De la Cruz vs. Paras

An order dismissing a partition case as to a specific lot is final and appealable where it finally disposes of the controversy over that lot, even if another lot remains under litigation; and a prior dismissal for lack of interest to prosecute under Section 3, Rule 17 operates as a dismissal on the merits and bars relitigation of that lot under res judicata.

Pedro San Miguel, predecessor-in-interest of petitioners, and private respondent Pablo San Miguel were claimants to parcels of land in the Lolomboy Estate in Bulacan. Lot No. 4543 was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15369, while Lot No. 3269 was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15370. Pablo asserted exclusive ownership of Lot No. 4543, while Pedro claimed a share therein as co-owner. The governing framework includes the Revised Rules of Court on final judgments and appealable orders, dismissal for failure to prosecute, and res judicata.

Sometime in 1962, Pedro San Miguel, predecessor-in-interest of petitioners, commenced a complaint for partition of real estate before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan against private respondent Pablo San Miguel. Docketed as Civil Case No. 2624, the complaint sought partition of Lot No. 4543 of the Lolomboy Estate, a portion of original Lot No. 3237 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15369 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan. Pablo traversed the complaint, disclaimed co-ownership, and asserted exclusive ownership of Lot No. 4543. On March 19, 1964, then trial Judge Ricardo C. Puno ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2624 pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court for "apparent lack of interest in the prosecution of the respective claims of the litigants."

Eleven years after the first complaint, Pedro San Miguel instituted another complaint for partition, docketed as Civil Case No. 4300-M of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, against Pablo San Miguel. This complaint prayed for partition of Lot No. 4543, covered by TCT No. T-15369, and Lot No. 3269, covered by TCT No. T-15370. Pablo filed an answer pleading res judicata, asserting that the same subject matter and cause of action had already been litigated and resolved in Civil Case No. 2624.

After preliminary hearing, the respondent Judge issued an order on December 10, 1973, dismissing Civil Case No. 4300-M "insofar as Lot 4543 is concerned" in view of res judicata. The case was ordered to proceed as regards Lot No. 3269. Pedro San Miguel died on July 4, 1974, and was substituted in the case by petitioners, his successors-in-interest. On July 31, 1974, the respondent Judge rendered a decision ordering the parties "as CO-OWNERS to present to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, a PROJECT OF PARTITION, dividing Lot No. 3269 ... into two equal parts." Petitioners received a copy of this decision on August 13, 1974.

On September 12, 1974, petitioners interposed their appeal from the judgment of the trial court; on that date, their notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal were filed. On December 9, 1974, the respondent Judge approved petitioners' corrected record on appeal but "insofar only as Lot No. 3269 is concerned ... because the case with respect to Lot 4543 has long became (sic) FINAL, cannot be appealed anymore, and therefore any record on appeal thereon will be useless, moot and academic." After denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a Petition for certiorari and/or mandamus before the Court of Appeals on February 5, 1975. The Court of Appeals elevated the petition to the Supreme Court upon discovering that only questions of law were raised.

• Res Judicata: Respondent Pablo San Miguel pleaded in his answer that the same subject matter and cause of action had already been litigated and resolved in the prior Civil Case No. 2624.

• Final and Appealable Order: Whether the December 10, 1973 order dismissing Civil Case No. 4300-M insofar as Lot No. 4543 is final and appealable.
• Res Judicata: Whether the March 19, 1964 dismissal of Civil Case No. 2624 for lack of interest to prosecute barred the later partition complaint as to Lot No. 4543 under res judicata.
• Abuse of Discretion: Whether the respondent Judge abused his discretion in approving petitioners' corrected record on appeal only insofar as Lot No. 3269 is concerned.

• Final and Appealable Order: Yes. The order is final and appealable because it finally disposes of the whole controversy between the parties with respect to the ownership of Lot No. 4543, leaving nothing more for the trial court to try or decide on that lot.
• Res Judicata: Yes. The prior dismissal for lack of interest to prosecute had the effect of a dismissal on the merits under Section 3, Rule 17, and barred relitigation of Lot No. 4543 under res judicata and estoppel by judgment.
• Abuse of Discretion: No. The respondent Judge did not abuse his discretion in approving the corrected record on appeal only as to Lot No. 3269, since the case as to Lot No. 4543 had become final and could no longer be appealed.

• Final and Appealable Order: Section 2, Rule 41 provides that only final judgments or orders are subject to appeal. The test is whether the order leaves something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits; if it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. A final order disposes of the cause as to all parties or a definite and separate branch thereof, reserving no further questions for future determination. The central point is the effect of the order on the rights of the parties. The December 10, 1973 order dismissed Civil Case No. 4300-M as to Lot No. 4543, finally disposing of the whole controversy between the parties over that lot and confirming Pablo San Miguel's exclusive ownership as previously adjudicated in Civil Case No. 2624. After the order, nothing more was left for the trial court to try or decide as to Lot No. 4543. The fact that Lot No. 3269 remained under litigation did not affect the final nature of the order, because a decree is final although some independent branch of the case is reserved for future consideration.
• Res Judicata: The March 19, 1964 order dismissing Civil Case No. 2624 for lack of interest to prosecute had the effect and consequences of a dismissal on the merits under Section 3, Rule 17, because it was neither without prejudice nor based on lack of jurisdiction. Pedro San Miguel did not appeal from that dismissal. When he later filed Civil Case No. 4300-M seeking partition of Lot No. 4543 and Lot No. 3269, the second case was barred by the prior judgment insofar as it related to Lot No. 4543. There was identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action between the first case and the second case as far as Lot No. 4543 was concerned, and the first judgment was final and rendered by a competent court upon the merits. The principle of estoppel by judgment, an aspect of res judicata, precluded relitigation of the specific question actually litigated and determined in the former action. Although access to courts is a constitutional guarantee, it is subject to limitation; once rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment, the party cannot litigate the same again. Public policy and sound practice demand that judgments become final at a definite date fixed by law.
• Abuse of Discretion: The respondent Judge did not abuse his discretion in issuing the December 9, 1974 order approving the corrected record on appeal only insofar as Lot No. 3269. The case with respect to Lot No. 4543 had long become final and could no longer be appealed, so any record on appeal concerning that lot would have been useless, moot, and academic.

• Final vs. Interlocutory Orders — An order is final if it disposes of the cause as to all parties or a definite and separate branch thereof, reserving no further questions for future determination; it is interlocutory if it is provisional and leaves substantial proceedings to be had. The test is whether something remains to be done in the trial court on the merits. The Court applied this to hold that the December 10, 1973 order dismissing the case as to Lot No. 4543 was final and appealable even though Lot No. 3269 remained pending.
• Res Judicata and Estoppel by Judgment — A final judgment on the merits by a competent court bars a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies involving the same subject matter and cause of action. Estoppel by judgment, an aspect of res judicata, precludes relitigation of a specific question actually litigated and determined in a former action. The Court applied this to bar the second partition complaint as to Lot No. 4543.
• Dismissal for Lack of Interest to Prosecute — Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court, a dismissal for failure to prosecute has the effect of a dismissal on the merits unless it is without prejudice or based on lack of jurisdiction. The Court applied this to the March 19, 1964 dismissal of Civil Case No. 2624, making it a bar to later litigation.
• Finality of Judgments / Reipublicae ut sit finis litium — Public policy and sound practice require that judgments of courts become final at a definite date fixed by law. The constitutional guarantee of access to courts is subject to the limitation that once rights are adjudicated in a valid final judgment, the same cannot be litigated again. The Court invoked this principle to uphold the finality of the dismissal as to Lot No. 4543.

• "Only final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal." — Quoted from Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, this passage states the controlling rule on appealability that the Court applied to the December 10, 1973 order.
• "The central point to consider is, threfore, the effects of the order on the rights of the parties." — The passage identifies the controlling consideration in distinguishing a final order from an interlocutory one.
• "The fact that the other lot, Lot No. 3269, remained under litigation and the respective claims of the parties thereto yet to be settled by the trial court would not affect the final nature of the subject order, because a decree, is nonetheless final although some independent branch of the case is reserved for future consideration ." — This passage explains why the pendency of the other lot did not make the dismissal as to Lot No. 4543 interlocutory.
• "Once the rights of a party-litigant have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, the party-litigant can no longer litigate the same again." — This passage states the limitation on the constitutional guarantee of access to courts and supports the res judicata ruling.

• Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa MRR Co. vs. Yard Crew Union, et al., 109 Phil. 1150-51 (1960) — Cited for the test whether an order leaves something to be done in the trial court on the merits, making it interlocutory.
• Bairan vs. Tan Siu Lay, L-19460, December 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 1239 — Cited for the definition of a final order and the nature of interlocutory orders.
• Antonio vs. Samonte, L-15410, April 26, 1961, 1 SCRA 1074 — Quoted for the definition of a final judgment or order as one that disposes of the cause or a definite and separate branch thereof.
• Province of Bohol vs. NWSA, L-30856, February 27, 1970, 31 SCRA 841-42 — Quoted for the definition of "interlocutory" as deciding some point but not the whole controversy.
• Africa vs. Africa, 42 Phil. 940-42 (1921) — Cited for the rule that an order in a partition case where a lot is exclusively claimed is appealable as a final settlement of the question raised.
• Rasay-Lahoz vs. Lecnor, L-27388, March 23, 1971, 38 SCRA 49-50 — Cited for the rule that a dismissal for lack of interest to prosecute has the effect of a dismissal on the merits.
• Comilang vs. Court of Appeals, L-37312, July 15, 1975, 65 SCRA 78 — Cited for the limitation on access to courts once rights are adjudicated in a final judgment.
• Yusingco vs. Ong King Lian, L-26523, December 24, 1971, 42 SCRA 589 — Cited for the rule that a fact or question directly determined in a prior suit is conclusively established between the same parties or privies.
• King vs. Joe, L-23617, August 23, 1967, 20 SCRA 1120 — Cited for the public policy that judgments should become final at a definite date fixed by law.

• Section 2, Rule 41, Revised Rules of Court — Only final judgments or orders are subject to appeal. The Court applied this to hold that the December 10, 1973 order dismissing the case as to Lot No. 4543 was final and appealable.
• Section 3, Rule 17, Revised Rules of Court — A dismissal for failure to prosecute has the effect of a dismissal on the merits unless it is without prejudice or based on lack of jurisdiction. The Court applied this to the March 19, 1964 dismissal of Civil Case No. 2624.
• Section 49 (b) and (c), Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court — A final judgment or order is conclusive between the parties and their privies as to the matter directly adjudged and as to other matters that might have been litigated. The Court applied this to bar relitigation of Lot No. 4543.
• Section (b), Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court — Cited in relation to estoppel by judgment, an aspect of res judicata precluding relitigation of a specific question actually litigated and determined. The Court applied this to the prior dismissal.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz, and Palma, JJ., concurred.