De Vera vs. Aguilar

For secondary evidence of a lost document to be admissible, the proponent must account for the loss or unavailability of the original and all existing duplicate originals. Proof that one copy was lost or destroyed in a particular office is insufficient if other counterparts were shown to exist and their whereabouts are not explained.

The disputed parcel of land in Bulacan was originally owned by Marcosa Bernabe. After her children (the petitioners) mortgaged it, the respondents (Spouses Aguilar) redeemed the property and subsequently purchased it from Marcosa Bernabe via a 1956 deed of sale. The respondents registered the sale, obtained a tax declaration in their name, and later secured a free patent and Original Certificate of Title. In 1980, the petitioners demanded partition, claiming the respondents had resold the land to Marcosa Bernabe in 1959. This alleged 1959 deed of sale became the central piece of evidence in the ensuing reconveyance suit.

• Parties and Prior Ownership: Petitioners and respondent Leona V. Aguilar are children and heirs of Marcosa Bernabe, the original owner of the subject land.
• 1956 Sale to Respondents: After the petitioners mortgaged the land, the respondents redeemed it and then purchased it directly from Marcosa Bernabe via a deed of absolute sale dated February 11, 1956. The respondents registered the deed, had the tax declaration transferred to their name, and later obtained a free patent and title.
• The Alleged 1959 Resale: Petitioners claimed that on April 28, 1959, the respondents sold the property back to Marcosa Bernabe. They presented a xerox copy of this alleged deed of sale (Exhibit A) as evidence.
• Evidence on Loss of Original: To justify using the xerox copy, petitioners presented testimony that: (1) the notary public's copy was lost when his office burned down; (2) a representative of the Provincial Assessor's Office could not locate the deed in their files; and (3) a representative of the National Archives stated pre-1960 records were destroyed by termites and they had no copy.
• Key Testimony on Originals: The notary public testified that the 1959 deed had "about four or five original copies." Petitioner Luis de Vera testified that one original was submitted to the Register of Deeds for registration in 1976.

• Admissibility of Secondary Evidence: Petitioners argued that the existence and due execution of the 1959 deed were established by the testimony of the notary public and a witness to the signing. They contended that the loss of the original was proven by the testimonies from the National Archives, Provincial Assessor, and the notary public regarding the destruction of their respective copies.
• Sufficiency of Proof: Petitioners maintained that the evidence presented sufficiently satisfied the predicate for admitting secondary evidence under the Rules of Court.

• Failure to Prove Loss: Respondents countered that the petitioners failed to prove the loss or destruction of the original deed and all its duplicate originals. They emphasized that petitioner's own witness testified that an original was submitted to the Register of Deeds, yet no effort was made to secure it from that office.
• Inadmissibility of Xerox Copy: Respondents argued that without proof of loss of all originals, the xerox copy (Exhibit A) was not the best evidence and should have been excluded, lacking any evidentiary value.

• Admissibility of Secondary Evidence: Whether the xerox copy of the alleged 1959 deed of sale was admissible as secondary evidence under the Best Evidence Rule.
• Sufficiency of Proof of Loss: Whether the petitioners satisfactorily proved the loss or destruction of the original deed and all its duplicate original copies.

• Admissibility of Secondary Evidence: The xerox copy was inadmissible. The Best Evidence Rule (Rule 130, Sec. 4, now Sec. 5) permits secondary evidence only after proof of the original's execution and its subsequent loss, destruction, or unavailability. The petitioners failed to meet this condition precedent.
• Sufficiency of Proof of Loss: The proof of loss was insufficient. The notary public's testimony established the existence of four or five original copies. The evidence only accounted for the destruction of the notary public's copy (one) and the possible loss of a copy at the National Archives or Assessor's Office. Crucially, petitioner Luis de Vera's testimony indicated that another original was submitted to the Register of Deeds. No evidence was presented to show that this copy was lost or could not be produced from that office. All counterparts must be accounted for before secondary evidence of any one is admissible.

• Best Evidence Rule — The rule requires that the original document be produced whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry. Secondary evidence (like a copy or testimony about contents) is admissible only upon proof of: (1) the original's existence and due execution, and (2) its subsequent loss, destruction, or unavailability. A critical corollary is that all existing duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for; proof that one copy is lost is insufficient if other originals are shown to exist and their whereabouts are unexplained.

• "All duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for before using copies. For, since all the duplicates or multiplicates are parts of the writing itself to be proved, no excuse for non-production of the writing itself can be regarded as established until it appears that all of its parts are unavailable (i.e. lost, retained by the opponent or by a third person or the like)." — This passage from Wigmore on Evidence, cited by the Court, encapsulates the strict requirement applied in the case.
• "The appellees, therefore, should have asked the office [Register of Deeds] to produce it in court and if it could not be produced for one reason or another should have called the Register of Deeds or his representative to explain why. That they failed to do." — This highlights the specific investigative step the petitioners neglected, which was fatal to their claim of loss.

• Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250 (1979) — Cited for the procedural order of proof for admitting secondary evidence: existence, execution, loss, contents.
• Michael & Co. v. Enriquez, 33 Phil. 87 (1915) — Cited for the methods of proving the due execution and loss of a document.

• Section 4 (now Section 5), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court — The provision on secondary evidence when the original is lost or destroyed. The Court applied this strictly, requiring proof of loss of the original and all duplicates before a copy could be admitted.

• Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa
• Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
• Justice Florenz D. Regalado
• Justice Ricardo J. Puno (Nocon, J., was also listed as concurring in the decision text).