De la Cruz vs. Paras

A municipal corporation may regulate but may not absolutely prohibit a lawful business, occupation, or calling under the general welfare clause and applicable enabling statutes; an ordinance that wholly bans the operation of night clubs rather than imposing reasonable restrictions is void for overbreadth and lack of statutory authority.

Petitioners were operators of night clubs, cabarets, and dance halls in the Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan, as well as professional hostesses, hospitality girls, and professional dancers employed in such establishments. Some operators had been issued licenses as early as 1958 and had invested large sums of money in their businesses. The Municipal Council of Bocaue enacted Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975, which prohibited the issuance and renewal of licenses to operators and hostesses, revoked existing permits, and made continued operation illegal after a thirty-day wind-up period. The ordinance was justified on the ground that night clubs were "the principal cause in the decadence of morality" in the community. The dispute required resolution of the scope of municipal police power under the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act No. 938 as amended, and the then-recently enacted Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337), as well as the effect of Presidential Decree No. 189 transferring regulatory authority over tourist-oriented businesses to the Department of Tourism.

Petitioners were operators of night clubs, cabarets, and dance halls in the Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan, together with professional hostesses, hospitality girls, and professional dancers employed in such establishments. Several operators had held licenses for many years — Jose Torres III since 1958, Vicente de la Cruz since 1960, Renato Alipio since 1961, and Leoncio Corpuz since 1972 — and had invested large sums of money in their businesses. The establishments were well-lighted, had no partitions, and the tables were near each other. The operators did not allow the hospitality girls to engage in immoral acts or to go out with customers. The hostesses were subjected to periodic medical check-ups, and those found infected with venereal disease or who failed to submit to examination were not allowed to work. The crime rate in the area of the night clubs was better than in other parts of Bocaue or in other towns of Bulacan.

On November 5, 1975, the Municipal Council of Bocaue enacted Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975, entitled the "Prohibition and Closure Ordinance" of Bocaue, Bulacan. The ordinance defined night clubs, cabarets, dance halls, professional hostesses, hospitality girls, professional dancers, and operators. Its operative provisions prohibited the issuance and renewal of licenses and permits to operators of night clubs, cabarets, or dance halls, and to professional hostesses, hospitality girls, and professional dancers. It revoked all existing licenses and permits upon the expiration of a thirty-day wind-up period, after which the operation of these establishments within the municipality would be illegal. Violation was punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding ₱200.00, or both.

Petitioners filed two cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, assailing the ordinance on three grounds: that a municipality had no authority to prohibit a lawful business; that the ordinance violated their rights to due process and equal protection because licenses previously granted were withdrawn without judicial hearing; and that under Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, the power to license and regulate tourist-oriented businesses had been transferred to the Department of Tourism. Respondents countered that the Municipal Council was authorized by law to prohibit night clubs under the Revised Administrative Code, Commonwealth Act No. 601, and Republic Acts Nos. 938, 978, and 1224, and that property rights were subordinate to public interests.

On January 15, 1976, the lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84, sustaining it as an exercise of police power to promote public morals, and dismissed the petitions. Petitioners then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via certiorari.

• Lack of Municipal Authority: Petitioners contended that a municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation, or calling, and that Ordinance No. 84 was therefore null and void.
• Due Process and Equal Protection: Petitioners alleged that the ordinance violated their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws, as the licenses previously given to them were in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.
• Jurisdiction Transferred to Department of Tourism: Petitioners argued that under Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 259, the power to license and regulate tourist-oriented businesses, including night clubs, had been transferred to the Department of Tourism, depriving the Municipal Council of jurisdiction.

• Municipal Authority to Prohibit: Respondents argued that the Municipal Council was authorized by law not only to regulate but also to prohibit the establishment, maintenance, and operation of night clubs, invoking Section 2243 of the Revised Administrative Code, Commonwealth Act No. 601, and Republic Acts Nos. 938, 978, and 1224.
• Subordination of Property Rights: Respondents maintained that Ordinance No. 84 was not violative of petitioners' right to due process and equal protection, since property rights are subordinate to public interests.
• Retention of Municipal Jurisdiction: Respondents contended that Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, did not deprive Municipal Councils of their jurisdiction to regulate or prohibit night clubs.

• Scope of Police Power: Whether a municipal corporation may, under the general welfare clause and its enabling statutes, absolutely prohibit the operation of a lawful business such as night clubs, or whether its power is limited to reasonable regulation.
• Statutory Authority — Republic Act No. 938: Whether Republic Act No. 938, as amended, authorizes municipal councils to prohibit the operation of night clubs, or whether the statute's title — which speaks only of regulation — limits the granted power to regulation, rendering a prohibition ordinance ultra vires.
• Constitutionality — One-Subject-One-Title Rule: Whether construing Republic Act No. 938 as allowing prohibition of night clubs would violate the constitutional requirement that every bill shall embrace only one subject expressed in its title.
• Effect of the Local Government Code: Whether the provisions of the recently enacted Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) reinforce the conclusion that municipal corporations may regulate but not prohibit the operation of night clubs.

• Scope of Police Power: No. The ordinance was an unreasonable and overbroad exercise of police power; the objective of fostering public morals could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than absolute prohibition, and the sweeping ban constituted a clear invasion of personal and property rights.
• Statutory Authority — Republic Act No. 938: No. While the body of Republic Act No. 938 was amended to include the word "prohibit," the title remained unchanged and continued to speak only of the power to "regulate," so that construing the statute as authorizing prohibition would render it constitutionally infirm under the one-subject-one-title rule.
• Constitutionality — One-Subject-One-Title Rule: No. The Constitution mandates that every bill shall embrace only one subject expressed in its title; since the title of Republic Act No. 938 limits the power to regulation, construing it to allow prohibition would affix a constitutional defect, and the construction saving the statute from infirmity is preferred.
• Effect of the Local Government Code: Yes, the Local Government Code reinforces the conclusion. Its provisions consistently use the term "regulate" with respect to cafes, restaurants, beer-houses, public dance halls, and similar establishments, indicating that municipal corporations may regulate but not prohibit the operation of night clubs.

• Scope of Police Power: The general welfare clause of the Revised Administrative Code (Section 2238) grants municipal councils the power to enact ordinances necessary to provide for health and safety, promote prosperity, improve morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience. However, as held in United States vs. Abendan and United States vs. Salaveria, ordinances passed under this clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State. The ordinance here was characterized by overbreadth: the purpose of fostering public morals, while worthy, could have been achieved by reasonable restrictions rather than absolute prohibition. The measure invaded personal rights of those desirous of patronizing night clubs and property rights of operators and employees in terms of investments and salaries. The judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action, but where there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation, the ordinance must be struck down.

• Statutory Authority — Republic Act No. 938: Republic Act No. 938, enacted on June 20, 1953, was entitled "An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishment, Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement." Its first section originally granted the power to "regulate." On May 21, 1954, Republic Act No. 979 amended the first section to include the power to "prohibit," but the title was not altered. The title continued to speak only of regulation. If only the body were considered, a municipal council might go as far as prohibiting night clubs. However, the unchanged title limited the power to regulation. Construing the statute as allowing prohibition would give rise to a constitutional question under the one-subject-one-title rule. Between two possible interpretations — one free from constitutional infirmity and one tainted — the former is to be preferred.

• Constitutionality — One-Subject-One-Title Rule: The Constitution mandates that "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Since the title of Republic Act No. 938 limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, construing the statute as authorizing prohibition would render it invalid. The well-settled principle of constitutional construction requires that between two interpretations, one of which saves the statute and one of which affixes a constitutional defect, the former is preferred. A construction that saves rather than one that seals the statute's doom commends itself.

• Effect of the Local Government Code: Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, reinforced the conclusion. Section 149(a) reiterated the general welfare clause. Sections 149(rr), (ss), and (tt) specifically empowered the sangguniang bayan to "regulate" cafes, restaurants, beer-houses, hotels, motels, public dancing schools, public dance halls, billiard pools, theatrical performances, and other forms of entertainment. The consistent use of "regulate" throughout these provisions indicated that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs but may only regulate them. Compelling petitioners to close their establishments would amount to a temporary termination of their business, causing deprivation to employees, and introducing an element of arbitrariness inconsistent with the due process clause's mandate of fairness and reasonableness.

• Reasonableness of Police Power Ordinances — An ordinance enacted under the general welfare clause is valid only if it is reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the municipal corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State. An ordinance that is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right is invalid. In this case, the absolute prohibition of night clubs was overbroad and unreasonable because the objective of improving public morals could have been achieved by reasonable restrictions rather than a total ban.

• Regulation vs. Prohibition of Lawful Businesses — Municipal corporations may regulate but may not absolutely prohibit a lawful business, occupation, or calling. The general welfare clause and enabling statutes confer regulatory power, not the power to interdict a calling entirely. A sweeping prohibition that goes beyond regulation constitutes a clear invasion of personal and property rights.

• One-Subject-One-Title Rule and Statutory Construction — Where the title of a statute limits the granted power to regulation but the body is amended to include prohibition, the statute must be construed as authorizing only regulation to avoid violating the constitutional requirement that every bill embrace only one subject expressed in its title. Between two interpretations, one free from constitutional infirmity and one tainted, the former is preferred.

• Overbreadth in Municipal Ordinances — An ordinance is void for overbreadth when its purpose could be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than absolute prohibition, and when it encompasses too wide a field, invading personal and property rights under the guise of police regulation.

• "It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on overbreadth: that a total prohibition of a lawful business is unreasonable when the legitimate objective could be achieved through narrower regulation.

• "It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed." — This defines the boundary of police power: when a regulation invades personal and property rights rather than reasonably regulating them, it exceeds the municipality's authority.

• "A construction that would save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself. We have done so before We do so again." — This states the canonical formulation of the constitutional construction principle that between two interpretations, one saving the statute from invalidity and one rendering it unconstitutional, the saving construction is preferred.

• "It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business." — This is the Court's direct and concise statement of the controlling doctrine distinguishing regulation from prohibition in the context of municipal police power.

• United States vs. Abendan, 24 Phil. 165 (1913) — Leading case establishing that ordinances enacted under the general welfare clause must be reasonable and not contravene fundamental law, legislative acts, public policy, or common right. Followed as the foundational test for validity of municipal ordinances.
• United States vs. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102 (1918) — Leading case articulating the two branches of the general welfare clause and the requirement that ordinances be reasonable, consonant with municipal powers, and consistent with state law and policy. Followed for the proposition that the judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action absent a clear invasion of personal or property rights.
• Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila, L-24693, 20 SCRA 849, July 31, 1967 — Distinguished. That case involved a regulatory measure governing the mode of motel operations, not a prohibition. The Court clarified that Ermita-Malate upheld regulation, not prohibition, and that the factual foundation of invalidity requirement does not apply when a statute is void on its face.

• Section 2238, Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines (1917) — The general welfare clause granting municipal councils power to enact ordinances necessary for health, safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience. Applied as the source of municipal police power, but construed as authorizing only reasonable regulation, not absolute prohibition.
• Republic Act No. 938, as amended by Republic Act No. 979 — Granted municipal or city boards and councils the power to regulate (and, as amended, prohibit) the establishment, maintenance, and operation of night clubs and similar places of amusement. Construed as authorizing only regulation because the title, unchanged by the amendment, speaks only of regulation, and construing it to allow prohibition would violate the one-subject-one-title rule.
• Article VIII, Section 19, par. 1, Constitution (1935 Constitution) — Mandates that "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Applied to hold that construing Republic Act No. 938 as allowing prohibition would render the statute constitutionally infirm, since its title speaks only of regulation.
• Section 149(a), (rr), (ss), (tt), Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (Local Government Code, 1983) — Reiterated the general welfare clause and specifically empowered the sangguniang bayan to "regulate" cafes, restaurants, beer-houses, public dance halls, billiard pools, and other forms of entertainment. Applied to reinforce the conclusion that municipal corporations may regulate but not prohibit night clubs.

Teehankee, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin, Relova, and Gutierrez Jr., JJ., concurred. Makasiar, J., reserved his right to file a dissent. De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, and Vasquez, JJ., were on leave.

• Justice Makasiar — Reserved his right to file a dissenting opinion. The text provided does not contain the substance of the dissent.