De los Santos vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

The doctrine of state immunity from suit cannot be invoked to bar a claim for just compensation where the government takes private property for public use without the landowner's consent and without initiating the proper expropriation proceedings, as such taking constitutes a submission to the court's jurisdiction to determine the compensation due.

Petitioners were co-owners of a parcel of land in Binangonan, Rizal, registered under a Torrens title since 1971. In October 1981, without the petitioners' knowledge or consent, a private contractor and the Provincial Engineer of Rizal constructed a public road and an artificial creek on the property, occupying a total area of 4,071 square meters. The project was funded by the national government and implemented by public works officials who believed, based on representations from the municipal mayor, that the land was public. No expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale were undertaken prior to the construction.

• Nature of the Action: Petitioners filed two consolidated cases: a petition for prohibition (Civil Case No. 46800) to stop the construction of a road and creek on their land, and an action for damages (Civil Case No. 46801) based on the constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process and just compensation.
• The Taking: In October 1981, government officials and a private contractor constructed a 9-meter wide, 128.70-meter long road and a 23.20-meter wide, 128.69-meter long artificial creek on petitioners' registered private property without their knowledge or consent. The project was funded by the national government.
• Government's Justification: Public respondents asserted the construction was a legitimate public works project initiated through proper government channels, approved by the Minister of Public Works, and intended to benefit the municipality. They claimed the area was believed to be public land based on the statement of the municipal mayor.
• Property's Status: The land was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 329945, registered in the names of the petitioners since March 29, 1971. The Court noted that with ordinary diligence, the officials would have discovered its private character.
• Factual Dispute: Petitioners contested the government's claim that the project was completed on May 21, 1982, insisting it was unfinished. This factual issue required a trial.

• State Immunity Inapplicable: Petitioners argued that the doctrine of state immunity from suit cannot be used to perpetrate an injustice, citing Amigable v. Cuenca. They maintained that when the government takes property without expropriation, a suit for compensation may be maintained against it.
• Violation of Constitutional Rights: They contended the taking was without due process of law and just compensation, violating the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution and Article 32 of the Civil Code.
• Proper Remedy: Petitioners asserted that the appellate court erred in stating their remedy "lies elsewhere," as filing a separate case for just compensation would be superfluous. The issue should be resolved in the existing cases.

• State Immunity from Suit: The Solicitor General and public respondents argued that the consolidated cases were in reality suits against the State, which had not consented to be sued. They cited precedents like Ministerio v. CFI and Begosa v. Chairman, PVA.
• Lack of Cause of Action/Forum Shopping: They moved for dismissal on the ground that Civil Case No. 46800 (prohibition) was barred by the pendency of Civil Case No. 46801 (damages), which involved the same parties and cause of action.
• Good Faith and Public Purpose: Respondents maintained the construction was done in good faith, pursuant to a duly approved and funded government project for the public benefit, and that the area was believed to be public land.

• State Immunity: Whether the doctrine of state immunity from suit bars the petitioners' actions for prohibition and damages.
• Propriety of Remedy: Whether the petitioners' claim for just compensation should be ventilated in the existing cases or in a separate action.
• Necessity of Impleading the State: Whether the Republic of the Philippines must be impleaded as a party for the cases to proceed.

• State Immunity: The defense of state immunity is unavailing. Where the government takes private property for public use without initiating expropriation proceedings and without paying just compensation, it is deemed to have submitted to the court's jurisdiction to determine the compensation due. The doctrine cannot be used as an instrument for injustice.
• Propriety of Remedy: The suggestion that the petitioners' remedy "lies elsewhere" is incorrect. The issue of just compensation can and should be threshed out in the consolidated cases, especially since a factual dispute exists regarding the project's completion. A separate action would be superfluous.
• Necessity of Impleading the State: For a full adjudication of the claim for just compensation, the Republic of the Philippines must be impleaded as a defendant. The cases are remanded for this purpose and for trial on the merits.

• Exception to State Immunity in Eminent Domain — The State may not invoke immunity from suit to defeat a claim for just compensation when it has taken private property for public use without the landowner's consent and without initiating expropriation proceedings. By undertaking the taking, the State is deemed to have submitted to the court's jurisdiction to fix the compensation. This exception prevents the doctrine from being used to sanction an injustice.

• "The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen."
• "It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit."
• "Public respondents' belief that the property involved is public, even if buttressed by statements of other public officials, is no reason for the unjust taking of petitioners' property."
• "A public infrastructure loses its laudability if, in the process of undertaking it, private rights are disregarded."

• Amigable v. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360 (1972) — Cited as controlling authority that a suit may be maintained against the government when it takes private property for public use without expropriation or negotiated sale.
• Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, 40 SCRA 464 (1971) — Applied for the principle that state immunity cannot be invoked to perpetrate injustice, and that taking property conditioned on just compensation implies submission to judicial jurisdiction.
• Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 204 SCRA 212 (1991) — Cited for the proposition that even in the exercise of eminent domain (jus imperii), the defense of immunity cannot be set up against an action for payment when property has been taken without just compensation.

• Article IV, Sections 1 and 2, 1973 Constitution (Bill of Rights) — Invoked by petitioners as the basis for the right against deprivation of property without due process of law and without just compensation.
• Article 32, paragraphs 6 and 7, Civil Code of the Philippines — Cited as the legal basis for the action for damages for violation of constitutional rights.

Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero (Ponente), Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo (took no part), Justice Jose C. Campos, Jr. (took no part), Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, Justice Jose A. R. Melo, Justice Vitug, Justice Davide, Jr.