De Leon vs. Esperon, Jr.

A case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such a case, or dismiss it on the ground of mootness. Where the court martial has already acquitted the accused, has been dissolved, and the accused have been released from confinement, any resolution of the petitions challenging the validity of the court martial's creation would be of no practical value.

The petitioners were military officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) — some from the Philippine Army and others from the Philippine Navy (Marines). Prior to February 24, 2006, the military received reports that units of the Philippine Marine Corps, First Scout Ranger Regiment, and Philippine National Police Special Action Force planned to join a protest march on the commemoration of the EDSA Revolution calling for the resignation of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The petitioners were among thirty military officers who joined a stand-off on February 26, 2006, inside the Philippine Marine Corps' headquarters in Fort Bonifacio, which led to the creation of an Ad Hoc Investigating Committee and subsequent court martial proceedings under Commonwealth Act No. 408, the Articles of War.

Prior to February 24, 2006, the military received reports that units of the Philippine Marine Corps, First Scout Ranger Regiment, and Philippine National Police Special Action Force planned to join a protest march of militant groups, civil society, political opposition, and the religious sector on the commemoration of the EDSA Revolution to call for the resignation of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The plan culminated in a stand-off on February 26, 2006, inside the Philippine Marine Corps' headquarters in Fort Bonifacio. The petitioners were among the thirty military officers who joined the stand-off.

As a result, an Ad Hoc Investigating Committee was created to conduct an inquiry on the facts and circumstances that led to the February 24-26, 2006 aborted plan. In an Investigation Report dated July 7, 2006, the Committee recommended that the petitioners, together with other officers and enlisted personnel, be charged before a General Court Martial for violations of the applicable Articles of War. On July 20, 2006, Col. Nemesio I. Dabal, Judge Advocate General of the Judge Advocate General's Office, AFP, issued Office Order No. 14-06 constituting a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel to conduct investigation on the cases of all the petitioners. Thereafter, the JAGO furnished the petitioners with charge sheets and amended charge sheets signed under oath by Captain Armando P. Paredes as the accuser, and gave them time to submit their respective counter-affidavits. They were also arrested and detained at Camp General Mateo Capinpin, Tanay, Rizal. The petitioners were charged with violations of Articles 63, 65, 67, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War.

On October 25, 2006, the Panel submitted its Pre-Trial Investigation Report to Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr. The Panel recommended that petitioners, except for Bañez, Segumalian, and Divinagracia, be tried before the court-martial for violation of the applicable Articles of War. The PTI Report was referred to Col. Pedro G. Herrera-Davila, Staff Judge Advocate for the Chief of Staff of the AFP. In his Pre-Trial Advice dated November 7, 2006, Col. Davila disapproved the PTI Report and recommended the referral to trial by a General Court Martial of the 37 AFP Officers, including the petitioners, for violations of Articles 96 (for all of the petitioners) and 97 (only for Segumalian). He also recommended that they be tried for violations of other offenses, considering that the available evidence established a prima facie case against them.

Thereafter, in a Memorandum dated November 17, 2006, Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr. created and convened a Special General Court Martial to try petitioners' cases and other high-ranking military officers. In Letter Order No. 758 dated November 24, 2006, Commodore Paterno E. Labiano, the Adjutant General, designated the officers to be detailed as the President and members of the Special General Court-Martial No. 2 who would try petitioners' cases. Hence, the petitioners filed the consolidated petitions before the Supreme Court.

• Due Process — Validity of Special General Court Martial: Petitioners alleged that the creation of Special General Court Martial No. 2 violates their right to due process under the Constitution and the Articles of War, because a Special General Court Martial is not among those allowed by the Articles of War to be created, and a special court martial is different from a general court martial, having different powers and functions.

• Procedural Irregularity — Multiple Roles of Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr.: Citing Articles 8, 9, 45, and 46 of the Articles of War, petitioners pointed out that Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr. cannot be the accuser, appointing authority, witness, prosecutor, and reviewer of the findings of the Special General Court Martial No. 2 all at the same time.

• Manifest Partiality: Petitioners claimed that Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr. displayed manifest partiality when he openly declared even before the start of the pre-trial investigation that all the accused should be prosecuted before a court martial for their attempt to overthrow the government, executed an affidavit against some of the accused officers, and expressed his willingness and determination to testify against them.

• Disregard of PTI Report: Petitioners argued that despite the PTI Report and the Pre-Trial Advice absolving the accused officers of the charge of attempted mutiny, Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr. overruled the findings and proceeded to indict them for mutiny, then immediately ordered the creation of the court martial without stating the factual and legal bases of the charges. They argued that Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr. should have afforded more weight to the PTI Report as the basis for issuing the Memorandum, the Panel being considered as a trier of facts.

• Illegal Confinement: Petitioners argued that their continuing confinement in a maximum security detention facility at Camp General Mateo Capinpin, Tanay, Rizal violates Article 70 of the Articles of War because they were never charged with any crime or serious offense defined in the Articles of War when they were placed in confinement in July 2006, and they were not restricted to the barracks, quarters, or tent as Article 70 mandates, but were placed in a maximum security detention facility.

• Validity of Referral to Court Martial: Respondents countered that Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr. correctly referred petitioners' charges to Special General Court Martial No. 2 for trial, and that the ruling of the Panel recommending dismissal of the charge for violation of Article 67 was merely recommendatory and thus not binding on Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr.

• Prima Facie Case: Respondents noted that both the AHIC in its Investigation Report and the Staff Advocate General in his Pre-Trial Advice recommended the referral of the charges against petitioners to court martial, thus there was a prima facie case against petitioners.

• No Disqualification of Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr.: Respondents maintained that Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr.'s affidavit and alleged statements that petitioners should be tried before court martial do not make the Memorandum creating Special General Court Martial No. 2 illegal, as he is expressly authorized to convene a court-martial, is not the judge of the charges, and even if he approves the findings and sentence, this is still subject to confirmation by the President in certain cases. They cited No. 5, paragraph 3, Chapter III, of Executive Order No. 178, providing that whether the commander who convened the court is the accuser or the prosecutor is mainly determined by his personal feeling or interest in the matter, and that an action by a commander which is merely official and in the strict line of his duty cannot be regarded as sufficient to disqualify him.

• Availability of Remedies: Respondents argued that the remedies of writs of prohibition and habeas corpus are unavailing because under Article 8 of the Articles of War and No. 5, paragraph 5, Chapter III, of Executive Order No. 178, Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr. is authorized to create or appoint a court-martial and to determine the cases to be referred to it for trial, and the Special General Court Martial No. 2 has jurisdiction over the cases filed against petitioners. Petitioners were likewise lawfully arrested and confined as a result of the charges against them for violations of the Articles of War pursuant to Article 70 thereof.

• Mootness: Whether the consolidated petitions have become moot and academic by virtue of the resolutions of Special General Court Martial No. 2 finding the petitioners not guilty of the charges against them.

• Mootness: Yes. The petitions were dismissed for having become moot and academic. Pending resolution of the case, Special General Court Martial No. 2 rendered various resolutions finding the petitioners not guilty of the charges against them, the court martial has long been dissolved, and the petitioners were already released from confinement. Any resolution of the petitions would be of no practical use or value.

• Mootness: The Court applied the doctrine of mootness as discussed in David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, which describes a moot and academic case as "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value." Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such a case, or dismiss it on the ground of mootness. The Court found that the Special General Court Martial No. 2 rendered the following various resolutions finding the petitioners not guilty of the charges against them: (1) Partial Ruling or Resolution dated October 16, 2009, cited in the After Trial Report rendered on the same date, adjudging Divinagracia not guilty; (2) Resolution dated March 2, 2010 adjudging Bañez not guilty; (3) Resolution dated September 28, 2010 adjudging De Leon, Segumalian, Doctolero, and Upano not guilty; and (4) Resolution dated February 14, 2011 adjudging Aquino and Fontiveros not guilty. Because the petitioners sought to annul the Memorandum dated November 17, 2006 and Letter Order No. 758, to restrain the Special General Court Martial, and to order the release of the petitioners from confinement, any resolution of these petitions would be of no practical value since as early as 2009, the Special General Court Martial No. 2 already absolved the petitioners of the charges under the Articles of War, the court martial has long been dissolved, and the petitioners were already released from confinement. Thus, the petitions were dismissed for having become moot and academic.

• Doctrine of Mootness — A case is moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such a case, or dismiss it on the ground of mootness. The Court applied this doctrine where the Special General Court Martial No. 2 had already acquitted all petitioners, the court martial had been dissolved, and the petitioners had been released from confinement, rendering any ruling on the validity of the court martial's creation of no practical value.

• "In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, we described a moot and academic case as 'one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value' and discussed that '[g]enerally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.'" — This passage states the controlling doctrine of mootness that the Court applied to dismiss the consolidated petitions.

• "Any resolution of the petitions to annul the Memorandum dated November 17, 2006 and Letter Order No. 758, to restrain the Special General Court Martial and to order the release of the petitioners from confinement would be of no practical value since as early as 2009, Special General Court Martial No. 2 already absolved the petitioners of the charges under the Articles of War, Special General Court Martial No. 2 has long been dissolved and the petitioners were already released from confinement." — This passage articulates the Court's application of the mootness doctrine to the specific facts of the case, explaining why the supervening events rendered the petitions moot.

• David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160 — Cited as the controlling precedent defining the doctrine of mootness. The Court relied on this case for the definition of a moot and academic case and the general rule that courts decline jurisdiction over such cases or dismiss them on the ground of mootness.

• Article 8, Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408) — Cited by petitioners to argue that Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr. cannot be the accuser, appointing authority, witness, prosecutor, and reviewer of the findings of the Special General Court Martial No. 2 all at the same time. The provision authorizes the President, the Chief of Staff of the AFP, and other specified officers to appoint General Courts-Martial, but provides that when any such commander is the accuser or the prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried, the court shall be appointed by a superior competent authority.

• Article 9, Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408) — Cited by petitioners in support of their argument that a Special General Court Martial is not among those allowed by the Articles of War to be created. The provision authorizes specified commanding officers to appoint special courts-martial, with a similar proviso regarding when the commanding officer is the accuser or prosecutor.

• Article 45, Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408) — Cited by petitioners regarding the action by the convening authority on records of trial, requiring referral to the staff judge advocate or Judge Advocate General before acting thereon.

• Article 46, Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408) — Cited by petitioners regarding the powers incident to the power to approve, including the power to approve or disapprove findings and sentences.

• Article 47, Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408) — Cited by respondents to show that even if Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr. approves the findings and sentence imposed by the court-martial, this is still subject to confirmation by the President in certain cases.

• Article 70, Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408) — Cited by petitioners to argue that their continuing confinement in a maximum security detention facility violates this provision because they were never charged with any crime or serious offense when placed in confinement, and they were not restricted to barracks, quarters, or tent. Respondents argued that petitioners were lawfully arrested and confined as a result of the charges against them pursuant to this article.

• Executive Order No. 178, No. 5, paragraph 3, Chapter III — Cited by respondents to argue that whether the commander who convened the court is the accuser or the prosecutor is mainly determined by his personal feeling or interest in the matter, and that an action by a commander which is merely official and in the strict line of his duty cannot be regarded as sufficient to disqualify him.

• Executive Order No. 178, No. 5, paragraph 5, Chapter III — Cited by respondents to argue that Lt. Gen. Esperon, Jr. is authorized to create or appoint a court-martial and to determine the cases to be referred to it for trial.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Diosdado M. Peralta, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., and Bienvenido L. Reyes.