De Leon vs. Luis

A lawyer's failure to arrest a client with a standing warrant or to report the client's presence in her office does not constitute obstruction of justice under Section 1(c) of P.D. No. 1829 absent a clear showing of intent to help the fugitive evade prosecution or delay the administration of justice.

Atty. Judith Z. Luis served as counsel of record for Ernesto de los Santos in a criminal case for qualified theft filed by petitioners Dr. Emily D. de Leon, Dr. Ma. Corazon Ramona Ll. de los Santos, Dean Atty. Joe-Santos B. Bisquera, and Atty. Diosdado G. Madrid. A warrant of arrest had been issued against Ernesto in connection with that case. The dispute centers on whether Atty. Luis's rendering of legal and notarial services to Ernesto at her office — knowing he had a standing warrant — constitutes obstruction of justice under P.D. No. 1829, a penal decree that punishes acts knowingly and willfully committed to obstruct, impede, frustrate, or delay the apprehension of suspects and the prosecution of criminal cases.

Atty. Judith Z. Luis was the counsel of record of Ernesto de los Santos in a criminal case for qualified theft filed by petitioners Dr. Emily D. de Leon, Dr. Ma. Corazon Ramona Ll. de los Santos, Dean Atty. Joe-Santos B. Bisquera, and Atty. Diosdado G. Madrid. A warrant of arrest had been issued against Ernesto in connection with that case. On 13 February 2013 and 7 June 2013, Atty. Luis rendered legal services to Ernesto and performed notarial functions on pleadings verified by him in her law office in Pasig City.

Petitioners claimed that despite knowing Ernesto had a standing warrant, Atty. Luis did not report his presence to the authorities to enable his arrest. They filed a complaint for obstruction of justice against Atty. Luis and her associate, Atty. Alfredo A. Salting, Jr., for their failure to effect a citizen's arrest against Ernesto. Petitioners' theory was that by not arresting Ernesto or reporting him, Attys. Luis and Salting delayed the prosecution of the qualified theft case and obstructed the service of process or court orders, in violation of Section 1(e) of P.D. No. 1829.

On 7 October 2013, the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office approved the filing of an Information against Atty. Luis; the case against Atty. Salting was dismissed. The case was raffled to Branch 70, MeTC, Pasig City, and a warrant of arrest was issued. Atty. Luis voluntarily surrendered on 24 October 2013 and posted a cash bond. She filed an Omnibus Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause, to Quash the Information, and to Defer/Suspend Arraignment, which Judge Mejorada denied on 4 June 2014. After Judge Mejorada inhibited, the case was re-raffled to Branch 69 before Judge Pimentel, who also inhibited motu proprio. The case was again re-raffled to Branch 72 before Judge Runes-Tamang.

On 13 January 2015, Judge Runes-Tamang granted Atty. Luis's motion for reconsideration and dismissed the complaint for want of probable cause, finding that petitioners failed to present proof that Atty. Luis assisted Ernesto with the sole purpose of helping him evade prosecution or delay the administration of justice. Petitioners sought reconsideration and Judge Runes-Tamang's inhibition. After the judge inhibited, the case was re-raffled for the fourth time, reaching Judge Reyes, who on 15 May 2015 denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and affirmed the dismissal. Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari before the RTC, which denied the petition on 29 March 2016 and the motion for reconsideration on 22 July 2016, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC. The MeTC's factual finding central to the Supreme Court's analysis was that there was no clear showing that the meeting between Atty. Luis and Ernesto at her office was for anything other than the signing and notarization of a Motion for Reconsideration, and that the evidence presented engendered more doubts as to the accused's guilt.

• Obstruction of Justice Under P.D. No. 1829: Petitioners argued that by not arresting Ernesto or reporting his presence to the authorities, Atty. Luis delayed the prosecution of the qualified theft case and obstructed the service of process or court orders, in violation of Section 1(e) of P.D. No. 1829.
• Implied Duty to Arrest or Report: Petitioners suggested a reading of Section 1(c) that would impose a positive duty on anyone — including a lawyer — with knowledge of a fugitive's whereabouts to arrest him or volunteer such information to the authorities, failing which they would be liable for obstruction of justice regardless of intent to obstruct, impede, frustrate, or delay proceedings.

• No Intent to Obstruct: Atty. Luis argued that Ernesto's presence in her office was solely to sign a Motion for Reconsideration and have it subscribed and sworn to before counsel, not to hide from authorities or evade arrest.
• Office Location Inconsistent with Concealment: Atty. Luis pointed out that had her intention been to "harbor" or "conceal" Ernesto, she would have asked to meet in a secluded place unknown to anyone, rather than at her notarial office which was known to petitioners, open to the public, and located in the busy business district of Ortigas, Pasig City.
• Constitutional Rights at Stake: Atty. Luis argued that allowing the obstruction of justice charge to prosper would defeat Ernesto's constitutional rights to counsel and to be presumed innocent, as lawyers would be reluctant to render legal services if doing so risked exposing them to obstruction of justice charges, forcing them to choose between self-preservation and their fiduciary duty to clients.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the RTC correctly found that the MeTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the dismissal of the charge for obstruction of justice against Atty. Luis.
• Obstruction of Justice: Whether Atty. Luis's failure to arrest Ernesto or report his presence in her office to the authorities, despite knowledge of a standing warrant for his arrest, constitutes obstruction of justice under P.D. No. 1829.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Yes. The RTC correctly held that the MeTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal case for obstruction of justice against Atty. Luis for lack of proof showing clear intent to help Ernesto evade or otherwise delay the proceedings against him.
• Obstruction of Justice: No. Atty. Luis's failure to arrest Ernesto or report his presence, without more, does not constitute "harboring" or "concealing" under Section 1(c) of P.D. No. 1829 absent proof of intent to prevent his arrest, prosecution, and conviction.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Grave abuse of discretion refers to the capricious, whimsical, or arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or abuse so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to carry out a legal obligation. The RTC correctly found no such abuse by the MeTC, which properly dismissed the case for lack of evidence of intent to obstruct justice. The absence of a controlling Supreme Court interpretation of what constitutes "concealing" and "harboring" under P.D. No. 1829 did not render the MeTC's dismissal gravely abusive, as the MeTC's reading was consistent with the text of the law.

• Obstruction of Justice: Section 1(c) of P.D. No. 1829 explicitly makes the intention to frustrate or delay apprehension, prosecution, and conviction an element of the offense. The Court adopted the definitions from People vs. Martin, where "conceal" refers to the act of hiding and "harbor" refers to the act of giving shelter and aid, and agreed with the MeTC that harboring a criminal presupposes something deliberate, not just the simple act of not voluntarily giving information to the authorities. Here, there was no showing that Ernesto's presence in Atty. Luis's office was for anything other than to sign a Motion for Reconsideration and have it notarized. The meeting took place in her notarial office — known to petitioners, open to the public, and located in the busy Ortigas business district — not in a secluded place. Penal statutes must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused; any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the accused. Petitioners' suggested reading, which would impose a positive duty to arrest or report regardless of intent, is incompatible with the letter of the law, basic statutory construction, and basic criminal law precepts. Such a reading would also undermine the lawyer-client relationship, defeating the client's constitutional rights to counsel and to be presumed innocent. The Court cited U.S. jurisprudence (United States vs. Silva, United States vs. Foy) for persuasive authority, noting that "harboring" and "concealing" are active verbs with the fugitive as their object, and that the statute does not impose a duty on one aware of a fugitive's whereabouts to reveal that information on pain of criminal prosecution.

• Strict construction of penal statutes — Penal laws are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies, or equitable considerations. If a penal statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of the accused is preferred. Acts in and of themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held criminal unless there is a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent. The Court applied this doctrine to reject petitioners' expansive reading of Section 1(c) of P.D. No. 1829, holding that the provision cannot be construed to impose a positive duty to arrest or report a fugitive absent proof of intent to obstruct justice.

• Elements of obstruction of justice under Section 1(c) of P.D. No. 1829 — The offense requires: (1) the accused knowingly or willfully obstructed, impeded, frustrated, or delayed the apprehension of a suspect and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases; (2) by harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, a person he knows or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect has committed an offense; and (3) with the intent to prevent his arrest, prosecution, and conviction. The intent element is essential — mere failure to arrest or report a fugitive, without more, does not constitute the offense.

• Definition of "harboring" and "concealing" — "Conceal" refers to the act of hiding; "harbor" refers to the act of giving shelter and aid. Harboring a criminal presupposes something deliberate and not just the simple act of not voluntarily giving information to the authorities as to the present whereabouts of a person. Absent a clear showing of an overt act evidencing intent to help the fugitive remain in violation of the law, the charge for obstruction of justice cannot stand.

• "P.D. No. 1829 punishes acts knowingly and willfully committed with the intention to obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay the administration of justice." — This passage states the intent requirement of P.D. No. 1829, which the Court held was not satisfied by mere failure to arrest or report a fugitive.

• "Petitioners' suggested reading of the provision, on the other hand, seeks to impose a positive duty on the part of anyone who may have knowledge of a fugitive's whereabouts (including his lawyer) to arrest him or volunteer such information to the authorities. Failing this, they will be liable for obstruction of justice under Section 1(c), lack of intent to obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay the proceedings notwithstanding. Their reading, however, cannot be sustained as it is incompatible with the letter of the law, basic statutory construction or basic criminal law precepts." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi: the rejection of petitioners' proposed interpretation that would eliminate the intent element and impose an affirmative duty to arrest or report.

• "For, it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or equitable considerations. They are not to be strained by construction to spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime: or multiply felonies." — This passage, quoted from People vs. Sullano, states the canonical formulation of the strict construction doctrine applied to reject petitioners' reading.

• "it does not impose a duty on one who may be aware of the whereabouts of the fugitive, although having played no part in his flight, to reveal this information on pain of criminal prosecution." — This passage, quoted from United States vs. Foy, was adopted by the Court as persuasive authority supporting the holding that Section 1(c) does not create an affirmative duty to report a fugitive's whereabouts.

• People vs. Martin, 148-A Phil. 294 (1971) — Cited for the definitions of "harbor" and "conceal" in the context of Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Philippine Immigration Act of 1940). The Court adopted these definitions by analogy for purposes of interpreting Section 1(c) of P.D. No. 1829, as no definitive Supreme Court ruling on the meaning of these terms under P.D. No. 1829 existed.

• People vs. Sullano, 872 Phil. 613 (2018) — Cited for the doctrine of strict construction of penal statutes against the State and liberally in favor of the accused, including the principle in dubiis reus est absolvendus. The Court relied on this doctrine to reject petitioners' expansive reading of Section 1(c).

• United States vs. Silva, 745 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1984) — U.S. precedent cited for persuasive weight, identifying four essential elements for conviction under the federal harboring statute (18 U.S.C. § 1071) and holding that "harboring and concealing" must be read narrowly so as not to proscribe any and all forms of aid to a fugitive.

• United States vs. Foy, 416 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1969) — U.S. precedent cited for persuasive weight, holding that "harboring" and "concealing" are active verbs with the fugitive as their object, and that the statute does not impose a duty to reveal a fugitive's whereabouts on pain of criminal prosecution. The Court quoted this proposition with approval.

• Section 1(c), P.D. No. 1829 ("Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders") — Penalizes harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person known or reasonably suspected to have committed an offense, in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution, and conviction. The Court applied this provision to hold that the intent element must be proven, and that mere failure to arrest or report a fugitive — absent any overt act demonstrating intent to obstruct justice — does not constitute the offense, particularly where a lawyer-client relationship is involved.

• Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari raising only questions of law. The Court allowed the direct resort under this rule because the parties did not disagree on any factual matter; the controversy was purely legal — whether Atty. Luis's actions constituted obstruction of justice under Section 1(c) of P.D. No. 1829.

• Canon 12, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that a lawyer, as an officer of the court, has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. The Court noted that this duty to the courts must be balanced with the lawyer's obligations toward clients, which is among the reasons evidence of criminal intent is essential in obstruction of justice cases.

Gesmundo, C.J., Caguioa, Carandang, and Gaerlan, JJ., concurred.