De Pedro vs. Romasan Development Corporation

The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration constitutes voluntary appearance that cures a defect in the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person due to improper service of summons; moreover, a party who has availed herself of the ordinary remedies of new trial and certiorari and lost therein is barred from subsequently filing a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Romasan Development Corporation owned a parcel of land in Antipolo City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 236044, derived from Original Certificate of Title No. 438 issued as early as August 30, 1937. In November 1996, Romasan's representative discovered that Aurora De Pedro had erected fences on a portion of this property and claimed ownership based on Original Certificate of Title No. P-691 issued pursuant to Free Patent No. 045802-91-914 dated December 9, 1991. Investigation revealed that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources had issued free patents covering portions of Romasan's property to several individuals, including De Pedro, despite the property having been previously released to private ownership.

• Romasan Development Corporation filed complaints for nullification of free patents and original certificates of title against several defendants, including Aurora De Pedro, alleging that the free patents were fraudulently obtained and covered portions of its property.
• The sheriff attempted to personally serve summons on De Pedro on February 15 and 18, 1999, but returned it unserved, stating that according to the messenger of the Post Office of Pasig, there was no person at the given address.
• The Regional Trial Court granted substituted service by publication without a detailed showing of diligent efforts to locate the petitioner.
• De Pedro learned of the decision only on March 16, 2000, when she received notice thereof, prompting her to file a motion for new trial on March 30, 2000.
• The trial court denied the motion for new trial, ruling that the decision had become final and executory because the motion was filed beyond the reglementary period counted from the date of publication.
• De Pedro subsequently filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed, and a petition for review before the Supreme Court, which was denied for non-payment of fees.
• De Pedro then filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals, which was also denied, leading to the instant petition.

• The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person because service of summons was defective; the sheriff's return failed to show diligent efforts to personally serve the summons before resorting to publication, which is required for actions in personam.
• The action filed by Romasan was in personam because it sought to establish personal obligations through prayers for attorney's fees, appearance fees, exemplary damages, and costs of suit.
• The case was dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia because there was a pending civil case filed by her against Romasan in 1997 involving the same property.
• The annulment of her title violated Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which prohibits collateral attacks on certificates of title.
• She was the real owner of the property by virtue of OCT No. P-691 issued in 1991, and the same trial court had previously ordered the reconstitution of her title in 1997.

• The process server tried other forms of substituted service, including service by registered mail, before resorting to publication.
• Petitioner was in evident malice and bad faith for failing to disclose in her petition that she had already filed a petition for certiorari and a petition for review before the Supreme Court, which were denied.
• Petitioner is barred from filing a petition for annulment of judgment because she had already availed herself of the remedies of motion for new trial and petition for certiorari, and lost.

• Procedural:
  • Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner despite the defective service of summons.
  • Whether the filing of a motion for new trial and petition for certiorari bars the subsequent filing of a petition for annulment of judgment.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the action for annulment of certificate of title was in personam or quasi in rem.
  • Whether the requisites of litis pendentia were satisfied.
  • Whether the annulment of petitioner's title violated Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529.

• Procedural:
  • The sheriff's return was defective because it failed to narrate the details of efforts made to personally serve summons upon the petitioner, merely stating that the post office messenger reported no person at the address. Without a detailed enumeration of the sheriff's actions showing diligent and reasonable efforts, substituted service or service by publication is irregular.
  • However, the filing of a motion for new trial and a petition for certiorari constitutes voluntary appearance, which cured the defect in the acquisition of jurisdiction over the petitioner's person.
  • A petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is an extraordinary remedy that may not be invoked where the party has already availed herself of the remedies of new trial, appeal, or petition for certiorari and lost, or where she failed to avail herself of those remedies through her own fault or negligence. Having filed a motion for new trial and a petition for certiorari, petitioner is barred from filing a petition for annulment of judgment.
• Substantive:
  • An action for annulment of certificate of title is quasi in rem, not in personam, because it subjects the petitioner's interest over the property to a burden and affects only the interests of the particular parties, not the whole world.
  • The requisites of litis pendentia were not satisfied because there was no identity of the relief prayed for or the rights asserted between the pending case for damages filed by petitioner and the action for annulment of title filed by respondent.
  • The annulment of the certificate of title did not violate Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529 because an action for annulment of certificate of title constitutes a direct attack on the title, not a collateral attack.
  • Certificates of title do not vest ownership; they merely evidence title. The trial court's finding that the free patent and title were irregularly issued is conclusive, and the principle of "bar by prior judgment" applies since the petitioner failed to appeal the decision.

• Preferred Mode of Service of Summons — Personal service is the preferred mode regardless of whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem. Substituted service or service by publication is only allowed after showing diligent and reasonable efforts to effect personal service, which must be detailed in the sheriff's return.
• Presumption of Regularity of Sheriff's Return — The sheriff's return is entitled to a presumption of regularity only if it contains details of the circumstances surrounding the attempt to serve summons personally and particulars showing the impossibility of serving the summons within reasonable time. A return that is merely pro forma or lacking in details does not enjoy this presumption.
• Voluntary Appearance — The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration is tantamount to voluntary appearance, which cures any defect in the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant due to improper service of summons.
• Annulment of Judgment as an Extraordinary Remedy — A petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is allowed only in exceptional cases where ordinary remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. It cannot be invoked where the party has availed herself of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies and lost, or where she failed to avail herself of those remedies through her own fault or negligence.
• Direct vs. Collateral Attack on Title — An action is a direct attack on a title when the object is to nullify the title or challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. An action for annulment of certificate of title is a direct attack, not a collateral attack prohibited by Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529.
• Nature of Certificates of Title — Certificates of title are indefeasible and binding upon the whole world, but they do not vest ownership; they merely evidence title or ownership of the property.

• "Regardless of the type of action — whether it is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem — the preferred mode of service of summons is personal service."
• "To avail themselves of substituted service, courts must rely on a detailed enumeration of the sheriff's actions and a showing that the defendant cannot be served despite diligent and reasonable efforts."
• "Failure to state the facts and circumstances that rendered service of summons impossible renders service of summons and the return ineffective."
• "Filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration is tantamount to voluntary appearance."
• "An action for annulment of judgment is an extraordinary remedy and is not to be granted indiscriminately by the Court. It is allowed only in exceptional cases and cannot be used by a losing party to make a mockery of a duly promulgated decision long final and executory."

• Manotoc v. Court of Appeals — Cited for the requirement that the sheriff's return must specify the date and time of attempts on personal service, inquiries made to locate the defendant, names of occupants, and all other acts done to justify substituted service.
• Domagas v. Jensen — Cited for the principle that substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service and requires a narration of efforts to personally serve summons.
• Hamilton v. Levy — Cited for the requirement that the facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer's Return.
• Macalalag v. Ombudsman — Cited for the rule that a petition for annulment of judgment may not be invoked where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, or petition for relief and lost.
• Sigma Homebuilding Corporation v. Inter-Alia Management Corporation — Cited for the principle that annulment of judgment cannot be used by a losing party to make a mockery of a duly promulgated decision long final and executory.
• Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals — Cited for the distinction between direct and collateral attacks on a certificate of title.
• Goco v. Court of Appeals — Cited for the definition of an action for annulment of certificates of title as a direct attack on the title.
• Pantaleon v. Asuncion — Cited by petitioner for the principle that personal service is required for personal judgments.

• Rule 14, Sections 6, 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, 16, and 20 of the Rules of Court — Provisions governing the service of summons, including personal service, substituted service, service by publication, and voluntary appearance.
• Rule 37, Section 1 of the Rules of Court — Grounds for new trial (fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or newly discovered evidence).
• Rule 47, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court — Coverage and grounds for annulment of judgment (extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction).
• Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Provision stating that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.
• Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Court — Principle of bar by prior judgment or conclusiveness of judgment.