De Sarasola vs. Yu Biao Sontua

Where both vessels may be blamed for a collision, article 827 of the Code of Commerce governs: each vessel bears its own damages, and both are jointly liable for cargo losses; a vessel that fails to maintain its course despite clear visibility is guilty of contributory negligence even if the other vessel's improper maneuver was the primary cause.

Plaintiff-appellee Gorgonio de Sarasola owned the motorboat Mercedes, and defendant-appellant Yu Biao Sontua owned the steamship Y. Sontua. The governing provisions are articles 826 and 827 of the Code of Commerce, which allocate liability where one or both vessels are at fault in a collision.

Plaintiff-appellee Gorgonio de Sarasola owned the motorboat Mercedes, while defendant-appellant Yu Biao Sontua owned the steamship Y. Sontua. On March 3, 1922, at 12 noon, the Mercedes entered Manila Bay through the Boca Grande. At 6 p.m., it navigated with motor and sail in the direction of the lighthouse indicating the entrance to the Pasig River. Several minutes thereafter, the Y. Sontua struck the Mercedes, and the Mercedes sank within half an hour. The lower court found that the collision took place at 6:43 p.m.

The record showed that the Y. Sontua changed its course, and that this change was the primary cause of the collision; if the Y. Sontua had remained true to its course, the collision would not have happened. It was equally true, however, that even after the Y. Sontua changed its course, if the Mercedes had remained true to its course, there would not have been any collision. If both had followed their courses, there would have been a full clearance and no collision. The officers of each vessel could see the other vessel and its course and maneuvers at a distance of two or three miles.

At 6:43 p.m., natural light still allowed the vessels to be seen clearly. By the aid of natural light, at the time of and prior to the collision, either vessel could be clearly and distinctly seen for a considerable distance, without the aid of artificial light. It was a matter of common knowledge that at 6:30 p.m. in ordinary weather, a person on the Luneta could plainly see a vessel on Manila Bay anywhere within the breakwater, and it was fair to assume that after an interval of six weeks, a person could also see a vessel anywhere within the breakwater thirteen minutes later, or at 6:43 p.m. If the collision had taken place after dark, the contention that the Mercedes acted under an emergency and ought not to be responsible for an error of judgment would have had much force; but because natural light permitted clear visibility, the Mercedes either knew or should have known that if it had remained true to its course, there would not have been any collision.

• Contributory Negligence: Defendant-appellant Yu Biao Sontua argued, on motion for reconsideration, that assuming without conceding that the collision was caused by an improper maneuver by the captain of the Y. Sontua, plaintiff Gorgonio de Sarasola was guilty of contributory negligence and therefore ought not to recover.
• Article 827: Defendant cited and relied upon article 827 of the Code of Commerce, which provides that if both vessels may be blamed for the collision, each one shall be liable for his own damages, and both shall be jointly responsible for the losses and damages suffered by their cargoes.

• Emergency: Plaintiff-appellee maintained that through the actions and false maneuver of the Y. Sontua, an emergency was thrust upon the Mercedes, and that what the Mercedes did was done under an emergency and hence was not negligent.
• No Evidence of Avoidance: On his motion for reconsideration, plaintiff-appellee contended that there was no evidence that if the Mercedes had remained true to its course, there would not have been any collision, and that for such reason article 827 was not in point.
• Visibility Findings: Plaintiff-appellee also attacked the statements in the opinion about the conditions surrounding and existing at the time of the accident as unwarranted and not sustained by the record.
• Question Not Raised Below: Plaintiff-appellee pointed out that the question upon which the December 20, 1924 decision was founded was not raised or presented in the lower court.

• Contributory Negligence: Whether the Mercedes was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to maintain its course, such that article 827 of the Code of Commerce applies.
• Applicability of Article 827: Whether article 827 governs where both vessels may be blamed for the collision.
• Emergency: Whether the Mercedes acted under an emergency and thus should not be held negligent.
• Evidence of Avoidance: Whether there was evidence that if the Mercedes had remained true to its course, the collision would not have happened.
• Judicial Notice of Visibility: Whether the court could take judicial notice of natural conditions of visibility and the time of day in assessing the vessels' conduct.
• Question Not Raised Below: Whether the Court may base its decision on a question not raised or presented in the lower court.

• Contributory Negligence: Yes. The Mercedes was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to maintain its course despite clear visibility, and the case falls under article 827 of the Code of Commerce.
• Applicability of Article 827: Yes. Article 827 provides that if both vessels may be blamed, each is liable for its own damages and both are jointly responsible for cargo losses.
• Emergency: No. The emergency argument would have force only if the collision had occurred after dark; natural light allowed clear visibility, so the Mercedes knew or should have known to maintain its course.
• Evidence of Avoidance: Yes. The Court was clearly of the opinion that if the Mercedes had remained true to its course, the collision would not have happened.
• Judicial Notice of Visibility: Yes. Courts may judicially notice time, days, date, and natural conditions of visibility, including the presence or absence of daylight.
• Question Not Raised Below: Yes. The Court acknowledged that the question was not raised below but held that the decision was founded upon facts shown to exist in the record.

• Contributory Negligence: The Court found that the Y. Sontua's change of course was the primary cause of the collision; had it remained true to its course, the collision would not have happened. But even after the Y. Sontua changed course, if the Mercedes had remained true to its course, there would have been a full clearance and no collision. The officers of both vessels could see each other at a distance of two or three miles. At 6:43 p.m., natural light allowed clear visibility; at 6:30 p.m. in ordinary weather, a person on the Luneta could plainly see a vessel on Manila Bay anywhere within the breakwater, and after six weeks, the same visibility could be assumed thirteen minutes later. Because the Mercedes either knew or should have known that remaining true to its course would avoid collision, it was contributorily negligent. Thus article 827 applied.
• Applicability of Article 827: The former opinion was founded on article 826, which makes the owner of the vessel at fault liable for losses and damages after expert appraisal. Defendant cited article 827, which provides that if both vessels may be blamed, each is liable for its own damages and both are jointly responsible for cargo losses. Because the Court found both vessels blameworthy—the Y. Sontua for the primary cause and the Mercedes for contributory negligence—article 827 governed.
• Emergency: Plaintiff contended that the Y. Sontua's actions thrust an emergency upon the Mercedes, so its maneuver was not negligent. The Court acknowledged that if the collision had taken place after dark, there would be much force in the contention that the Mercedes acted on an emergency and ought not to be responsible for an error of judgment. But the physical facts showed that by natural light, at the time of and prior to the collision, either vessel could be clearly and distinctly seen for a considerable distance. The emergency doctrine therefore did not excuse the Mercedes.
• Evidence of Avoidance: Plaintiff's motion for rehearing argued that there was no evidence that if the Mercedes had remained true to its course, there would not have been any collision. The Court denied the motion, stating that the case had received careful consideration by every member, that the entire record had been read and portions reread by four different members, and that every member was clearly of the opinion that if the Mercedes had remained true to its course, the collision would not have happened.
• Judicial Notice of Visibility: The Court relied on volume 23, Corpus Juris, section 1990, page 164, which states that courts judicially notice the calendar, computation of time, days, weeks, months, the time when the sun rises or sets, the duration of twilight, the presence or absence of daylight, the natural conditions of visibility, and the direction of shadows. Applying this, the Court took judicial notice that at 6:43 p.m. on March 3, 1922, natural light permitted the vessels to see each other, supporting the finding of contributory negligence.
• Question Not Raised Below: The petition for rehearing pointed out that the question upon which the December 20, 1924 decision was founded was not raised or presented in the lower court. The Court agreed that this was true and recognized it in the decision itself. It nevertheless held that the decision was founded upon facts shown to exist in the record, so the failure to raise the question below did not prevent the Court from ruling on it.

• Article 827 of the Code of Commerce — Both Vessels at Fault — When both vessels may be blamed for a collision, each vessel is liable for its own damages, and both are jointly responsible for the losses and damages suffered by their cargoes. The Court applied this provision after finding that the Y. Sontua's improper maneuver was the primary cause and the Mercedes was contributorily negligent.
• Contributory Negligence in Maritime Collisions — A vessel may be contributorily negligent even if the other vessel's improper maneuver was the primary cause of the collision, where the vessel fails to maintain its course despite clear visibility and could have avoided the collision by doing so. The Court applied this to the Mercedes, which knew or should have known that remaining true to its course would have avoided the collision.
• Emergency Doctrine in Maritime Collisions — An emergency may excuse an error of judgment where the collision occurs after dark and the vessel is suddenly confronted with danger; however, the doctrine does not apply where natural light allowed clear visibility of the other vessel's course and maneuvers. The Court rejected the Mercedes' emergency contention because the collision occurred at 6:43 p.m. with sufficient natural light.
• Judicial Notice of Natural Conditions of Visibility — Courts may take judicial notice of the calendar, computation of time, the time of sunrise or sunset, the duration of twilight, the presence or absence of daylight, and natural conditions of visibility; the almanac is part of the law of the land. The Court used this doctrine to determine that at 6:43 p.m. the vessels could clearly see each other, which supported the finding that the Mercedes should have maintained its course.
• Questions Not Raised Below — A question not raised or presented in the lower court may still be resolved where the decision is founded upon facts shown to exist in the record. The Court applied this principle in denying plaintiff's motion for rehearing, acknowledging that the contributory-negligence theory had not been presented below but upholding the ruling because it rested on record facts.

• "If both vessels may be blamed for the collision, each one shall be liable for his own damages, and both shall be jointly responsible for the losses and damages suffered by their cargoes." — This is article 827 of the Code of Commerce as quoted in the decision; it supplies the controlling rule for the case after the Court found both vessels blameworthy.
• "It follows from what has been said that the negligence of the Y. Sontua was the primary cause of the accident, and that the Mercedes was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to maintain its course, and that the case comes under the provisions of article 827." — This is the ratio decidendi of the majority opinion on defendant's motion for reconsideration, stating the dual findings of primary cause and contributory negligence.
• "With all due respect to learned counsel, every member of this court is clearly of the opinion that if the Mercedes had remained true to its course, the collision would not have happened." — This passage from the denial of plaintiff's motion for rehearing confirms the factual basis for applying article 827 and rejecting plaintiff's argument that there was no evidence of avoidance.
• "The time when the moon or the sun rises or sets on a particular day is judicially known, as well as the time of the several changes of the moon, and the speed at which the sun sinks below the horizon, the duration of twilight, and the presence or absence of daylight, the natural conditions of visibility, and the direction in which the sun casts a shadow at a given time of a particular day." — This passage, quoted from Corpus Juris, states the judicial-notice doctrine the Court used to assess visibility at the time of the collision.

• Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Philippine Steamship Co. and Fernandez Hermanos, 44 Phil., 359 — Cited by Justice Street in his separate concurring opinion as a similar case where both vessels were declared in the wrong; it supports the conclusion that both vessels may be blamed in a collision.

• Article 826, Code of Commerce — Provides that if a vessel collides with another through the fault, negligence, or lack of skill of the captain, sailing mate, or any other member of the complement, the owner of the vessel at fault shall indemnify the losses and damages suffered, after an expert appraisal. The former opinion was founded on this article.
• Article 827, Code of Commerce — Provides that if both vessels may be blamed for the collision, each one shall be liable for his own damages, and both shall be jointly responsible for the losses and damages suffered by their cargoes. The Court applied this article after finding both vessels blameworthy.

Johnson, Villamor, and Romualdez, JJ., concurred. Street, J., filed a separate concurring opinion, considering the case similar to Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Philippine Steamship Co. and Fernandez Hermanos, where both vessels were declared in the wrong; he viewed the officers of the Mercedes as having rashly attempted to cross the course of the Y. Sontua after its change of course became apparent, with no excuse for that movement. Avanceña, J., took no part in the original consideration of the case.

• Justices Malcolm and Ostrand — They dissented, stating that the decision of Judge Nepomuceno in the lower court and the original decision on appeal decided the question at issue, and that even on the changed theory of appellant, negligence on the part of the captain and crew of the Mercedes had not been shown. They maintained their dissent when plaintiff's motion for rehearing was denied.