De Joya vs. Marquez

A judge properly issues a warrant of arrest when the records and supporting evidence submitted by the prosecutor establish a prima facie case against the accused, and a petitioner who refuses to surrender and submit to the court's jurisdiction cannot seek relief from the courts.

Petitioner Chester De Joya was an incorporator and director of State Resources Development Management Corporation, the entity at the center of a syndicated estafa charge under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to P.D. No. 1689. Private complainant Manuel Dy Awiten had invested over a hundred million pesos in the corporation, and the checks issued to him representing returns on his investment were dishonored for insufficient funds or closed account. The National Bureau of Investigation investigated the complaint, and State Prosecutor Benny Nicdao conducted the preliminary investigation, finding probable cause to indict petitioner and his co-accused.

Private complainant Manuel Dy Awiten was induced by Mina Tan Hao, also known as Ma. Gracia Tan Hao, to invest more than a hundred million pesos in State Resources Development Management Corporation. Dy issued several checks amounting to ₱114,286,086.14 in favor of the corporation. In turn, the corporation issued several checks to Dy purportedly representing the return of his investments. These checks were later dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds or because the account had been closed.

The National Bureau of Investigation conducted an investigation into the complaint filed by Dy against Hao and Victor Ngo for syndicated estafa, and submitted its report to Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño. Dy thereafter filed a supplemental affidavit to include the incorporators and members of the board of directors of State Resources Development Management Corporation as participants in the conspiracy to commit syndicated estafa. Among those included was petitioner Chester De Joya, who was named in the Articles of Incorporation as an incorporator and director of the corporation.

State Prosecutor Benny Nicdao conducted the preliminary investigation and issued a resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner and his co-accused for violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to P.D. No. 1689. Petitioner and the other accused submitted counter-affidavits denying the charges. The records of the case, including the NBI report, the affidavit-complaint, copies of the checks, the demand letter, the supplemental affidavit, the counter-affidavits, the prosecutor's resolution, and the Articles of Incorporation, were forwarded to respondent Judge Placido C. Marquez of Branch 40, Manila-RTC.

Respondent judge personally evaluated the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence and issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner and his co-accused in Criminal Case No. 03-219952. Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, assailing the finding of probable cause. Notably, petitioner continuously refused to surrender and submit to the trial court's jurisdiction throughout the proceedings.

• Erroneous Finding of Probable Cause: Petitioner asserted that respondent judge erred in finding the existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused.

• Probable Cause: Whether respondent judge erred in finding the existence of probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant of arrest against petitioner.
• Jurisdiction over the Person: Whether petitioner may seek relief from the courts while continuously refusing to surrender and submit to the trial court's jurisdiction.

• Probable Cause: No. The documents in the records sufficiently established probable cause under Section 6, Rule 112, as they showed a prima facie case that the accused, as incorporators and directors, had knowledge of the corporation's activities and transactions entailing large investments and dishonored checks.
• Jurisdiction over the Person: No. Petitioner is not entitled to seek relief from the courts while refusing to surrender, as one who invokes the court's jurisdiction must first submit to it.

• Probable Cause: Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest pertains to facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. The standard is less stringent than that required for establishing guilt; a prima facie case suffices. The records examined by respondent judge contained the NBI report, the affidavit-complaint, the dishonored checks, the demand letter, the supplemental affidavit implicating petitioner as incorporator and director, the prosecutor's resolution thoroughly explaining the bases for finding probable cause, and the Articles of Incorporation naming petitioner as incorporator and director. These documents tended to show that private complainant was enticed to invest over a hundred million pesos, that the corporation issued dishonored checks representing returns, and that petitioner, as incorporator and director, had knowledge of the corporation's activities. Judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine probable cause; they personally review the prosecutor's initial determination to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. The general rule is that the Court does not review factual findings of the trial court, including the determination of probable cause, except in exceptional cases to prevent misuse of the strong arm of the law — a situation not present here.

• Jurisdiction over the Person: Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent is acquired by voluntary appearance or submission to the court, or by coercive process such as service of summons. Petitioner continuously refused to surrender and submit to the court's jurisdiction. There was no exceptional reason to allow petitioner to obtain relief without submitting to the court's jurisdiction. His continued refusal showed an intent to circumvent and frustrate the object of legal process, the purpose of which is to place the accused under the custody of the law for trial. The principle that one who invokes the court's jurisdiction must first submit to it barred petitioner's recourse.

• Probable Cause for Issuance of Warrant of Arrest — Probable cause pertains to facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. The standard is less stringent than that for establishing guilt; as long as the evidence presents a prima facie case, the judge has sufficient ground to issue a warrant. Judges do not conduct a de novo hearing; they personally review the prosecutor's initial determination to verify it is supported by substantial evidence. The Court applied this doctrine by examining the records of Criminal Case No. 03-219952 and finding that the documents — including the NBI report, affidavit-complaint, dishonored checks, demand letter, prosecutor's resolution, and Articles of Incorporation — sufficiently established probable cause.

• Submission to Jurisdiction as Prerequisite to Relief — A party who invokes the court's jurisdiction must first submit to it. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired by voluntary appearance or submission, or by coercive process. The Court applied this principle by holding that petitioner's continuous refusal to surrender barred him from seeking relief, as his evasive stance showed intent to circumvent the object of legal process.

• Non-Review of Factual Findings of Trial Court — The general rule is that the Supreme Court does not review the factual findings of the trial court, including the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The exception applies only when necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of justice. The Court found no exceptional circumstance warranting departure from the general rule.

• "in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance." — This passage defines the standard for determining probable cause, emphasizing common sense over technical evidentiary rules, and is drawn from the Court's citation of Webb vs. De Leon.

• "before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of an accused. Hence, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence." — This articulates the scope and limits of a judge's duty in determining probable cause for a warrant of arrest, distinguishing it from a trial on the merits.

• "he who invokes the court's jurisdiction must first submit to its jurisdiction." — This is the controlling principle barring petitioner's recourse, establishing that submission to jurisdiction is a prerequisite to seeking judicial relief.

• Webb vs. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652 (1995) — Cited as the source of the formulation that probable cause is determined through the calculus of common sense rather than technical rules of evidence, and that judges personally review the prosecutor's determination without conducting a de novo hearing. The case was followed.

• Section 6, Rule 112, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Governs the issuance of a warrant of arrest by the Regional Trial Court. It requires the judge to personally evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and supporting evidence within ten days from the filing of the complaint or information, and to issue a warrant of arrest if probable cause is found. The provision was applied to confirm that respondent judge properly evaluated the records and found sufficient basis for the warrant.

• Article 315, par. 2(a), Revised Penal Code, in relation to P.D. No. 1689 — Defines and penalizes syndicated estafa. These provisions set the substantive offense for which petitioner was charged and for which probable cause was determined.

Puno (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.