De Luna vs. Court of Appeals

In an ejectment case, the sole issue is possession de facto, and while an inferior court may resolve the question of ownership when necessary to determine possession, it may not declare ownership in a manner unsupported by evidence; prior possession entitles the possessor to remain on the property until lawfully ejected by one with a better right.

Petitioner Jose de Luna claimed ownership of an unregistered parcel of land of 30,856 square meters in Babon San Juan, Botolan, Zambales, asserting possession since 1938. Private respondent Juan Dimaano, Jr. contested petitioner's claim, alleging that the property was owned by Agustin Dequiña, Jr., who had inherited it from his father Agustin Dequiña, Sr. Agustin Dequiña, Sr. was the elder brother of petitioner's mother, Apolonia Dequiña, making him petitioner's uncle. Dimaano, Jr. claimed to occupy the property by virtue of a lease agreement with Agustin Dequiña, Jr. entered in February 1972.

Petitioner Jose de Luna filed a complaint for forcible entry on February 7, 1972 before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Botolan, Zambales, alleging that he was the owner of an unregistered parcel of land measuring 30,856 square meters located in Babon San Juan, Botolan, Zambales, which he had possessed since 1938. He claimed that on December 18 and 19, 1971, defendants Octavio Daclison, Oscar Crispin, and private respondents Juan Dimaano, Jr. and Gerino Doble entered the land and began plowing it. Thereafter, on January 15 and 16, 1972, the defendants fenced the property with barbed wire, and on February 5 and 6, 1972, they began planting sugar cane, all despite petitioner's objections. Petitioner prayed that the defendants be ordered to vacate the land and pay him ₱45.00 monthly per hectare until possession was restored, plus litigation expenses and costs.

In their answer, the defendants denied the material allegations of the complaint. Daclison, Crispin, and Doble asserted as a special and affirmative defense that they had not entered nor occupied the disputed property. Dimaano, Jr., for his part, raised the defense that petitioner was not the owner, alleging instead that the owner was Agustin Dequiña, Jr. Dimaano, Jr. contended that the property was originally owned by Agustin Dequiña, Sr., who had declared it for taxation purposes in 1906. Upon Dequiña, Sr.'s death in 1945, his son Agustin Dequiña, Jr. allegedly succeeded him and possessed the property from 1945 until February 1972, when the property was leased to Dimaano, Jr. Agustin Dequiña, Sr. was the elder brother of petitioner's mother, Apolonia Dequiña.

After trial on the merits, the MTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, ordering the defendants to restore possession of the property to him and ordering Dimaano, Jr. to pay ₱12,312.00 as actual damages and ₱5,000.00 as costs. The defendants appealed to the RTC, which reversed the inferior court's decision and dismissed the complaint. Petitioner then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the RTC judgment. The Court of Appeals and the RTC concluded that the subject property was owned by Agustin Dequiña, Jr. and that Dimaano, Jr. was entitled to possess it.

• Error in Determining Ownership: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals and the RTC erred in determining the ownership of the disputed property in an action for ejectment, where the sole issue should have been possession de facto.
• Error in Concluding Ownership: Petitioner contended that the appellate courts erred in concluding that Agustin Dequiña, Jr. is the owner of the property, as there was no evidence to support such a finding.

• Scope of Ejectment Proceedings: Whether the Court of Appeals and the RTC erred in determining the ownership of the disputed property in an action for forcible entry.
• Sufficiency of Evidence on Ownership: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Agustin Dequiña, Jr. is the owner of the disputed property and that respondent Dimaano, Jr. is entitled to possess the same.

• Scope of Ejectment Proceedings: Yes, partially. While an inferior court may resolve the question of ownership when necessary to determine possession, it may do so only insofar as to determine the issue of possession, not to make a definitive and unsupported declaration of ownership.
• Sufficiency of Evidence on Ownership: Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Agustin Dequiña, Jr. owned the property, there being no evidence whatsoever to support such a conclusion, while petitioner had sufficiently established prior possession.

• Scope of Ejectment Proceedings: The well-established rule in ejectment cases is that the only issue to be resolved is who is entitled to physical or material possession of the premises — possession de facto — independent of any claim of ownership. If a party can prove prior possession, he may recover possession even from the owner himself, and he is entitled to remain on the property until lawfully ejected by one with a better right through accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. However, where the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding ownership, an inferior court has the power to resolve ownership but only insofar as necessary to determine possession, pursuant to Section 32(2) of B.P. Blg. 129. In this case, the MTC acted correctly in receiving evidence on ownership because Dimaano, Jr. claimed possession through a lease with the alleged owner, Agustin Dequiña, Jr. The error lay not in receiving such evidence but in the appellate courts' unsupported conclusion that Dequiña, Jr. owned the property.

• Sufficiency of Evidence on Ownership: Petitioner established prior possession through the testimony of his witnesses. His tenant Epigenio Dilag possessed the land from 1953 until Dimaano, Jr.'s entry in 1972, and such possession redounded to petitioner's benefit since possession may be exercised in one's own name or in that of another under Article 524 of the Civil Code. Witness Victor dela Cruz further testified that he witnessed the delivery of the property to petitioner and his mother by Agustin Dequiña, Sr. in 1938, and that he saw them cultivate the land from 1938 to 1941, and that he himself leased the land from them from 1944 to 1952. By contrast, Dimaano, Jr. failed to prove that Agustin Dequiña, Jr. possessed the property prior to petitioner, much less that Dequiña, Jr. owned it. Dequiña, Jr.'s testimony that he was a co-owner was self-serving and unsupported. The mere fact that Agustin Dequiña, Sr. had declared the property for taxation purposes from 1908 to 1945 did not constitute possession nor proof of ownership in the absence of Dequiña, Jr.'s actual possession. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' ruling that Dequiña, Jr. owned the property was unsupported by any evidence. The Court noted, however, that the decision does not bar either petitioner or Dequiña, Jr. from resolving the issue of ownership in an appropriate proceeding.

• Prior Possession in Ejectment — In ejectment cases, the sole issue is who is entitled to physical or material possession (possession de facto), independent of any claim of ownership. A party who proves prior possession may recover possession even from the owner and is entitled to remain on the property until lawfully ejected through accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The Court applied this doctrine by finding that petitioner had established prior possession dating back to at least 1938 through his own cultivation and that of his tenants, entitling him to recover possession from the respondents.
• Determination of Ownership in Ejectment — Where the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding ownership, an inferior court has the power to resolve the ownership question, but only insofar as necessary to determine the issue of possession. The Court found that the MTC properly received evidence on ownership because Dimaano, Jr. claimed possession through a lease with the alleged owner, but the appellate courts erred in making a definitive and unsupported declaration of ownership.
• Tax Declaration Not Proof of Possession or Ownership — A tax declaration, by itself, does not constitute possession nor proof of ownership in the absence of actual possession. The Court applied this principle in rejecting the claim that Agustin Dequiña, Sr.'s tax declarations from 1908 to 1945 established ownership or possession in favor of Agustin Dequiña, Jr.
• Possession Through Another — Under Article 524 of the Civil Code, possession may be exercised in one's own name or in that of another. The Court relied on this provision to hold that the possession of the property by petitioner's tenant, Epigenio Dilag, from 1953 redounded to petitioner's benefit.

• "Well-established is the rule in ejectment cases that the only issue to be resolved therein is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises, or possession de facto, independent of any claim of ownership that either party may set forth in their pleadings." — This passage states the fundamental doctrine governing the scope of ejectment proceedings and the primacy of possession de facto over ownership claims.
• "However, where the question of possession can not be resolved without deciding the question of ownership, an inferior court has the power to resolve the question of ownership but only insofar as to determine the issue of possession." — This formulation defines the exception to the general rule and delineates the limited jurisdiction of inferior courts to pass upon ownership in ejectment cases, grounded in Section 32(2) of B.P. Blg. 129.
• "The mere fact that Agustin Dequiña, Sr. had declared the subject for taxation purposes from 1908 up to 1945 did not constitute possession thereof, nor is it proof of ownership in the absence of Dequiña, Jr.'s actual possession of said property." — This passage articulates the evidentiary principle that tax declarations alone do not establish possession or ownership, a point critical to the Court's rejection of respondents' claim.

• Presco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82215, 192 SCRA 232 (1990) — Cited as authority for the rule that the only issue in ejectment cases is possession de facto, independent of ownership claims.
• Ramirez and Bayot de Ramirez vs. Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 114 — Cited for the proposition that a tax declaration does not constitute possession of property.
• Casimiro vs. Fernandez, 9 Phil. 562 — Cited for the principle that a tax declaration is not proof of ownership in the absence of actual possession.
• Province of Camarines Sur vs. Director of Lands, 64 Phil. 600 — Cited alongside Casimiro for the same proposition regarding tax declarations and ownership.

• Section 32(2), B.P. Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) — Provides that inferior courts have the power to resolve the question of ownership in ejectment cases when necessary to determine the issue of possession. The Court applied this provision to uphold the MTC's receipt of evidence on ownership, given Dimaano, Jr.'s claim of possession through a lease with the alleged owner.
• Article 524, Civil Code — Provides that possession may be exercised in one's own name or in that of another. The Court relied on this article to hold that the possession of the property by petitioner's tenant, Epigenio Dilag, redounded to petitioner's benefit.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concurred.