Datu Malingin vs. Sandagan

Membership in an indigenous cultural community does not exempt an individual from criminal prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or other penal laws, and the invocation of Sections 65 and 66 of RA 8371 cannot bar regular courts from exercising jurisdiction over criminal cases, as RA 8371 finds application only in disputes relating to claims and rights of ICCs/IPs, not in prosecutions for offenses against society.

Petitioner Datu Malingin (Lemuel Talingting y Simborio) identified himself as a tribal chieftain and member of the Higaonon-Sugbuanon Tribe, an indigenous group. He was charged with six counts of rape before Branch 10, RTC, Abuyog, Leyte, for alleged carnal knowledge of a 14-year-old minor committed by force, threat, intimidation, and superior strength. The Informations were issued by respondent Prosecutor III Junery M. Bagunas, and the cases were raffled to the court presided by respondent Judge Carlos O. Arguelles. Petitioner anchored his defense on Sections 65 and 66 of RA 8371, which respectively provide for the primacy of customary laws in disputes involving ICCs/IPs and vest jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs in the NCIP. The respondents included the Police Officers who had detained petitioner, against whom he sought a declaration of guilt for arbitrary detention.

Petitioner Datu Malingin (Lemuel Talingting y Simborio) is a tribal chieftain of the Higaonon-Sugbuanon Tribe, an indigenous group. Through criminal Informations issued by respondent Prosecutor III Junery M. Bagunas, he was accused of having carnal knowledge of a 14-year-old minor, AAA, on six occasions by force, threat, intimidation, and by taking advantage of superior strength. The resulting cases — Criminal Case Nos. 3821 through 3826 — were filed for rape and raffled to Branch 10, RTC, Abuyog, Leyte, presided by respondent Judge Carlos O. Arguelles.

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. He averred that as a member of the Higaonon-Sugbuanon Tribe, the criminal cases against him should, pursuant to Sections 65 and 66 of RA 8371, be resolved first through the customary law and practices of his indigenous group, and thereafter referred to the NCIP. On August 31, 2017, respondent Judge denied the Motion to Quash, reasoning that the invocation of RA 8371 was misplaced because the law covered only disputes concerning customary law and practices of ICCs and did not extend to cases cognizable by regular courts such as violations of RA 8353 and the RPC.

Undeterred, petitioner filed the present Petition for Mandamus directly with the Supreme Court, praying that the RTC be declared without jurisdiction to settle disputes involving IPs, that the Prosecutor be ordered to refrain from prosecuting cases involving IPs, and that the respondent Police Officers — PO3 Arvin R. Sandagan, PO3 Estelito R. Avelino, and PO2 Noel P. Guimbaolibot — be declared guilty of arbitrary detention for having detained him without warrant on June 3, 2017. Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC's denial of his Motion to Quash before resorting to the Supreme Court.

• Mandamus as Proper Remedy: Petitioner contended that mandamus is the only available remedy to ensure that victims of violations of cultural rights are given reparation.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion by Prosecutor: Petitioner argued that respondent Prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion by failing to observe the rights of members of an indigenous group, claiming that IPs are not subject to the country's penal laws because they have the right to use customary laws and practices to resolve disputes.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion by Judge: Petitioner ascribed grave abuse of discretion to respondent Judge for not taking into account that cases cognizable by regular courts do not include those covered by RA 8371.
• Arbitrary Detention: Petitioner posited that respondent Police Officers committed arbitrary detention because they detained him without warrant on June 3, 2017.

• Procedural Infirmities: Respondent Judge countered that the petition should be denied outright because mandamus applies only when the complained act involves a ministerial duty, whereas he was exercising judicial, not ministerial, function; and that lack of jurisdiction is properly the subject of certiorari, not mandamus.
• Filed Out of Time: Respondent Judge contended that the petition was filed out of time because petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration on the denial of the Motion to Quash, which is a sine qua non condition for certiorari, and that direct resort to the Supreme Court violates the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
• RA 8371 Inapplicable: Respondent Judge argued that petitioner cannot rely on RA 8371 because he is not exempt from criminal prosecution under the RPC; that following the principle of generality, penal laws bind all persons within Philippine territorial jurisdiction; that rape cases are excluded from claims or disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs; and that granting petitioner's submissions would surrender police power and grant him criminal immunity to which he is not entitled.
• Adoption of Comment: Respondents Prosecutor and Police Officers manifested that they adopted the Comment filed by respondent Judge and prayed for dismissal of the petition for utter lack of merit.

• Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts: Whether the petition for mandamus filed directly with the Supreme Court should be dismissed for non-observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
• Availability of Mandamus: Whether mandamus is the proper remedy to compel respondent Judge and Prosecutor to desist from proceeding with the rape cases against petitioner.
• Applicability of RA 8371: Whether the invocation of Sections 65 and 66 of RA 8371 exempts a member of an indigenous cultural community from criminal prosecution under the RPC for rape.

• Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts: Yes. The petition was filed in violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, no exceptional or compelling circumstance having been established to justify direct recourse to the Supreme Court.
• Availability of Mandamus: No. Mandamus lies only when there is a clear legal right and a corresponding ministerial duty neglected by respondents; neither was established, as criminal prosecution and judicial adjudication involve discretionary, not ministerial, functions.
• Applicability of RA 8371: No. RA 8371 applies to disputes relating to claims and rights of ICCs/IPs, not to criminal prosecutions under the RPC; penal laws apply to all persons within Philippine territory regardless of membership in an indigenous group.

• Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts: While the Supreme Court, the CA, and the RTC share concurrent original jurisdiction over petitions for mandamus under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution and Sections 9(1) and 21(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts requires litigants to file petitions with the court below as a general rule. The doctrine serves as a constitutional filtering mechanism that allows the Supreme Court to focus on its more important tasks and remain the court of last resort. Direct recourse is allowed only in exceptional or compelling instances. No extraordinary circumstance was established here, warranting dismissal for non-observance of the doctrine.

• Availability of Mandamus: Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus is available when a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For a writ to issue, there must be concurrence of petitioner's legal right and a corresponding ministerial duty imposed by law upon respondents. A ministerial duty does not involve the exercise of judgment; it is one undertaken in a prescribed manner without regard to one's own judgment. Two requirements failed here. First, petitioner failed to show a clear legal right violated by respondents, because his indictment for rape had nothing to do with his purported ICC membership but arose from acts covered by the RPC. Second, the duties of prosecuting a criminal case and adjudicating it — exercised by the Prosecutor, Judge, and Police Officers — are discretionary functions requiring the exercise of judgment and conscience, not ministerial duties. In the absence of both a clear legal right and a corresponding neglected ministerial duty, mandamus cannot issue.

• Applicability of RA 8371: RA 8371 finds application in disputes relating to claims and rights of ICCs/IPs. Petitioner's indictment for rape has nothing to do with his purported ICC membership but arises from alleged acts covered by the RPC. RA 8371 does not bar criminal prosecution because crime is an offense against society. Penal laws apply to individuals without regard to membership in an ICC. Customary laws and practices of IPs may be invoked provided they are not in conflict with the national legal system; there must be legal harmony between national laws and customary laws, and the latter must not undermine the application of legislative enactments including penal laws. The Court relied on Ha Datu Tawahig vs. Lapinid, which involved substantially identical facts — a petition for mandamus by an IP member and tribal leader seeking to evade rape prosecution by invoking RA 8371 — and reiterated that the intention of laws protecting IPs does not include depriving courts of jurisdiction over criminal cases. Membership in an indigenous group does not hinder the filing of a criminal case against the person concerned.

• Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts — Litigants must, as a rule, file petitions for extraordinary writs with the court below rather than directly with the Supreme Court, even when concurrent original jurisdiction exists among the RTC, CA, and Supreme Court. The doctrine serves as a constitutional filtering mechanism allowing the Supreme Court to focus on its more important tasks and remain the court of last resort. Direct recourse is allowed only in exceptional or compelling instances. The Court applied this doctrine to dismiss the petition, no extraordinary circumstance having been shown to justify direct recourse.

• Mandamus — Requisites — A writ of mandamus requires the concurrence of (1) a clear legal right on the part of petitioner and (2) a corresponding ministerial duty imposed by law upon the respondent which was neglected. A ministerial duty is one that does not involve the exercise of judgment; it is undertaken in a prescribed manner and in compliance with the law, without regard to one's own judgment. In contrast, a discretionary duty requires the exercise of judgment and conscience. The Court found neither requisite present: petitioner had no clear legal right to evade criminal prosecution by virtue of ICC membership, and the functions of prosecuting and adjudicating criminal cases are discretionary, not ministerial.

• Principle of Generality of Penal Laws — Penal laws are binding on all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, without regard to membership in an ICC. RA 8371 does not serve as a bar to criminal prosecution because crime is an offense against society. Customary laws and practices of IPs may be invoked only if they do not conflict with the national legal system and do not undermine the application of legislative enactments, including penal laws.

• "RA 8371 finds application in disputes relating to claims and rights of ICCs/IPs. This is not the case here." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the scope of RA 8371, distinguishing disputes involving ICC/IP claims and rights from criminal prosecutions under the RPC.

• "penal laws apply to individuals without regard to his or her membership in an ICC." — This formulation captures the Court's holding that ICC membership provides no exemption from criminal prosecution, a principle reiterated from Ha Datu Tawahig vs. Lapinid and central to the dismissal.

• "in the absence of a clear legal right on the part of petitioner and the corresponding ministerial duties required by law on respondents that they neglected to perform, then a writ of mandamus cannot be issued." — This states the controlling rule on the unavailability of mandamus, tying the two requisite elements to the facts and explaining why neither was satisfied.

• "The Court is and must remain the court of last resort. It must not be burdened with the obligation to deal with suits which also fall under the original jurisdiction of lower-ranked courts." — This passage articulates the rationale underlying the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on direct recourse to the Supreme Court.

• Ha Datu Tawahig vs. Lapinid, G.R. No. 221139, March 20, 2019 — Controlling precedent directly on point. The petitioner therein, also an IP member and tribal leader, raised substantially the same arguments invoking RA 8371 to evade rape prosecution. The Court explained that the intention of laws protecting IPs does not include depriving courts of jurisdiction over criminal cases, and that ICC members cannot simply invoke RA 8371 to evade prosecution and criminal sanctions. The present decision reiterated and applied this ruling.

• Lihaylihay vs. Tan, G.R. No. 192223, July 23, 2018 — Cited for the proposition that mandamus requires concurrence of a legal right and a corresponding ministerial duty, and for the distinction between ministerial and discretionary duties.

• Gios-Samar, Inc. vs. Department of Transportation and Communications, G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019 — Cited for the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and the rule that litigants must file petitions for extraordinary writs with the court below.

• Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation, Inc. vs. Judge Riel, 750 Phil. 57 (2015) — Cited for the principle that direct recourse to the Supreme Court is allowed only in exceptional or compelling instances, and that non-observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants dismissal.

• Section 5(1), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Vests the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. The Court noted this jurisdiction is shared with the RTC and CA, giving rise to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

• Sections 9(1) and 21(1), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 — Respectively vest the CA and RTC with original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto. These provisions establish the concurrent jurisdiction underlying the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

• Section 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Defines the scope of mandamus as available when a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office, provided there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court applied this provision to test whether petitioner's case met the requisites for mandamus.

• Sections 65 and 66, RA 8371 (Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997) — Section 65 provides that when disputes involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve the dispute. Section 66 vests the NCIP with jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, subject to exhaustion of customary remedies. The Court held these provisions inapplicable to criminal prosecutions under the RPC, as they govern disputes relating to claims and rights of ICCs/IPs, not offenses against society.

• RA 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997) — The law under which petitioner was charged. The Court noted that violations of RA 8353 are cognizable by regular courts and are not disputes covered by RA 8371.

Perlas-Bernabe, Senior Associate Justice (Chairperson), Hernando, and Delos Santos, JJ., concurred. Baltazar-Padilla, J., was on leave.