Dawat, Jr. vs. People

Self-defense cannot be successfully invoked where unlawful aggression has ceased to exist, as when the accused leaves the scene to retrieve a weapon and returns to attack the former aggressor — such conduct constitutes retaliation, not self-defense. Additionally, minor inconsistencies in prosecution witnesses' testimonies on collateral matters do not discredit their entire testimony but instead enhance credibility by negating any suspicion of rehearsed testimony.

Petitioner Romeo Dawat, Jr. and victim Wenceslao Flores were residents of Purok 3, Barangay Pambuhan, Mercedes, Camarines Norte. On the evening of September 22, 2011, a group including Emily Aloc, Sherly Abanto, Robert Oliva, and Wenceslao was gathered at the terrace of the house of Emily's sister-in-law, Nena Aloc, for a drinking spree. Petitioner was at his own house in the same vicinity. The charge arose under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, penalizing homicide with reclusion temporal.

On September 22, 2011, at about 10:00 in the evening, Emily Aloc, Sherly Abanto, Robert Oliva, and Wenceslao Flores were having a drinking spree at the terrace of the house of Emily's sister-in-law, Nena Aloc, at Purok 3, Barangay Pambuhan, Mercedes, Camarines Norte. Robert went inside the house to get water while Wenceslao excused himself to answer the call of nature. When the group noticed that Wenceslao had not returned, Emily started looking for him. About four arm's length from where she was searching, she saw petitioner Romeo Dawat, Jr. holding Wenceslao by the neck while poking a bolo at the victim's neck. She then witnessed petitioner slit Wenceslao's neck, causing it to bleed. Petitioner subsequently released Wenceslao, grabbed Emily, poked the bolo at her, and threatened that she would be the next victim. Emily pleaded for her life and petitioner yielded.

Robert heard the commotion outside and looked through the window, seeing Wenceslao bleeding. Wenceslao told him, "Pare, may tama ako, tinira ako ni Romeo Dawat." Thereafter, Wenceslao proceeded to his father's house. Emily followed Wenceslao and went to the barangay to look for his siblings, who were attending a gathering there. Myrna Flores, Wenceslao's sister, was advised to check on her injured brother. Upon arriving at their father's house, she found Wenceslao bloodied and lying face down on the floor. When she asked who was responsible, Wenceslao replied that it was petitioner and stated that he was going to die and would not last until morning. Wenceslao was brought to the hospital but was declared dead on arrival. The cause of death was "Hemorrhagic Shock Secondary to Hacked (sic) Wound on the Left Lateral Neck."

Petitioner invoked self-defense. He testified that he was sleeping at the back of his house when he was awakened by the shouts of Robert and Wenceslao, with Robert throwing stones at his house. Robert and Wenceslao demanded that he come outside, but he refused and went to the back of his house. Wenceslao jumped over the fence and threw a stone at him once, which missed. Wenceslao then approached and punched him. Petitioner noticed that Wenceslao was holding a knife in his left hand, so he grabbed a bolo. He held Wenceslao by the head and asked what his problem was; Wenceslao allegedly replied, "Isang bala ka lang." While petitioner was poking the bolo at Wenceslao's neck, the latter moved, causing his neck to rub against the bolo and resulting in injury. Petitioner claimed he did not intend to kill the victim.

The trial court convicted petitioner of homicide, crediting the prosecution witnesses' testimonies and noting petitioner's own admission of the killing in his failed attempt to invoke self-defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification, reducing the civil indemnity to PhP50,000 and adding PhP50,000 in temperate damages, finding that petitioner's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt through Emily's positive identification and the victim's dying declaration, and that self-defense was unavailing for lack of unlawful aggression.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Petitioner argued that a single inconsistency in the testimonies of Emily and Robert — regarding whether Wenceslao was present during the drinking spree — should have led the CA to discredit their entire testimonies.
• Self-Defense: Petitioner maintained that the CA should have appreciated and given full credit to his claim of self-defense, asserting that Wenceslao's collective actuations — following him to his backyard, throwing a stone at him while armed with a knife, and threatening him — posed actual and imminent danger constituting unlawful aggression.
• Cause of Injury: Petitioner claimed that he did not slit Wenceslao's neck; rather, it was the victim's own movement while the bolo was poked at him that caused the injury, effectively arguing it was the victim's own fault.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Whether the CA erred in giving full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses despite an alleged inconsistency.
• Self-Defense: Whether the CA erred in not giving credence to petitioner's claim of self-defense.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: No. The inconsistency pertained to a minor, collateral detail — Wenceslao's presence or absence during the drinking spree — which did not negate the fact that he was present in the area and was fatally injured by petitioner. Minor inconsistencies enhance credibility by removing suspicion of rehearsed testimony.
• Self-Defense: No. Unlawful aggression — the indispensable first element of self-defense — was absent at the time petitioner allegedly defended himself. Even assuming initial unlawful aggression existed when Wenceslao threw a stone and punched petitioner, such aggression ceased when petitioner left to retrieve a bolo, and his subsequent attack constituted retaliation, not self-defense.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Factual findings of the trial court carry great weight and respect due to its unique opportunity to observe witnesses on the stand, and appellate courts will not overturn such findings absent facts or circumstances of weight and substance affecting the result — a rule applied with even greater stringency where the CA sustains those findings. The inconsistency petitioner identified — whether Wenceslao was present during the drinking spree — concerned a minor, collateral matter unrelated to the essential elements of the crime charged. Wenceslao's presence or absence during the drinking spree did not negate the fact that he was present in or near the area and was fatally injured by petitioner. Such minor inconsistencies enhance credibility, for they remove any suspicion that the testimonies were contrived or rehearsed. Petitioner did not even attempt to show that the witnesses were impelled by ill motive to testify falsely.

• Self-Defense: By invoking self-defense, petitioner effectively admitted inflicting the fatal injury, shifting the burden of proof to him to establish the elements of his defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on his part. Unlawful aggression is the indispensable first element — without it, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete. Unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected, or imminent danger; mere threatening or intimidating action is insufficient, and the peril must be imminent and actual, not merely speculative. Here, Wenceslao threw a stone only once and missed; he did not use the knife to strike; and there was no description of the stone's size. Even assuming initial unlawful aggression existed, it ceased when petitioner left to retrieve a bolo — there was no showing Wenceslao followed him or continued his aggression. The logical conclusion is that petitioner left and ran to get a bolo; the moment he left, unlawful aggression had ceased. When petitioner returned and slit Wenceslao's neck, he did so to retaliate. Furthermore, when petitioner returned with the bolo, he had Wenceslao under control — poking the bolo at his neck and questioning him — at which point unlawful aggression no longer existed. Wenceslao's verbal threat ("Isang bala ka lang") did not constitute unlawful aggression because it was not real and imminent; petitioner failed to establish that Wenceslao actually possessed a gun or pointed one at him. When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor; otherwise, retaliation — not self-defense — is committed. Additionally, Emily's positive identification of petitioner as the one who slit Wenceslao's neck, corroborated by her sworn statement, and the victim's dying declaration to both Robert and Myrna — satisfying all four requisites of a dying declaration under People vs. Salafranca — independently established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Unlawful Aggression as Indispensable Element of Self-Defense — Unlawful aggression is the indispensable first element of self-defense; without it, there can be no self-defense, whether complete (as a justifying circumstance) or incomplete (as a privileged mitigating circumstance). Unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected, or imminent danger to one's life. Mere threatening or intimidating action does not amount to unlawful aggression. The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely speculative. When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor; otherwise, retaliation — not self-defense — is committed. The Court applied this doctrine by finding that even if Wenceslao initially committed unlawful aggression by throwing a stone and punching petitioner, such aggression ceased when petitioner left to retrieve a bolo, making his subsequent attack retaliatory rather than defensive.

• Burden of Proof Shifts Upon Invocation of Self-Defense — When the accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof shifts to the accused to prove the elements of his defense. It becomes incumbent upon him to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence, for even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused had admitted the killing. By invoking self-defense, the accused effectively admits having inflicted the fatal injury.

• Dying Declaration — A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as hearsay, may be admitted when the following requisites concur: (a) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim. All four requisites were found present: Wenceslao communicated to Robert and Myrna that he was injured by petitioner; he told Myrna he was going to die and would not last until morning; he was presumed competent to testify; and the declaration was offered in a homicide prosecution where he was the victim.

• Minor Inconsistencies Enhance Credibility — Inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration nor the veracity or weight of their testimony. On the contrary, these minor inconsistencies enhance the credibility of the witnesses, for they remove any suspicion that their testimonies were contrived or rehearsed.

• "There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, without the element of unlawful aggression." — This passage states the indispensable character of unlawful aggression as the first element of self-defense, serving as the ratio decidendi for the rejection of petitioner's defense.

• "When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed." — This formulation distinguishes self-defense from retaliation, the critical distinction upon which the Court found petitioner's conduct to be retaliatory rather than defensive.

• "Inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration nor the veracity or weight of their testimony. On the contrary, these minor inconsistencies enhance the credibility of the witnesses, for they remove any suspicion that their testimonies were contrived or rehearsed." — This is the canonical statement of the doctrine on minor inconsistencies enhancing witness credibility, frequently cited in Philippine jurisprudence on evidence.

• People vs. Salafranca, 682 Phil. 470 (2012) — Cited as the controlling authority for the four requisites of a dying declaration. The Court applied its test and found all requisites present.
• People vs. Damitan, 423 Phil. 113 (2001) — Cited for the rule that when an accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof shifts to the accused, who must rely on the strength of his own evidence.
• People vs. Reyes, 823 Phil. 695 (708 (2018)) — Cited for the three elements of self-defense: unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation.
• Dela Cruz vs. People, 747 Phil. 376 (2014) — Cited for the definition of unlawful aggression as presupposing actual, sudden, unexpected, or imminent danger, and for the rule that when unlawful aggression ceases, retaliation — not self-defense — is committed.
• Calma vs. People, 820 Phil. 858 (2017) — Cited for the doctrine that minor inconsistencies in testimonies on collateral matters enhance rather than diminish witness credibility.
• People vs. Gerola, 813 Phil. 1055 (2017) — Cited for the rule that factual findings of the trial court carry great weight and respect, and that appellate courts will not overturn them absent circumstances of weight and substance, with more stringent application where the CA sustains those findings.
• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — Cited for the proper awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and temperate damages in homicide cases.

• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes homicide: any person who kills another without the attendance of any qualifying circumstances of murder, or parricide or infanticide, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and punished by reclusion temporal. The Court applied this provision to convict petitioner, imposing the penalty in its medium period since neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances were present.
• Article 64, Revised Penal Code — Provides rules for the application of penalties containing three periods; when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. The Court used this provision to fix the imposable penalty at reclusion temporal in its medium period.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225), Section 1 — Mandates that in imposing a prison sentence for an RPC offense, the court shall prescribe an indeterminate sentence with a maximum term that could properly be imposed under the RPC rules and a minimum term within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed. The Court applied this to affirm the indeterminate penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor (minimum) to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal (maximum).

Chief Justice Gesmundo, Justice Leonen (Chairperson), Justice Inting, and Justice J. Lopez concurred.