De Chavez vs. Ocampo

An election protest is duly filed within the statutory period when it is delivered to and accepted by the clerk of court, even at the clerk's house outside office hours, before midnight of the last day of the two-week period, which expires at twelve o'clock in the evening of that day. The clerk's contemporaneous note and receipt of the protest and docket fees establish the actual date of filing, and the official stamp placed the following day does not control.

Macario de Chavez contested the proclamation of Juan Buenafe as municipal mayor-elect of Batangas. Section 479 of the Election Law required an election protest to be filed within two weeks from the day following the proclamation by the board of canvassers.

On December 21, 1937, the board of canvassers proclaimed Juan Buenafe as municipal mayor-elect of Batangas, in the province of Batangas. Macario de Chavez sought to contest the proclamation on grounds of fraud and irregularities committed in the election.

At 11:40 p.m. on January 4, 1938, De Chavez submitted to E.S. Ilustre, clerk of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, at Ilustre's house, a motion of protest against Buenafe. He paid P16 for docket fees on that occasion. The clerk wrote at the top of the first page of the original protest: "Received ; Jan. 4, 1938 at 11:40 p.m. at my home" and signed "E.S. Ilustre." On the duplicate copy kept by De Chavez, the clerk wrote: "Received the original and copy together with P16 registration fee — this 4th day of January, 1938 at 11:40 p.m. at my home. E.S. Ilustre."

Upon being notified of the protest, Buenafe filed a motion to dismiss. He alleged that the protest had been filed outside the two-week period because the official stamp on the first page and the official receipt for docket fees showed January 5, 1938. He also alleged that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because he was notified of the protest on January 26, 1938, when the law required notification within twenty days following its filing.

The trial court's order referred to the note written at the top middle of the first page of the motion of protest and stated that Ilustre received the motion outside office hours and not in his capacity as clerk of court. The notes were later marked as Exhibits 1 and 2 and presented as evidence at the trial, where they were admitted without objection by respondent. Respondent did not deny the authenticity of the notes at trial.

• Reinstatement of Protest: Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus ordering the respondent judge to reinstate the motion of protest and proceed to hear and decide it on the merits.
• Timeliness: Petitioner maintained that the protest was filed at 11:40 p.m. on January 4, 1938, and therefore within the two-week period, as shown by the clerk's notes on the original and duplicate copies.
• Validity of Filing at Clerk's House: Petitioner's position was that delivery to the clerk of court at his house outside office hours, accepted by the clerk in his official capacity, constituted valid filing.
• Official Stamp: Petitioner contended that the January 5, 1938 official stamp and docket fee receipt did not establish the actual date of filing because the clerk lacked the court stamp and docket at night and completed the stamping the following day.

• Late Filing: Respondent argued that the official stamp and official receipt showed the protest was filed on January 5, 1938, outside the two-week period.
• Lack of Jurisdiction: Respondent alleged that the Court of First Instance did not acquire jurisdiction because he was notified of the protest on January 26, 1938, beyond the twenty-day period required by law.
• Prior Motion for Reconsideration: Respondent maintained that the petition for mandamus should be dismissed because petitioner did not seek reconsideration of the dismissal order in the lower court.
• Authenticity of Notes: Respondent argued that there was no evidence on the notes appearing at the top of the motion of protest and on the signature of clerk Ilustre.
• Dangerous Doctrine / Discretion: In his motion for reconsideration, respondent argued that allowing filing at the clerk's house shortly before midnight would be a dangerous doctrine, impracticable, and would make receipt of a protest discretionary; the protest should be filed during office hours.

• Timeliness and Computation of Period: Whether the election protest was filed within the two-week period prescribed by section 479 of the Election Law, where it was delivered at 11:40 p.m. on January 4, 1938, and the proclamation occurred on December 21, 1937.
• Validity of Filing at Clerk's House: Whether delivery of the protest to the clerk of court at his house outside office hours constituted a valid filing.
• Evidentiary Weight of Clerk's Notes: Whether the clerk's notes and signature, rather than the official stamp dated January 5, 1938, established the true date of filing.
• Authenticity of Clerk's Notes: Whether respondent could contest the authenticity of the clerk's notes for the first time in the Supreme Court after failing to deny them in the lower court.
• Prior Motion for Reconsideration: Whether a petition for mandamus may be entertained without a prior motion for reconsideration in the lower court.

• Timeliness and Computation of Period: Yes. The protest was filed within the two-week period; the period began on December 22, 1937, and expired at midnight on January 4, 1938, and the protest was delivered at 11:40 p.m. that day.
• Validity of Filing at Clerk's House: Yes. Delivery to the clerk of court at his house outside office hours, received by him in his official capacity, was a valid filing.
• Evidentiary Weight of Clerk's Notes: The clerk's contemporaneous notes, not the January 5 official stamp, established the true date of filing; the stamp was placed the following day because the clerk lacked the stamp and docket at night.
• Authenticity of Clerk's Notes: Respondent was barred from contesting the notes' authenticity for the first time on appeal; he did not deny them in the lower court, and they were admitted without objection.
• Prior Motion for Reconsideration: No. A motion for reconsideration was not required where the same questions had been properly raised and wholly decided by the lower court.

• Timeliness and Computation of Period: Section 479 of the Election Law required an election protest to be filed within two weeks from the day following the proclamation by the board of canvassers. The proclamation was on December 21, 1937, so the two weeks—fourteen days—began to run on December 22, 1937, and expired on January 4, 1938, at twelve o'clock in the evening, pursuant to section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code and Manalo vs. Sevilla. The clerk's note and signature on the first page of the motion showed filing at 11:40 p.m. on January 4, 1938. The protest was therefore within the period.
• Validity of Filing at Clerk's House: The motion was handed to E.S. Ilustre in his capacity as clerk of court, and he received it as such. It would be unreasonable to suppose that petitioner intended a different capacity or that the clerk received it otherwise, as both suppositions are contrary to the natural course of events. Because the motion was delivered outside office hours and the clerk was not required to remain in court until midnight on January 4, it could not rationally be held that the motion should have been filed in court rather than at the clerk's house. The place was accidental; the controlling fact was that the motion was presented and accepted before twelve o'clock on the night of January 4.
• Evidentiary Weight of Clerk's Notes: Respondent relied on the official stamp and docket fee receipt showing January 5, 1938. However, respondent did not specifically or generally deny the allegation that the protest was filed at 11:40 p.m. on January 4, 1938. The notes and signature of the clerk were authentic. When the clerk received the motion, he did not have the court's stamp or the docket in which to enter it, so he did the following day what he could not do the night before. The official stamp therefore did not reflect the actual date of filing.
• Authenticity of Clerk's Notes: In the resolution denying reconsideration, the notes were marked Exhibits 1 and 2, presented as evidence at the trial, and admitted without objection by respondent. The trial court's appealed order referred to the note, showing that it had been presented. The note on Exhibit 1 was exposed to view at the top middle of the first page of the motion of protest. Having seen the note when he filed his motion to dismiss and having failed to deny it at trial, respondent could not raise the question of authenticity for the first time before the Supreme Court. The clerical error in citing paragraph 6 of the motion of protest instead of paragraph 6 of the petition for mandamus did not justify reconsideration.
• Prior Motion for Reconsideration: The rule requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before resort to special remedies rests on the principle that Courts of First Instance should not be summarily deprived of the opportunity to decide issues with due deliberation, as in Herrera vs. Barretto and Joaquin. But when a definite question has been properly raised, argued, and submitted to the lower court and has been wholly decided by it, a motion for reconsideration is no longer necessary as a condition precedent to a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, as held in Municipal Council of Masantol vs. Guevara. Here, respondent had raised in the Court of First Instance the same questions of fact and law now addressed to the Supreme Court, and the lower court had decided them. The contention that the petition should be dismissed for lack of a motion for reconsideration was therefore not sustained.

• Election Protest Period and Midnight Deadline — Under section 479 of the Election Law, an election protest must be filed within two weeks from the day following the proclamation. Under section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, the period expires at twelve o'clock in the evening of the last day. A protest filed at 11:40 p.m. on the last day is timely.
• Valid Filing with Clerk Outside Office Hours — Delivery of an election protest to the clerk of court at his house outside office hours is valid filing when the clerk receives it in his official capacity before the deadline. The place of delivery is accidental; the essential fact is presentment and acceptance before midnight.
• Official Stamp Not Conclusive — The date stamped by the clerk on the following day does not control the date of filing where the clerk's contemporaneous note and receipt show actual delivery before midnight and the stamp was placed later because the stamp and docket were unavailable at night.
• Motion for Reconsideration as Condition Precedent — A motion for reconsideration before resorting to a special civil action is not required when the same definite question has been properly raised, argued, and wholly decided by the lower court. The rule exists to give the lower court an opportunity to correct itself, not to require a useless repetition.
• Waiver of Authenticity Objection — A party who fails to deny the authenticity of a document when he had the opportunity and when it was offered in evidence cannot raise the issue of authenticity for the first time on appeal. This supported the Court's reliance on the clerk's notes.

• "The protest having been filed at 11:40 p.m., on January the 4th, as per the note and the signature of the clerk of court at the top of the first page of petitioner's motion, we conclude that the protest was filed within the period provided by law for purpose." — States the ratio decidendi on timeliness, holding that the clerk's note and signature established filing within the statutory period.
• "In the second place, the motion having been delivered to the clerk of court outside of office hours, and the latter, on the other hand, not being under any duty to remain in court up to midnight on January 4th, it cannot be rationally held that the said motion should have been filed in court instead of in the house of the clerk of court." — Defines the rule validating filing with the clerk outside office hours when the deadline falls at midnight.
• "When the clerk of court received the motion, he did not then have the stamp of the court nor the docket in which to enter the said motion, and to remedy the deficiency, he did the following day what he could not do the night before. This is all that happened." — Explains why the January 5 official stamp did not control the actual date of filing.
• "For this reason, when a definite question has been properly raised, argued, and submitted to the lower court and has been wholly decided by the latter, a motion for reconsideration of the same question is no longer necessary as a condition precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari in this court." — States the exception to the motion-for-reconsideration requirement applied to the petition for mandamus.

• Herrera vs. Barretto and Joaquin, 25 Phil., 245 — Cited by respondent for the general rule that a petition for a special remedy must be preceded by a motion for reconsideration in the lower court. The Court recognized the principle but held it inapplicable where the lower court had already decided the same question.
• Municipal Council of Masantol vs. Guevara, 44 Phil., 580 — Relied upon for the exception: when a definite question has been properly raised, argued, and submitted to the lower court and wholly decided, a motion for reconsideration is not a condition precedent to a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court.
• Manalo vs. Sevilla, 24 Phil., 609 — Cited for the computation of the statutory period under section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, under which the period expires at twelve o'clock in the evening of the last day.

• Section 479, Election Law — Requires an election protest to be filed within two weeks from the day following the proclamation of the election result by the board of canvassers. Applied: proclamation on December 21, 1937; deadline January 4, 1938.
• Section 13, Revised Administrative Code — Governs computation of periods and provides that the period expires at twelve o'clock in the evening of the last day. Applied to hold that the two-week period expired at midnight on January 4, 1938.
• Code of Civil Procedure, special remedies provisions — Invoked in respondent's argument that a petition for a special remedy must be dismissed absent a prior motion for reconsideration. The Court applied the exception recognized in Municipal Council of Masantol vs. Guevara.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial and Diaz, JJ.