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De Los Santos vs. Reyes

The petition for review was dismissed with costs against petitioner Bernardo de los Santos, leaving undisturbed the Court of Appeals’ affirmance in toto of the trial court’s dismissal of his complaint for reconveyance and declaration that Faustino B. Reyes owned the land. The dispute centered on a parcel in Angono, Rizal, registered in the name of Virginia T. Reyes, Faustino’s daughter and Bernardo’s wife, although Faustino claimed he paid the price and placed the land in her name only to comply with the hacienda owner’s two-lot limit. Bernardo’s claim depended on inheritance from Virginia’s child, but he failed to prove the child was born alive and survived Virginia, as required by Article 43 of the Civil Code. The Court also held that no express or implied trust existed and that Article 1448’s disputable presumption of a gift to a child of the payor was rebutted by Faustino’s testimonial evidence.

Primary Holding

In a Rule 45 petition, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the Supreme Court absent exceptional circumstances; and under Article 1448 of the Civil Code, no implied trust arises when title to property is conveyed to a child of the person paying the price, because a gift is disputably presumed, although that presumption may be rebutted by testimonial evidence.

Background

Bernardo de los Santos was married to Virginia T. Reyes, daughter of Faustino B. Reyes. The land in Biga-a, San Roque, Angono, Rizal was registered under Act No. 496 in Virginia’s name, but Faustino claimed he was the actual purchaser and had the title placed in Virginia’s name only to comply with the hacienda owner Justa G. Vda de Guido’s requirement that no one person could buy more than two lots at a time. The dispute implicated Article 43 of the Civil Code on survivorship and Articles 1444 and 1448 on trusts. Spouses Benjamin Diestro and Aida Lagarejos were also impleaded as respondents but were described as strangers to the family of Bernardo and Faustino.

History

1968 – 1992
  1. Feb 12, 1968

    Court of First Instance of Rizal, Civil Case No. 8640

    Dismissed petitioner’s complaint for reconveyance, declared Faustino B. Reyes owner, and ordered petitioner to pay P1,500 as moral damages and attorney’s fees plus costs.

  2. 7 yrs 5 mos later
  3. Jul 23, 1975

    Court of Appeals, C.A.-G.R. No. 41943-R

    Affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision.

  4. 1 yr 5 mos later
  5. Dec 27, 1976

    Supreme Court, petition filed

    Petitioner invoked Rule 45 to seek review of the Court of Appeals decision.

  6. 30 days later
  7. Jan 26, 1977

    Supreme Court

    Private respondents filed their Comment in compliance with the resolution.

  8. 5 mos 15 days later
  9. Jul 11, 1977

    Supreme Court

    Petitioner filed his Reply after being directed to do so.

  10. Supreme Court

    Gave due course to the petition.

  11. Sep 26, 1977

    Supreme Court

    Petitioner filed his Brief.

  12. 2 mos 27 days later
  13. Dec 23, 1977

    Supreme Court

    Respondents filed their Brief.

  14. 14 yrs 1 mo later
  15. Jan 27, 1992

    Supreme Court

    Dismissed the petition for lack of merit with costs against petitioner.

Facts

The land subject of the controversy is a parcel located in Biga-a, San Roque, Angono, Rizal. It was registered under Act No. 496 in the name of Virginia T. Reyes under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 59373 (referred to in petitioner’s brief as No. 59573) and declared for taxation in her name under Tax Declaration No. 2323. Virginia was the daughter of private respondent Faustino B. Reyes and the wife of petitioner Bernardo de los Santos. The deed of sale covering the property made Virginia appear as the buyer.

Faustino claimed that he was the actual buyer and that he caused the property to be placed in Virginia’s name only to comply with the requirement of the hacienda owner, Justa G. Vda de Guido, that no one person could buy more than two lots at a time. Since the sale, the property remained in his possession until it was sold, and he received its products even after Virginia married Bernardo. A notarized agreement (kasunduan) dated June 15, 1955 showed that Faustino bought three lots for a total consideration of P14,000; he paid P11,000 at the time of the agreement and later paid the P3,000 balance. Virginia, then only eighteen years old, could not have paid the price of the lot. An extrajudicial settlement/adjudication affidavit (Exhibit C) was later executed to transfer the land from Virginia’s name to Faustino’s.

Virginia died of coronary embolism on the same date she gave delivery to a baby girl. According to petitioner, the baby was born alive and died after Virginia, which would allow him to inherit the property from the child who had inherited it from Virginia. Faustino denied this and testified that the baby was born dead because its head was crushed when it was extracted from the mother’s womb with forceps. Petitioner did not take the witness stand to deny Faustino’s testimony. The spouses Benjamin Diestro and Aida Lagarejos allegedly admitted in their answer that the baby was born alive, but they were complete strangers to the family of Bernardo and Faustino.

The trial court found that petitioner failed to substantiate his complaint and did not contradict Faustino’s testimony. It further found that the baby was born dead and that Faustino was the actual owner of the land notwithstanding the title in Virginia’s name.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Documentary Evidence Over Oral Testimony: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals misinterpreted or disregarded the probative value of his public documentary evidence—the deed of sale, certificate of title, tax declaration, and extrajudicial settlement affidavit—as against Faustino B. Reyes’ oral testimony, which petitioner characterized as self-serving and impeached by Faustino’s own prior extrajudicial declaration; public documents, petitioner maintained, should be accorded the highest probative value and could be invalidated only by clear, conclusive, convincing, and strong evidence.
  • Registered Title and Tax Declaration: Petitioner maintained that Faustino B. Reyes could not be declared owner because the land was registered under Act No. 496 in Virginia T. Reyes’ name and declared for taxation in her name.
  • Trust and Parol Evidence: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in admitting Faustino B. Reyes’ oral testimony tending to establish an alleged express or implied trust, over petitioner’s objection, in violation of Articles 1431, 1443, and 1448 of the New Civil Code.
  • Presumption of Survivorship: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Virginia T. Reyes and her baby died at the same time, overlooking the alleged admission in the pleading of the Diestro spouses that the baby was born alive, and in misinterpreting and misapplying Article 43 of the New Civil Code.

Issues

  • Review of Factual Findings: Whether the Supreme Court may review the Court of Appeals’ findings of fact in a Rule 45 petition where petitioner alleges misappreciation of documentary and oral evidence.
  • Ownership Despite Registered Title: Whether Faustino B. Reyes may be declared owner notwithstanding the certificate of title and tax declaration in Virginia T. Reyes’ name.
  • Admissibility of Oral Testimony and Trust: Whether the oral testimony of Faustino B. Reyes to establish an alleged express or implied trust was admissible under Articles 1431, 1443, and 1448 of the New Civil Code.
  • Presumption of Survivorship: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Virginia T. Reyes and her baby died at the same time under Article 43 of the Civil Code despite the alleged admission of the Diestro spouses that the baby was born alive.
  • Estoppel: Whether petitioner may raise estoppel for the first time in the Supreme Court.

Ruling

  • Review of Factual Findings: No. Except for the third assigned error, the matters raised are questions of fact; the Court of Appeals’ findings are conclusive absent exceptional circumstances, and none of the exceptions in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr. obtain.
  • Ownership Despite Registered Title: No. The Court of Appeals’ finding that Faustino B. Reyes was the actual owner was supported by the evidence; registration and tax declaration in Virginia’s name did not preclude that finding.
  • Admissibility of Oral Testimony and Trust: Yes, the testimony was admissible. No express or implied trust existed; Article 1448 applied, and the disputable presumption of a gift to the payor’s child was rebutted by Faustino’s testimonial evidence.
  • Presumption of Survivorship: No. Petitioner failed to prove that Virginia died before the child; under Article 43, absent proof, they are presumed to have died at the same time, and Faustino’s unrebutted testimony that the child was born dead supported the finding.
  • Estoppel: No. Estoppel was not raised in the Court of Appeals and cannot be raised for the first time in the petition.

Ruling Rationale

  • Review of Factual Findings: Rule 45 limits review to questions of law, and the Court of Appeals’ factual findings are conclusive on the Supreme Court. The assigned errors I, II, and IV challenged factual findings. The Court cited Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., which enumerates exceptions to the rule—such as findings grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible inferences; grave abuse of discretion; misapprehension of facts; conflicting findings; findings beyond the issues; findings contrary to the trial court’s; conclusions without citation of specific evidence; undisputed facts; and findings premised on the supposed absence of evidence but contradicted by the record—and found none present. The third assigned error raised a question of law, but petitioner failed to show reversible error.
  • Ownership Despite Registered Title: The Court of Appeals’ finding that Faustino was the actual owner was supported by the evidence. Faustino paid the price; the notarized kasunduan dated June 15, 1955 showed that he bought three lots for P14,000, paid P11,000, and later paid the P3,000 balance. Virginia was only eighteen years old and could not have paid the price. Faustino remained in possession of the property and received its fruits even after Virginia married petitioner. The extrajudicial adjudication affidavit was merely a practical and expeditious way to transfer the land from Virginia’s name to Faustino’s. Thus, registration in Virginia’s name did not establish her beneficial ownership.
  • Admissibility of Oral Testimony and Trust: Petitioner assumed that an express trust over an immovable was created, which under Article 1444 cannot be proved by parol evidence. The assumption was wrong. There was neither an express nor an implied trust. The applicable provision was Article 1448: an implied trust arises when property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the beneficial interest, with the former as trustee and the latter as beneficiary. However, if the person to whom title is conveyed is a child of the one paying the price, no trust is implied; a gift is disputably presumed. Faustino’s testimonial evidence that the land was not a gift to Virginia was properly allowed to rebut that disputable presumption.
  • Presumption of Survivorship: Article 43 provides that if there is doubt as between two or more persons called to succeed each other as to who died first, the party alleging the death of one prior to the other must prove it; absent proof, they are presumed to have died at the same time, with no transmission of rights from one to the other. Petitioner alleged that Virginia died before the child, so he bore the burden of proof. He failed to prove it and did not contradict Faustino’s positive testimony that the child was born dead. The alleged admission in the Diestro spouses’ answer was ineffective against Faustino’s specific denial, because they were strangers to the family and not directly concerned.
  • Estoppel: The Court noted that estoppel was not raised in petitioner’s Brief before the Court of Appeals. It cannot be raised for the first time in the petition.

Doctrines

  • Conclusiveness of Court of Appeals’ Factual Findings in Rule 45 Petitions — In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised; findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the Supreme Court. Exceptions exist, such as when the conclusion is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; when there is grave abuse of discretion; when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; when the findings of fact are conflicting; when the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues; when its findings are contrary to the trial court’s; when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence; when the facts are not disputed; and when the finding is premised on the supposed absence of evidence but contradicted by the record. None obtained in this case.
  • Implied Trust and Disputable Presumption of Gift to a Child under Article 1448 — When property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the beneficial interest, an implied trust arises, with the former as trustee and the latter as beneficiary. However, if the person to whom title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price, no trust is implied; a gift is disputably presumed. The presumption may be rebutted by evidence, including testimonial evidence. The Court applied this because Faustino paid the price and placed the land in his daughter Virginia’s name; his evidence that the land was not a gift rebutted the presumption.
  • Presumption of Survivorship under Article 43 — If there is doubt as between two or more persons called to succeed each other as to who died first, the party alleging the death of one prior to the other must prove it; absent proof, they are presumed to have died at the same time, and there is no transmission of rights from one to the other. Petitioner failed to prove Virginia died before her child, so no inheritance through the child.
  • Parol Evidence and Express Trusts over Immovables — Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code, an express trust over an immovable cannot be proved by parol evidence. The Court noted that petitioner’s assumption of an express trust would make Article 1444 applicable, but rejected the assumption because no express trust existed.
  • Estoppel Cannot Be Raised for the First Time on Appeal — A party cannot raise estoppel for the first time in the Supreme Court if it was not raised in the Court of Appeals. The Court applied this to petitioner’s estoppel argument.

Key Excerpts

  • "It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this Court being bound by the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals." — States the general rule on the scope of Rule 45 review and supports the dismissal of the largely factual assignments of error.
  • "There is neither an express nor implied trust in this case. The applicable provision of the Civil Code, as correctly pointed out by respondent Court, is Article 1448 which provides as follows:" — States the ratio decidendi on the trust issue and identifies Article 1448 as the controlling provision.
  • "However, if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child." — Canonical formulation of Article 1448’s exception, which the Court applied to Faustino and Virginia.
  • "If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other." — States Article 43 of the Civil Code, which defeated petitioner’s claim to inherit through Virginia’s child.

Precedents Cited

  • Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 191 SCRA 218 — Cited for the enumeration of exceptions to the rule that the Court of Appeals’ findings of fact are conclusive on the Supreme Court; the Court found none of the exceptions present.
  • Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 737 — Cited for the general rule that the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in cases brought from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law, and that the Court of Appeals’ factual findings are conclusive.

Provisions

  • Article 43, Civil Code — Provides that if there is doubt as between two or more persons called to succeed each other as to who died first, the party alleging the prior death must prove it; absent proof, they are presumed to have died at the same time, with no transmission of rights. Applied: petitioner failed to prove Virginia died before her child, so he could not inherit through the child.
  • Article 1444, Civil Code — Cited by the Court as providing that a trust over an immovable cannot be proved by parol evidence. Applied only hypothetically: petitioner’s assumption of an express trust would have made the provision relevant, but the Court found no express trust existed.
  • Article 1448, Civil Code — Provides for an implied trust when property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the beneficial interest, except that if the transferee is a child of the payor, no trust is implied and a gift is disputably presumed. Applied: no implied trust arose; the presumption of gift was rebutted by testimonial evidence.
  • Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari; only questions of law may be raised, and factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive. Applied: the petition was dismissed because the assigned errors were largely factual and no exception applied.

Notable Concurring Opinions

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin, and Romero, JJ.