David vs. Calilung

A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under the Family Code may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, to the exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs and a prior spouse whose marriage was already judicially declared void; the compulsory heirs may, however, collaterally attack the validity of the marriage in proceedings for the settlement of the deceased spouse's estate, and the prior spouse may file a separate civil action for partition against the estate administrator.

Lucila David married Rene Aguas on November 24, 1981 in Mabalacat, Pampanga, and they had five children — the Aguas heirs. On December 22, 2005, a RTC decision declared their marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity (the 2005 Nullity Decision), but that decision was never registered with the Registry of Deeds, no actual partition of conjugal properties was undertaken, and the presumptive legitimes of the children were not delivered. Rene contracted a second marriage with Cherry Calilung on October 7, 2006, and died intestate on November 17, 2015. The legal framework at issue includes R.A. No. 8369 (the Family Courts Act of 1997), which created and granted exclusive jurisdiction to Family Courts over complaints for declaration of nullity of marriage; A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages), which limits the filing of such petitions solely to the husband or wife; and Articles 52 and 53 of the Family Code, which require the partition and distribution of properties and delivery of presumptive legitimes before a subsequent marriage may be validly contracted.

Lucila David married Rene Aguas on November 24, 1981 in Mabalacat, Pampanga. Out of their marital union, they begot five children: Princess Luren, Danica Lane, Sean Patrick, Sean Michael, and Samantha — collectively, the Aguas heirs. The spouses acquired conjugal properties, including a 500-square-meter parcel of land in Sunset Valley Estate, Angeles City, covered by TCT No. 90811 in their names, as well as merchandise inventory in Rene's pawnshop and ready-to-wear sales business.

On December 10, 2003, Rene filed a petition to declare his marriage with Lucila null and void on the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity, declaring the Sunset Valley Estate property and the business inventory as conjugal properties. On December 22, 2005, the RTC rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 11284 declaring the marriage null and void (the 2005 Nullity Decision), ordering the division of the conjugal properties and the delivery of the presumptive legitimes of the common children. However, the 2005 Nullity Decision and its certificate of finality were never registered with the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Angeles City; no annotation was made on TCT No. 90811; no actual partition of the Sunset Valley Estate was undertaken; and the presumptive legitimes of the Aguas heirs were not delivered. Neither Rene nor any of the petitioners moved for execution of the 2005 Nullity Decision within five years from its entry, nor filed an independent action for its revival within ten years.

On October 7, 2006, Rene contracted a second marriage with Cherry Calilung. On November 17, 2015, Rene died intestate. On May 24, 2017, Cherry filed a petition for settlement of the intestate estate of Rene, docketed as SP Case No. R-ANG-17-01449-SP and raffled to RTC-Angeles City, Branch 56. On October 2, 2017, the Aguas heirs filed a Comment/Opposition in the settlement proceeding, alleging that they are Rene's legitimate children; that the marriage of Rene and Lucila was dissolved without liquidation or separation of properties as required by Article 102 of the Family Code; that Article 52 requires the judgment of nullity, partition, and delivery of presumptive legitimes to be recorded in the appropriate registries; that failure to comply with Articles 52 and 53 nullifies the subsequent marriage between Rene and Cherry; and that properties acquired during the previous marriage should not have been included in Rene and Cherry's property regime under Article 92.

On November 3, 2017, Lucila and the Aguas heirs filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage of Rene and Cherry with the RTC of Angeles City, grounded on non-compliance with Articles 52 and 53 of the Family Code. The petition was raffled to Branch 59, the designated Family Court. On November 10, 2017, Branch 59 issued a Transmittal Order directing re-raffle to regular courts, reasoning that the petition involved a collateral attack on the marriage and that compulsory heirs have no legal right to file such a petition. The petition was then re-raffled to Branch 60, which on November 24, 2017 dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction, holding that under R.A. No. 8369 the Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction and that petitioners have no cause of action under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Branch 60 denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration on June 13, 2018, noting that the Transmittal Order of Branch 59 had already become final. Petitioners received both orders on December 5, 2017 and thereafter elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 on pure questions of law.

• Procedural Irregularity: Petitioners argued that the abrupt dismissal by Branch 60 of the petition for declaration of nullity, without waiting for petitioners to exercise their right to file a motion for reconsideration on the Transmittal Order issued by Branch 59, was unprocedural.
• Erroneous Refusal to Refer Back: Petitioners maintained that Branch 60 erred in holding that referral of the case back to the Family Court would be an imposition upon a co-equal branch, since the Transmittal Order of Branch 59 was erroneous.
• Error in Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction: Petitioners contended that Branch 60 committed manifest error of law and acted contrary to law and established jurisprudence in dismissing the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
• Applicability of Niñal vs. Bayadog: Petitioners insisted on the application of Niñal vs. Bayadog, where the Court allowed the children by a previous marriage to file a direct action to declare a subsequent marriage void after the death of their father.

• Jurisdiction over the RTC Petition: Whether Branch 59 or Branch 60 has jurisdiction over the RTC petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
• Propriety of Dismissal: Whether Branch 60 erred in dismissing the RTC petition for nullity of marriage.
• Real Party-in-Interest: Whether the petitioners are the real parties-in-interest to file the subject RTC petition for nullity of marriage.

• Jurisdiction over the RTC Petition: Branch 59, the designated Family Court, has exclusive jurisdiction over the RTC petition, which is a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage under Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 8369; Branch 60, not being a Family Court, lacks jurisdiction.
• Propriety of Dismissal: No error. Branch 60 properly dismissed the re-raffled RTC petition for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, as only the designated Family Court may hear complaints for declaration of nullity of marriage when one exists in the area.
• Real Party-in-Interest: No. Under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife; compulsory heirs may only collaterally attack the marriage in estate settlement proceedings, and a prior spouse whose marriage was already declared void is not an injured spouse in a bigamous marriage.

• Jurisdiction over the RTC Petition: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action, and is ascertained from the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. R.A. No. 8369, through Sections 3 and 5, created Family Courts and granted them exclusive original jurisdiction over complaints for declaration of nullity of marriage. Section 17 (Transitory Provisions) mandated the Supreme Court to designate RTC branches as Family Courts pending the establishment of regular Family Courts; these designated branches exercise exclusive jurisdiction over family cases to the exclusion of other RTC branches. The Court designated Branch 60 as Family Court in A.M. No. 99-11-07-SC, but later revoked that designation and designated Branch 59 in lieu thereof in A.M. No. 08-8-460-RTC. The RTC petition was captioned as a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code, and its allegations directly sought the nullification of Rene and Cherry's marriage — a direct action, not a collateral attack. As a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage under Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 8369, it falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of Branch 59. Branch 59 therefore improperly ordered the re-raffle; however, its erroneous Transmittal Order had already attained finality because no motion for reconsideration, appeal, or certiorari petition was filed.

• Propriety of Dismissal: Because Branch 59, a designated Family Court, exists in Angeles City, Branch 60 does not have jurisdiction over the subject RTC petition. When a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action; any act performed without jurisdiction is null and void. Branch 60 therefore correctly dismissed the petition and could not order its transfer to Branch 59, as it lacked authority to act on the re-raffled petition or on the motion for reconsideration. The dismissal orders of Branch 59 and Branch 60 do not constitute res judicata because they were not rendered on the merits — they did not contain a legal declaration of the parties' rights and liabilities nor a determination of whether the petitioners were right in seeking nullity. Nevertheless, rather than simply upholding the dismissal and requiring petitioners to refile, the Court found it imperative to resolve the standing issue, as the parties had extensively discussed it in their pleadings and remanding would be counterproductive to the cause of justice.

• Real Party-in-Interest: Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which took effect on March 15, 2003, provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The Rationale of the Rules explains that only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file such petitions; compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor and can only question the validity of the marriage upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for settlement of the estate filed in regular courts. Following Enrico vs. Heirs of Spouses Medinaceli, the Aguas heirs, as children of the deceased spouse, have no legal personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of their father's marriage with Cherry. Lucila, for her part, is not the wife in the marriage sought to be annulled — her marriage to Rene was declared null and void in the 2005 Nullity Decision, so she is not an aggrieved or injured spouse under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. While Juliano-Llave vs. Republic held that the prior spouse may file a suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage, the RTC petition here was not anchored on bigamy but on non-compliance with Articles 52 and 53; moreover, Rene and Cherry's marriage is not bigamous because Rene and Lucila's marriage was already declared void. Niñal vs. Bayadog is inapplicable because it involved a marriage under the Civil Code, whereas the instant case concerns a marriage celebrated during the effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The Aguas heirs may, however, collaterally attack the validity of Rene and Cherry's marriage in the pending settlement proceedings (SP Case No. R-ANG-17-01449-SP before Branch 56), which has primary and exclusive jurisdiction over successional rights under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court. A collateral attack on a void marriage is permitted for purposes other than remarriage, such as determination of heirship and settlement of estate. Lucila, not being an heir of Rene, is a stranger to the settlement proceedings and cannot participate therein; her remedy is to file a separate civil action for partition against the administrator of Rene's estate under Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.

• Exclusive Jurisdiction of Family Courts — Under R.A. No. 8369, Family Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over complaints for declaration of nullity of marriage. In areas where designated Family Courts exist, they exercise such jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other RTC branches. The Court applied this by holding that Branch 59, the designated Family Court in Angeles City, had exclusive jurisdiction over the RTC petition, while Branch 60, a non-Family Court, properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

• Standing to File Petition for Declaration of Nullity — Under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor and cannot file a direct action; they may only question the validity of the marriage upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for settlement of the estate. The Court applied this rule to hold that the Aguas heirs lacked standing, and that Lucila, whose marriage to Rene was already declared void, was not an injured spouse under the Rule.

• Collateral Attack on Void Marriage for Purposes Other Than Remarriage — A void marriage may be collaterally attacked in a suit not directly instituted to question its validity, so long as the validity of the marriage is essential to the determination of the case and the purpose is other than remarriage (e.g., determination of heirship, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime). The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the Aguas heirs may collaterally attack the validity of Rene and Cherry's marriage in the pending settlement proceedings.

• Principle of Priority / Exclusive Concurrent Jurisdiction — The court which first takes cognizance of an action over which it has jurisdiction and power to afford complete relief has the exclusive right to dispose of the controversy without interference from other courts of concurrent jurisdiction. The Court applied this principle to hold that Branch 56, which first took cognizance of the settlement of Rene's estate, has exclusive jurisdiction over the determination of the Aguas heirs' successional rights and shares.

• Probate Court's Limited Jurisdiction Over Title Disputes — A probate or intestate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and belonging to outside parties by title adverse to the deceased; it may only provisionally determine inclusion or exclusion from the inventory, subject to final determination of ownership in a separate action. The Court applied this rule to hold that Lucila, as a stranger to the estate proceedings, must file a separate civil action for partition against the estate administrator.

• "Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State." — This passage, drawn from the Rationale of the Rules and quoted in the decision, articulates the canonical formulation of the rule limiting standing in direct actions for nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and is the central basis for denying the Aguas heirs' standing.

• "Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts." — This passage defines the distinction between a direct action for nullity (reserved to the spouse) and a collateral attack in estate proceedings (available to heirs), and is the key passage relied upon to channel the Aguas heirs' remedy to the settlement proceedings.

• "Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked." — Quoted from De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro, this passage establishes the doctrine permitting collateral attack on a void marriage for purposes other than remarriage, which the Court applied to allow the Aguas heirs to challenge the marriage in the estate settlement.

• "The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." — Quoted from Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, this provision embodies the principle of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, which the Court applied to hold that Branch 56 has primary and exclusive jurisdiction over the determination of the heirs' successional rights.

• Enrico vs. Heirs of Spouses Medinaceli, 560 Phil. 673 (2007) — Controlling precedent. The Court followed Enrico in holding that compulsory heirs have no legal personality to file a direct petition for declaration of nullity of their deceased parent's marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and may only question the marriage's validity in estate settlement proceedings. The Court also relied on Enrico to distinguish Niñal vs. Bayadog on the ground that Niñal involved a Civil Code marriage while the instant case concerns a Family Code marriage.

• Niñal vs. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661 (2000) — Distinguished. Petitioners invoked Niñal to support their standing to file a direct action, but the Court declined to apply it because Niñal involved a marriage solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, whereas the marriage of Rene and Cherry was contracted in 2006, during the effectivity of both the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

• Juliano-Llave vs. Republic, 662 Phil. 203 (2011) — Distinguished. The Court acknowledged that Juliano-Llave held that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not shut out the prior spouse from filing a suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage. However, the Court distinguished the instant case because the RTC petition was not anchored on bigamy but on non-compliance with Articles 52 and 53, and Rene and Cherry's marriage was not bigamous since Rene and Lucila's marriage had already been declared void.

• De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro, 568 Phil. 724 (2008) — Followed. The Court relied on De Castro for the doctrine that a void marriage may be collaterally attacked in a suit not directly instituted to question its validity, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case and the purpose is other than remarriage.

• Agtarap vs. Agtarap, 666 Phil. 452 (2011) — Followed. The Court cited Agtarap for the rule that a probate or intestate court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed by outside parties, and that such parties must resort to an ordinary action before a court of general jurisdiction — the basis for directing Lucila to file a separate civil action for partition.

• Section 5(d), R.A. No. 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) — Grants Family Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage, and those relating to marital status and property relations of husband and wife. Applied to hold that the RTC petition falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the designated Family Court (Branch 59).

• Section 17, R.A. No. 8369 (Transitory Provisions) — Mandates the Supreme Court to designate RTC branches as Family Courts pending the establishment of regular Family Courts, and provides that in areas where there are no Family Courts, the RTC in general shall adjudicate family cases. Applied to establish that designated Family Court branches exercise exclusive jurisdiction over family cases to the exclusion of other RTC branches.

• Section 2(a), A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC — Provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Applied to deny the Aguas heirs and Lucila standing to file the direct action for nullity of Rene and Cherry's marriage.

• Articles 52 and 53, Family Code — Article 52 requires that the judgment of nullity, partition and distribution of properties, and delivery of presumptive legitimes be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of properties; Article 53 provides that the subsequent marriage shall be null and void if the requirements of Article 52 are not complied with. These articles were the substantive basis of the petitioners' RTC petition, though the Court ultimately ruled on standing rather than on the merits of these provisions.

• Section 1, Rule 73, Rules of Court — Provides that the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. Applied to hold that Branch 56, handling the settlement proceeding, has primary and exclusive jurisdiction over the determination of the Aguas heirs' successional rights.

• Section 1, Rule 87, Rules of Court — Provides that an action to recover real property or an interest therein from the estate may be commenced against the executor or administrator. Applied to direct Lucila to file a separate civil action for partition against the administrator of Rene's estate.

• Section 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court — Provides that a final and executory judgment may be executed on motion within five years from entry, and thereafter by independent action before barred by the statute of limitations. Cited to note that Rene, Lucila, or the Aguas heirs could have moved for execution of the 2005 Nullity Decision but failed to do so.

• Article 1152, Civil Code — Provides that the period for prescription of actions to demand fulfillment of obligations declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment became final. Cited in relation to the ten-year period for filing an independent action for revival of the 2005 Nullity Decision.

Peralta, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Gesmundo, Hernando, Carandang, Inting, Zalameda, Lopez, Gaerlan, and Rosario, JJ., concurred. Leonen, J., was on official business. Caguioa, J., filed a concurring opinion, which the majority cited for the insight that upon finality of the 2005 Nullity Decision, Rene, Lucila, or the Aguas heirs could have moved for execution within five years or filed an independent action for revival within ten years, and that the Aguas heirs' successional rights should be determined in the Settlement Proceeding pending before Branch 56 to the exclusion of all other courts under the principle of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction.

• Lazaro-Javier, J. — Filed a separate opinion. The text of the decision does not detail the substance of this separate opinion; only the notation "please see separate opinion" appears.