De Castro vs. Court of Appeals

Documents not formally offered as evidence during trial, and pleadings filed after the case has been submitted for decision, cannot be included in a record on appeal under Rule 41, Section 6 of the Rules of Court; the trial court has discretion to order the exclusion of immaterial matters before approving the record on appeal, and the appellant must redraft and resubmit the record within the time fixed by the court rather than seek mandamus to compel approval of the unredacted version.

Felipe de Santos owned premises at No. 1045 M. de Santos, Manila, leased to Basilio de Castro at a pre-war rental of ₱140 per month. During the Japanese occupation, Executive Order No. 117 of the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission vested authority in the Mayor of Manila to fix or adjust rentals, and the Mayor fixed the rental for the subject premises at ₱100 per month. This wartime regulatory framework created the tension between the landlord's desire to collect ₱140 and the tenant's reliance on the Mayor's rental fixation order, which became the central procedural question when the constancia informing the court of the Mayor's decision was excluded from the record on appeal.

On March 3, 1943, Felipe de Santos filed a complaint in the Municipal Court of Manila to eject Basilio de Castro from premises at No. 1045 M. de Santos, Manila, and to collect rentals at ₱140 per month beginning February 1943. After trial, the Municipal Court dismissed the complaint. De Santos appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided over by Judge Arsenio Locsin. While the case was pending decision in the CFI, the parties received notice that the Mayor of Manila, acting under Executive Order No. 117 of the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission, had rendered a decision fixing the rental for the premises at ₱100 per month. The Mayor's decision, dated September 10, 1943, declared that any increase above ₱100 was illegal, void, and without value, and denied de Castro's application for a further decrease to ₱70, finding the ₱100 rate reasonable for a commercial property in a commercial district.

On September 28, 1943, de Castro personally prepared and filed a constancia informing the CFI of the Mayor's decision, attaching a copy thereof as Exhibit 7, with due notice to de Santos. Two days later, on September 30, 1943, Judge Locsin rendered his decision ordering de Castro to vacate the premises and to pay ₱140 monthly rental until he vacated, entirely ignoring the Mayor's decision. De Castro received a copy of the decision on October 6, 1943.

On November 2, 1943, de Castro gave notice of his intention to appeal, paid the appeal bond, and submitted his record on appeal for approval. A copy was sent to de Santos by registered mail, and no opposition to the approval was filed within the five-day period fixed by Rule 41, Section 7. Instead of approving the record on appeal, however, the court set the "Exception and Notice of Appeal" for hearing on December 18, 1943. At that hearing, de Santos submitted his opposition to the approval of the record on appeal for the first time. De Castro objected to the consideration of the opposition as having been filed too late, but the objection was overruled, and on the basis of the opposition, Judge Locsin ordered the elimination of the constancia from the record on appeal. De Castro moved for reconsideration, which was denied by order dated January 11, 1944, directing de Castro to comply with the order of December 18 within five days, failing which the record on appeal would be disapproved and the appeal declared abandoned.

On January 17, 1944, de Castro gave notice of his intention to file a petition for mandamus and requested the suspension of all proceedings pending the outcome thereof. Due to the reorganization of the Court of Appeals into five districts, the petition could not be immediately accepted and was docketed only on January 27, 1944 as CA-G.R. No. 2. On March 18, 1944, the Court of Appeals (Padilla, J.) promulgated its decision denying the petition, holding that the constancia and the Mayor's decision had no place in the record on appeal because they were not part of the evidence submitted before the case was submitted for decision, and that the act sought to be compelled was not ministerial, so mandamus did not lie. De Castro filed a motion for reconsideration on April 3, 1944, which was denied the following day. The clerk of court entered judgment on April 8, 1944. On April 10, 1944, de Castro received notice of the denial and filed a second motion for reconsideration, which was denied on April 18, 1944, on the ground that judgment had already been entered. On April 17 and 18, 1944, de Castro filed his notice of intention and petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Meanwhile, on April 4, 1944, even while the motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals was still pending, no entry of judgment had been made, and the time to appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court had not yet expired, Judge Locsin issued an order dismissing de Castro's appeal on the ground that more than seventeen days had elapsed since counsel received the Court of Appeals' decision and the appellant had not perfected his record on appeal in accordance with the order of January 11, 1944. De Castro received a copy of this order on April 7, 1944, and on April 15, 1944, moved to set it aside, reminding the court that the Court of Appeals' decision was not yet final and that his motion for suspension of proceedings remained unresolved. Upon learning that a writ of execution had already been issued, de Castro asked for its stay. Judge Locsin nevertheless ordered the sheriff to execute his decision, prompting de Castro to pray, in his petition for certiorari, for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain execution. The record of the case was completely burned in or about February 1945 during the battle for Manila and was thereafter reconstituted by the parties as far as possible, with the parties stipulating that the statement of facts appearing on pages one to four of the petitioner's brief contained substantially all the facts of the case.

• Liberal Interpretation of the Rules: Petitioner argued that the Rules of Court should be liberally interpreted so as to permit the inclusion of the constancia and the Mayor's decision in the record on appeal, in order that he might base one of his assignments of error in the appellate court on those documents.
• Alternative Relief — Deletion by Clerk: Petitioner insisted that, in the event the Court of Appeals' decision were upheld, the CFI should be ordered to approve the record on appeal with instructions that the clerk of court or the petitioner himself cross out the part ordered eliminated, rather than requiring the petitioner to redraft the entire record.
• Premature Dismissal: Petitioner contended that the CFI's order dismissing his appeal was erroneous because the Court of Appeals' decision was not yet final when the dismissal was issued, as his motion for reconsideration was still pending, no entry of judgment had been made, and the period to appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court had not yet expired; he also reminded the court that his motion for suspension of proceedings remained unresolved.
• Procedural Fairness on Reconsideration: In his motion for reconsideration before the Supreme Court, petitioner alleged that he was not permitted to answer the respondents' brief and that the case was not set for oral argument, praying that the decision be reconsidered so that the CFI could reinstate his appeal.

• Opposition to Record on Appeal: Respondent de Santos submitted opposition to the approval of the record on appeal at the December 18, 1943 hearing, contending that the constancia and the Mayor's decision should be excluded therefrom.
• Motion for Execution and Dissolution of Injunction: Respondents' counsel filed an urgent motion praying for the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction pendente lite and the issuance of a writ of execution, alleging that petitioner failed to file a new bond in lieu of the original bond lost or destroyed by fire, and that petitioner was attempting to sublet the premises to a Chinese merchant; a further motion was filed for immediate issuance of execution due to petitioner's non-compliance with Section 8, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court.
• Delivery of Deposited Rentals: In the motion for reconsideration phase, respondents prayed that the sum of ₱840 deposited by de Castro as payment of rents from August 1945 to January 1946 at ₱140 per month be delivered to respondents' counsel.

• Inclusion in Record on Appeal: Whether the constancia and the Mayor's decision, filed after trial and not formally offered as evidence, may be included in the record on appeal under Rule 41, Section 6.
• Mandamus: Whether mandamus lies to compel the trial judge to approve a record on appeal that includes documents not presented or offered at the hearing.
• Dismissal of Appeal: Whether the trial court's dismissal of the appeal was proper, given that the Court of Appeals' decision was not yet final when the dismissal was ordered.
• Redrafting vs. Deletion: Whether the clerk of court or the petitioner should make the deletion from the record on appeal, or whether the petitioner must redraft and resubmit the record as directed by the trial court.

• Inclusion in Record on Appeal: No. Documents not formally offered as evidence during trial and pleadings filed after the case was submitted for decision cannot be included in the record on appeal under Rule 41, Section 6, which refers only to pleadings filed before the case was submitted for decision.
• Mandamus: No. The act sought to be compelled is not ministerial; the trial judge has discretion to approve or disapprove the record on appeal, and mandamus cannot direct how he shall act or compel a particular result.
• Dismissal of Appeal: The dismissal, though premature when issued because the Court of Appeals' decision was not yet final and the petition for certiorari was still appealable, became well-founded upon the Supreme Court's affirmance of the Court of Appeals' decision, as the petitioner's failure to redraft the record on appeal within the time fixed by the court resulted in the abandonment of his appeal.
• Redrafting vs. Deletion: The petitioner must redraft the record on appeal. Section 7, Rule 41 imposes the duty on the appellant to redraft and resubmit the record within the time limited by the court's order; no law authorizes the clerk of court to perform this duty or permits the judge to instruct the clerk to make the deletion.

• Inclusion in Record on Appeal: Rule 41, Section 6 provides that the record on appeal shall include copies of all pleadings, petitions, motions, and interlocutory orders relating to the appealed order or judgment, but these refer to pleadings filed before the case was submitted for decision. The constancia and the Mayor's decision were filed after the hearing had been terminated and the case submitted for decision, and were never formally offered as evidence. Under Rule 123, Section 72, "the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." Because the trial court could not take these documents into consideration in rendering its decision, the appellate court could not do so either. To construe the rule otherwise would allow parties to file pleadings and documents after trial that might have evidentiary character but could not be considered as evidence because the period for presentation had already lapsed, bringing about confusion in judicial proceedings. The provision governing inclusion of documentary evidence in records on appeal cannot be stretched to include pleadings or documents not presented or offered at the hearing.

• Mandamus: Mandamus can issue only to compel the trial judge to act; it cannot direct how he shall act or compel him to decide in a particular way. The law imposes on the trial judge alone the duty to determine whether a bill of exceptions (now record on appeal) is correct or not. Because the inclusion of the constancia was not specifically enjoined by the rules, the CFI had discretion to allow or disallow it, and no grave abuse of that discretion was shown. The petitioner, by choosing to file mandamus rather than obey the order to redraft the record, elected to stand on his record on appeal as presented, preferring to rise or fall with it rather than amend it within the time fixed by the court.

• Dismissal of Appeal: The dismissal of the appeal decreed by the trial court was not altogether correct at the time it was decreed, because the Court of Appeals' decision was not yet final and the petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was still available. However, upon the Supreme Court's affirmance of the Court of Appeals' decision, the dismissal became well-founded as the necessary effect of that affirmance. The petitioner's failure to file an amended record on appeal within the time fixed by the court, after the mandamus proceedings confirmed the correctness of the trial court's order of exclusion, meant the notice of appeal he had filed would be dismissed. It was therefore unnecessary to pass upon the other questions raised.

• Redrafting vs. Deletion: Section 7, Rule 41 expressly provides that if the trial judge orders the amendment of the record, the appellant shall redraft the record by including therein such additional matters as the court may have directed, and shall submit the redrafted record for approval. A reading of the whole section shows that the court has full discretion to approve or not approve the record on appeal, and may therefore also order the exclusion or striking out of immaterial and unnecessary matters before approving it. The duty to redraft devolves upon the appellant, not upon the clerk of court. No law authorizes the judge to instruct the clerk to make the deletion; the appellant must perform this duty himself.

• Formal Offer of Evidence Rule — Under Rule 123, Section 72 of the Rules of Court, "the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." Documents not formally offered as evidence during trial cannot be considered by the trial court in rendering its decision, nor by the appellate court on appeal. The Court applied this rule to exclude the constancia and the Mayor's decision from the record on appeal, as they were never formally offered as evidence at the hearing.

• Contents of Record on Appeal — Under Rule 41, Section 6, the record on appeal shall include the order or judgment from which the appeal is taken and, in chronological order, copies of all pleadings, petitions, motions, and interlocutory orders relating to the appealed order or judgment. These refer to pleadings filed before the case was submitted for decision. Pleadings or documents filed after trial and not offered as evidence have no place in the record on appeal. The Court held that this provision cannot be liberally construed to include documents not presented or offered at the hearing.

• Mandamus — Ministerial Duty Required — Mandamus can issue only to compel the trial judge to act; it cannot direct how he shall act or compel him to decide in a particular way. The writ lies only when the act sought to be compelled is ministerial and enjoined by law. Where the trial judge has discretion to approve or disapprove a record on appeal, mandamus does not lie to compel a particular exercise of that discretion.

• Appellant's Duty to Redraft Record on Appeal — Under Rule 41, Section 7, if the trial judge orders the amendment of the record on appeal, the appellant must redraft the record and resubmit it for approval within the time limited by the court's order. The duty devolves upon the appellant, not upon the clerk of court. If the appellant chooses to file mandamus rather than comply, and the mandamus proceedings confirm the correctness of the trial court's order, the appellant is regarded as having failed to file the amended record on appeal in time, and the appeal is dismissed.

• "The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." — This quotation of Rule 123, Section 72 articulates the formal offer requirement that bars the trial and appellate courts from considering the constancia and the Mayor's decision, which were never formally offered as evidence.

• "Mandamus can issue only to compel the trial judge to act; it cannot direct how he shall act, or compel him to decide in a particular way that the bill shall contain, for the law imposes on the trial judge alone the duty to determine whether a bill of exceptions is correct or not." — This passage, quoted from 4 C.J. 308, defines the limits of mandamus in the context of record on appeal approval and is the ratio decidendi for denying the writ.

• "By such attitude, appellant chose to stand on his record on appeal as it was presented, thus preferring to rise or fall with it rather than to amend it within the time fixed by the court." — This formulation captures the Court's reasoning that the petitioner's decision to seek mandamus instead of redrafting the record constituted an election that led to the dismissal of his appeal upon affirmance of the Court of Appeals.

• Ayala de Roxas vs. Valencia, 5 Phil. 182 — Cited for the proposition that documents not offered and rejected during the hearing cannot be included in the record on appeal; followed as supporting authority.
• Aliño vs. Villamor, 2 Phil. 234 — Cited for the principle that the object of a bill of exceptions is simply to present in intelligible form the facts necessary to enable the appellate court to review the rulings, orders, or judgment excepted to; followed.
• Dayrit vs. Gonzales, 7 Phil. 182 — Cited for the rule that documents forming no part of the proofs before the appellate court will not be considered in disposing of the issues of an action; followed.
• Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Santamaria, 49 Phil. 820 — Cited in the dissenting opinion of Paras, J., for the proposition that courts should exercise caution in ordering exclusion from a record on appeal of matters the appellant deems necessary, and that the appellate court can pass upon the propriety of any matter incorporated therein; distinguished by the majority.

• Rule 41, Section 6, Rules of Court — Defines the contents of a record on appeal: the order or judgment from which the appeal is taken and, in chronological order, copies of all pleadings, petitions, motions, and interlocutory orders relating to the appealed order or judgment. Applied to exclude the constancia and the Mayor's decision, which were filed after the case was submitted for decision and did not fall within the enumerated categories.
• Rule 41, Section 7, Rules of Court — Governs the procedure for amendment and approval of the record on appeal: if the trial judge orders amendment, the appellant shall redraft the record and resubmit it for approval within the time limited. Applied to hold that the duty to redraft devolves upon the appellant, not the clerk of court, and that the court has discretion to order exclusion of immaterial matters.
• Rule 123, Section 72, Rules of Court — Provides that "the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." Applied to bar both the trial court and the appellate court from considering the constancia and the Mayor's decision, which were never formally offered as evidence.
• Rule 37, Rules of Court — Referenced as the proper procedure the petitioner should have followed if he believed the Mayor's decision would help him, rather than simply filing the constancia after trial.
• Executive Order No. 117, Philippine Executive Commission — Vested authority in the Mayor of Manila to fix or adjust rentals. The Mayor's decision thereunder fixed the rental at ₱100 per month and declared any increase above that amount illegal, void, and without value; this was the document petitioner sought to include in the record on appeal.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Feria, and Bengzon, JJ., concurred in the majority decision.

Hilado, J., filed a separate concurring opinion. He reiterated his adherence to the theory — expressed in his dissenting opinions in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, and People vs. Jose y Santos — that all judicial proceedings had in Japanese-sponsored courts during the occupation were null and void, and that neither the Philippine Executive Commission nor the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de facto government, citing General MacArthur's proclamation of October 23, 1944. He argued that because the proceedings in this case had not culminated in a final judgment when the record was burned, no vested rights would be prejudiced by declaring them null, as there can be no vested right in mere matters of procedure. Notwithstanding this position, and out of deference to the majority, he concurred in the result on the merits, agreeing that the constancia was none of the matters enumerated in Rule 41, Section 6, that the CFI had discretion to allow or disallow its inclusion, and that no grave abuse of discretion was shown, the six-to-five division of the Court itself proving that the CFI's action was consistent with a mere error of judgment.

• Paras, J. (with Pablo and Briones, JJ. concurring) — Dissented on the principal ground that under Section 6 of Rule 41, matters incorporated in the record on appeal need not always have been presented before or at trial or offered as evidence, so long as they bear some relation to the appealed judgment. The dissent argued that the safe course is to leave the question of relevancy to the appellant, since the appellate court can pass upon the propriety of any matter in the record on appeal, and that substantial rights may be prejudiced more by requiring the record to contain less than by allowing it to contain more. The dissent further contended that Section 7, Rule 41 authorizes amendment by inclusion of additional matters, not by exclusion, and that the practical procedure is for the CFI to order deletion rather than require the appellant to redraft the entire record. The dissent also argued that the trial court's dismissal of the appeal was erroneous because the Court of Appeals' decision was not yet final when the dismissal was ordered, and that the filing of the mandamus petition suspended proceedings in the CFI, making it impossible for the petitioner to comply with the order to redraft without converting his mandamus case into a moot case. The dissent would have granted the petition for mandamus and ordered the respondent judge to approve and certify the record on appeal.

• Perfecto, J. — Dissented on both the validity of the Japanese-sponsored proceedings and the merits. On validity, he maintained that all processes in the case were null and void under General MacArthur's October 1944 proclamation, consistent with his dissent in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon. On the merits, he argued that the CFI erred in ordering the elimination of the constancia because Section 7, Rule 41 authorizes amendment only by inclusion, not exclusion, under the principle inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. He contended that the inclusion of a superfluous document cannot harm the appellee, while its exclusion may prejudice the appellant's substantial rights, and that the appellate court can disregard irrelevant matter. He criticized the majority's reasoning as resting on "conjecture and fiction," arguing that the petitioner's filing of mandamus did not constitute an election to "rise or fall" with the unredacted record, and that the majority's proposition that an erroneous order becomes "well-founded" by a subsequent decision was a "metaphysical impossibility" and a "judicial paradox." He further argued that the sacrifice of the constitutional right of appeal for a trivial procedural detail was unjust, and that records on appeal should be abolished as an unjust imposition on appellants. In the resolution on the motion for reconsideration, he dissented again, emphasizing that the petitioner was denied the opportunity to file a reply brief and to present oral argument, and that the Court's failure to act on the petitioner's request for permission to file a reply brief was a decisive factor in the petitioner's inability to respond.