David vs. Arroyo

PP 1017 is constitutional only as an exercise of the President’s calling-out power under Section 18, Article VII; it cannot authorize the issuance of decrees, the enforcement of laws unrelated to lawless violence through the military, or the takeover of privately owned public utilities or businesses affected with public interest without legislation. G.O. No. 5 is valid except for its reference to “acts of terrorism,” which remains undefined by law.

The 1987 Constitution places the calling-out power in the President under Section 18, Article VII, but vests legislative power in Congress under Section 1, Article VI and allows Congress to delegate emergency powers under Section 23, Article VI. Section 17, Article XII permits the State to take over privately owned public utilities or businesses affected with public interest in times of national emergency. The Administrative Code limits the President’s ordinance power to executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum orders, memorandum circulars, and general or special orders.

On February 24, 2006, as the nation marked the 20th anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued PP 1017, declaring a state of national emergency and invoking Section 18, Article VII and Section 17, Article XII. The proclamation commanded the AFP to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion, and enforce obedience to all laws and all decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated by her personally or upon her direction. On the same day, she issued G.O. No. 5, which directed the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence and to carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures for that purpose.

Respondents stated that the proximate cause of the issuances was a conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the NPA, and some members of the political opposition to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan, and Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped from their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, and vowed to remain defiant. On February 17, authorities obtained “Oplan Hackle I,” which detailed plans for bombings and attacks during the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City and the assassination of selected targets, including cabinet members and President Arroyo; the President did not attend the homecoming, and a bomb was found and detonated at the PMA parade ground the next day. On February 21, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a communist safehouse in Batangas, and two flash disks containing minutes of meetings between members of the Magdalo Group and the NPA, a tape recorder, audio cassette cartridges, diskettes, and copies of subversive documents were found in his possession; before his arrest, he announced through DZRH that the “Magdalo’s D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I.” On February 23, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP-Special Action Force were planning to defect, and SAF Commanding General Marcelino Franco, Jr. issued a public statement that all SAF units were under responsible and trustworthy officers. Also on that day, at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco, businessmen and mid-level government officials plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo administration; Nelly Sindayen of TIME Magazine reported that Pastor Saycon called a U.S. government official about his group’s plans if President Arroyo were ousted and also phoned a man code-named Delta, identified as B/Gen. Danilo Lim, who said “it was all systems go for the planned movement against Arroyo.” B/Gen. Lim and Col. Ariel Querubin confided to AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Generoso Senga that a huge number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical mass and armed component to the anti-Arroyo protests scheduled for February 24, and that they could not stop the soldiers because they too were breaking the chain of command; Gen. Senga took custody of B/Gen. Lim and directed Col. Querubin to return to the Philippine Marines Headquarters. The CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary work within the military and the police, and NPA spokesman Gregorio “Ka Roger” Rosal and NDF spokesman Cesar Renerio made statements about bringing down the Arroyo regime. Respondents also cited the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan, the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three soldiers, and the CPP’s directive for front organizations to join mass protests. By midnight of February 23, the President convened her security advisers and several cabinet members, directed the AFP and PNP to account for all their men and keep the chain of command solid, and suspended classes in all levels in the entire National Capital Region.

Immediately after the issuances, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by local governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies, which to the President’s mind were organized for purposes of destabilization, were cancelled, and Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that “warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be implemented.” Undeterred, groups of protesters from KMU and NAFLU-KMU marched from various parts of Metro Manila toward the EDSA shrine; those near EDSA were violently dispersed by anti-riot police using truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water cannons, and tear gas, and the same police action was used against protesters marching to Cubao, Quezon City, and to the corner of Santolan Street and EDSA. That evening, hundreds of riot policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in Makati City. According to KMU, the police cited PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal. During the dispersal along EDSA, police arrested without warrant petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist, and his companion Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.

At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, CIDG operatives of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila; the raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue, and policemen from Camp Crame were stationed inside the editorial and business offices while policemen from the Manila Police District were stationed outside the building. A few minutes later, the police surrounded the premises of Malaya and its sister publication Abante. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor said the raid was “meant to show a ‘strong presence,’ to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this government”; Director General Lomibao warned that if media did not follow the standards in G.O. No. 5 and PP 1017 and would contribute to instability in the government, he would recommend a “takeover”; and National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks to “cooperate” and warned that his agency would not hesitate to recommend closure of any broadcast outfit that violated rules set for media coverage when national security was threatened. Also on February 25, police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of KMU, while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan on the basis of a warrant dated 1985; his lawyer explained that the warrant, from a case of inciting to rebellion filed during the Marcos regime, had long been quashed, and Beltran is not a party in any of these petitions. Members of KMU who went to Camp Crame to visit Beltran were told they could not be admitted because of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5; two were arrested and detained, and the rest were dispersed. Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest during a public forum at the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City, but his two drivers, identified as Roel and Art, were taken into custody; retired Major General Ramon Montaño was arrested at the Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmariñas, Cavite; attempts were made to arrest Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casiño, and Liza Maza; and Bayan Muna Representative Josel Virador was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in Davao City and later turned over to the custody of the House of Representatives, where the “Batasan 5” decided to stay indefinitely. The decision stressed that the alleged violations of the rights of Representatives Beltran, Satur Ocampo, et al. are not being raised in these petitions.

On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency had ceased to exist. Seven petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed with the SC, three of which impleaded President Arroyo as respondent. During oral arguments on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to the issuances, and there was no refutation from petitioners’ counsels; the SC later noted that petitioners presented nothing to refute the narrated events. The Solicitor General admitted during the oral arguments that the search of the Daily Tribune offices and the seizure of its materials for publication and other papers were illegal and inadmissible “for any purpose,” and that the warrantless arrests and seizures executed by the police were illegal and could not be condoned.

• Encroachment on Emergency Powers and Martial Law: Petitioners in G.R. No. 171396 argued that PP 1017 encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress, is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for martial law, and violates freedom of the press, of speech, and of assembly.
• Censorship and “Emergency”: Petitioners in G.R. No. 171409 argued that the CIDG raid on the Daily Tribune offices was censorship or prior restraint, and that “emergency” refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane, and similar occurrences, so no emergency justified PP 1017.
• Usurpation of Legislative Power: Petitioners in G.R. No. 171485, including Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero and 21 other members of the House of Representatives, argued that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 usurped legislative power, violated freedom of expression, amounted to a declaration of martial law, and were issued without clear and verifiable factual basis and necessity.
• Legislative Power, Factual Basis, and Assembly: Petitioners in G.R. No. 171483, KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members, argued that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 arrogated unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees, lacked factual basis, and violated freedom of expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble.
• Specific Constitutional Violations: Petitioner ALGI in G.R. No. 171400 argued that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violate Section 4, Article II; Sections 1, 2, and 4, Article III; Section 23, Article VI; and Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution.
• Martial Law or Emergency Powers Without Congressional Approval: Petitioners in G.R. No. 171489 argued that PP 1017 was an arbitrary and unlawful exercise of martial law powers and, if not martial law, amounted to an exercise of emergency powers without congressional approval and went beyond the nature and function of a proclamation under the Revised Administrative Code.
• Freedom of Expression and Access to Information: Petitioner Loren B. Legarda in G.R. No. 171424 argued that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and the right to access to information on matters of public concern, and prevented her from fully prosecuting her election protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

• Mootness: Respondent Solicitor General countered that the petitions should be dismissed for being moot because President Arroyo had issued PP 1021 lifting PP 1017.
• Legal Standing: Respondent argued that petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et al.), and 171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no legal standing.
• Impleading the President: Respondent argued that it was not necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as respondent.
• Constitutional and Legal Basis: Respondent argued that PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis.
• Free Expression and Redress of Grievances: Respondent argued that PP 1017 does not violate the people’s right to free expression and redress of grievances.
• Calling-Out Discretion and Factual Basis: During oral arguments, the Solicitor General argued that the Constitution gives the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces and that no petitioner had shown PP 1017 was without factual bases; while not respondents’ task to state the facts behind the proclamation, they presented the facts for the elucidation of the issues.

• Mootness: Whether the issuance of PP 1021 rendered the petitions moot and academic.
• Legal Standing: Whether petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171485, 171400, 171483, 171489, and 171424 have legal standing.
• Impleading the President: Whether President Arroyo may be impleaded as respondent.
• Judicial Review of Factual Bases: Whether the SC may review the factual bases of PP 1017.
• Facial Challenge: Whether PP 1017 is unconstitutional on its face for overbreadth or vagueness.
• Calling-Out Power: Whether PP 1017 is constitutional as an exercise of the President’s calling-out power.
• Take Care Power and Decrees: Whether PP 1017’s command to enforce obedience to laws and to decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated by the President is constitutional.
• Power to Take Over: Whether PP 1017 authorizes the President to take over privately owned public utilities or businesses affected with public interest without legislation.
• G.O. No. 5 and “Acts of Terrorism”: Whether G.O. No. 5 is constitutional, particularly its directive to suppress “acts of terrorism.”
• Warrantless Arrest and Assembly: Whether the warrantless arrest of David and Llamas and the dispersal and warrantless arrest of KMU and NAFLU-KMU members were constitutional.
• Press Freedom and Search: Whether the imposition of standards on media, prior restraint, and the warrantless search and seizure at the Daily Tribune were constitutional.

• Mootness: No. PP 1021 did not render the petitions moot and academic because the SC found all the recognized exceptions to the mootness rule present.
• Legal Standing: Yes. David and Llamas and the Daily Tribune had direct injury; the other petitioners were allowed to sue under the transcendental importance doctrine, and the SC relaxed standing requirements.
• Impleading the President: No. The President may not be sued during tenure; removal is by impeachment.
• Judicial Review of Factual Bases: Yes. The SC may review whether the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion, not whether her decision was correct.
• Facial Challenge: No. Overbreadth and vagueness were not applicable; PP 1017 is not primarily a speech regulation and was not shown invalid in all applications.
• Calling-Out Power: Yes. PP 1017 is constitutional as a call on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence; the President had factual basis.
• Take Care Power and Decrees: No as to decrees. The clause authorizing enforcement of decrees is unconstitutional; the President has no legislative power and may not issue decrees. The military may enforce only laws pertinent to suppressing lawless violence.
• Power to Take Over: No. Section 17, Article XII is an aspect of emergency powers; the President may declare a national emergency but cannot take over a privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without legislation.
• G.O. No. 5 and “Acts of Terrorism”: G.O. No. 5 is valid except for the phrase “acts of terrorism,” which is unconstitutional because Congress has not defined and punished it.
• Warrantless Arrest and Assembly: No. The warrantless arrest of David and Llamas and the dispersal and warrantless arrest of KMU and NAFLU-KMU members were unconstitutional absent any lawful warrantless arrest exception or clear and present danger to the right to assemble.
• Press Freedom and Search: No. The warrantless search of the Daily Tribune, the seizure of its materials, and the media standards and prior restraint violated Section 2 and Section 4, Article III and Rule 126.

• Mootness: A case is moot when a supervening event leaves no justiciable controversy, but the SC may still decide it where there is a grave violation of the Constitution, exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest, a need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, or the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. PP 1021 lifted PP 1017, but illegal acts were allegedly committed during the eight days PP 1017 was operative; the issues involved basic rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and the press; the SC had to guide the bench, bar, military, and police; and the acts were capable of repetition. The SC also noted media reports that PP 1017 might be reimposed if the May 1 rallies became unruly and violent. All exceptions were present.

• Legal Standing: Locus standi is the right of appearance in a court on a given question. In private suits, the real-party-in-interest rule governs; in public suits, the direct injury test from People vs. Vera requires a personal and substantial interest such that the petitioner has sustained or will sustain direct injury, but the SC may relax the requirement under the transcendental importance doctrine. David and Llamas had direct injury from their warrantless arrest; Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. had direct injury from the unlawful search; the opposition congressmen claimed usurpation of legislative powers; ALGI raised a public right; KMU could assert the rights of its members and its right to peaceful assembly; Cadiz et al. and the IBP failed to allege direct injury but the issue was of transcendental importance; Legarda had no taxpayer, legislator, or media personality standing, but the SC relaxed the rules. The SC held that all petitioners had locus standi.

• Impleading the President: The settled doctrine is that the President, during tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case. The immunity is concurrent with tenure, not term. The President remains accountable to the people but may be removed only by impeachment. Impleading President Arroyo as respondent was therefore not proper.

• Judicial Review of Factual Bases: Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution empowers the courts to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. Lansang vs. Garcia shifted the inquiry from the political question doctrine to checks and balances, and Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora held that the President’s calling-out power, while discretionary, may be examined to determine whether it was exercised within constitutional limits or with grave abuse of discretion. The standard is not correctness but arbitrariness; the petitioner must show that the President’s decision was totally bereft of factual basis. The Solicitor General narrated the escape of the Magdalo Group, the Magdalo D-Day threat, defections in the military, NPA statements, and an intelligence report showing growing alliance between the NPA and the military; petitioners presented nothing to refute these events. The President was justified in issuing PP 1017, but the exercise of the power must not stifle liberty.

• Facial Challenge: The overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool for testing statutes in free speech cases; PP 1017 is not primarily directed to speech or speech-related conduct but is a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. Lawless violence, insurrection, and rebellion are harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct subject to state regulation. Facial invalidation is strong medicine to be used sparingly and only as a last resort; the challenger must show that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Petitioners did not even attempt to show this. The void-for-vagueness doctrine is subject to the same principles and was also not shown to apply; petitioners failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017.

• Calling-Out Power: Section 18, Article VII grants the President a sequence of graduated powers: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. The only criterion for the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. The President has full discretion and wide latitude in exercising this power and is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country through the government’s intelligence network. PP 1017’s wording shows that the President invoked her calling-out power, not martial law. It is not harmless like the declaration of a state of rebellion in Sanlakas because it also invoked Section 17, Article XII, but as a call on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence it is constitutional.

• Take Care Power and Decrees: Section 17, Article VII provides that the President shall control all executive departments, bureaus, and offices and shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. The President may use the military to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence, but she cannot call the military to enforce unrelated laws such as customs laws, family and property relations, or obligations and contracts. Section 1, Article VI vests legislative power in Congress. The President’s ordinance power under the Administrative Code is limited to executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum orders, memorandum circulars, and general or special orders; she cannot issue decrees. The clause in PP 1017 authorizing enforcement of “decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction” was lifted from President Marcos’s PP 1081; insofar as it grants President Arroyo authority to promulgate decrees, it is unconstitutional. Decrees are void and cannot be enforced.

• Power to Take Over: Section 17, Article XII and Section 23, Article VI relate to national emergencies and must be read together. Congress is the repository of emergency powers; it may delegate such powers to the President by law, for a limited period, subject to restrictions, and to carry out a declared national policy. Section 17, Article XII is an aspect of the emergency powers clause; the “State” that may temporarily take over privately owned public utilities or businesses affected with public interest refers to Congress, not the President. The President may declare a state of national emergency, but without legislation she has no power to take over such utilities or businesses. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. vs. Sawyer held that the President cannot seize private property absent constitutional or statutory authority, and Araneta vs. Dinglasan held that legislative power remains in Congress even in times of crisis. “Emergency” is broad and may include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect; the limited view that it refers only to natural disasters was rejected.

• G.O. No. 5 and “Acts of Terrorism”: G.O. No. 5 is an order issued by the President as Commander-in-Chief addressed to subordinates in the AFP to carry out PP 1017; it is valid if reasonable and not arbitrary. It provides a valid standard: the military and police should take only the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” However, “acts of terrorism” have not been defined and made punishable by Congress. P.D. No. 1835, which mentioned “terrorism,” was repealed by E.O. No. 167, and neither law defined “acts of terrorism.” Since there is no law defining “acts of terrorism,” President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, would have absolute discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism, leading to possible indiscriminate arrests, breaking into offices and residences, media takeovers, and dispersal of assemblies. This violates due process. The “acts of terrorism” portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.

• Warrantless Arrest and Assembly: Section 2, Article III guarantees the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and provides that no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause determined personally by the judge. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure allows warrantless arrest only when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officer, or when an offense has just been committed and the officer has probable cause based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person arrested has committed it. Neither exception justified David’s warrantless arrest; the arresting officers invoked only the observation that some rallyists wore t-shirts with “Oust Gloria Now” and their erroneous assumption that David was the leader. The inquest prosecutor released him for insufficiency of evidence, noting that David was not wearing the t-shirt and that even if he were, it would not be sufficient for inciting to sedition, and that there was insufficient evidence for violation of BP 880. David and Llamas were arrested while exercising their right to peaceful assembly; they were not committing a crime and there was no clear and present danger warranting limitation of that right. The dispersal and arrest of KMU and NAFLU-KMU members were also unwarranted; the dispersal was based merely on Malacañang’s directive cancelling all permits previously issued by local government units. BP 880 lodges the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies with local government units, which may issue and revoke permits after due notice and hearing on the determination of clear and present danger; petitioners were not notified or heard before the revocation. The absence of notice was a fatal defect.

• Press Freedom and Search: Section 2, Article III requires a search warrant issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense, determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and witnesses, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Rule 126, Section 8 requires the search of a house, room, or other premise to be made in the presence of the lawful occupant or any member of his family or, in their absence, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. Section 9 requires the warrant to be served in the daytime unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted for service at any time of the day or night. The Daily Tribune offices were searched without warrant at about 1:00 a.m. of February 25, 2006, in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building; police seized materials for publication and other papers and stationed themselves in the vicinity. These acts violated the rules on search and seizure. The search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen near the Daily Tribune offices, and the warnings of government officials to media constituted plain censorship and prior restraint, abhorrent to freedom of the press under Section 4, Article III. Burgos vs. Chief of Staff held that closure of newspaper offices is previous restraint or censorship. The Solicitor General admitted that the search and seizure were illegal and inadmissible for any purpose. The imposition of standards on media and any prior restraint on the press were likewise unconstitutional.

• Calling-out power — Under Section 18, Article VII, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, may call out the armed forces whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. The only criterion is necessity; the President has full discretion and wide latitude, but the SC may review whether the power was exercised with grave abuse of discretion or arbitrarily. The President cannot invoke a greater power when acting under a lesser power.

• Graduated Commander-in-Chief powers — Section 18, Article VII grants a sequence of powers: calling out the armed forces, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and declaring martial law. Calling out is the least severe; martial law and suspension require invasion or rebellion and public safety, and are subject to constitutional safeguards.

• State of national emergency vs. emergency powers — The President may declare a state of national emergency, but the exercise of emergency powers, including the takeover of privately owned public utilities or businesses affected with public interest under Section 17, Article XII, requires congressional legislation under Section 23, Article VI. Section 17, Article XII is not self-executing and does not authorize the President to act alone.

• President cannot issue decrees — Legislative power is vested in Congress under Section 1, Article VI. The President’s ordinance power under the Administrative Code is limited to executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum orders, memorandum circulars, and general or special orders. A clause authorizing the President to enforce “decrees” is unconstitutional.

• Moot and academic exceptions — Courts may decide an otherwise moot case where there is a grave violation of the Constitution, exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest, a need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, or the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

• Transcendental importance and locus standi — The SC may relax the direct injury requirement in public suits where the issues are of transcendental importance. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing under specific conditions; organizations may assert the rights of their members.

• Overbreadth and void-for-vagueness — Overbreadth is an analytical tool for testing statutes in free speech cases; facial invalidation is strong medicine to be used sparingly and only as a last resort. The challenger must show that there can be no instance when the law may be valid. The void-for-vagueness doctrine is subject to similar principles and requires a showing that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the law’s meaning.

• “Acts of terrorism” must be defined by law — No act can be considered a crime unless a law defines it and imposes the corresponding penalty. An undefined phrase such as “acts of terrorism” cannot be the basis for arrests or suppression because it gives the Executive absolute discretion and violates due process.

• Warrantless arrest exceptions — Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, a warrantless arrest is lawful only when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officer, or when an offense has just been committed and the officer has probable cause based on personal knowledge that the person arrested committed it.

• Right to assembly and BP 880 — The right to peaceably assemble is not subject to previous restraint or censorship; a permit for the use of a public place may be required, but limitation requires a clear and present danger of a substantive evil. Under BP 880, local government units regulate assemblies and may revoke permits only after due notice and hearing.

• Search and seizure and prior restraint — Searches and seizures must comply with Section 2, Article III and Rule 126: probable cause, search warrant, presence of the lawful occupant or witnesses, and daytime service unless allowed. Prior restraint or censorship of the press is abhorrent to the freedom of the press.

• Presidential immunity from suit — The President may not be sued in any civil or criminal case during tenure of office; the immunity is concurrent with actual incumbency, not the term. The President remains accountable to the people but may be removed only by impeachment.

• “The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence.” — The SC upheld PP 1017 only as an exercise of the calling-out power, not as authority for the extraneous powers in the proclamation.

• “The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased.” — The SC held that the President cannot exercise the takeover power under Section 17, Article XII without legislation from Congress.

• “Since there is no law defining "acts of terrorism," it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism.” — The SC struck down the “acts of terrorism” portion of G.O. No. 5 because it gave the President absolute discretion without a statutory definition.

• “The search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship.” — The SC declared the Daily Tribune search and the media warnings unconstitutional prior restraint and censorship.

• Lansang vs. Garcia, No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 448 — Controlling precedent on judicial review of the factual basis for emergency powers; the SC may inquire whether the President acted arbitrarily, not whether her decision was correct.
• Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338 SCRA 81 — Followed; the President’s calling-out power is discretionary but may be examined for grave abuse of discretion or whether it was exercised within constitutional limits.
• Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656 — Cited and distinguished; a declaration of a state of rebellion is harmless, but PP 1017 involved more than the calling-out power because it also invoked Section 17, Article XII.
• Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. vs. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) — Followed; the President cannot seize private property to keep production going absent constitutional or statutory authority, and the President’s power to see that laws are faithfully executed does not make him a lawmaker.
• Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949) — Followed; legislative power remains in Congress even in times of crisis, and emergency powers must come from a valid delegation.
• De Jonge vs. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) — Followed; peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime.
• Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, No. L-64161, December 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 816 — Followed; closure of newspaper offices is previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to freedom of the press.
• Reyes vs. Bagatsing, No. L-65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553 — Followed; freedom of assembly is not to be limited except on a showing of clear and present danger of a substantive evil the State has a right to prevent.

• Section 18, Article VII, 1987 Constitution — The President’s calling-out power; PP 1017 was upheld as a call on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, but not as authority for decrees, unrelated law enforcement, or takeover.
• Section 17, Article VII, 1987 Constitution — The President’s control over executive departments and duty to ensure laws are faithfully executed; the SC held the military may enforce only laws pertinent to suppressing lawless violence.
• Section 1, Article VI, 1987 Constitution — Legislative power is vested in Congress; the President cannot issue decrees.
• Section 23, Article VI, 1987 Constitution — Congress may authorize the President to exercise emergency powers for a limited period, subject to restrictions, and to carry out a declared national policy; this is the source of any takeover power.
• Section 17, Article XII, 1987 Constitution — The State may temporarily take over or direct the operation of privately owned public utilities or businesses affected with public interest in times of national emergency; the SC held this requires legislation and does not authorize the President to act alone.
• Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Judicial power includes the authority to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; basis for reviewing the factual bases of PP 1017.
• Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Right against unreasonable searches and seizures; the warrantless search of the Daily Tribune and the warrantless arrests were unconstitutional.
• Section 4, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Freedom of speech, expression, press, and assembly; the dispersal of rallies, media standards, and prior restraint violated this provision.
• Section 5, Rule 113, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Warrantless arrest exceptions; neither exception justified the arrest of David and Llamas.
• Rule 126, Sections 4, 8, and 9, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Requirements for search warrants, presence of witnesses, and daytime service; violated by the Daily Tribune search.
• Batas Pambansa Bilang 880 — Regulation of assemblies and rallies; local government units may revoke permits only after due notice and hearing, and the wholesale cancellation of permits was invalid.
• Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II, Revised Administrative Code of 1987 — Proclamations are acts declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest; used to distinguish the state of rebellion in Sanlakas from PP 1017.

• Chief Justice Panganiban (Concurring) — Fully concurred in the ponencia and stressed that PP 1017 was not harmless; even if reissued under its present language, it would still be illegal. He agreed that the SC should set the parameters of presidential power and strike down abuse at its inception.
• Justice Ynares-Santiago (Concurring) — Concurred in part; agreed that PP 1017 is an exercise of the calling-out power but cannot authorize enforcement of unrelated laws, issuance of decrees, warrantless searches and arrests, or prior restraint. She viewed Section 17, Article XII as an economic emergency provision requiring congressional authorization, and agreed that the “acts of terrorism” portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional for vagueness.

• Justice Tinga (Dissenting) — Would dismiss all the petitions. He viewed PP 1017 as a declaration and exercise of the calling-out power that created no new rights or obligations and could not diminish constitutional rights; the majority, in his view, ruled on non-justiciable issues and prejudged individual grievances without a proper trial. He also argued that “acts of terrorism” could be construed as acts already punishable under existing penal laws and that the Section 17, Article XII issue was not ripe. Corona and Velasco, Jr., JJ., joined his dissent.