David vs. Court of Appeals

Self-defense is unavailing where unlawful aggression has already ceased before the accused fires at the victims, even if the accused had earlier been attacked; however, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority may be appreciated when the accused's age at the time of the crime is established by his own statement and corroborating testimony and the prosecution offers no contrary evidence.

Petitioner Joaquin E. David was charged in two separate informations with homicide and frustrated homicide arising from a shooting incident on March 28, 1981, in Malabon, Metro Manila, which resulted in the death of Noel Nora and the serious wounding of his brother, Narciso Nora, Jr. The dispute originated from derogatory remarks petitioner had allegedly made, which led to a confrontation between petitioner and the Nora brothers along Flerida Street near their residences. Petitioner's father was a policeman whose .38 caliber firearm was used in the shooting.

On March 28, 1981, at about 10:00 p.m., the Nora brothers — Arturo, Arnel, Noel, and Narciso — were walking along Flerida Street in Malabon, Metro Manila, on their way home to Capitan Tiago Street. They saw petitioner Joaquin E. David near the compound of his house. Noel Nora, the deceased, confronted petitioner about derogatory remarks allegedly made by the latter. Petitioner ran to his house to get a gun. When the Nora brothers reached the intersection of Flerida and Capitan Tiago Streets, petitioner shouted at them "Putang ina ninyo" and other epithets, and then fired four times at them. One shot hit Noel, killing him. Another shot hit Narciso Nora on the ankle. Another nearly hit the zipper of Arturo Nora.

Petitioner claimed self-defense. He alleged that on the night in question, he went to the corner of Flerida and Capitan Tiago Streets because Noel Nora had earlier challenged him to a fight. Upon reaching the place, he found that Noel had brought along his three brothers and other companions who ganged up on him. Petitioner claimed that Noel Nora stabbed him with a knife, hitting him on the left arm, and that the group could have stabbed him several times more had he not been able to dodge their blows. When he tried to run away, the victim's brothers held both his arms while Narciso hit him with a piece of wood on the thighs and buttocks and the others boxed him on the abdomen. Petitioner said he was able to run away, but the Nora brothers chased him, shouting, "We will enter your house and we will kill you." Petitioner therefore took the .38 caliber gun of his father, a policeman, from the cabinet on the ground floor of their house.

Petitioner went out of the house. The Nora brothers, who were just five steps away from the door of their house, ran after seeing that petitioner had a gun. But after running to the other side of the street, they hurled stones at petitioner and shouted derogatory words at him. Petitioner claimed he afterward went inside the compound, but he slipped, whereupon the Nora brothers advanced toward him. He warned them not to get near, but they kept coming closer, for which reason petitioner fired at them. Petitioner was then from four to five meters away from the group. Petitioner afterward went inside their house and gave the gun to his mother.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals both found that the shooting occurred outside petitioner's residential compound, on the streets, after petitioner had retrieved his father's gun from their house. Defense witnesses Eduardo Bartolo and Pilar David (petitioner's mother) corroborated that petitioner was near or entering the gate of their compound when the shooting happened, not inside it. Defense witness Inocencio Antonio testified that the victims were already retreating — frightened and running away — when petitioner advanced and fired at them. The appellate court found that while petitioner had indeed been mauled and beaten up by the deceased and his companions, the aggression stopped when petitioner was able to free himself and seek refuge in his house; by going back out with a gun, his act became retaliatory rather than defensive.

• Self-Defense: Petitioner contended that the elements of self-defense were established by clear, sufficient, credible, and convincing evidence, arguing that the unlawful aggression of the Noras and their group did not cease and that the Court of Appeals' finding to the contrary was unsupported by the evidence, particularly the testimonies of defense witnesses Inocencio Antonio and Florthelito Vergara.
• Exculpatory Facts: Petitioner claimed the appellate court failed to consider exculpatory facts in his favor, including that he suffered injuries from the attack by the Noras, that he felt depressed and vomited after the shooting and had to be hospitalized (showing he was not a killer at heart), that he fired with his eyes closed (evidenced by Narciso Nora being hit only on the ankle), and that the deceased and his brothers were bullies of violent character who had been charged with slight physical injuries.
• Incomplete Self-Defense and Other Mitigating Circumstances: Petitioner argued that at the very least, incomplete self-defense should be appreciated, and that additional mitigating circumstances should be credited: sufficient provocation or threat by the offended party immediately preceding the act, immediate vindication of a grave offense, and passion or obfuscation.
• Presumption of Innocence: Petitioner contended that the decision of the Court of Appeals was not in accordance with the constitutional presumption of innocence.

• Self-Defense: Whether the elements of self-defense, particularly unlawful aggression, were established by the evidence to justify the shooting of the Nora brothers.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the testimonies of the defense witnesses, despite inconsistencies, should be preferred over those of the prosecution witnesses.
• Incomplete Self-Defense: Whether incomplete self-defense may be appreciated in petitioner's favor.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation, immediate vindication of a grave offense, and passion or obfuscation should be appreciated, and whether the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority applies.
• Damages: Whether the awards of damages by the lower courts were proper and consistent with current jurisprudence.

• Self-Defense: No. Unlawful aggression had ceased when petitioner retrieved a gun from his house and returned to shoot the victims, making his act retaliatory rather than defensive; self-defense requires that the aggression still exists when the aggressor is injured or disabled.
• Credibility of Witnesses: No. The trial court's findings on witness credibility are entitled to great respect, and the inconsistencies in defense witness testimonies — particularly regarding the number of warning shots and the locus of the shooting — undermined their credibility.
• Incomplete Self-Defense: No. The finding that there was no unlawful aggression at the time of the shooting rules out self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, because unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of both.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Yes, in part. The privileged mitigating circumstance of minority was appreciated (petitioner was 17 at the time of the crime), along with voluntary surrender and immediate vindication of a grave offense; however, passion or obfuscation and sufficient provocation cannot be considered separately from vindication of a grave offense as they all arose from the same incident.
• Damages: Modified. Death indemnity was increased to P50,000; actual damages were reduced to amounts supported by receipts (P22,000 for Noel Nora's death, P1,928.65 for Narciso Nora's injuries); moral damages and attorney's fees were sustained.

• Self-Defense: The accused who claims self-defense must prove its elements clearly and convincingly, because such a claim proceeds from the admission that he killed or wounded another — a felony for which he should be criminally liable unless he establishes legitimate defense. The indispensable element of unlawful aggression requires that the aggression still exists when the aggressor is injured or disabled. Here, while petitioner was indeed mauled and beaten up by the deceased and his companions, the aggression stopped when petitioner was able to free himself and seek refuge in his house. By going back out with his father's gun and shooting the retreating victims, petitioner's act became retaliatory — done to avenge the pain and injuries he had suffered — rather than defensive. Defense witness Inocencio Antonio himself testified that the victims were frightened and retreated after seeing petitioner armed with a gun, and that petitioner then advanced toward them. An act of aggression, when its author does not persist in his purpose or discontinues his attitude so that the object of attack is no longer in peril, does not constitute unlawful aggression warranting self-defense.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect because it has the opportunity to observe the deportment of witnesses and their manner of testifying. The trial court's painstaking analysis of the evidence and its conclusion that prosecution witnesses were more credible than defense witnesses should be upheld absent proof that it overlooked important matters. The defense witnesses' testimonies were inconsistent on material points: petitioner claimed he fired one warning shot, while defense witness Antonio testified to two warning shots, then later attempted to correct himself, only succeeding in showing that he had lied. The locus of the shooting was also contradicted by defense witnesses Bartolo and Pilar David, who placed petitioner near or entering the gate of the compound — outside the residence — rather than inside it as claimed. Petitioner's reliance on People vs. Quiritan was unavailing because in that case, the delay in producing witnesses (two years) coupled with confusing testimonies showed fabrication, whereas nothing in this case indicated the prosecution witnesses' testimonies were fabricated.

• Incomplete Self-Defense: Incomplete self-defense requires the presence of at least one element of self-defense, most critically unlawful aggression. Since the Court found that there was no longer any unlawful aggression when petitioner shot the victims, the possibility of self-defense — whether complete or incomplete — is ruled out. Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element; without it, neither complete nor incomplete self-defense can be appreciated.

• Mitigating Circumstances: The mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense was appreciated because petitioner had been beaten up by the Noras and their companions. Although the unlawful aggression had ceased when petitioner shot the Nora brothers, the mauling was nonetheless a grave offense for the vindication of which petitioner may be given the benefit of a mitigating circumstance. However, passion or obfuscation and sufficient provocation cannot be considered apart from vindication of a grave offense because all three circumstances arose from one and the same incident — the attack on petitioner — and should be treated as one mitigating circumstance. Critically, the Court found that petitioner was only 17 years old on March 28, 1981, based on his sworn statement to the police ("17 taong gulang") and his mother's testimony that he was "16 or 17" at the time. When the accused alleges minority and the prosecution does not disprove the claim by contrary evidence, the allegation can be accepted as fact; any doubt as to age is resolved in favor of the accused. The privileged mitigating circumstance of minority (under Article 68, RPC) reduces the penalty by one degree. With two ordinary mitigating circumstances (voluntary surrender and immediate vindication of a grave offense) and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty is further reduced by one degree pursuant to Article 64, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court rejected the argument that petitioner's lack of incorrigibility was a ground for reducing the penalty, as that pertains to suspension of judgment for youthful offenders under Article 192 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which could no longer be ordered since petitioner was already over 18 when the trial court rendered its decision.

• Damages: The award of P30,000 as indemnity for the death of Noel Nora was increased to P50,000 pursuant to current rulings. The award of P37,000 for actual damages was reduced to P22,000 because only expenses supported by receipts and actually expended in connection with the death may be allowed; actual damages cannot be based on the bare allegation of a witness without supporting documents. Only P22,000 was supported by a receipt (Exh. X) for funeral expenses. Moral damages of P30,000 and attorney's fees of P20,000 were deemed reasonable and allowed. For the shooting of Narciso Nora, Jr., actual damages were reduced from P8,728 to P1,928.65, as the receipts (Exhs. Y and Z) showed payment of only that amount to the National Orthopedic Hospital. Moral damages of P20,000 were sustained as just and reasonable.

• Elements of Self-Defense — Self-defense requires: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element; without it, self-defense — whether complete or incomplete — cannot be appreciated. An act of aggression, when its author does not persist in his purpose or discontinues his attitude so that the object of attack is no longer in peril, is not unlawful aggression. The Court applied this by finding that the Nora brothers' aggression had ceased when petitioner escaped to his house; his subsequent return with a gun to shoot the retreating victims was retaliatory, not defensive.

• Retaliation Distinguished from Self-Defense — In retaliation, the aggression begun by the injured party has already ceased when the accused attacks him. In self-defense, the aggression still exists when the aggressor is injured or disabled by the person making the defense. The act of repelling unlawful aggression must immediately follow such aggression. The Court found petitioner's conduct retaliatory because he retrieved a firearm and returned to shoot victims who were already retreating.

• Credibility of Witnesses; Trial Court's Findings — Findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect because it has the opportunity to observe the deportment of witnesses and their manner of testifying. Such findings should be upheld absent proof that the trial court overlooked important matters bearing on credibility. The Court sustained the trial court's assessment that prosecution witnesses were more credible than defense witnesses, whose testimonies were inconsistent on material points.

• Minority as a Privileged Mitigating Circumstance — If the accused alleges minority and the prosecution does not disprove the claim by contrary evidence, the allegation can be accepted as fact. Any doubt as to whether the accused is over or under 18 years of age is resolved in his favor. Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority (over 15 and under 18) reduces the penalty by one degree. The Court applied this based on petitioner's sworn statement giving his age as 17 and his mother's corroborating testimony, with no contrary evidence from the prosecution.

• Imposition of Penalty with Privileged and Ordinary Mitigating Circumstances — When a privileged mitigating circumstance (minority) and two ordinary mitigating circumstances (voluntary surrender and immediate vindication of a grave offense) are present with no aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced by one degree for the privileged circumstance, and further reduced by one degree under Article 64, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code for the two ordinary circumstances without any aggravating circumstance. The Indeterminate Sentence Law is then applied to the resulting penalty.

• Actual Damages Must Be Supported by Receipts — Only expenses supported by receipts and which appear to have been actually expended in connection with the death or injury of the victim should be allowed. The award of actual damages cannot be based on the allegation of a witness without any tangible document to support such claim.

• Unity of Mitigating Circumstances Arising from the Same Incident — Mitigating circumstances of passion or obfuscation and sufficient provocation cannot be considered separately from the circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense when all three arose from one and the same incident. They should be considered as one mitigating circumstance.

• "An act of aggression, when its author does not persist in his purpose, or when he discontinues his attitude to the extent that the object of his attack is no longer in peril, is not unlawful aggression warranting self-defense." — This passage defines the cessation of unlawful aggression, the indispensable element of self-defense, and explains why petitioner's claim failed: the victims had already retreated.

• "In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party has already ceased when the accused attacks him. In self-defense, the aggression still exists when the aggressor is injured or disabled by the person making the defense." — This distinguishes retaliation from self-defense, the critical distinction on which the rejection of petitioner's defense turned.

• "If the accused alleges minority and the prosecution does not disprove his claim by contrary evidence, such allegation can be accepted as fact." — This states the rule on appreciation of minority as a mitigating circumstance when age is disputed or unproven by the prosecution, which led to the significant reduction of petitioner's penalty.

• "Any doubt in respect of age of the accused is resolved in his favor." — This principle, drawn from early American-period jurisprudence, was applied to accept petitioner's age as 17 at the time of the crime, entitling him to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.

• Castanares vs. Court of Appeals, 92 SCRA 567 — Cited for the rule that an accused claiming self-defense must prove its elements clearly and convincingly, because the claim proceeds from admission of the killing or wounding.
• People vs. Macariola, 120 SCRA 92 — Cited for the definition of unlawful aggression: an act of aggression is not unlawful aggression warranting self-defense when its author does not persist in his purpose or discontinues his attitude so that the object of attack is no longer in peril.
• US vs. Ferrer, 1 Phil. 56 — Cited for the principle that the act of repelling unlawful aggression must immediately follow such aggression.
• People vs. Quiritan, 197 SCRA 32 (1991) — Distinguished; petitioner relied on it for the proposition that guilt cannot be predicated on delayed and inconclusive eyewitness testimonies showing fabrication, but the Court found it inapplicable because nothing showed the prosecution witnesses' testimonies were fabricated.
• People vs. Cabiles, 248 SCRA 207 (1995) — Cited for the doctrine that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect.
• US vs. Bergantino, 3 Phil. 118 (1903) — Followed for the rule that if the accused alleges minority and the prosecution does not disprove the claim, the allegation can be accepted as fact, and any doubt as to age is resolved in favor of the accused.
• US vs. Barbicho, 13 Phil. 616 (1909) — Followed for the principle that in the absence of proof that the accused was 18 on the day of the crime, he must be considered under that age and the mitigating circumstance of minority applied.
• US vs. Agadas, 36 Phil. 246 (1917) — Followed for the rule that where there is reasonable doubt as to whether the accused was 18 at the time of the crime, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the defendant.
• People vs. Sumaoy, 263 SCRA 460 (1996) — Cited as basis for increasing the death indemnity from P30,000 to P50,000 pursuant to current rulings.
• Fuentes, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 430 (1996) — Followed for the rule that actual damages must be supported by receipts and cannot be based on unsupported allegations.
• People vs. De los Santos, 85 Phil. 870 (1950) and People vs. Dagatan, 106 Phil. 88 (1959) — Cited for the principle that mitigating circumstances arising from one and the same incident should be considered as one mitigating circumstance.

• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and prescribes the penalty for homicide (reclusion temporal). Applied as the base penalty for the homicide charge.
• Article 50, Revised Penal Code — Provides that a felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution that would produce the felony as a consequence, but which do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the offender. Applied to the frustrated homicide charge, with the penalty one degree lower than that for consummated homicide.
• Article 68, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Applied as the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
• Article 64, paragraph 5, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Applied after the privileged reduction for minority, further reducing the penalty for the presence of voluntary surrender and immediate vindication of a grave offense.
• Article 13, paragraphs 4, 5, and 6, Revised Penal Code — Defines the ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat (par. 4), immediate vindication of a grave offense (par. 5), and passion or obfuscation (par. 6). Paragraph 5 was appreciated; paragraphs 4 and 6 were held to be subsumed in paragraph 5 as arising from the same incident.
• Article 192, Child and Youth Welfare Code (P.D. No. 603, as amended) — Formerly Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code; provides for suspension of judgment of youthful offenders (over 9 but under 18). The Court held this could no longer be ordered because petitioner was already over 18 when the trial court rendered its decision, and that it is not a mitigating circumstance for purposes of reducing the penalty.
• Rule 130, §51, Revised Rules on Evidence — Pertains to the admissibility of evidence of the violent and dangerous character of the deceased when self-defense is claimed and the character of the slaying is doubtful. The Court noted this rule but found no inference of violent character could be drawn from dismissed cases filed against the deceased.

Regalado, Puno, and Martinez, JJ., concurred. Melo, J., was on leave.