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De Joya vs. Jail Warden of Batangas City

The petition for habeas corpus was dismissed, the Court finding that detention under a final judgment of conviction for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is lawful. Petitioner, who had jumped bail and allowed her conviction to become final, argued that SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 deleted the penalty of imprisonment and should apply retroactively to secure her release. The petition was denied on three grounds: habeas corpus is unavailing when detention is by virtue of a valid judgment from a court with jurisdiction; the Circular is not a penal law and thus cannot be applied retroactively under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code; and the Circular merely provides a rule of preference for imposing fines and does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty.

Primary Holding

A writ of habeas corpus will not issue to discharge a person imprisoned under a final judgment of conviction for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, as SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 does not abolish imprisonment but merely provides a rule of preference for imposing fines based on the circumstances of the offense and the offender.

Background

Norma de Joya was charged with two counts of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for issuing postdated checks that were dishonored for "account closed." She pleaded not guilty but jumped bail during trial, resulting in her conviction in absentia in both cases in 1995 and 1997, with the trial court sentencing her to one year of imprisonment for each count. No appeal was filed from either decision. After remaining at large for five years, she was arrested in December 2002 while applying for an NBI clearance. Subsequently, she sought the retroactive application of SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 to secure her release, which the trial court denied.

History

  1. Charged with two counts of violation of B.P. 22 before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Batangas City.

  2. Convicted *in absentia* in Criminal Case No. 25484 (December 14, 1995) and Criminal Case No. 25773 (March 21, 1997); no appeal was filed, rendering the judgments final and executory.

  3. Arrested on December 3, 2002, while applying for an NBI clearance and detained at the Batangas City Jail.

  4. Filed an urgent motion with the MTCC on July 28, 2003, seeking retroactive application of SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 and release from detention.

  5. MTCC denied the motion on August 15, 2003.

  6. Filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Supreme Court.

Facts

  • The B.P. 22 Charges: Petitioner issued two postdated checks in 1994—Solid Bank Check No. 040297 for ₱150,000.00 and Security Bank and Trust Company Check No. 038111 for ₱225,000.00. Both checks were presented within 90 days of their dates and dishonored by the drawee banks on the ground of "account closed." Separate Informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 were filed against her.
  • Trial and Conviction: Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges. However, she jumped bail while trial was ongoing, and no evidence was adduced in her defense. The trial court convicted her in absentia in Criminal Case No. 25484 on December 14, 1995, and in Criminal Case No. 25773 on March 21, 1997, sentencing her to one year of imprisonment for each case and ordering her to indemnify the complainants.
  • Flight and Arrest: Petitioner remained at large for five years following her conviction. No appeal was interposed from either judgment. She was finally arrested on December 3, 2002, while applying for an NBI clearance, and was forthwith detained.
  • Motion for Release: On July 28, 2003, petitioner filed an urgent motion with the MTCC seeking the retroactive application of SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, which enjoined a rule of preference for imposing fines over imprisonment in B.P. 22 cases. The trial court denied the motion on August 15, 2003, ruling that the judgments had long become final and executory, the Circular should be applied prospectively, and the Circular did not amend B.P. 22.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Retroactivity of Penal Laws: Petitioner argued that SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 should be applied retroactively pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, citing United States v. Pacrose.
  • Deletion of Imprisonment: Petitioner maintained that the Circular deleted the penalty of imprisonment for violations of B.P. 22, allowing only the imposition of a fine, thereby rendering her continued detention illegal.

Arguments of the Respondents

  • Finality of Judgments: Respondent countered that the two judgments of conviction had long attained finality and could no longer be modified.
  • Imprisonment Not Deleted: Respondent argued that SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as modified by Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, did not delete the penalty of imprisonment for B.P. 22 cases, citing Abarquez v. Court of Appeals.

Issues

  • Habeas Corpus: Whether a writ of habeas corpus lies to secure the release of a person detained under a final judgment of conviction for B.P. 22.
  • Retroactivity of Circular: Whether SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 can be applied retroactively to final judgments of conviction.
  • Nature of the Penalty: Whether SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 deleted the penalty of imprisonment for violations of B.P. 22.

Ruling

  • Habeas Corpus: The writ does not lie, as detention pursuant to a final judgment by a court with jurisdiction is lawful under Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner's detention was by virtue of a valid final judgment convicting her of B.P. 22 violations.
  • Retroactivity of Circular: SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 cannot be applied retroactively to final judgments. The Circular is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which governs the retroactive application of penal laws favorable to the accused, is inapplicable. Reliance on Ordonez v. Vinarao was misplaced, as that case involved a reduction of penalty introduced by a new law, whereas the Circular does not amend B.P. 22.
  • Nature of the Penalty: Imprisonment was not deleted. The Circular merely lays down a rule of preference, directing courts to consider the circumstances of the offense and the offender—such as good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence—before imposing imprisonment. Even if applied retroactively, the petition would fail because petitioner jumped bail, adduced no evidence of good faith during trial, and evaded arrest for five years.

Doctrines

  • Writ of Habeas Corpus; When Not Allowed — The writ shall not be allowed if the person restrained of liberty is in custody under process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, provided the court had jurisdiction to issue the process or render the judgment. Informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order does not warrant discharge.
  • Rule of Preference in B.P. 22 Penalties — SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered the more appropriate penalty. It does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, nor does it defeat the legislative intent behind B.P. 22. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay, subsidiary imprisonment under the Revised Penal Code may still apply.

Key Excerpts

  • "The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22."
  • "The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law."

Precedents Cited

  • Lozano v. Judge Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986) — Cited for the proposition that B.P. 22 punishes the act not as an offense against property but as an offense against public order, given the deleterious effects of worthless checks on trade, commerce, and the banking system.
  • Abarquez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148557 — Cited by the Office of the Solicitor General and relied upon to support the view that Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 did not delete the penalty of imprisonment.
  • Ordonez v. Vinarao, 239 SCRA 114 (1994) — Distinguished; reliance on this case was misplaced because it involved the retroactive application of a new law reducing a penalty, whereas Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law.
  • People v. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109 (1933) — Cited for the positivist theory of criminal law adopted in the Philippines, emphasizing that penalties must consider the convict's relationship to family, society, and the State for reformation and social usefulness.

Provisions

  • Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court — Bars the issuance of habeas corpus when the person is in custody by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record with jurisdiction. Applied to deny the petition, as petitioner was detained under a final judgment.
  • Article 22, Revised Penal Code — Provides retroactive application of penal laws favorable to the accused. Held inapplicable because SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law.
  • Section 1, Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 — Prescribes alternative penalties of imprisonment, fine, or both for issuing checks without sufficient funds. The Court noted that the Administrative Circular does not amend this provision but merely guides the exercise of judicial discretion in applying it.
  • SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 — Enjoined courts to take notice of the rule of preference in imposing penalties for B.P. 22, favoring fines over imprisonment under circumstances indicating good faith. Held not to delete imprisonment.
  • SC Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 — Clarified that Circular No. 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as a penalty, that the determination rests upon the judge's sound discretion, and that subsidiary imprisonment applies if a fine alone is imposed but the accused is unable to pay.

Notable Concurring Opinions

Puno, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga.