David vs. Gutierrez-Fruelda

A party's voluntary appearance through motions seeking affirmative relief from the trial court is equivalent to service of summons and cures any defect in the mode of service, including service by publication; and a motion to lift an order of default must strictly comply with Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court by being under oath, alleging that the failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, and accompanied by an affidavit of merit showing a meritorious defense.

Private respondents Vicente L. Panlilio, Roberto L. Panlilio, Remedios P. Papa, Adelwisa P. Fernandez, and Lourdes D. Panlilio are co-owners of agricultural lands over which petitioner Roberto R. David held a special power of attorney. The dispute arose from petitioner's alleged fraudulent exercise of that authority, prompting private respondents to seek accounting, reconveyance, and damages. Petitioner was abroad when the complaint was filed, necessitating service of summons by publication.

On September 17, 2004, private respondents Vicente L. Panlilio, Roberto L. Panlilio, Remedios P. Papa, Adelwisa P. Fernandez, and Lourdes D. Panlilio, represented by their attorney-in-fact Vicente L. Panlilio, filed a complaint for accounting, reconveyance, and damages with a prayer for preliminary attachment against petitioner Roberto R. David, his wife Marissa David, and the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, docketed as Civil Case No. 13008 before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 43. Private respondents alleged that petitioner had fraudulently exceeded his special power of attorney by causing the conversion of their agricultural lands to residential, commercial, and industrial purposes, registering some of the lands in his own name, mortgaging others, failing to remit or account for any money received from transactions involving their lands, and absconding.

Personal service of summons could not be effected because petitioner was abroad. On January 24, 2005, the RTC ordered service by publication. The last date of publication was March 19, 2005. Private respondents thereafter moved to declare petitioner in default, asserting that he had failed to file an answer within 60 days from the date of last publication, which lapsed on May 19, 2005. On July 14, 2005, petitioner filed a motion for extension of 15 days within which to file an answer, accompanied by an opposition to the motion to declare him in default.

The following day, July 15, 2005, the RTC declared petitioner in default, noting that the period to answer had lapsed on May 19, 2005, and that petitioner had failed to answer despite "many opportunities" given to him. The RTC simultaneously denied the motion for extension and allowed private respondents to present evidence ex parte against petitioner. Petitioner then moved to lift the order of default and sought another extension of 15 days, arguing that declarations of default are frowned upon, that he should be given the opportunity to present evidence in the interest of substantial justice, and that he had meritorious defenses. The RTC denied this motion on September 21, 2005, finding it fatally flawed under Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court because it was not under oath, was unaccompanied by an affidavit of merit, and contained no allegation that the failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The RTC further noted that petitioner's bare allegation of having meritorious defenses was insufficient. Petitioner then elevated the matter directly to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Denying Lift of Default Order: Petitioner alleged that the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in denying the lifting of the order of default and in holding that sufficient time had been given to file an answer, when copies of the complaint and alias summons were sent by registered mail as evidenced by a registry receipt rather than a registry return card, and when no affidavit showing deposit of a copy of the summons and order of publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to petitioner by registered mail to his last known address, was shown by private respondents.
• Non-Compliance with Rule 14, Section 15: Petitioner argued that the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in denying the motion to lift the order of default for supposed failure to follow Section 3(b), Rule 9 to the letter, when the judge herself failed to follow the mandate of Section 15, Rule 14 to specify, in the order granting leave for extraterritorial service, a reasonable time not less than 60 days after notice within which the defendant must answer.

• Compliance with Rule 9, Section 3(b): Private respondents countered that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to lift the order of default because the motion was not under oath, did not contain an allegation that the failure to file an answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, and was unaccompanied by an affidavit of merit showing that petitioner had a meritorious defense.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Default Order: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to lift the order of default.
• Validity of Service of Summons: Whether alleged defects in the service of summons by publication invalidated the RTC's acquisition of jurisdiction over petitioner.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Default Order: No. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to lift the order of default, as the motion failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
• Validity of Service of Summons: No defect in service of summons could be relied upon by petitioner, his voluntary appearance through motions seeking affirmative relief having cured any alleged defect and conferred jurisdiction over his person.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Default Order: A party declared in default may, at any time after discovery and before judgment, file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that the failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence and that the party has a meritorious defense. Petitioner availed of this remedy but failed to satisfy its basic requirements: the motion was not under oath, contained no allegation of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, and was unaccompanied by an affidavit of merit. His bare assertion that he had meritorious defenses was unsubstantiated, and he did not even state what evidence he intended to present. While default orders are generally viewed with disfavor, the RTC correctly denied relief where the motion was fatally deficient. The Supreme Court also noted that petitioner failed to attach a copy of the motion to lift the order of default to his petition, as required by Section 3, Rule 46, which alone would have been sufficient ground for dismissal, though private respondents supplied the missing document. Additionally, petitioner disregarded the hierarchy of courts by filing the certiorari petition directly with the Supreme Court instead of the Court of Appeals.

• Validity of Service of Summons: Petitioner's challenge to the service of summons by publication was rendered moot by his voluntary appearance. By filing two motions for extension of time to file an answer, with opposition to the motion to declare him in default and a motion to lift the order of default, petitioner invoked the RTC's jurisdiction and sought affirmative relief. Under Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court, voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons and cures any alleged defect therein. Petitioner's motions were not motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person; on the contrary, they sought the RTC's affirmative action. Thus, petitioner waived any defect in the service of summons by publication, and the RTC necessarily acquired jurisdiction over his person by acting on his motions.

• Voluntary Appearance as Equivalent to Service of Summons — Under Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court, the defendant's voluntary appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant does not constitute voluntary appearance. In this case, petitioner's filing of motions seeking affirmative relief — extension of time to answer, opposition to being declared in default, and lifting of the default order — constituted voluntary appearance, curing any defect in the service of summons by publication and conferring jurisdiction over his person.

• Requisites of a Motion to Lift Order of Default — Under Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a party declared in default may file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that: (a) the failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence; and (b) the party has a meritorious defense. The motion must be under oath and accompanied by an affidavit of merit. In this case, petitioner's motion was not under oath, contained no allegation of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, and failed to substantiate the claim of meritorious defense, rendering it fatally deficient.

• Hierarchy of Courts — Resort to the higher courts should be made in accordance with their hierarchical order. The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. Petitioner's direct filing with the Supreme Court, bypassing the Court of Appeals, constituted non-compliance with this doctrine.

• "His voluntary appearance was equivalent to service of summons. It has cured any alleged defect in the service of summons." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the effect of voluntary appearance on defective service of summons, establishing that seeking affirmative relief from the trial court waives any defect in service.

• "Thus, petitioner waived any defect in the service of summons by publication or even want of process because for the RTC to validly act on his motions, it necessarily acquired jurisdiction over his person." — This reinforces the doctrine that voluntary appearance confers jurisdiction, distinguishing motions seeking affirmative relief from motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person.

• "Unfortunately, his claim that he has meritorious defenses is unsubstantiated. He did not even state what evidence he intends to present if his motion is granted." — This illustrates the strict application of Section 3(b), Rule 9, showing that a bare allegation of meritorious defense without an affidavit of merit or specification of evidence is insufficient to lift an order of default.

• Cezar vs. Ricafort-Bautista, G.R. No. 136415, October 31, 2006, 506 SCRA 322 — Followed for the proposition that voluntary appearance cures any alleged defect in the service of summons.
• Villareal vs. CA, 356 Phil. 826 (1998) — Followed for the principle that seeking affirmative relief from the trial court waives defects in service and confers jurisdiction over the person.
• Cerezo vs. Tuazon, G.R. No. 141538, March 23, 2004, 426 SCRA 167 — Followed for the enumeration of remedies available to a party declared in default, including the availability of certiorari when grave abuse of discretion attends the declaration of default.
• Delos Santos vs. Carpio, G.R. No. 153696, September 11, 2006, 501 SCRA 390 — Followed for the doctrine that default orders are not viewed with favor.
• Velayo-Fong vs. Velayo, G.R. No. 155488, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 320 — Followed for the requirement that a motion to lift an order of default must comply with Section 3(b), Rule 9, including substantiation of the claim of meritorious defense.
• St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC, 356 Phil. 811 (1998) — Followed for the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, requiring resort to lower tribunals before elevation to the Supreme Court.

• Section 3(b), Rule 9, Rules of Court — Governs relief from orders of default. A party declared in default may file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon showing that the failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence and that the party has a meritorious defense. Applied to deny petitioner's motion, which failed to meet any of these requirements.
• Section 20, Rule 14, Rules of Court — Provides that the defendant's voluntary appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons, and that inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person does not constitute voluntary appearance. Applied to hold that petitioner's motions for extension and lifting of default constituted voluntary appearance, curing defects in service by publication.
• Section 15, Rule 14, Rules of Court — Requires that an order granting leave for extraterritorial service specify a reasonable time, not less than 60 days after notice, within which the defendant must answer. Petitioner invoked this provision to argue that the RTC failed to comply with its mandate, but the issue was rendered moot by his voluntary appearance.
• Section 3, Rule 46, Rules of Court — Requires that a petition for certiorari be accompanied by certified true copies of the orders challenged and other relevant documents. Petitioner's failure to attach the motion to lift the order of default was noted as a sufficient ground for dismissal.
• Section 13, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Requires that conclusions in a Division decision be reached in consultation before assignment to the writer of the opinion. Cited in the certification appended to the decision.

Associate Justice Renato C. Corona, Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, and Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion concurred. No separate concurring opinions were written.