De Roma vs. Court of Appeals
Candelaria de Roma died intestate survived by two adopted daughters, Buhay and Rosalinda. During her lifetime, Candelaria donated seven parcels of land to Buhay. Upon Candelaria's death, Rosalinda sought to include the donated properties in the estate inventory for collation. The SC ruled that the deed of donation did not contain an express prohibition against collation as required by Art. 1062; the phrase "di na mababawing muli" merely meant the donation was irrevocable. Because there was no express exemption, the donated properties must be collated.
Primary Holding
For a donation to be exempt from collation under Article 1062 of the Civil Code, the donor must expressly prohibit it; describing the donation as irrevocable or imputing it to the free portion does not constitute an express prohibition.
Background
When a compulsory heir succeeds with other compulsory heirs, they must bring into the estate mass any property received from the decedent by gratuitous title to compute legitimes and partition. An exception exists if the donor expressly prohibits collation. This case addresses what qualifies as an "express prohibition" in a deed of donation.
History
- Original Filing: Court of First Instance of Laguna (Intestate administration proceedings)
- Lower Court Decision: CFI ruled in favor of Buhay, holding the decedent expressly prohibited collation and the donation did not impair legitimes.
- Appeal: CA reversed the CFI, holding the deed of donation contained no express prohibition to collate, and ordered collation.
- SC Action: Appeal by certiorari to the SC to review the CA's reversal.
Facts
- The Parties: Candelaria de Roma (decedent), Buhay de Roma (adopted daughter/petitioner), Rosalinda de Roma (adopted daughter, represented by guardian Felicidad Carin Gal/private respondent).
- The Donation: During her lifetime, Candelaria donated seven parcels of coconut land to Buhay. The deed of donation stated the transfer was made "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" (by a giving that can no longer be taken back). It also stated Candelaria had other properties sufficient for her livelihood, the donation would not destroy the legitime of her heirs, and the lands were part of her free portion ("Libre Disposicion").
- Death and Administration: Candelaria died intestate on April 30, 1971. Administration proceedings were instituted. Buhay was appointed administratrix and filed an inventory excluding the donated properties and their fruits.
- The Dispute: Rosalinda opposed the inventory, arguing the donated properties and their fruits must be collated under Art. 1061. Buhay countered that collation was not required under Art. 1062 because the decedent prohibited it and the donation was not inofficious.
Arguments of the Petitioners
- Cites Article 1062 of the Civil Code, claiming no obligation to collate because the decedent expressly prohibited such collation in the deed of donation.
- Argues the donation was not inofficious because it could be accommodated in, and imputed to, the free portion of the estate.
- Assigns error on the CA for deciding the case beyond the 12-month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11(1) of the 1973 Constitution, implying the decision is invalid.
Arguments of the Respondents
- Cites Article 1061 of the Civil Code, arguing the donated properties are subject to collation.
- Contends the deed of donation contains no express prohibition to collate as an exception to Art. 1062.
Issues
- Procedural Issues: Whether the CA's decision is invalid for being rendered beyond the 12-month period prescribed by the 1973 Constitution.
- Substantive Issues: Whether the deed of donation contained an express prohibition against collation under Art. 1062 of the Civil Code.
Ruling
- Procedural: The SC ruled against the petitioner. Citing Marcelino v. Cruz, the constitutional provision requiring courts to decide cases within 12 months is merely directory. Failure to decide on time does not deprive the court of jurisdiction or render its decision invalid.
- Substantive: The SC ruled against the petitioner. The phrase "sa pamamagayan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as irrevocable; it did not expressly prohibit collation. The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not exempt it from collation under Art. 1061. Imputation to the free portion or the donation not being inofficious is irrelevant to the sole issue of whether there was an express prohibition. The SC presumed that since the deed was prepared by a lawyer (evidenced by the use of terms like "legitime" and "free portion"), an express prohibition would have been explicitly written if that was the donor's intention. Absent a plain and unequivocal expression of that intention, the general rule of collation applies.
Doctrines
- Express Prohibition to Collate — Under Art. 1062, collation is not required only if the donor expressly provided so, or if the donee repudiates the inheritance (unless the donation is reduced as inofficious). The SC applied this strictly: the intention to exempt from collation must be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general rule. An implied prohibition or mere use of the word "irrevocable" will not suffice.
- Directory Nature of Constitutional Period to Decide Cases — The constitutional mandate for courts to decide cases within a specific period (formerly 12 months under the 1973 Constitution) is directory, not mandatory. Failure to comply does not invalidate the resulting decision.
Provisions
- Article 1061, Civil Code — Requires compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs to bring into the estate mass any property received from the decedent by donation or gratuitous title for computing legitimes and partition. Applied as the general rule mandating collation of the donated properties.
- Article 1062, Civil Code — Provides exceptions to collation: (1) donor expressly prohibited it, or (2) donee repudiates the inheritance (unless donation is reduced as inofficious). Applied to reject the petitioner's defense; the SC found no express prohibition existed in the deed.
- Article X, Section 11(1), 1973 Constitution — Prescribed the 12-month period for courts to decide cases. Applied as merely directory, not mandatory.
- Article VIII, Section 15, 1987 Constitution — Cited in passing as the reworded current provision emphasizing the need for speedy disposition of cases.