De la Llana v. Alba

A legislative abolition of inferior courts, when made in good faith as part of a bona fide reorganization, does not violate the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure of judges, because the power to create courts necessarily includes the power to abolish them, and abolition of an office is legally distinct from removal of its incumbent — there can be no tenure to a non-existent office.

Petitioners are Gualberto J. de la Llana, Presiding Judge of Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo, and seven members of the Philippine bar. Respondents are Manuel Alba (Minister of Budget), Francisco Tantuitco (Chairman, Commission on Audit), and Ricardo Puno (Minister of Justice) — officials tasked with implementing the challenged statute. The 1973 Constitution vested in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel (Article X, Section 6) and granted the Court the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal (Article X, Section 7). The same Constitution provided that members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated. All existing inferior courts were created by statute, not by the Constitution itself; the Supreme Court is the only constitutional court. Under the amended 1973 Constitution, executive and legislative powers were commingled in a modified parliamentary system, with Cabinet members playing leading roles in the legislative process and the Prime Minister required to come from the Batasang Pambansa.

On August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was organized by Executive Order, later amended by Executive Order No. 619-A dated September 5, 1980. The Committee — chaired by the Chief Justice, with Minister of Justice Ricardo C. Puno as Co-Chairman, and including Justices Ramon C. Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, retired Justice Felix Q. Antonio, and Deputy Minister of Justice Jesus Borromeo — was tasked with formulating plans for the reorganization of the entire judiciary, embracing all lower courts including the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City and Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but excluding the Sandiganbayan. On October 17, 1980, the Committee submitted its Report, identifying a basic and urgent need for restructuring the judicial system, noting that clogged dockets had continued to worsen notwithstanding the Supreme Court's efforts since 1973 when administrative supervision over inferior courts was vested in it. The Report characterized the contemplated reorganization as the first of its kind since the Judiciary Act became effective on June 16, 1901.

Thereafter, Cabinet Bill No. 42 — which became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 — was introduced, drafted substantially in accordance with the guidelines presented by the Committee's Report, though some options were not availed of upon consultation with the governmental and parliamentary leadership. The Bill was referred to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, which conducted public hearings in December 1980 consisting of dialogues with members of the bench and bar who had submitted written proposals and position papers. Committee Report No. 225 was submitted recommending approval with amendments. The minutes of the Batasang Pambansa proceedings show that 590 pages were devoted to the Bill's discussion. The Act was signed by the President on August 14, 1981.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 creates an Intermediate Appellate Court, thirteen Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, replacing the Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, Courts of Agrarian Relations, City Courts, Municipal Courts, and Municipal Circuit Courts. Section 44, the transitory provision at the center of the controversy, provides that the existing inferior courts shall continue to function until the completion of the reorganization as declared by the President; upon such declaration, the said courts "shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office," with pending cases transferred to the appropriate new courts together with pertinent functions, records, equipment, property, necessary personnel, and applicable appropriations. Section 41 authorizes the President to fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597. Section 43 requires the Supreme Court to submit a staffing pattern within thirty days from the Act's effectivity.

Petitioners filed the present petition seeking to enjoin respondents from implementing BP 129, alleging that the Act violates the security of tenure provision of the Constitution, was enacted in bad faith, and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. At the hearing, amici curiae — including former Senator Lorenzo Sumulong, Dean Irene Cortes, Atty. Raul Roco, and others — argued before the Court, and various memoranda were submitted by bar associations and legal luminaries. Petitioners also moved to disqualify the Chief Justice and Justices Aquino and Melencio-Herrera for their service on the Committee on Judicial Reorganization, but the motion was denied, the Court noting that none of the three had any role in framing or discussing BP 129 and that their Committee work was limited to submitting alternative plans, scholarly in nature.

• Security of Tenure: Petitioners contended that the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution, which provides that members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated.
• Lack of Good Faith: Petitioners imputed lack of good faith in the enactment of BP 129, characterizing the legislative process as tainted by arbitrariness and alleging that the abolition of courts was designed to cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose of removing incumbent judges.
• Undue Delegation — Compensation: Petitioners characterized as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of authority to fix the compensation and allowances of Justices and judges thereafter appointed.
• Undue Delegation — Timing: Petitioners objected to the absence in the statute of a "definite time frame limitation" for the completion of the reorganization, arguing that the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed was improperly left to the President.
• Disqualification: Petitioners sought to disqualify the Chief Justice and Justices Aquino and Melencio-Herrera because the first-named was Chairman and the other two were members of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization.

• Legitimate Exercise of Legislative Power: The Solicitor General maintained that there was no valid justification for the attack on the constitutionality of the statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary under Article X, Section 1 of the Constitution.
• Good Faith: Respondents argued that the allegations of absence of good faith and the attack on the independence of the judiciary were unwarranted and devoid of any support in law, the Act having been the product of exhaustive study and deliberation by the legislative body.

• Standing: Whether petitioners have legal standing to assail the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
• Good Faith in Enactment: Whether BP 129 was enacted in good faith and in response to a pressing and urgent need for judicial reorganization.
• Security of Tenure: Whether the abolition of existing inferior courts and the consequent cessation of incumbents from office violates the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure under Article X, Section 7.
• Supreme Court's Removal Power: Whether the Constitution's vesting in the Supreme Court of the power to discipline and dismiss judges of inferior courts precludes legislative abolition of courts that results in the separation of incumbents.
• Undue Delegation — Compensation: Whether the President's authority to fix the compensation and allowances of Justices and judges constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
• Definite Time Frame: Whether the absence of a "definite time frame limitation" in the statute renders it defective.
• Disqualification of Justices: Whether the participation of certain Justices in the Committee on Judicial Reorganization disqualifies them from adjudicating the case.

• Standing: Yes. Judge de la Llana has a personal and substantial interest as an incumbent judge directly affected by the Act, and the other petitioners have standing as members of the bar, officers of the court, and taxpayers.
• Good Faith in Enactment: Yes. The enactment was in good faith, responding to a pressing and urgent need for major reorganization, as evidenced by 590 pages of Batasang Pambansa deliberations and the exhaustive study preceding the Act's signing on August 14, 1981.
• Security of Tenure: No violation. Abolition of inferior courts in good faith does not impair security of tenure, because abolition of an office is legally distinct from removal of its incumbent — there can be no tenure to a non-existent office.
• Supreme Court's Removal Power: No preclusion. The power to discipline and remove judges applies to removal from an existing office, not to abolition of the office itself; however, as a matter of constitutional construction, the Executive should consult the Supreme Court regarding incumbent justices and judges in implementing the reorganization.
• Undue Delegation — Compensation: No undue delegation. The statute provides a sufficient standard — the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597.
• Definite Time Frame: No defect. The statute requires the Supreme Court to submit a staffing pattern within thirty days from effectivity and mandates that the Act be carried out through an Executive Order issued by the President; existing courts continue functioning until the President declares the reorganization complete.
• Disqualification of Justices: No disqualification. The three Justices had no role in framing or discussing BP 129; their Committee work was limited to submitting alternative plans for reorganization, which is scholarly in nature and does not constitute participation in the legislative process.

• Standing: Judge de la Llana falls within the principle in People vs. Vera that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The other petitioners, as members of the bar and officers of the court, cannot be considered devoid of any personal and substantial interest; their capacity as taxpayers has also been demonstrated. A retreat from the liberal approach followed in Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works was deemed unwarranted.

• Good Faith in Enactment: The Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization's Report identified grave and pressing problems — clogged dockets that had worsened notwithstanding the Supreme Court's efforts since 1973, accelerated economic development, population growth, and increasing urbanization — calling for institutional reform. The 590 pages of Batasang Pambansa minutes devoted to discussion, the public hearings conducted in December 1980, and the exhaustive study from the Committee's inception to the Presidential signature on August 14, 1981, demonstrated good faith throughout. The allegation of arbitrariness was found to be without factual basis.

• Security of Tenure: The settled rule is that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of incumbents, and that for abolition to be valid it must be made in good faith. As held in Cruz vs. Primicias, Jr., abolition of an office does not amount to illegal removal of its incumbent. Justice Laurel's concurring opinion in Zandueta vs. De la Costa reaffirmed that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and reorganize them, necessitating new appointments, provided the purpose is the fulfillment of a great public need and not the defeat of security of tenure. The test remains whether the abolition is in good faith; that element being conspicuously present in BP 129, the petition lacked merit. The power to create courts necessarily includes the power to abolish them, and no law is irrepealable.

• Supreme Court's Removal Power: Removal is distinguished from termination by virtue of abolition of the office: after abolition, there is in law no occupant, whereas in removal, there is an office with an occupant who loses his position. From the standpoint of strict law, the question of impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, the practical effect on incumbents is separation, indistinguishable from removal. To preclude any plausibility that the power of removal vested in the Supreme Court is ignored, the Court held that as a matter of constitutional construction, the Executive should consult the Court regarding incumbent justices and judges and accord its views the fullest consideration. This construction saves the statute from any unconstitutional taint and follows the principle that in the choice between an interpretation that saves and one that invalidates a statute, the former is preferred. No question of law is involved in such consultation, and no intrusion into the appointment power occurs, which remains with the Executive.

• Undue Delegation — Compensation: The statute's language is clear: compensation and allowances shall be "as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." The existence of a standard is thus express. As held in Edu vs. Ericta, to avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. The standard may be express or implied; if express, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The strong ties between the executive and legislative departments under the amended Constitution further assure that policy framing and implementation can be accomplished with unity and efficiency.

• Definite Time Frame: The statute's language is categorical: Section 43 requires the Supreme Court to submit a staffing pattern within thirty days from effectivity, and Section 44 mandates that the Act be immediately carried out through an Executive Order issued by the President. Existing inferior courts continue functioning until the President declares the reorganization complete, at which point they are deemed automatically abolished. There is no ambiguity. Incumbents whose length of service, quality of performance, and clean record justify reappointment may be named anew, in legal contemplation without interruption in the continuity of their service.

• Disqualification of Justices: None of the three Justices had any hand in framing or discussing BP 129. They were not consulted and did not testify. The challenged legislation is entirely the product of the legislative body. Their Committee work was limited to submitting alternative plans for reorganization, which is more in the nature of scholarly studies. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, members of the Court had been consulted in drafting proposed legislation affecting the judiciary. The involvement of the Chief Justice and members of the Court in judicial reform is consistent with the institutional role of judicial bodies in studying and recommending improvements to the judicial system.

• Valid Abolition of Office — The abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body, if done in good faith, suffers from no infirmity. Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. The test of validity is whether the abolition is made in good faith, with a purpose that is the fulfillment of a great public need and not the defeat of security of tenure. If the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold the abolition of inferior courts under BP 129, finding that good faith was conspicuously present from the Act's inception to its signing.

• Distinction Between Removal and Abolition — Removal implies that the office subsists after ouster, while in abolition the office no longer exists, thereby terminating the right of the incumbent to exercise the rights and duties of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After abolition, there is in law no occupant. The Court relied on this distinction to conclude that security of tenure is not impaired by legislative abolition of courts, though it acknowledged that the practical effect on incumbents — separation from the judiciary — is indistinguishable from removal.

• Power to Create Includes Power to Abolish — The constitutional grant to the legislature of the power to establish inferior courts necessarily includes the power to abolish them. No law is irrepealable. The power to create an office includes the power to abolish the same. The right of judges to hold office during good behavior until retirement age does not deprive the legislature of its power to abolish, organize, or reorganize inferior courts. Judges take office with the encumbrance and knowledge that their courts may be abolished.

• Non-Delegation Doctrine — Sufficient Standard Test — To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. A standard defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries, and specifies the public agency to apply it. The standard may be either express or implied; if express, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The Court found the standard in BP 129's reference to the guidelines in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to PD 985, as amended by PD 1597.

• Constitutional Construction — Saving Interpretation — In the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred. The principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act must be applied to avoid any unconstitutional taint. The Court used this principle to hold that the Executive should consult the Supreme Court in implementing the reorganization, thereby saving BP 129 from any plausible charge of unconstitutionality.

• Security of Tenure and Judicial Independence — Security of tenure is an added guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by fear of reprisal, with judgments inspired solely by knowledge of the law and the dictates of conscience. The independence assured is impressed with a significance transcending that of a purely personal right. Nonetheless, there is no surer guarantee of judicial independence than the character and fitness of those appointed to the Bench; judges of the type of Lord Coke can remain independent regardless of the legislature's power to reorganize inferior courts.

• "Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity." — This passage states the controlling doctrine on valid abolition of office, the ratio decidendi upon which the constitutionality of BP 129 was upheld.

• "Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant." — This passage articulates the legal distinction between removal and abolition that resolves the security of tenure challenge, and is the formulation most frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on court reorganization.

• "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy." — This quotation from Edu vs. Ericta, adopted by the Court in resolving the undue delegation issue, states the canonical formulation of the sufficient-standard test for permissible delegation of legislative power.

• "In the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred." — This passage states the principle of constitutional construction that the Court applied to hold that executive consultation with the Supreme Court in implementing the reorganization saves BP 129 from any unconstitutional taint, and is a standard canon of statutory construction in Philippine jurisprudence.

• People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) — Controlling authority on the requirement of standing to impugn the validity of a statute: the person challenging a statute must have a personal and substantial interest such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Applied to establish Judge de la Llana's standing.

• Cruz vs. Primicias, Jr., L-28573, June 13, 1968, 23 SCRA 998 — Controlling authority on the doctrine that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of incumbents, and that abolition must be made in good faith. Quoted at length in the majority opinion as the settled rule applicable to judicial reorganization.

• Zandueta vs. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 615 (1938) — Justice Laurel's concurring opinion reaffirmed the standard of good faith as the test of validity for abolishing an inferior court, with due recognition of the security of tenure guarantee. Cited for the proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and reorganize them, necessitating new appointments.

• Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 51 O.G. 147 (1955) — Authority on the power of the legislature to abolish inferior courts and on the character and fitness of judges as the surer guarantee of judicial independence. Former Chief Justice Paras's opinion was cited for the proposition that judicial independence depends more on the character of judges than on tenure alone.

• Edu vs. Ericta, L-32096, October 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481 — Controlling authority on the sufficient-standard test for permissible delegation of legislative power. Quoted at length for the formulation that a standard defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries, and specifies the public agency to apply it.

• Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322 (1921) — Early leading case on the independence of the judiciary, identifying good judges as those who discharge their duties undeterred by outside influence. Cited for the proposition that an independent and efficient judiciary is essential to the constitutional order.

• Brillo vs. Enage, 94 Phil. 732 (1954) — Authority on the distinction between abolition of a court and mere change of name. Cited for the proposition that the right of a judge to hold office until age seventy does not deprive the legislature of its power to abolish inferior courts, and distinguished where the court was merely renamed rather than abolished.

• Fortun vs. Labang, 104 SCRA 607 (1981) — Authority on the need to preserve judicial independence, especially where there is a fusion between the executive and legislative branches. Cited for the observation that "many are the ways by which such independence could be eroded."

• Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Company, 57 Phil. 600 (1932) — Authority on the Court's role as guardian of constitutional rights. Cited for Justice Malcolm's statement that the Supreme Court should not sanction usurpations by any other department, but should also strictly confine its own sphere to powers conferred by the Constitution.

• Aquino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, L-40004, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275 — Authority on the standing of petitioners vindicating public rights. Cited for the proposition that the protection of private rights is an essential constituent of public interest, and that private and public interests are aspects of the totality of the legal order.

• Article X, Section 1, 1973 Constitution — "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law." Applied as the constitutional basis for the legislature's power to create — and by necessary implication, abolish — inferior courts.

• Article X, Section 6, 1973 Constitution — "The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof." Cited as a new provision of the 1973 Constitution transferring administrative supervision from the Executive to the Supreme Court, underscoring the need to preserve judicial independence.

• Article X, Section 7, 1973 Constitution — "The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal." Central provision at issue; the Court held that the security of tenure guarantee is not impaired by good-faith abolition of courts, and that the power to discipline and dismiss applies to removal from existing office, not to abolition of the office itself.

• Article XIII, Section 1, 1973 Constitution — "A public office is a public trust." Cited as a legal imperative underlying the security of tenure provision, which is to be viewed as enabling justices and judges to perform their functions efficiently, not as a purely personal right.

• Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 41 (Chapter IV) — Provides that Justices and judges shall receive compensation and allowances "as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." Applied to negate the charge of undue delegation by supplying an express standard.

• Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 43 — Requires the Supreme Court to submit a staffing pattern within thirty days from the Act's effectivity. Applied to show that the statute provides a definite time frame for implementation.

• Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 44 — Transitory provision mandating that the Act be carried out through an Executive Order, that existing courts continue functioning until the President declares the reorganization complete, and that upon such declaration the old courts "shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." The central provision challenged as violative of security of tenure; upheld as constitutional.

• Article VII, Section 16, Amended 1973 Constitution — Vests in the President all powers under the 1935 Constitution unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise, and requires the President to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Applied to support the conclusion that the President can be relied upon to implement the reorganization in accordance with his constitutional duty.

• Felix V. Makasiar, J. — Concurred with the main opinion.
• Venicio Escolin, J. — Concurred with the main opinion.
• Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., J. — Concurred in the result, the abolition being in good faith.
• Ramon C. Fernandez, J. — Concurred provided that in the task of implementation by the Executive, as far as present Justices and judges who may be separated are concerned, it would be in accordance with the tenets of constitutionalism if the Court be consulted and its view respected.
• Antonio P. Barredo, J. — Separate concurring opinion emphasizing that the Constitution is a living instrument that adapts to demands of obtaining circumstances; that the critical situation of the judiciary — including corruption and incompetence among some judges — justified extraordinary remedies; that the power to create carries with it the power to abolish; and that the President could be trusted to act in good faith in implementing the reorganization, adhering to his oath to do justice to every man.
• Ramon C. Aquino, J. — Separate concurring opinion arguing that the petition should have been dismissed outright because the Court has no jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief and prohibition is not the proper remedy to test constitutionality; that the petition is premature with no justiciable controversy; that seven of eight petitioners are practicing lawyers without personality to sue even as taxpayers; and that the law was enacted in utmost good faith.
• Juvenal K. Guerrero, J. — Separate concurring opinion grounding concurrence on the social justification and functional utility of the law, citing statistics on administrative cases against judges (322 total, 102 found guilty, 17 dismissed); arguing that public office is a privilege in the gift of the State with no vested right therein; that removal is merely incidental to valid abolition; and that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality.
• Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, J. — Separate concurring opinion distinguishing tenure of judges from tenure of courts; arguing that judges are entailed to their courts but courts are not entailed to their judges; that the constitutional guarantee of tenure applies only as courts exist; that the power to discipline cannot pose an obstacle to abolition; that public office is not property; and recommending safeguards in implementation including a reasonable time frame, simultaneous appointments, and deemed uninterrupted service for those not separated.
• Vicente G. Ericta, J. — Separate concurring opinion holding that the power to create includes the power to abolish, that security of tenure cannot be invoked when there is abolition rather than removal, that the abolition passes the test of good faith, and that in a conflict between public interest and individual interest of judges, the public weal must prevail.
• Vicente Abad Santos, J. — Concurring and dissenting; agreed that BP 129 is not unconstitutional but disagreed that the President is obliged to consult the Supreme Court in implementation, arguing that requiring consultation would constitute an invasion of executive territory and that the implicit suggestion of possible unconstitutional implementation is not congruent with the conclusion that the law is constitutional.
• Efren I. Plana, J. — Concurring and dissenting; agreed on constitutionality based on good faith but disagreed on the consultation requirement, noting the Supreme Court cannot give advisory opinions even to the President; further observed that the 1973 Constitution, with its commingling of executive and legislative powers, has significantly eroded the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power.

• Claudio Teehankee, J. — Dissented, arguing that the express constitutional guaranty of security of tenure must override the implied authority to remove judges by legislation. The 1973 Constitution transferred administrative supervision over all courts to the Supreme Court and vested exclusively in it the power to discipline and dismiss judges, thereby ruling out ouster of judges by legislative action. The "new courts" created by BP 129 are substantially the "old courts" with a change of name, as shown by the transitory provision transferring pending cases, records, equipment, personnel, and appropriations from old to new courts without specification — which would not have been possible had the new courts been genuinely different. The dissent relied on the 7-member majority opinion in Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice (G.R. No. L-1790, Jan. 18, 1955), which fell one vote short of the constitutionally required majority to invalidate R.A. 1186, and argued that any reorganization should at least allow incumbents to remain in office in the corresponding new courts unless removed for cause. The dissent further contended that the unprecedented total abolition of 1,663 judicial positions, coming after the martial-law era requirement that all judges submit resignations and the replacement of 33 judges, would further enfeeble an already feeble judiciary, and that due process must be observed in separating misfits from the judiciary rather than summary removal based on confidential adverse reports.