De Chavez vs. Office of the Ombudsman

A finding of probable cause in a preliminary investigation is not a pronouncement of guilt; the Ombudsman's use of "liable for" refers only to probable cause, and the administrative aspect of an Ombudsman resolution must be appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.

Petitioners were officials of Batangas State University, while private respondent Nora L. Magnaye was a Professor IV at the same institution. The legal backdrop includes the Ombudsman's constitutional and statutory mandate under Article XI, Section 13(1) of the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 to investigate and prosecute public officials for acts appearing illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The complaints implicated Republic Act No. 3019, Republic Act No. 6713, the Revised Penal Code, Presidential Decree No. 1445, Republic Act No. 8292, and civil service disciplinary rules. The case also concerns the procedural distinction between the Ombudsman's preliminary investigation of criminal charges and its adjudication of administrative liability.

Nora L. Magnaye, a Professor IV at Batangas State University (BSU), filed with the Office of the Ombudsman on 7 November 2001 an administrative complaint against petitioners Ernesto M. de Chavez, BSU President; Porfirio C. Ligaya, BSU Vice-President for Extension Campus Operations; Rolando L. Lontok, Sr., BSU Vice-President for Academic Affairs; Rolando M. Lontok, Jr., BSU Associate Dean of the College of Computer Science and Information Technology; Gloria G. Mendoza, BSU Dean of the College of Liberal Arts; and other BSU officials Virginia Baes, Amador M. Lualhati, Victoria A. Zaraspe, and Jessie A. Montalbo. The complaint, docketed as OMB-1-01-1036-K, charged Grave Misconduct, Oppression, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interests of the Service, Falsification of Official Documents, Dishonesty, Gross Neglect of Duty, and Violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713. The generative facts alleged that (a) de Chavez, Lontok, Sr., and Mendoza caused the collection and received graduation fees from the SY 2000-2001 graduating class without official receipts and without remitting the same to BSU; (b) de Chavez and Lontok, Sr. did not conduct public bidding for the rental of caps and gowns and gave the contract to relatives; (c) de Chavez and Lontok, Sr. required and received P200.00 from each graduating student for comprehensive examination without BSU Board of Regents authorization; (d) Lontok, Jr. and Montalbo collected internet fees without official receipts despite the absence of internet facilities at BSU Lipa City Campus; (e) Ligaya collected P200.00 each as Related Learning Experience Fee (RLEF) without official receipts; (f) de Chavez and Baes conspired in designating close relatives of de Chavez to key administrative positions; (g) de Chavez made faculty appointments and transmitted them to the Civil Service Commission without BSU Board of Regents approval; (h) de Chavez prevented the elected President of the Federation of Supreme Student Assembly from sitting as a Board of Regents member; (i) de Chavez issued a Memorandum increasing fees for records and other documents without Board approval; (j) de Chavez, Baes, and Zaraspe designated and appointed faculty members to key positions without authority; (k) de Chavez and Lontok, Sr. failed to respond to a letter of PTA-BSU Lipa Campus officials in violation of Republic Act No. 6713; (l) de Chavez collected notarial fees from contractual employees without official receipts; and (m) de Chavez and Lontok, Sr. did not renew the contracts of two faculty members.

On 13 November 2001, based on the same imputed acts plus an additional allegation, Magnaye filed another complaint with the Ombudsman, this time imputing criminal liability to the BSU officials for Violation of Section 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, Violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713, Falsification of Official Documents, and Estafa. The criminal complaint was docketed as OMB-1-01-1083-K. The additional allegation involved an alleged violation of Section 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against de Chavez, Baes, Lualhati, and Ligaya for conspiring in designating Ligaya as Campus Administrator for Lipa despite the competent performance of Magnaye, and for narrowing Magnaye's assignment to the Deanship of Liberal Arts and transferring her to the Balayan and then Calaca campuses.

Petitioners denied the allegations in a Joint Counter-Affidavit dated 30 January 2002. They countered that the BSU management did not collect graduation fees for the SY 2000-2001 commencement exercises; the graduating class, with guidance of advisers, fixed, collected, and disbursed the contributions; no public bidding was conducted because BSU did not enter into any contract with a supplier and the graduating students had complete freedom to hire caps and gowns; the receipts signed by Lontok, Sr. merely acknowledged amounts from Magnaye intended for Mr. Fralundio Sulit, from whom the graduating class rented caps and gowns; internet fees were receipted through Accountable Form No. 51 and no internet fees were collected at BSU Lipa City Campus; the RLEF was collected by the Cashier's Office of the College, while the prior collection by Ligaya's office was the Dual Training Fee for non-degree courses, which was turned over to the Cashier's Office effective the second week of December 2001; de Chavez relied on a Resolution of the Office of the President declaring that the designation of his relatives to certain BSU positions was not violative of the rule against nepotism, and the designations were confirmed by the Board of Regents; the Board recognized the practice of submitting appointments to the Civil Service Commission for attestation before confirmation by the Board; no one had been elected President of the Federation of Student Assembly; the increase in miscellaneous fees was approved by the Board of Trustees of PBMIT through Board Resolution No. 6, series of 1997; failure to respond to some letters was due to preoccupation with other pressing matters; BSU neither collected nor shared in notarial fees charged by the notary public; and management could opt not to renew the contracts of some faculty members who did not enjoy security of tenure.

In her Reply dated 8 March 2002, Magnaye attached a photocopy of an Audit Report dated 7 February 2001 of State Auditor IV Milagros D. Masangkay, Office of the Auditor, Pablo Borbon Memorial Institute of Technology. The Audit Report found that graduation fees were not issued official receipts and were not taken up in the books of the College despite prior years' audit recommendations, in violation of Sections 63 and 68 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 and Section 4(d) of Republic Act No. 8292, resulting in an aggregate understatement of Cash and Trust Liability accounts by about ₱3,342,550.00. It recommended that the accountable officer issue official receipts (Accountable Form 51) for graduation fees collected and deposit the collections in an authorized government depository bank, and that the Accountant record all collections and disbursements in the books of accounts. Magnaye also accused petitioners of grave oppression and harassment for giving her two unsatisfactory performance ratings for the periods June to 15 July 2001 and 16 July 2001 to 20 October 2001, which she claimed were retaliation and a basis for dropping her from the rolls of BSU. Petitioners refuted these imputations.

After a clarificatory hearing and the submission of position papers, the Ombudsman, through Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II Joy N. Casihan-Dumlao with Director Joaquin F. Salazar and Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Victor C. Fernandez concurring, issued a Joint Resolution dated 14 February 2005 in OMB-1-01-1036-K and OMB-1-01-1083-K. It recommended the indictment of de Chavez, Lontok, Sr., and Mendoza for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, and proposed the dismissal of the complaints against Ligaya, Lontok, Jr., Lualhati, Zaraspe, and Montalbo for lack of probable cause. Upon review, Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo issued a Supplemental Resolution dated 12 July 2005 partially approving the Joint Resolution with modifications. He found de Chavez, Lontok, Sr., Lontok, Jr., and Mendoza liable for violation of Section 3(e) and (h) of Republic Act No. 3019 and Article 315(2)(b) of the Revised Penal Code; found de Chavez, Lontok, Sr., Lontok, Jr., and Ligaya guilty of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct; and imposed dismissal from the Service with accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service. The decretal portion specified findings on graduation fees, caps and gowns rental, internet fees, further fact-finding on Ligaya for probable malversation, referral of certain administrative aspects to the Civil Service Commission, further fact-finding on comprehensive examination fees and caps and gowns rentals, and the administrative penalty of dismissal under Section 52(A), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, with accessory penalties under Section 58, Rule IV. Aggrieved, petitioners filed the present petition, which also prayed for a Temporary Restraining Order commanding the Ombudsman to cease and desist from implementing the Supplemental Resolution dated 12 July 2005 or from conducting further proceedings in the two cases. Mendoza filed a Petition in Intervention dated 12 December 2005 after her lawyer discovered she was not included in the petition; the intervention was allowed in the Court's First Division Resolution of 28 August 2006.

• Ombudsman Jurisdiction / Criminal Liability: Petitioners alleged that the Supplemental Resolution dated 12 July 2005 categorically stated they were liable for criminal acts; that the Ombudsman did not discuss probable cause but immediately ruled on guilt; and that it did not state or instruct the filing of criminal informations. They argued this rendered trial an exercise in futility and violated Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution, and that the Ombudsman exceeded its jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 6770 because no statute grants it power to determine guilt or innocence.
• Ligaya Directive / Malversation: Petitioners argued that the directive to the Field Investigation Office to conduct further fact-finding on Ligaya for probable malversation was questionable because the Ombudsman had already arbitrarily decreed Ligaya's guilt by stating he collected ₱200.00 each from BSU students as RLEF without official receipts and misappropriated the same.
• Forum Shopping: Petitioners argued that the Ombudsman should have dismissed the two separate but identical complaints filed by Magnaye on the ground of forum shopping.
• Probative Value of Affidavits / Factual Findings: Petitioners questioned the probative value of the affidavits presented during preliminary investigation and the conclusions of fact reached by the Ombudsman.

• Ombudsman Jurisdiction / Finding of Criminal Liability: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without jurisdiction in finding petitioners already liable for criminal offenses.
• Forum Shopping: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the two separate but identical criminal complaints of private respondent.
• Administrative Liability / Proper Forum: Whether the Supreme Court may pass upon the administrative liability of petitioners or must refer that aspect to the Court of Appeals.

• Ombudsman Jurisdiction / Finding of Criminal Liability: No. The Ombudsman did not exceed its jurisdiction or declare guilt; the words "liable for" referred only to probable cause, and preliminary investigation is not a trial on the merits. The directive on Ligaya merely ordered further fact-finding on probable malversation.
• Forum Shopping: No. The administrative and criminal complaints have different causes of action and reliefs, so the elements of forum shopping are not present.
• Administrative Liability / Proper Forum: No, the Supreme Court cannot pass upon the administrative liability; under Fabian vs. Desierto, appeals from Ombudsman administrative decisions must be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. The criminal petition is dismissed and the administrative aspect referred to the Court of Appeals.

• Ombudsman Jurisdiction / Finding of Criminal Liability: The 1987 Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 empower the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public official or employee appearing illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. It may conduct a preliminary investigation to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty and should be held for trial. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial; it is not a trial on the merits and does not decide guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecutor merely determines probable cause and files the corresponding information if found. The Ombudsman enjoys the presumption of regularity under Rule 131, Section 3(m), including official actuations in all phases of work; the presumption that he knows whereof he speaks applies. The word "liable" means subject or exposed to adverse contingency or action and is synonymous with susceptible, prone, exposed, indicating temporary or fluctuating situations. Nowhere in the challenged resolution did it state petitioners were found "guilty" beyond reasonable doubt, unlike the administrative disposition which found them "guilty" and imposed penalties. Thus "liable for" alluded only to probability of guilt and probable cause to hold them for trial, not a declaration of guilt. Probable cause is the existence of facts and circumstances that would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting on facts within the prosecutor's knowledge, that the person charged was guilty of the crime prosecuted. Pimentel Jr. vs. COMELEC states probable cause need only rest on evidence showing more likely than not a crime was committed and by the suspects; it need not establish absolute certainty; it demands more than bare suspicion but less than evidence justifying conviction; it merely binds over the suspects to stand trial and is not a pronouncement of guilt. The finding was based on Magnaye's complaints under oath, sworn statements and notarized affidavits of witnesses, and official and public documents; a clarificatory hearing was conducted on 13 May 2004; the 24-page Supplemental and Joint Resolutions contained lengthy discussions, determined appropriate crimes, analyzed each charge against the elements, and scrutinized the evidence. As to Ligaya, the directive merely ordered further investigation and gathering of evidence on liability for "probable" malversation; it did not conclude guilt beyond reasonable doubt and saw the need to gather more information before deciding indictment. Technical rules of evidence are not strictly applied in Ombudsman preliminary investigation under Administrative Order No. 08; defenses and admissibility are better ventilated at trial. Courts consistently refrain from interfering with the Ombudsman's constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutorial powers absent compelling reason.
• Forum Shopping: The test for forum shopping is identity of (1) parties, (2) rights or causes of action, and (3) reliefs sought. Although the parties, facts, and circumstances are essentially the same, the rights or causes of action and reliefs differ. The 7 November 2001 complaint is administrative: causes are grave misconduct, oppression, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, and violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713; relief is dismissal from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and leave credits. The 13 November 2001 complaint is criminal: causes are violations of Section 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, falsification of official documents, and estafa; reliefs include imprisonment, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture of prohibited interest and unexplained wealth. Thus the allegation of forum shopping is vacuous.
• Administrative Liability / Proper Forum: The petition sought annulment of the Supplemental Resolution on both criminal (OMB-1-01-1083-K) and administrative (OMB-1-01-1036-K) complaints. Procedurally, the remedy of an aggrieved party in criminal complaints before the Ombudsman where probable cause is found is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65; the Court thus gave due course and resolved the finding of probable cause in the criminal aspect. However, the Court cannot and will not pass judgment on administrative liability. Under Fabian vs. Desierto, appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative liability cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, the administrative aspect should be referred to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition.

• Ombudsman's preliminary investigation determines probable cause, not guilt — A preliminary investigation is inquisitorial and not a trial on the merits; its purpose is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the respondent is guilty and should be held for trial. The prosecutor does not decide guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the Ombudsman's use of "liable for" in the Supplemental Resolution was construed as a finding of probable cause, not a declaration of guilt.
• Probable cause in preliminary investigation — Probable cause exists when facts and circumstances would excite in a reasonable mind, acting on facts within the prosecutor's knowledge, the belief that the person charged was guilty of the crime prosecuted. It requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence justifying conviction; it need only show that more likely than not a crime was committed and by the suspect, and merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. Applied to uphold the Ombudsman's finding.
• Presumption of regularity in performance of official functions — Under Rule 131, Section 3(m), official duty is presumed regularly performed, including all phases of a public officer's work. The Ombudsman is presumed to know the extent and limits of his powers, so his use of "liable for" was presumed to refer only to probable cause.
• Forum shopping test — Forum shopping exists when two or more pending cases involve identity of (1) parties, (2) rights or causes of action, and (3) reliefs sought. Applied: administrative and criminal complaints based on same facts did not constitute forum shopping because the causes of action and reliefs differed.
• Non-interference with the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial powers — Courts consistently refrain from interfering with the Ombudsman's constitutionally mandated powers absent compelling reason, based on respect for those powers and practicality. Applied to reject petitioners' challenge to the probable-cause findings.
• Technical rules of evidence in Ombudsman preliminary investigation — The Ombudsman's preliminary investigation need not strictly follow the technical rules of evidence; defenses, admissibility, and factual/evidentiary issues are better ventilated during a full-blown trial. Applied to reject petitioners' objections to affidavits and factual conclusions.
• Appeals from Ombudsman administrative decisions — Appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative liability cases must be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Applied to refer the administrative aspect of the petition to the Court of Appeals.

• "A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no objective except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the respondent is guilty thereof." — This passage states the nature and limited purpose of preliminary investigation, which is central to rejecting petitioners' claim that the Ombudsman had already adjudged their guilt.
• "We, then, conclude that the words "liable for" employed by the Ombudsman in the challenged resolution really alluded only to the probability of guilt. They simply imply that the Ombudsman had found probable cause to hold petitioners liable for the crimes imputed and, thus, should be held liable for trial in the courts of law. It is not a declaration of guilt." — This is the ratio decidendi on the first issue: the phrase "liable for" in the Ombudsman's resolution means probable cause, not a finding of criminal guilt.
• "The test in determining the presence of forum shopping is whether in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of (1) parties, (2) rights or causes of action, and (3) relief(s) sought." — This defines the controlling forum-shopping test applied to reject petitioners' second issue.
• "In the leading case of Fabian v. Desierto, we ruled that appeals from decisions of the public respondent in administrative liability cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, the administrative aspect of the present petition should be referred to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition." — This states the procedural rule that required the referral of the administrative aspect to the Court of Appeals.

• Pimentel Jr. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 126394, 24 April 1998, 289 SCRA 586, 600-601 — Cited for the standard of probable cause in preliminary investigation: it need only rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime was committed and by the suspect; it is not a pronouncement of guilt.
• Employees' Compensation Commission vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115858, 28 June 1996, 257 SCRA 717, 723 — Cited for the three-part test of forum shopping: identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.
• Quiambao vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 149069, 20 September 2004, 438 SCRA 495, 510 — Cited for the policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman's constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutorial powers.
• The Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, 418 Phil. 715, 721 (2001) — Cited in Quiambao vs. Desierto for the Ombudsman's insulation from outside pressure and its wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers.
• Maturan vs. People, G.R. Nos. 150353-54, 27 July 2004, 435 SCRA 323, 331 — Cited for the policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman based on respect for its powers and on practicality.
• Fabian vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, 16 September 1998, 295 SCRA 470, 491 — Controlling precedent holding that appeals from Ombudsman decisions in administrative liability cases must be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.
• Diamante vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 147911, 14 October 2005, 473 SCRA 95, 103 — Cited for the purpose of preliminary investigation: to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty.
• Cruz, Jr. vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 110436, 27 June 1994, 233 SCRA 439, 458 — Cited for the rule that the prosecutor in preliminary investigation does not decide guilt beyond reasonable doubt but merely determines probable cause.
• Acuna vs. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, G.R. No. 144692, 31 January 2005, 450 SCRA 232, 241 — Cited for the procedural remedy of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 for an aggrieved party in criminal complaints where the Ombudsman found probable cause.

• Article XI, Section 13(1), 1987 Constitution — Empowers the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint any act or omission of any public official or employee appearing illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Applied to uphold the Ombudsman's preliminary investigation.
• Sections 11(4)(a) and 15(1), Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) — Statutory grant of investigatory and prosecutory powers, including preliminary investigation. Applied to uphold the Ombudsman's authority.
• Section 3(m), Rule 131, Revised Rules of Evidence — Disputable presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. Applied to presume that the Ombudsman used "liable for" within the limits of his power to find probable cause.
• Section 14(2), 1987 Constitution — Right to a speedy, impartial, and public trial. Petitioners invoked it; the Court rejected the argument because preliminary investigation is not a trial and no guilt was declared.
• Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Offenses for which the Ombudsman found probable cause. The criminal petition challenging that finding was dismissed.
• Article 315(2)(b), Revised Penal Code — Estafa. The Ombudsman found probable cause for this offense; the criminal petition was dismissed.
• Section 5(a), Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) — Part of the administrative complaint against petitioners.
• Sections 63 and 68, Presidential Decree No. 1445 — Audit requirements for official receipts and accounting of government funds. Cited in the Audit Report attached by Magnaye.
• Section 4(d), Republic Act No. 8292 (Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997) — Special trust fund treatment for graduation fees. Cited in the Audit Report.
• Section 52(A), Rule IV, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service — Penalty of dismissal for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct. Imposed by the Ombudsman in the Supplemental Resolution.
• Section 58, Rule IV, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service — Accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from government employment. Imposed by the Ombudsman.
• Rule 43, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Appeals from Ombudsman administrative decisions to the Court of Appeals. Applied to refer the administrative aspect of the petition.
• Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Petition for certiorari. The remedy for an aggrieved party in criminal complaints where the Ombudsman found probable cause; the Court resolved the criminal aspect under this remedy.
• Administrative Order No. 08, Office of the Ombudsman — Clarifies and modifies certain rules of procedure; technical rules of evidence are not strictly applied in Ombudsman preliminary investigation. Applied to reject petitioners' objections to affidavits and factual conclusions.
• Administrative Order No. 07, Office of the Ombudsman — Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Cited in relation to the conduct of preliminary investigation.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. concurred. No separate concurring opinion is summarized in the text.