De Vera vs. De Vera

A judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside only upon motion of the accused, not upon motion of the prosecution or private complainant, and the prosecution cannot seek certiorari to increase the penalty imposed absent a patent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The mere filing of an information or issuance of a warrant of arrest does not automatically render a subsequent surrender involuntary; voluntariness depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the act of giving oneself up.

Rosario T. de Vera was the lawful wife of Geren A. de Vera. She accused Geren and Josephine F. Juliano of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila, alleging that Geren contracted a second marriage with Josephine on July 31, 2003, while his marriage to Rosario remained valid and subsisting. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 130139. The Information charged both Geren and Josephine, with the latter alleged to have knowledge of Geren's existing marriage.

Rosario T. de Vera accused her husband Geren A. de Vera and Josephine F. Juliano of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila. The Information, filed on February 24, 2005, alleged that on or about July 31, 2003, Geren — previously lawfully married to Rosario and without that marriage having been legally dissolved — willfully contracted a second marriage with Josephine, who likewise knew that Geren's prior marriage remained valid and subsisting. Upon arraignment, Geren pleaded guilty.

On April 8, 2005, Geren filed a motion seeking to withdraw his guilty plea in the meantime so that he could prove the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Petitioner opposed the motion, arguing that not all elements of voluntary surrender were present, that it was raised only as an afterthought since Geren had earlier invoked a voluntary plea of guilty without mentioning surrender, and that since the case was ready for promulgation, the motion should no longer be entertained. The RTC, in an Order dated June 6, 2005, granted Geren's motion and appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. On the same date, the RTC promulgated its Sentence, finding Geren guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years and two months of prision correccional as maximum, applying Article 349 in relation to paragraph 5, Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, with two mitigating circumstances (plea of guilty and voluntary surrender) and no aggravating circumstance.

Petitioner moved for partial reconsideration, which the RTC denied on August 25, 2005. Meanwhile, on June 8, 2005, Geren applied for probation, which the RTC favorably acted upon by referring it to the Probation Officer of San Juan, Metro Manila. Petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which rendered the assailed Decision on February 28, 2006 affirming the RTC Order and Sentence, and the assailed Resolution on May 24, 2006 denying her motion for reconsideration. The CA sustained the RTC's appreciation of voluntary surrender, maintaining that all its requisites were present.

The factual circumstances of the surrender itself were as follows: The Information was filed with the RTC on February 24, 2005. On March 1, 2005, the court issued an Order finding probable cause for Geren to stand trial and for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In the afternoon of that same day, Geren surrendered to the court and filed a motion for reduction of bail. After he posted bail, there was no further need for the court to issue the warrant of arrest. Geren thereafter pleaded guilty during arraignment.

• Failure to Apply People vs. Cagas: Petitioner argued that the CA erroneously failed to apply the ruling in People vs. Cagas regarding the requisites of voluntary surrender, specifically the fourth requisite that there be no pending warrant of arrest or information filed. Since a warrant of arrest had been issued, petitioner insisted that arrest was imminent and the surrender could not be considered voluntary.
• Erroneous Appreciation of Mitigating Circumstances: Petitioner contended that the CA incorrectly affirmed the RTC Orders and Sentence appreciating the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender in favor of Geren, warranting the exercise of the Supreme Court's appellate judicial discretion.

• Double Jeopardy: Geren opposed petitioner's motion for reconsideration before the RTC by invoking his right against double jeopardy.

• Modification of Judgment: Whether a private complainant may move for the modification of a judgment of conviction to increase the penalty imposed on the accused.
• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to assail a judgment of conviction on the ground of alleged misappreciation of a mitigating circumstance.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was properly appreciated in favor of the accused.

• Modification of Judgment: No. Under Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside only upon motion of the accused, not upon motion of the prosecution or private complainant, as this would violate the right against double jeopardy.
• Propriety of Certiorari: No. Mere misappreciation of a mitigating circumstance does not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is the jurisdictional requirement for certiorari.
• Voluntary Surrender: Yes. The requisites of voluntary surrender were satisfied: Geren had not been actually arrested, he surrendered himself to the court, and the surrender was voluntary, as he gave himself up upon learning that the court found probable cause and before the warrant of arrest was issued or served.

• Modification of Judgment: Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. The phrase "upon motion of the accused" was added in the 1985 amendment, effectively resurrecting the earlier rule prohibiting the prosecution from seeking modification of a judgment of conviction. The requisite consent of the accused is intended to protect him from having to defend himself anew from more serious offenses or penalties which the prosecution or the court may have overlooked. Here, it was petitioner — the private complainant — who moved for reconsideration of the RTC decision, while Geren timely opposed invoking double jeopardy. The Court explained that the rule underwent significant changes: prior to the 1964 Rules, the prosecution could not move to increase the penalty; the 1964 amendment allowed it; the 1985 amendment restored the prohibition by requiring that modification be upon motion of the accused, a phrase retained in the present Rules. The Court also cited People vs. Court of Appeals, where it declared that a petition for certiorari by the prosecution seeking a higher penalty constituted a violation of the accused's right against double jeopardy.

• Propriety of Certiorari: While certiorari may be resorted to on jurisdictional grounds, review is allowed only in apparently void judgments where there is a patent showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Court distinguished People vs. Veneracion, where certiorari was entertained because the trial judge refused to impose the proper penalty due to personal aversion to the death penalty law — an exceptional case of grave abuse of discretion. No such abuse may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The trial court's action thus became an improper object of, and therefore non-reviewable by, certiorari.

• Voluntary Surrender: For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, three requisites must be present: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up, either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense of his search and capture. Petitioner relied on People vs. Cagas, People vs. Taraya, and People vs. Barcino, Jr. for the proposition that a pending warrant of arrest renders surrender involuntary. However, the Court distinguished each case: in Cagas, the accused did not surrender but was caught by police; in Taraya, the warrant had been issued and forwarded for implementation; in Barcino, the accused surrendered more than a year after the incident, not to acknowledge culpability but to deny it. In the present case, upon learning that the court had determined the presence of probable cause and before the issuance and implementation of the warrant of arrest, Geren surrendered to the court, acknowledging his culpability, which was bolstered by his eventual plea of guilt. The Court further clarified, citing People vs. Oco, that the mere filing of an information or issuance of a warrant of arrest does not automatically make a surrender involuntary; the accused may still be entitled to the mitigating circumstance depending on the actual facts surrounding the act of giving himself up.

• Modification of Judgment of Conviction (Section 7, Rule 120) — A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. The prosecution or private complainant cannot move to increase the penalty imposed in a promulgated judgment, as this would place the accused in double jeopardy. The phrase "upon motion of the accused" was introduced in the 1985 amendment and retained in the present Rules, intended to protect the accused from having to defend himself anew from more serious offenses or penalties.

• Certiorari Against Judgments of Conviction — A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to on jurisdictional grounds to assail a judgment of conviction, but only where there is a patent showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Mere misappreciation of evidence or of a mitigating circumstance does not constitute grave abuse of discretion. The exceptional case of People vs. Veneracion — where the trial judge refused to impose the legally mandated penalty due to personal opposition to the death penalty — does not extend to ordinary errors in the appreciation of mitigating circumstances.

• Voluntary Surrender as a Mitigating Circumstance — The requisites are: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense of his search and capture. The mere filing of an information or issuance of a warrant of arrest does not automatically render a subsequent surrender involuntary; the determination depends on the actual facts surrounding the act of giving oneself up. Where the accused surrenders upon learning that the court found probable cause and before the warrant is issued or served, the surrender is voluntary.

• "Simply stated, in judgments of conviction, errors in the decision cannot be corrected unless the accused consents thereto; or he, himself, moves for reconsideration of, or appeals from, the decision." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the limitation on who may seek modification of a judgment of conviction, grounding the rule in the protection against double jeopardy.

• "Obviously, no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Consequently, the trial court's action cannot come within the ambit of the writ's limiting requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction." — This defines the boundary between correctable legal error and grave abuse of discretion for purposes of certiorari, establishing that ordinary misappreciation of mitigating circumstances is not reviewable via certiorari.

• "We would like to point out that the mere filing of an information and/or the issuance of a warrant of arrest will not automatically make the surrender 'involuntary.'" — This clarifies the doctrine on voluntary surrender, distinguishing cases where a warrant was pending from those where the accused genuinely surrendered spontaneously, and is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on mitigating circumstances.

• People vs. Cagas, G.R. No. 145504, June 30, 2004, 433 SCRA 290 — Distinguished. The Court declined to apply Cagas because the accused therein did not surrender but was caught by police, unlike Geren who voluntarily gave himself up.
• People vs. Taraya, 398 Phil. 311 (2000) — Distinguished. In Taraya, the warrant of arrest had been issued and forwarded for implementation, unlike the present case where the warrant was never served because Geren surrendered before it could be issued.
• People vs. Barcino, Jr., 467 Phil. 709 (2004) — Distinguished. The accused therein surrendered more than a year after the incident, not to acknowledge culpability but to deny it, and there was a pending warrant. Geren, by contrast, surrendered on the same day probable cause was found and acknowledged his guilt.
• People vs. Oco, 458 Phil. 815 (2003) — Followed. The Court cited Oco for the proposition that the accused may still be entitled to voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance even if a warrant for his arrest had been issued, provided he surrenders before the warrant is served and the surrounding facts demonstrate spontaneity.
• People vs. Viernes, 423 Phil. 463 (2001) — Cited for the historical evolution of the rule on modification of judgments of conviction, tracing the changes from the pre-1964 Rules through the 1964 and 1985 amendments to the present Rules.
• People vs. Court of Appeals, 405 Phil. 247 (2001) — Cited for the rule that a petition for certiorari by the prosecution seeking a higher penalty constitutes a violation of the accused's right against double jeopardy.
• People vs. Veneracion, 319 Phil. 364 (1995) — Distinguished as an exceptional case where certiorari was entertained because the trial judge refused to impose the legally mandated death penalty due to personal aversion, constituting grave abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized this was not the situation in the present case.
• People vs. Astudillo, 449 Phil. 778 (2003) — Cited for the principle that the requisite consent of the accused in seeking modification of a judgment of conviction is intended to protect him from having to defend himself anew from more serious offenses or penalties.

• Section 7, Rule 120, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that a judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. A judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. Applied to bar petitioner's motion for reconsideration and subsequent certiorari petition seeking to increase Geren's penalty.
• Article 349, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy. Applied in convicting Geren, in relation to paragraph 5, Article 64 of the same Code (effect of mitigating circumstances on the imposition of penalty) and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
• Paragraph 5, Article 64, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its minimum period. Applied to determine the indeterminate penalty imposed on Geren.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (Associate Justice, Chairperson), Conchita Carpio Morales (Associate Justice), Minita V. Chico-Nazario (Associate Justice), Diosdado M. Peralta (Associate Justice).