De Castro vs. Court of Appeals of Manila

Documents not formally offered as evidence during trial may not be included in the record on appeal, and the trial court's statutory power to approve or disapprove the record on appeal necessarily includes the authority to order the exclusion of immaterial and unnecessary matters before approval.

Felipe de Santos was the owner of premises at No. 1045 M. de Santos, Manila, leased to Basilio de Castro at a prewar rate of P100 per month. Executive Order No. 117, issued by the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission during the Japanese occupation, vested the Mayor of Manila with authority to fix or adjust rentals, rendering any court-ordered rental increase void and unenforceable. The ejectment proceedings and all appellate proceedings in this case occurred during the Japanese occupation, partly under the Philippine Executive Commission and partly under the so-called Republic of the Philippines, with the case record later destroyed by fire during the battle for Manila in February 1945 and subsequently reconstituted by stipulation of the parties.

On March 3, 1943, Felipe de Santos filed a complaint in the Municipal Court of Manila to eject Basilio de Castro from premises at No. 1045 M. de Santos, Manila, and to collect rentals at P140 per month beginning February 1943. After trial, the Municipal Court dismissed the complaint. Santos appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided over by Judge Arsenio Locsin. While the case was pending decision in the CFI, the parties received notice of a decision by the Mayor of Manila, rendered under Executive Order No. 117 of the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission, fixing the rental for the premises at P100 per month and declaring any increase above that amount illegal, null, and without value.

On September 28, 1943, Castro personally prepared and filed a pleading entitled "constancia" informing the CFI of the Mayor's decision, with a copy of the decision attached as Exhibit 7. Two days later, on September 30, 1943, Judge Locsin rendered his decision ordering Castro to vacate the premises and to pay P140 monthly rental until he vacated, entirely ignoring the Mayor's decision. Castro received a copy of the decision on October 6, 1943.

On November 2, 1943, Castro gave notice of his intention to appeal, paid the appeal bond, and submitted his record on appeal, which included the constancia and the Mayor's decision. A copy was sent to Santos by registered mail. No opposition to the approval of the record on appeal was filed within the five-day period fixed by Rule 41, section 7. Instead of approving it, the court notified the parties that the "Exception and Notice of Appeal" would be set for hearing on December 18, 1943. At that hearing, Santos submitted his opposition to the approval of the record on appeal for the first time. Castro objected to the consideration of the opposition as untimely, but his objection was overruled, and the court ordered the elimination of the constancia from the record on appeal. Castro moved for reconsideration, which was denied by order dated January 11, 1944, directing him to comply within five days or face disapproval of the record on appeal and declaration of abandonment of the appeal.

On January 13, 1944, Castro received the order. On January 17, within the period fixed, he gave notice of his intention to file a petition for mandamus and requested suspension of all proceedings pending its outcome. Due to the reorganization of the Court of Appeals into five districts, the mandamus petition could not be immediately filed and was docketed only on January 27, 1944, as CA-G.R. No. 2. On March 18, 1944, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision denying the petition, holding that the constancia and the Mayor's decision had no place in the record on appeal and that mandamus did not lie because the act sought was not ministerial. Castro filed a motion for reconsideration on April 3, 1944, which was denied the following day. He received notice of the denial by ordinary mail on April 10. Judgment had been entered on April 8. Castro filed a second motion for reconsideration on April 10, which was denied on April 18 on the ground that judgment had already been entered. On April 17, he filed notice of intention to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and the petition itself on April 18.

Meanwhile, on April 4, 1944 — while the motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals was still pending, while no entry of judgment had yet been made, while the period to appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court had not yet expired, and while Castro's motion for suspension of proceedings remained unresolved — Judge Locsin issued an order dismissing the appeal, stating that more than seventeen days had elapsed since counsel received the Court of Appeals' decision of March 18 without compliance with the order of January 11. Castro received this order on April 7. On April 15, he moved to set it aside, noting that the Court of Appeals' decision was not yet final, that his motion for suspension remained unresolved, and that compliance could easily be effected by the clerk of court crossing out the portion to be eliminated. Upon learning that a writ of execution had already been issued, Castro asked for its stay. Judge Locsin denied these requests and ordered the sheriff to execute his decision. Castro then filed the present petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain execution.

The record of the case was completely burned in or about February 1945 during the battle for Manila and was reconstituted by stipulation of the parties, who agreed that the statement of facts appearing on pages one to four of petitioner's brief contained substantially all the facts of the case.

• Liberal Construction of the Rules: Petitioner argued that the Rules of Court should be liberally interpreted so as to permit the inclusion of the constancia and the Mayor's decision in the record on appeal, in order that he might base one of his assignments of error intended to be raised in the appellate court.
• Alternative Proposal for Amendment: Petitioner further insisted that, in the event the Court of Appeals' decision were upheld, the Court of First Instance should be ordered to approve the record on appeal with instructions that the clerk of court or the petitioner himself cross out the portion ordered eliminated, rather than requiring a complete redrafting of the record on appeal.

• Exclusion of Untimely Documents: Respondents argued that the constancia and the Mayor's decision were filed after the trial had terminated and the case had been submitted for decision, and therefore had no place in the record on appeal, as they were not part of the evidence submitted and did not fall within the purview of Rule 41, section 6, which refers to pleadings filed before the case was submitted for decision.
• Mandamus Does Not Lie: Respondents maintained that the act petitioner sought to compel was not ministerial and not enjoined by law, so the writ of mandamus could not issue.

• Inclusion of Unoffered Documents in Record on Appeal: Whether the constancia and the Mayor's decision, which were never formally offered as evidence during trial, may properly be included in the record on appeal.
• Authority to Order Exclusion: Whether the trial judge has the authority to order the exclusion or striking out of immaterial and unnecessary matters from the record on appeal before approving it.
• Availability of Mandamus: Whether mandamus lies to compel the trial judge to approve the record on appeal in a particular form.
• Validity of the Dismissal of Appeal: Whether the trial court's dismissal of the appeal was proper, given that it was issued while the certiorari petition was still pending.

• Inclusion of Unoffered Documents in Record on Appeal: No. Documents never formally offered as evidence at the hearing cannot be considered as such and cannot be included in the record on appeal, pursuant to Section 72, Rule 123 of the Rules of Court.
• Authority to Order Exclusion: Yes. The trial court's power to exercise full discretion to approve or not approve the record on appeal necessarily includes the power to order the exclusion or striking out of immaterial and unnecessary matters before approval.
• Availability of Mandamus: No. Mandamus can issue only to compel the trial judge to act; it cannot direct how he shall act or compel him to decide in a particular way what the record on appeal shall contain.
• Validity of the Dismissal of Appeal: The dismissal, though not altogether correct at the time it was decreed because the certiorari petition was still appealable to the Supreme Court, became well-founded as the effect of the present decision, the petitioner having chosen to stand on his record on appeal rather than amend it within the time fixed by the court.

• Inclusion of Unoffered Documents in Record on Appeal: The constancia and the Mayor's decision were filed after the trial of the case and while it was already pending decision before the court a quo. They were never formally offered as evidence at the hearing, and therefore cannot be considered as evidence under Section 72, Rule 123, which provides that "the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." The petitioner did not follow the procedure outlined in Rule 37 to have them admitted as evidence. They cannot even be considered as evidence that had been offered and rejected during the hearing so as to qualify for inclusion in the record on appeal. The permanent provision governing inclusion of documentary evidence in records on appeal (Section 6, Rule 41) cannot be stretched to include pleadings or documents not presented or offered at the hearing. Since the trial judge could not take the documents into consideration when deciding the case, the appellate court can neither take them into consideration on appeal. The petitioner's intention was to incorporate the documents to affect the court's sympathies and induce revision of the trial findings, which is not sanctioned by the rules of civil procedure.

• Authority to Order Exclusion: Section 7, Rule 41 provides that if the trial judge orders the amendment of the record, the appellant shall redraft it by including additional matters directed by the court. Although the section speaks in terms of "inclusion," a reading of the whole section reveals that the court has been given full discretion to approve or not approve the record on appeal. In view of that discretion, the court may also order the exclusion or striking out of immaterial and unnecessary matters before approving the record on appeal, formerly termed a "bill of exceptions." The appellant's duty to redraft and resubmit the record devolves upon the appellant personally, not upon the clerk of court.

• Availability of Mandamus: Mandamus can issue only to compel the trial judge to act; it cannot direct how he shall act, or compel him to decide in a particular way what the record shall contain, for the law imposes on the trial judge alone the duty to determine whether the record on appeal is correct. The act sought to be compelled — approval of the record on appeal in a form including the constancia — was not ministerial and was not enjoined by law, so the writ of mandamus does not lie.

• Validity of the Dismissal of Appeal: The appellant was ordered to eliminate the constancia from the record on appeal but, instead of obeying the order, filed an action for mandamus. By this attitude, the appellant chose to stand on his record on appeal as presented, preferring to rise or fall with it rather than amend it within the time fixed by the court. Consequently, if the mandamus proceedings upheld the action of the court a quo — as they did — the appellant would be regarded as having failed to file in time the amended record on appeal, and the notice of appeal would be dismissed. Although the dismissal decreed by the trial court was not altogether correct at the time it was decreed because the certiorari petition was still appealable to the Supreme Court, it became well-founded as the effect of the present decision.

• Formal Offer of Evidence Rule — Under Section 72, Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. Documents filed after trial and while the case is pending decision, and never formally offered as evidence, cannot be considered as evidence and cannot be included in the record on appeal. The Court applied this rule to exclude the constancia and the Mayor's decision from the record on appeal.

• Trial Court's Discretion Over Record on Appeal — The trial court's power to approve or disapprove the record on appeal, conferred by Section 7, Rule 41, necessarily includes the authority to order the exclusion or striking out of immaterial and unnecessary matters before approval. The Court held that although the section speaks of "inclusion" of additional matters, the court's full discretion over approval extends to ordering exclusion of irrelevant documents.

• Limitations of Mandamus Against Trial Judges — Mandamus can issue only to compel a trial judge to act; it cannot direct how he shall act or compel him to decide in a particular way what the record on appeal shall contain. The law imposes on the trial judge alone the duty to determine whether the record on appeal is correct. The Court denied mandamus because the act sought — approval of the record on appeal in a form including the constancia — was discretionary, not ministerial.

• "The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." — This quotation of Section 72, Rule 123 of the Rules of Court establishes the controlling rule that excluded the constancia and the Mayor's decision from the record on appeal, as they were never formally offered as evidence during trial.

• "Mandamus can issue only to compel the trial judge to act; it cannot direct how he shall act, or compel him to decide in a particular way what the bill shall contain, for the law imposes on the trial judge alone the duty to determine whether a bill of exceptions is correct or not." — This passage defines the doctrinal limitation on mandamus as applied to approval of records on appeal, establishing that the writ cannot control the exercise of judicial discretion.

• "Accordingly, though the dismissal of the appeal decreed by the trial court was not altogether correct at the time it was decreed because the petition for certiorari was still appealable to this Court, now it becomes well-founded for it is merely the effect of the present decision." — This passage articulates the Court's reasoning that the trial court's premature dismissal of the appeal was validated retroactively by the Supreme Court's own affirmance of the exclusion order, a conclusion that drew vigorous dissent.

• Ayala de Roxas vs. Valencia, 5 Phil. 182 — Cited for the proposition that documents not offered and rejected during the hearing cannot be included in the record on appeal; followed as controlling authority.

• Aliño vs. Villamor, 2 Phil. 234 — Cited for the definition of the object of a bill of exceptions: "simply to present in an intelligible form the facts necessary to enable the appellate court to review the rulings, orders, or judgments excepted to"; followed.

• Dayrit vs. Gonzales, 7 Phil. 182 — Cited for the rule that "documents forming no part of the proofs before the appellate court will not be considered in disposing of the issues of an action"; followed.

• Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Santamaria, 49 Phil. 820 — Cited by the dissent (Paras, J.) for the contrary proposition that courts should exercise caution in ordering exclusion from a record on appeal of matters the appellant thought necessary, since the appellant bears the cost of printing; distinguished by the majority.

• Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, G.R. No. L-5 — Referenced in the concurring and dissenting opinions regarding the validity of judicial proceedings conducted under the Japanese-sponsored government; the majority did not rely on this case.

• Section 72, Rule 123, Rules of Court — Provides that "the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." Applied to hold that the constancia and the Mayor's decision, never formally offered as evidence, could not be considered by the trial court or included in the record on appeal.

• Section 6, Rule 41, Rules of Court — Governs the contents of the record on appeal, requiring inclusion of the order or judgment appealed from and, in chronological order, copies of all pleadings, petitions, motions, and interlocutory orders relating to the appealed order or judgment. Applied to exclude the constancia, which was filed after the case was submitted for decision and was none of the enumerated matters.

• Section 7, Rule 41, Rules of Court — Governs amendment of the record on appeal, providing that if the trial judge orders amendment, the appellant shall redraft the record by including additional matters directed by the court and resubmit for approval. Applied to hold that the appellant had the duty to redraft and resubmit, and that the court's discretion over approval includes the power to order exclusion of immaterial matters.

• Rule 37, Rules of Court — Outlines the procedure for admitting additional evidence. Cited to note that petitioner did not follow this procedure to have the constancia and Mayor's decision admitted as evidence.

• Executive Order No. 117, Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission — Vested the Mayor of Manila with authority to fix or adjust rentals, rendering court-ordered rental increases void and unenforceable. The Mayor's decision under this order was the document petitioner sought to include in the record on appeal.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Feria, and Bengzon, JJ., concurred in the majority decision.

Hilado, J., filed a separate concurring opinion. He reiterated his consistent position — expressed in his dissenting opinions in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, and his concurring opinion in People vs. Jose y Santos — that all judicial proceedings conducted under the Japanese-sponsored Philippine Executive Commission and the so-called Republic of the Philippines were null and void, and that neither organization was a de facto government under international law. He relied on General MacArthur's proclamation of October 23, 1944, which condemned the "so-called government styled as the 'Republic of the Philippines'" and, in his reading, included judicial processes within the condemnation. He argued that declaring the proceedings null would not prejudice vested rights because no final judgment had been rendered when the record was burned, and there can be no vested right in mere matters of procedure. Notwithstanding this position, he concurred on the merits out of deference to the majority, noting that no party had raised the question of validity of the Japanese-sponsored proceedings. On the merits, he agreed that the constancia was not among the matters enumerated in Section 6, Rule 41, that the Court of First Instance had discretion to allow or disallow its inclusion, and that no grave abuse of discretion was shown — the six-to-five division of the Court itself being the strongest proof that the trial court's action was consistent with a mere error of judgment rather than abuse of discretion.

• Paras, J. (with Pablo and Briones, JJ.) — Dissented on the ground that under Section 6, Rule 41, the matters incorporated in the record on appeal need not always have been presented before or at trial or offered as evidence, as long as they bear some relation to the appealed judgment. He argued that the safe course is to leave the question of relevancy to the appellant, since the appellant is in the best position to determine the issues to be raised on appeal and bears the printing expenses. He cited Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Santamaria for the proposition that courts should exercise caution in ordering exclusion from a record on appeal. He further contended that Section 7, Rule 41 speaks only of inclusion of additional matters, not exclusion, and that requiring redrafting imposed unnecessary expense and delay. He also argued that the trial court's dismissal of the appeal was erroneous because the Court of Appeals' decision was not yet final when the dismissal was ordered, the mandamus proceedings having suspended the CFI proceedings, and that the petitioner could not have complied with the order to amend without rendering his mandamus petition moot.

• Perfecto, J. — Dissented on multiple grounds. He maintained that all processes in the case were null and void under General MacArthur's October 1944 proclamation, and that no Commonwealth tribunal had jurisdiction to take cognizance of judicial processes of Japanese-sponsored courts. On the merits, he argued that Section 7, Rule 41 authorizes amendment by "inclusion" only, not "exclusion," applying the principle inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. He contended that inclusion of superfluous matter cannot harm the appellee — if truly irrelevant, the appellate court would disregard it — but exclusion of relevant matter prejudices the appellant's substantial rights. He criticized the order to rewrite the entire record on appeal to eliminate a brief constancia as wasteful and unnecessary, noting the scarcity of paper during the occupation. He decried the sacrifice of a constitutional right to appeal for a trivial procedural technicality, characterizing the record on appeal as serving no substantial purpose in the administration of justice beyond convenience for the appellate court. In his dissent to the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, he argued that the petitioner was denied due process because his request to file a reply-brief was never acted upon and the case was never set for oral argument after reconstitution. He also attacked the majority's reasoning that the erroneous dismissal order became "well-founded" by the effect of the Supreme Court's decision, calling it a metaphysical impossibility — an effect producing its own cause — and a dangerous precedent permitting trial courts to dismiss appeals prematurely in the expectation that the appellate court might later validate the dismissal.