Deaño vs. Godinez

A private communication made by a public officer to his immediate superior in the performance of a legal duty, explaining an official matter and submitted in the exercise of official functions, is a privileged communication under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code; it is presumed to have been sent without malice, and the writer is not liable for damages even if the language used is harsh or uncalled for.

Trinidad A. Deaño was a school dentist in Lanao, while Diogenes Godinez was a district supervisor of schools. Their official relationship placed Godinez under the supervision of the Division Superintendent of Schools and involved him in the administration of school fund drives, including the dental-medical drive. The case turns on Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines when defamatory imputations are not presumed malicious, particularly private communications made in the performance of a legal, moral, or social duty.

Trinidad A. Deaño was a school dentist in Lanao, while Diogenes Godinez was a district supervisor of schools. On or about March 20, 1956, Godinez, as district supervisor, sent a communication to the Division Superintendent of Schools, his immediate superior, concerning an alleged confusion in the dental-medical reports of the district. The communication was an indorsement by way of explanation of a matter referred to him in his official capacity. In it, Godinez stated that the basic communication had been written through the deliberate misinformation of Dr. T. Deaño, the school dentist; that she twisted the facts to satisfy her ulterior motives; that upon her arrival in the district she was informed of the set-up under which teachers contributed twenty pesos each by installments to cover voluntary drives, including the dental-medical drive and support to the Boy Scout Rally; that despite that information she required teachers in the field to sign blank forms she brought, not filled, and later put the amount of P20.00, tending to show that the teachers contributed P20.00 each solely for the dental-medical drive; and that teachers in Lumbatan district could be asked individually to support his contention. He further described Dr. Deaño as a carping critic, a fault finder, and one who suspected every teacher or school official to be potential grafters and swindlers of the medical-dental funds; welcomed a probe to clear his besmirched reputation; stated that the lady dentist must be ready to answer complaints of teachers and pupils against her services while she was in Lumbatan District; declared that she would not be welcomed in Lumbatan district the next school year and that if she were sent back, he and his teachers would not lift a finger in the collection of dental-medical funds; and asserted that she did more harm than good to the teeth of the patients she treated.

Trinidad claimed that with malice aforethought and in disregard of proper decorum and accepted administrative practices, Godinez wrote the communication making statements contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, and to existing rules and regulations. She alleged that the statements caused irreparable damage to her personal dignity and professional standing, and asked for P30,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.

Godinez moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the letter complained of is a privileged communication and that the action had already prescribed.

• Malice and Disregard of Administrative Practices: Plaintiff-appellant maintained that defendant wrote the communication with malice aforethought and in disregard of proper decorum and accepted administrative practices.
• Contrary to Law and Public Policy: She claimed that the statements in the letter were contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, and to existing rules and regulations.
• Damages: She sought P30,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees for the alleged irreparable damage to her personal dignity and professional standing.

• Privileged Communication: Defendant-appellee moved to dismiss on the ground that the letter complained of is a privileged communication.
• Prescription: He also moved to dismiss on the ground that the action had already prescribed.

• Privileged Communication: Whether the letter in which the alleged defamatory statements appear partakes of the nature of a privileged communication.

• Privileged Communication: Yes. The letter is a privileged communication under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, being a private communication sent by defendant to his immediate superior in the performance of a legal duty; it is presumed without malice, and the writer is not liable for damages.

• Privileged Communication: The communication was an indorsement sent by defendant to the Division Superintendent of Schools, his immediate superior, by way of explanation of an alleged confusion concerning a dental-medical report submitted relative to a fund drive then being undertaken for a public purpose. It was a comment on a communication referred to defendant in his official capacity as district supervisor and a report submitted in obedience to a lawful duty. Although the language used was harsh and uncalled for, it was excusable in the interest of public policy. Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides that every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious even if true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty. The letter falls under this exception. The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public policy, which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though it may incidentally afford immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer. Public policy recognizes that the right of the individual to immunity from untruthful charges derogatory to character is not absolute and must at times yield to the superior necessity of investigating the conduct of persons charged with wrong-doing. Because the letter was privileged, it was presumed to have been sent without malice. It being a communication sent in the discharge of a legal duty, the writer is not liable for damages. The Court relied on Abbott vs. National Bank of Commerce of Tacoma, U.S. vs. Cañete, et al., and Gilmer vs. Hilliard.

• Privileged Communication — A communication made in the performance of a legal, moral, or social duty is not actionable even if defamatory, because public policy favors the free and unfettered administration of justice and the investigation of wrongdoing. Under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, such a private communication is an exception to the presumption of malice. The Court applied the doctrine to an official letter from a district supervisor to his immediate superior explaining a dental-medical fund report.
• Qualified Privilege Based on Public Policy — The right of an individual to immunity from untruthful charges derogatory to character is not absolute and must at times yield to the superior necessity of subjecting to investigation the conduct of persons charged with wrong-doing. The Court invoked this principle to protect the communication despite the harsh and uncalled-for language used.
• Presumption of Malice and Its Exceptions under Article 354 — Every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious even if true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the cases enumerated in Article 354, including a private communication made in the performance of a legal, moral, or social duty. Because the letter was privileged, it was presumed sent without malice.

• "The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public policy, which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer." — This passage states the foundational rationale for protecting privileged communications despite the risk that the privilege may shield malicious speakers.
• "Public policy is the foundation of the doctrine of privileged communications. It is based upon the recognition of the fact that the right of the individual to enjoy immunity from the publication of untruthful charges derogatory to his character is not absolute and must at times yield to the superior necessity of subjecting to investigation the conduct of persons charged with wrong-doing." — This excerpt defines the philosophy behind qualified privilege and explains why the individual’s reputational interest must sometimes yield to the investigation of official wrongdoing.
• "The letter sent by defendant being a privileged communication, it is presumed that it was sent without malice." — This is the decisive presumption applied to the communication, negating the malice element required for liability.
• "It being a communication sent in the discharge of a legal duty, the writer is not liable for damages." — This states the ultimate no-liability ruling and ties the privilege directly to the discharge of a legal duty.

• Abbott vs. National Bank of Commerce of Tacoma, 175 U.S. 409, 411 — Cited for the proposition that the doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public policy, which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice even if it may incidentally immunize a malignant slanderer.
• U.S. vs. Cañete, et al., 38 Phil. 235 — Quoted for the philosophy behind qualified privilege: the right to immunity from untruthful charges is not absolute and must yield to the superior necessity of investigating wrongdoing.
• Gilmer vs. Hilliard, 43 Phil. 180 — Cited as authority that alleged libel based on official letters of a public officer to his superior officers, written in the discharge of official duties, does not give rise to an action for damages.
• U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 — Cited in footnote in support of the rule that a privileged communication is presumed to have been sent without malice.
• Lu Chu Sing, et al. vs. Lu Tiong Gui, 76 Phil. 669 — Cited in the same footnote as additional support for the presumption that a privileged communication is sent without malice.

• Article 354, Revised Penal Code — Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious even if true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except: (1) a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and (2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. The Court applied exception (1) to the defendant's official letter to his immediate superior, holding it privileged and presumed without malice.

Bengzon, C.J.; Concepcion; Reyes, J.B.L.; Barrera; Paredes; Dizon; Regala; Makalintal; Bengzon, J.P.; and Zaldivar, JJ.