motion for reconsideration and never elevated the ruling for judicial review, so it became final and executory. The DOJ’s July 20 and September 20, 1999 resolutions attempting to modify it were ultra vires and without basis in law and fact. The SC also cited Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals and Crespo vs. Mogul for the rule that after the information is filed and the accused arraigned, any disposition of the case rests in the sound discretion of the court; the prosecutor cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.
• Referral to Ombudsman: Under Honasan II vs. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have concurrent jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of offenses committed by public officers; the Ombudsman may take over at any stage in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 places offenses committed in relation to office under the control and supervision of the Ombudsman. The City Prosecutor found probable cause against dela Rama for Murder and forwarded the resolution to the Ombudsman, who approved it. The SC rejected petitioner’s claim that the Ombudsman’s Resolution was a patent nullity because the City Prosecutor found no relation to office; the SC noted that murder can be committed in relation to public office, and the Ombudsman found probable cause against dela Rama only and that the crime was committed in relation to his office. The Ombudsman’s ruling became final.
• DOJ’s Reassertion of Jurisdiction: Both the City Prosecutor and the DOJ, on their own initiative, referred the case to the Ombudsman under the Joint Circular. The City Prosecutor’s referral on September 16, 1997 came earlier than the DOJ’s referral dated May 19, 1998. When the Ombudsman approved the City Prosecutor’s Resolution on October 31, 1997, it took cognizance of the case in the exercise of primary jurisdiction, and that exercise barred the DOJ from intervening in the preliminary investigation. The DOJ was effectively deprived of its power to assert jurisdiction; its later resolutions were ultra vires.

• Concurrent Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ in Preliminary Investigation — The Ombudsman and the DOJ have concurrent jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers or employees; the Ombudsman may take over at any stage in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Under OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001, offenses committed by public officers in relation to office are under the control and supervision of the Ombudsman, while offenses not in relation to office and cognizable by regular courts are investigated and prosecuted by the provincial or city prosecutor, which shall rule with finality. The SC applied this by upholding the City Prosecutor’s and DOJ’s referrals to the Ombudsman and treating the Ombudsman’s approval as an exercise of primary jurisdiction.
• Primary Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman — Once the Ombudsman takes cognizance of a case in the exercise of primary jurisdiction, it bars the DOJ from intervening in the preliminary investigation. The SC applied this when the Ombudsman approved the City Prosecutor’s Resolution on October 31, 1997, barring the DOJ from later modifying it.
• Finality of Ombudsman Resolution — An Ombudsman resolution that is not elevated for judicial review becomes final and executory and cannot be modified by the DOJ. The SC applied this to the June 15, 1998 Order denying petitioner’s appeal and affirming the dismissal of the complaint against respondents.
• Ultra Vires Act — An act beyond the authority of a government office is ultra vires and without legal basis. The SC held that the DOJ’s July 20 and September 20, 1999 resolutions attempting to modify the final Ombudsman Resolution were ultra vires and had no basis in law and fact.
• Prosecutor’s Control Once Information Is Filed — Although the prosecutor retains direction and control of the prosecution even after the case is in court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court; the court is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it. The SC applied this after the Information against dela Rama was filed and he was arraigned, so any subsequent disposition rested with the RTC.

• “When the Ombudsman approved the City Prosecutor's Resolution on October 31, 1997 which affirmed the prosecutor's dismissal of the charges against the respondents, it then and there took cognizance of the case in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction, and, by doing so, such exercise of jurisdiction barred the DOJ from intervening in the preliminary investigation proceedings.” — The SC identifies the precise moment the Ombudsman’s primary jurisdiction attached and explains why the DOJ could no longer intervene.
• “The DOJ's attempts to make such modification are ultra vires and had no basis in law and in fact.” — The SC characterizes the DOJ’s later resolutions as beyond its authority after the Ombudsman had already acted.
• “In short, the resolution of the Ombudsman for Military dated 15 June 1998 attained finality.” — The SC confirms the finality of the Ombudsman’s denial of petitioner’s appeal.
• “Concededly, murder which is the felony under scrutiny can be 'committed in relation to the public office'.” — The SC rejects the premise that the Ombudsman’s resolution was a patent nullity for lack of relation to office.

• Honasan II vs. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 159747, April 13, 2004, 427 SCRA 46, 70-75 — Controlling precedent; followed for the rule that the Ombudsman and the DOJ have concurrent jurisdiction over preliminary investigation of offenses committed by public officers, with the Ombudsman exercising primary jurisdiction.
• Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 324 Phil. 568, 601 (1996) — Cited for the rule that once the information is filed, any disposition of the case rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.
• Crespo vs. Mogul, No. L-53373, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 462, 471 — Cited in Roberts, Jr. for the same rule on the trial court’s control after the information is filed.

• RA No. 6770 — Cited in the referral of petitioner’s appeal to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Military; the SC treated the Ombudsman as having concurrent jurisdiction over the preliminary investigation.
• OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 (October 5, 1995), Items 1 and 2 — Item 1 places preliminary investigation and prosecution of offenses committed by public officers in relation to office, whether cognizable by the Sandiganbayan or regular courts, under the control and supervision of the Ombudsman; Item 2 places offenses not in relation to office and cognizable by regular courts under the provincial or city prosecutor, which shall rule with finality. Applied to uphold the referrals to the Ombudsman and bar the DOJ.
• Constitution; Section 15, Ombudsman Act of 1989; Section 4, Sandiganbayan Law, as amended — Cited in Honasan II for the rule that these do not give the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers; the authority is concurrent with other investigating agencies. Applied to uphold concurrent jurisdiction.
• Sections 2 and 4, Rule 112, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (effective December 1, 2000) — Section 4 recognizes the authority of DOJ prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigation and the Ombudsman’s role in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and states that the same Rule applies to preliminary investigations conducted by Ombudsman officers. Applied to support concurrent jurisdiction.
• Rule 43, Rules of Court — The procedural route used by respondents to file their Petition for Review with the CA from the DOJ resolutions.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The procedural route used by petitioner to file the present Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC.
• Section 10, Department Order No. 223 (June 30, 1993), as amended — Provides that the aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration within a non-extendible period of ten days from receipt of the resolution on the appeal; the DOJ applied it to deny respondents’ motion for reconsideration as late.