De la Costa vs. Cleofas

When, after a judgment has become final, facts and circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible or unjust, the interested party may ask the court to modify or alter the judgment to harmonize it with justice and the supervening facts, and the court must afford the party an opportunity to substantiate his allegations before issuing execution. Furthermore, the liquidation of accounts necessary to determine the correct balance under a judgment is a judicial act incumbent upon the court and cannot be delegated to the sheriff.

Marciano Sto. Domingo and Bonifacio Cleofas were parties to Civil Case No. 6123 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, involving a subdivision known as "Talipapa Subdivision" covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13063 of Rizal Province. The dispute centered on the respective rights and obligations arising from the sale of subdivision lots, including Sto. Domingo's preferential lien over the land as security for Cleofas's payment obligation. The case was submitted to the trial court on a compromise stipulation approved as the judgment, which governed the parties' ongoing financial relationship including monthly collections from lot buyers, surveyor's fees, and the P1,200 payment schedule.

In Civil Case No. 6123 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Bonifacio Cleofas sued Marciano Sto. Domingo and others over the Talipapa Subdivision property. The parties submitted a stipulation for the court's approval, under which Cleofas would remain owner of the parcel of land and all office equipment, furniture, supplies, plans, and contracts related to the subdivision. Sto. Domingo would be relieved of obligations arising from the sale of 83 lots, with Cleofas assuming the obligation to issue titles to repurchasers. Cleofas was to pay Sto. Domingo P1,200 within one year from approval of the stipulation, with one-half of monthly collections from buyers to be applied on account, subject to a proviso that if Sto. Domingo had collected more than P1,082.50 from the sale of the 83 lots, the excess would be deducted from the P1,200. Sto. Domingo was to assume the obligation of paying the unpaid balance of the surveyor's fees and Bureau of Lands fees, payable out of the first amounts collected from buyers. Sto. Domingo was granted a preferential lien over the land as guarantee for the P1,200 payment, remaining subsisting until full payment. The court approved the stipulation in its entirety as its judgment, without costs.

After the judgment became final, Sto. Domingo filed a motion on July 31, 1936 for execution, alleging that Cleofas had paid only P100 on account of the P1,200. Cleofas opposed, claiming he had paid approximately P200. On April 12, 1937, Sto. Domingo filed another motion reiterating his prayer for execution, this time alleging the correct balance was P995. Cleofas again objected, stating that subsequent to the judgment, the parties had entered into an agreement dated November 14, 1936, under which Sto. Domingo received P80 and waived his July 31 motion, with the balance to be paid monthly from December 1936 through delivery of one-half of Cleofas's income from subdivision lot sales, and that failure to comply for three successive months would entitle Sto. Domingo to execution for the total balance. Cleofas alleged he had complied, having collected about P200 in December 1936 through March 1937, of which P25 was paid to Attorney Felix D. Agcaoili and P80 to surveyor Antonio Gamboa for the unpaid balance of surveyor's fees under paragraph 4 of the stipulation. Cleofas further alleged that Sto. Domingo had collected more than P1,082.50 from lot sales, so the excess should be deducted from the judgment amount.

On May 29, 1937, the court resolved the motion and opposition by ordering Cleofas to pay Sto. Domingo P995 plus incidental expenses of execution, without hearing Cleofas's evidence on the subsequent agreement or the alleged deductions. The court denied Cleofas's attempt to appeal and held that it was within the sheriff's power to resolve all incidents preventing or obstructing the complete execution of the final judgment. Cleofas sued out a writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals and obtained an injunction to restrain the sheriff, but the writ arrived too late and the sheriff had already sold the property at public auction to Sto. Domingo. The Court of Appeals declared the order of May 29, 1937 null and void, as well as the sheriff's sale.

• Validity of Judgment Execution: Petitioners argued that there was no room to doubt the validity of the judgment whose execution was ordered, and that the parties in Civil Case No. 6123 had an adequate opportunity to present evidence.
• Liquidation of Accounts: Petitioners contended that the liquidation of accounts was properly made, or at least that the sheriff was competent to resolve incidents obstructing execution.
• Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners maintained that no grave error or abuse of discretion was committed by Judge de la Costa in issuing the order of May 29, 1937.
• Propriety of Certiorari: Petitioners argued that the petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals was improper because Cleofas could have appealed from the order of May 29, 1937.

• Supervening Agreement: Respondent Cleofas argued that a subsequent agreement dated November 14, 1936 showed he was no longer indebted in the amount of P995 but in a much lesser amount, and that he had complied with its terms by turning over portions of his collections to Sto. Domingo's counsel and to the surveyor as required by the original stipulation.
• Excess Collections: Respondent contended that Sto. Domingo had collected more than P1,082.50 from the sale of the 83 lots, and that the excess should be deducted from the judgment amount pursuant to the proviso in paragraph 3 of the stipulation.
• Improper Delegation to Sheriff: Respondent maintained that the liquidation of accounts was a judicial function that the court could not delegate to the sheriff, and that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering execution without first effecting such liquidation.

• Execution Despite Supervening Facts: Whether the Court of First Instance of Rizal could legally order execution of the final judgment, or whether it should have given Cleofas an opportunity to substantiate his allegation that he owed a lesser amount than the P995 claimed by Sto. Domingo.
• Delegation of Liquidation to Sheriff: Whether the trial court could delegate the liquidation of accounts to the sheriff rather than performing that judicial act itself.
• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether certiorari was the proper remedy, given that Cleofas could have appealed from the order of May 29, 1937.

• Execution Despite Supervening Facts: No. The trial court should have allowed Cleofas to substantiate his allegation of a lesser balance before issuing execution, because when supervening facts render execution of a final judgment unjust, the court must modify or alter the judgment to harmonize it with justice and the changed circumstances.
• Delegation of Liquidation to Sheriff: No. The liquidation of accounts was a judicial act incumbent upon the court which it could not legally delegate to the sheriff.
• Propriety of Certiorari: Yes. Certiorari was proper because an appeal from the order of May 29, 1937 would not have proved an adequate and speedy remedy, the trial court having grossly exceeded its discretion.

• Execution Despite Supervening Facts: A prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution of a final judgment within five years from its entry under section 443 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, it is well-settled that when, after a judgment has become final, facts and circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible or unjust, the interested party may ask the court to modify or alter the judgment to harmonize it with justice and the supervening facts. In this case, Cleofas alleged that a subsequent agreement showed he owed less than P995, and Sto. Domingo neither contradicted the allegation nor denied the agreement. Under these circumstances, the court was duty-bound to allow Cleofas to substantiate his allegation and thereafter to issue execution only for the correct balance. The trial court's failure to do so rendered the execution order improper.
• Delegation of Liquidation to Sheriff: The Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering execution without first effecting a liquidation and in taking the view that the sheriff should make the liquidation. Liquidation of accounts to determine the correct balance owing under a judgment is a judicial act incumbent upon the court. The court could not legally delegate this function to the sheriff, whose role is ministerial, not adjudicative.
• Propriety of Certiorari: Petitioners contended that certiorari was improper because Cleofas could have appealed from the order of May 29, 1937. The Court of Appeals held that certiorari was proper because the trial court grossly exceeded its discretion. This conclusion was affirmed, because if Cleofas had elected to appeal, that remedy would not have proved adequate and speedy, as required by section 217 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The gravity of the abuse of discretion and the imminence of execution justified certiorari as the appropriate remedy.

• Supervening Facts Doctrine — When, after a judgment has been rendered and has become final, facts and circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible or unjust, the interested party may ask the court to modify or alter the judgment to harmonize it with justice and the supervening facts. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that Cleofas's allegation of a subsequent agreement reducing his indebtedness, which Sto. Domingo did not deny, required the trial court to hear evidence before issuing execution.
• Judicial Nature of Liquidation of Accounts — The liquidation of accounts necessary to determine the correct balance under a judgment is a judicial act incumbent upon the court and cannot be delegated to the sheriff. The Court held that the trial court's delegation of this function to the sheriff constituted grave abuse of discretion.
• Adequacy of Appeal as Bar to Certiorari — Certiorari lies when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. Where the trial court has grossly exceeded its discretion, appeal would not be an adequate and speedy remedy, and certiorari is proper.

• "when after judgment has been rendered and the latter has became final, facts and circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible or unjust, the interested party may ask the court to modify or alter the judgment to harmonize the same with justice and the facts" — This passage states the ratio decidendi on supervening facts justifying modification of a final judgment before execution.
• "The liquidation to be made was a judicial act incumbent upon the court which it could not legally delegate to the sheriff." — This defines the doctrine that liquidation of accounts is a non-delegable judicial function, central to the Court's affirmance of the Court of Appeals.
• "if the respondent Cleofas had elected to appeal, this would not have proved an adequate and speedy remedy" — This passage establishes the basis for sustaining the propriety of certiorari where appeal is not an adequate remedy against a trial court's grave abuse of discretion.

• Molina vs. De la Riva, 8 Phil. 569 — Cited as authority for the supervening facts doctrine, supporting the proposition that a court may modify a final judgment when subsequent facts render its execution unjust.
• Behn, Meyer & Co. vs. McMicking, 11 Phil. 276 — Cited as further authority for the supervening facts doctrine.
• Warner Barnes & Co. vs. Jaucian, 13 Phil. 4 — Cited as further authority for the supervening facts doctrine.
• Espiritu vs. Crossfield and Guash, 14 Phil. 588 — Cited as further authority for the supervening facts doctrine.
• Flor Mata vs. Lichauco and Salinas, 36 Phil. 809 — Cited as further authority for the supervening facts doctrine.
• De Castro and Morales vs. Justice of the Peace of Bocaue, 33 Phil. 595 — Cited as authority for the proposition that certiorari is proper when appeal is not an adequate and speedy remedy.
• Valdez vs. Querubin, 37 Phil. 774 — Cited as further authority for the adequacy-of-remedy requirement in certiorari.

• Section 443, Code of Civil Procedure — Provides that a prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution of a final judgment within five years from its entry. The Court acknowledged this right but held it subject to the supervening facts doctrine.
• Section 217, Code of Civil Procedure — Governs the availability of certiorari when there is no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. The Court applied this provision to sustain the propriety of certiorari in the Court of Appeals.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concurred.