De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro

A marriage solemnized without a marriage license, on the strength of a false affidavit of five-year cohabitation under Article 34 of the Family Code, is void ab initio; and the validity of such a void marriage may be collaterally attacked in a suit not directly instituted for that purpose, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. The child of such a void marriage, however, may be recognized as the illegitimate child of the father and entitled to support upon proof of filiation through the civil registry, admissions in public documents, or other evidence.

Petitioner Reinel Anthony B. De Castro and respondent Annabelle Assidao-De Castro became sweethearts in 1991 and planned to marry. Article 34 of the Family Code dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years without legal impediment, provided they execute an affidavit to that effect — a provision aimed at protecting parties in long-standing cohabitation from the humiliation of public marriage-license publication. The parties invoked this provision to marry without a license, despite never having cohabited for the requisite period.

Petitioner Reinel Anthony B. De Castro and respondent Annabelle Assidao-De Castro met and became sweethearts in 1991. They applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. Sometime in October 1994, they had their first sexual relation and continued to engage in sex regularly thereafter. When the couple returned to the civil registrar's office, the marriage license had already expired. To proceed with the marriage, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years, in lieu of a marriage license. On the same date, they were married by Judge Jose C. Bernabe of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City. After the ceremony, however, the parties returned to their respective homes and never lived together as husband and wife.

On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reianna Tricia A. De Castro. From the child's birth, respondent solely supported her out of her income as a government dentist and from her private practice. On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, alleging that petitioner had reneged on his obligation to support her and their child. Petitioner denied being married to respondent, claiming the marriage was void ab initio because it was facilitated by a false affidavit, that he signed the marriage contract only to save respondent from embarrassment due to her pregnancy, that he lacked parental advice, and that he had never lived with respondent nor acknowledged the child.

The trial court found the marriage void for lack of a marriage license but declared petitioner the natural father of the child and obliged him to provide support. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on the marriage issue, holding that the marriage remained valid until properly nullified in a direct proceeding, and declared the child legitimate. The appellate court relied on the presumption of validity of marriage, petitioner's refusal to undergo DNA testing, and an affidavit executed by petitioner on 7 April 1998 admitting paternity. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting the present petition.

• Invalidity of Marriage: Petitioner contended that the trial court properly annulled the marriage because the evidence and admissions showed it was celebrated without a marriage license, and the affidavit executed in lieu thereof contained a false narration of facts, the parties never having lived together as husband and wife.
• Collateral Attack Permissible: Petitioner argued that a void marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack, citing Niñal vs. Bayadog, and that there was no necessity to institute a separate proceeding for declaration of nullity, as doing so would entail enormous expense, delay, and additional burden on the courts.
• No Need for Prosecuting Attorney: Petitioner maintained that the appearance of a prosecuting attorney was unnecessary because the case was an ordinary action for support, not an action for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage.
• Denial of Paternity: Petitioner claimed that in view of the nullity of the marriage and his vigorous denial of the child's paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the child his legitimate child.

• Dilatory Tactic: Respondent claimed the petition was a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the Court of Appeals' decision.
• No Collateral Attack: Respondent argued that the legitimacy of the marriage cannot be attacked collaterally but can only be contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose.
• Paternity Established: Respondent pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner was uncertain and evasive about their sexual encounters, and that despite challenges from her and the trial court, petitioner strongly objected to DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation.

• Jurisdiction to Determine Validity of Marriage: Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support.
• Filiation and Support: Whether the child is the daughter of petitioner and entitled to support.

• Jurisdiction to Determine Validity of Marriage: Yes. The trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage in an action for support, because the right to support hinges on the existence of a valid marriage, and a void marriage may be collaterally attacked when essential to the determination of the case.
• Filiation and Support: Yes, but as an illegitimate child. The child was declared petitioner's illegitimate daughter entitled to support, filiation having been established through the birth certificate, petitioner's affidavit admitting paternity, and testimonial and documentary evidence of the parties' sexual relationship.

• Jurisdiction to Determine Validity of Marriage: The Court reaffirmed the doctrine in Niñal vs. Bayadog that, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity; for other purposes — such as determination of legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, or dissolution of property regime — the court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question it, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This was reiterated in Nicdao Cariño vs. Yee Cariño, where the Court ruled on the validity of marriages in a claim for death benefits. Under Article 4 of the Family Code, the absence of any essential or formal requisite renders a marriage void ab initio. Here, the evidence showed that the parties did not have a marriage license. They executed an affidavit under Article 34 claiming five years of cohabitation, but respondent herself admitted during cross-examination that they had not lived together as husband and wife for five years before the marriage. The purpose of Article 34 is to protect parties in scandalous cohabitation from the humiliation of public marriage-license publication; where there was no cohabitation at all, the rationale does not apply, and the false affidavit is a mere scrap of paper. The failure to obtain and present a marriage license thus rendered the marriage void ab initio.

• Filiation and Support: Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate children may establish their filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Article 172 provides that filiation may be proven by the record of birth in the civil register, a final judgment, an admission in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent, the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The Certificate of Live Birth listed petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner executed an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, wherein he expressly stated that he was the legitimate father of Reianna Tricia A. De Castro. The trial court's findings — that petitioner conceded respondent was his former girlfriend, that they regularly had sexual relations, and that photographs of the wedding showed petitioner placing the ring and kissing respondent — further supported the conclusion that the child was his. Because the marriage was void, the child could not be legitimate; she was, however, petitioner's illegitimate daughter and thus entitled to support.

• Collateral Attack on Void Marriages — A void marriage may be collaterally attacked in a suit not directly instituted to question its validity, so long as the validity of the marriage is essential to the determination of the case. This is distinct from the rule that, for purposes of remarriage, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is required under Article 40 of the Family Code. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the trial court properly determined the marriage's validity in an action for support, since the right to support depended on the existence of a valid marriage.

• Article 34 Affidavit as Substitute for Marriage License — The Family Code dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years without legal impediment, provided they execute an affidavit to that effect. The purpose is to protect parties in long-standing cohabitation from the humiliation of public marriage-license publication. Where the affidavit is false and there was no cohabitation, the affidavit has no value and cannot substitute for a marriage license; the marriage is void ab initio for absence of a formal requisite under Article 4.

• Proof of Filiation of Illegitimate Children — Under Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate children may establish filiation through the same means as legitimate children: the record of birth in the civil register, a final judgment, an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument signed by the parent, open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The Court found filiation established through the birth certificate and petitioner's affidavit admitting paternity.

• "However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case." — This passage, quoted from Niñal vs. Bayadog, articulates the controlling doctrine on collateral attack of void marriages and forms the ratio decidendi for the Court's ruling that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the marriage's validity in an action for support.

• "The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio." — This passage states the Court's conclusion on the marriage's invalidity, applying Article 34 of the Family Code to facts where no genuine cohabitation existed.

• Niñal vs. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661 (2000) — Controlling precedent on collateral attack of void marriages. The Court relied on its holding that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in a suit not directly instituted for that purpose when essential to the determination of the case, and that the purpose of Article 34's exemption is to protect parties in scandalous cohabitation.

• Nicdao Cariño vs. Yee Cariño, 403 Phil. 861 (2001) — Followed as reiterating the Niñal doctrine. The Court had there ruled on the validity of marriages in a claim for death benefits, confirming that evidence must be adduced to prove grounds rendering a marriage an absolute nullity.

• Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693 (1999) — Cited for the proposition that the validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.

• Article 4, Family Code — Provides that the absence of any essential or formal requisite renders a marriage void ab initio, while a defect in any essential requisite renders it voidable. Applied to hold the marriage void for absence of a marriage license, a formal requisite.

• Article 34, Family Code — Dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years without legal impediment, provided they execute an affidavit to that effect. Applied and found inapplicable because the affidavit was false and no cohabitation existed.

• Article 40, Family Code — Requires a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void before a party may remarry. Cited to clarify that the final judgment requirement applies specifically to remarriage, not to collateral determinations of marital validity for other purposes.

• Article 172, Family Code — Enumerates the means by which legitimate filiation may be proven: record of birth, final judgment, admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument, open and continuous possession of status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Applied by analogy to illegitimate filiation through Article 175.

• Article 175, Family Code — Provides that illegitimate children may establish their filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Applied to uphold the child's filiation with petitioner through the birth certificate and his affidavit of admission.

Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Chairperson), Antonio T. Carpio, Conchita Carpio Morales, and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. concurred.